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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the macro-economic history of Cyprus and Malta in the inter-war period. It 
constructs the first detailed estimates of output at aggregate and sector levels, enabling the analysis 
of economic growth and the sector structure of the islands‟ economies. It evaluates their 
performance within the context of economic change on Europe‟s South Eastern periphery and, 
specifically, in light of the experience of British colonial rule. 
 
The thesis argues, first, that economic growth was slow in wider European comparison and as 
sluggish as in neighbouring countries. It was so despite the two islands‟ being far less exposed to 
the political upheavals of the First World War than most other economies in South Eastern Europe. 
Second, the proximate reasons for their comparatively weak growth performance differed: Cyprus 
experienced a prolonged agricultural crisis, but participated in the post-depression recovery through 
the growth in international demand for the output of its copper mining industry. Malta‟s growth was 
slower than Cyprus due to the combination of declining British military expenditure and the 
population increasing faster than previously.  
 
These differences notwithstanding, the islands were ultimately affected by common problems. Their 
small overall size had a negative effect on their performance as global protectionism increased and 
restricted export opportunities. In addition, the colonial governments remained committed to 
balanced budgets and non-intervention in the economy, limiting their ability to combat the effects 
of the great depression. As a result, the deteriorating economic situation increased the political 
tension between the islanders and the colonial governments. The reluctance to mount an effective 
policy response to the great depression acted as a catalyst to political polarization, leading to 
violence and the suspension of the islands‟ constitutions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and 
Historiography 
 
“Size is not necessarily a very useful index of the stage of economic growth of a country; 
still, because the Island is small, people have often felt that its potential is limited.”1 
Purpose and aims 
 
The economic history of Cyprus and Malta, especially during the tumultuous interwar period, has 
not been adequately researched. Historians have mostly focused on the islands‟ political conflicts, 
while economists stayed away from the development history due to the lack of publicly available 
data for any period before 1950. The limited research on the interwar period has been based on 
unprocessed primary data and accounts of contemporary colonial officials. The lack of a more 
thorough quantitative analysis of their economies led to historical interpretations remaining 
unchallenged
2
. 
 
The thesis provides new quantitative evidence on the economic performance of Cyprus and Malta 
and compares the two British colonies growth record with that of independent states of Southern 
Europe. Pamuk and Williamson assure us that, with the exception of Mandated Palestine, the 
performance of Mediterranean economies was poor, with the colonial governments of the region 
being more reluctant to intervene in economic issues than the governments of independent states
3
. 
In order to evaluate whether Cyprus and Malta had the same fate as their neighbours, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) estimates have been constructed for the period 1921 to 1938. The new 
GDP estimates serve to indicate whether the islands were typical lacklustre performers or non-
typical success stories. This is important, as along with Gibraltar, Cyprus and Malta were the last 
British colonies in Europe during a period of state creation after the collapse of the continental 
empires. These new national entities were capable of formulating independent economic policies 
while Malta and Cyprus remained under British control. Thus while independent governments were 
taking increasing control of their economies, Malta and Cyprus stood out as areas under direct, 
rather than indirect, British influence in Europe. 
 
                                                 
1
 Hald, M.W., A Study of the Cyprus Economy, (Bellapais: 1968), p.1.  
2
 Hill, G., A History of Cyprus: Volume IV, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p.34; Georghallides, G.S., 
A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1979); Fenech, D., Responsibility 
and Power in Inter-war Malta. Book One: Endemic Democracy 1919-1930 (San Gwann: PEG Ltd, 2005). 
3
 Metzer, J., “Economic Growth and External Trade in Mandatory Palestine: a Special Mediterranean Case” in Pamuk, 
Ş. & Williamson, J, The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p.364; 
Pamuk & Williamson, The Mediterranean Response…, (2000), p.63. 
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By combining extensive evidence into GDP estimates, the islands‟ performance will enable insights 
into issues that affected British colonies, as well as issues that affected small island economies 
during a period of global volatility, rising protectionism and economic crisis. By understanding the 
reasons driving their performance and comparing them with autonomous Southern European states, 
it is possible to evaluate the economic policies of colonial states in the interwar period.  
 
The estimation of GDP will bridge a substantial gap in the economic history of the islands. Despite 
their geographical size, Cyprus and Malta have received substantial scholarly interest in their 
history; however research has been focused on political rather than economic issues, thus leaving 
their economic history under-researched. Yet, the political relationships between the islands‟ 
inhabitants and their British overlords were shaped by the economic performance of the islands, and 
thus the islands economic history can provide fresh insights to the political relationship of the 
inhabitants with the British.  
 
All these questions can be better considered by quantifying the economic effects on the islands. In 
estimating GDP through the reconstruction of Historical National Accounts (HNAs), one attempts 
to “measure magnitudes [of growth] in terms of… modern systems of ends, means and values” in 
order to better understand the economic conditions of the time
4
. Thus a fresh impetus is provided to 
historical issues through the quantification of the economic conditions of the period
5
. GDP 
estimation requires a quantitative evaluation of all sectors of the economy and their combination 
into a single indicator of economic progress. This allows for an economic analysis of Malta and 
Cyprus at aggregate and sector levels, enabling a greater understanding of the economies and the 
reasons behind their performance. The colonial office in London frequently compared and 
contrasted the situation in Malta and Cyprus, since decisions about the islands were often made by 
the same persons back in London
6
. The islands are studied together here in order to differentiate the 
general factors underlying their performance from island-specific reasons: this helps assessing the 
more general impacts of colonialism and of economic size, while acknowledging the effects of 
island-specific issues.  
 
After the Second World War Cyprus and Malta were similar in having rapid economic growth, but 
they had very different de-colonisation experiences. Understanding their economic development 
                                                 
4
 Kuznets, S., Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 
1966), p.23. 
5
 Maddison, A., The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, (Paris: OECD, 2001), p.45. 
6
 An example of such common concerns was the concern of the “niggardly treatment of Cyprus” when considering the 
issue of financing the King‟s Own Malta Regiment. National Archives, London. File: CO158/414, Lord Milner to 
Churchill, 10 October 1919 
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during the interwar period enables a greater understanding of the prerequisites of successful growth. 
The new GDP estimates for the period 1921–1938 allow a longer term perspective on their growth 
performance, and make it possible to evaluate how much of the post-1945 rapid growth was due to 
interwar developments.  
 
The islands were not predicted to have successful economic development on the eve of their 
independence from Britain in the 1960s. Mayer stated that the Cypriot economy would be a „copra–
boat‟ economy, depended on being the main British military base in the Middle East. He believed 
that independence would result in economic decline, since “Cyprus will contain a million people, a 
fact best appreciated by those who have lived on an aircraft carrier”7. The UN was also concerned 
about the island‟s prospects reporting that after independence “the Cyprus Economy…seemed to be 
running along a downhill and rather bumpy road”8. A similar sentiment was shared by Balogh and 
Seers on the prospects of the Maltese economy; after the Second World War, Malta was superseded 
as a British military base by Cyprus which had no significant military forces stationed there 
previously. Balogh and Seers concluded that the decline of military expenditure in Malta would 
lead to long-term economic decline
9
. 
 
The development of the islands in the past fifty years has refuted such predictions. In 2004, Cyprus 
and Malta joined the European Union having already converged to 82.8% and 69.2% of the per 
capita GDP of European Union members. Indeed, Cyprus had a higher per capita GDP at entry than 
Greece and Portugal who had been members and significant beneficiaries of the community for 
more than two decades
10
. The rapid convergence of Cyprus and Malta to European income levels 
took place despite having much lower starting levels of per capita GDP than either Portugal or 
Greece in the 1950s. Their development was so rapid that Cyprus and Malta achieved one of the 
highest annual average growth of GDP in Europe during the period 1950–200311. 
 
                                                 
7
 Mayer, A.J., Middle Eastern Capitalism: Nine Essays, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959) p.48-50; the 
population was a gross overestimate since the estimated population in 2007 was less than a million. 
8
 Thorp, W.L., Cyprus. Suggestions for a Development Programme, (New York, United Nations, 1961), p.5. 
9
 Balogh, T., & Seers, D., The Economic Problems of Malta: An Interim Report, (Malta: GPO, 1955), 
p.viii; The State of Malta is actually an archipelago which is comprised of Malta, Gozo, Comino, and Comineto. Unless 
specifically mentioned otherwise, the term Malta is used to represent the whole archipelago. 
10
 Source: Eurostat, GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Standard, http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ as consulted 10 Mar 
2006. 
11
 Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, 
 http://www.conference-board.org/economics as consulted 20 Oct 2008; Heston, A., Summers, R. & Aten, B., “The 
International Comparison of Prices Program (ICP), Version 6.1” Penn World Tables (Pennsylvania, PA: CICUP, 2002) 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/icp.html as consulted 20 Jun 2007. Based on both databases the annual average of the last 
fifty years, Cyprus and Malta, along with Spain, were the top three growth performers in Europe. 
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Their rapid economic growth is particularly noteworthy if one considers the exogenous shocks 
faced by both islands. Cyprus was convulsed by almost continual conflict during the period 1955-
1974: the Greek-Cypriot demand for union with Greece resulted in a rebellion against British rule in 
1955, which led to inter-communal conflict between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots by 1958. 
The island was declared a republic in 1960, but in 1963 inter-communal conflict broke out again, 
with the Turkish Cypriots withdrawing into armed enclaves, leading to incidents of sporadic 
violence until 1974
12
. In that year the Turkish army invaded after a Greek-Cypriot coup (assisted by 
the Greek junta) against the Greek-Cypriot president. The invasion led to forced population 
exchanges and the occupation of 40% of the area of the Republic of Cyprus, an occupation which 
continues to this day. The coup and the subsequent invasion caused serious damage to the economy 
of to the Republic of Cyprus, particularly since the majority of the tourist infrastructure remained 
inaccessible within the Turkish occupied area
13
. Despite the grievous economic blow of the 
occupation, the Republic of Cyprus exhibited great resilience. Remarkably, the economy recovered 
to its 1973 levels of per capita GDP just four years after Turkey‟s intervention. This rapid recovery 
took place despite the fact that over 30% of the population was displaced and that the occupied area 
used to produce 70% of output
14
. The recovery is even more remarkable as it took place at a period 
when the golden era of European growth was ending, with oil price shocks creating strains for non-
oil producing economies, such as Cyprus
15
.  
 
Malta has also been successful in weaning itself away from dependence on British military 
expenditure despite the bleak prognosis by experts
16
. Malta was the central military base for Britain 
in the Mediterranean before the Second World War, but the advances in military aviation led to its 
exposure to heavy and sustained bombing during the war
17
. As a result of the bombing, Malta‟s 
strategic importance as the main British naval base between England and the Far East was 
questioned. The decision to reduce British military presence after the Suez crisis debacle in 1956 
                                                 
12
 After 1963 the Republic of Cyprus represented all communities except the Turkish-Cypriots who set up their own 
representative communities.  
13
 Eteocleous, S., “Economic Achievements” in Charalambous, J. & Georghallides, G., (eds.) Focus on Cyprus, 
(London: North London University, 1993), pp.71–86, p.75.  
14
 Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Pocket Book No.2: The Cyprus Economy in Figures (1950–1978) and Main Socio-
Economic Indicators, (Nicosia: Statistics and Research Department, 1980) p.4. The Turkish-Cypriots are not included 
in most datasets of the Republic of Cyprus from 1963 onwards.  
15
 Crafts, N.F.R., “The Great Boom: 1950-1973” in Schulze, M., (ed.) Western Europe: Economic and Social Change 
since 1945, (London: Longman, 1998), pp.42-62, p.48; Crafts, N.F.R, “The Golden Age of Economic Growth in 
Europe, 1950-1973” The Economic History Review, Vol.48, No.3, (1995), pp. 429–444, p.429, p.436. 
16
 The UN technical support team feared a 15% decrease of national income with the cessation of Military spending in 
the 1960s; however, growth continued despite the withdrawal of British forces in 1979. Bonnano, N.S., Capital, 
Accumulation and Economic Growth: In Theory and as They Relate in the Maltese Paradigm, (Fribourg: University of 
Fribourg, 1989), p.30, pp.131-133.  
17
 It is estimated that Malta suffered as many as ten tons of bombs per family during the Second World War. Castillo, 
D., The Maltese Cross: a Strategic History of Malta, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006)  p.217  
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marked a rapid reduction of British military expenditure in Malta, with predictions that the 
economy would be in freefall
18
. However, Malta was supported by substantial foreign aid in order 
to successfully develop its economy and it is a now a hub for ICT, tourism and light manufacturing. 
In fact Malta has been able to maintain rapid economic growth even after the closing of the last 
foreign military base on its territory. Despite the pessimism about their future development, both 
islands have been relatively successful in converging to the income levels of mainland Europe after 
the Second World War, but how much was their success due to interwar developments is unknown. 
 
Historians who were primarily interested in the political history of the islands devoted parts of their 
analysis to the interwar economic conditions, but the main focus of their research was on political 
and not economic matters
19
. Their work was based on contemporary opinion and primary data 
sources, but with little systematic analysis. No attempt has been made to analyse the substantial 
primary material within a framework that would allow comparisons over time and across countries. 
As a result of the scattered nature of the data the interwar period was ignored in economic analysis, 
with most economists concentrating on the period after the Second World War due to greater 
availability of national accounting data
20
. Thus there is a knowledge gap in the islands‟ economic 
history: with the exception of Jenness‟ work on the pre-1914 economic development of Cyprus, 
written as long ago as 1962, knowledge of the islands‟ economic history is limited21. The 
quantification of the islands‟ interwar output allows us to assess their performance within the 
broader context of European economic history.  
 
Ideally, one would construct yearly GDP estimates for the period 1914–1949 in order to link up to 
existing estimates and create an annual series for the past century. However, such an undertaking 
would have been beyond the efforts of one individual as it would entail heavy archival research. 
Thus this attempt focused on the economic development of the islands for the period 1921–1938, 
for which we know very little. These years were very important in the political history of Cyprus 
and Malta, because it was then that the relationship between the islands and their colonial overlord 
was permanently altered.  
 
The 1920s brought several significant constitutional changes on the islands, as Britain sought to 
diffuse the democratic and nationalistic aspirations of the Cypriots and Maltese. The attempt to 
                                                 
18
 Metwally, M.M., Structure and Performance of the Maltese Economy, (Malta: Aquilina & Co, 1977), p.xi.  
19
 Examples include: Georghallides. A Political…; Fenech, D., Responsibility and Power. 
20
 Examples include: Wilson, R., Cyprus and the International Economy, (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1992); Malta 
Labour Party, The Maltese Economy, (Hamrun: Malta Labour Party, 2001). 
21
 Jenness, D., The Economics of Cyprus: A Survey to 1914, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1962). 
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placate such demands with new constitutions failed, as both colonies suffered violence that led to 
the suspension of their constitutions by the end of 1931. Yet, research on the political grievances of 
the period does not adequately take into account the worsening economic conditions of interwar 
Europe when considering how the increasing political tension led to violence
22
. The new GDP 
estimates open the way towards a better understanding on how the political disturbances on the 
islands were related to the economic conditions prevailing during the great depression, as analysed 
in chapter 8 of this thesis.  
 
The effect an economy‟s size on economic growth has been debated since the establishment of 
national income accounting and it is still divisive. For some, small size is an advantage for a nation, 
especially during turbulent economic conditions. Kuznets, a pioneer of the national accounting 
method, argued that small states could have high and stable income levels through exceptional 
natural resource endowments or due to their dependence on an external power
23
. Easterly and Kray 
have argued that to be a small state in the second half of the 20
th
 century is to “have small 
problems” since small states have a higher per capita income than larger states, and do not seem to 
suffer a growth disadvantage
24
. Mellinger et al. indicate that small island states have advantages to 
offset disadvantages of geographical location, since Hong Kong and Singapore are currently the 
only high income economies in the world located in the tropical zone
25
. 
 
Kuznet‟s argument of small state income stability was relevant to the two islands during the 
interwar period. Malta was dependent on British military expenditure, but this thesis indicates that 
stable income through great power dependence could have negative consequences, limiting 
economic growth. The importance of Malta as a military port arose from the natural harbours of the 
island and the presence of the Royal Navy Dockyard. Military expenditure made substantial direct 
and indirect contributions to the island‟s income, yet such transfers were not without their 
disadvantages
26
. Cyprus was not important in military terms during the interwar period, and became 
important as a British military base only after the Second World War. However, during the interwar 
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period, large copper sulphate deposits were discovered and exploited in Cyprus, but the effects of 
copper exploitation have not been previously quantified.  
 
Others argue that small economic size is an economic disadvantage. States like Malta and Cyprus 
suffer from higher transaction costs in freight transport and the possibility to embrace technology is 
limited owing to a low threshold to economies of scale
27
. It has also been argued that small states 
are more vulnerable to large exogenous shocks which can destabilise their economies, leading to 
growth retardation and sudden changes in disposable income, with substantial negative welfare 
effects
28
. Guillaumont argues that the disadvantages of a small state also exist in terms of economic 
policy as the welfare of the citizens of a small state is vulnerable to factors over which that state has 
little or no control
29
. Small states are more vulnerable to the economic effects of environmental 
disasters and trade shocks, since they are usually dependent on exporting a very narrow range of 
products
30
. As a result, indexes devised to measure economic vulnerability indicate small island 
states as the most vulnerable
31
. The economic analysis of these small islands during one of the most 
volatile periods in European economic history indicate that Cyprus and Malta were at a 
disadvantage due to their small economic size.  
 
Evidence from the second half of the 20
th
 century indicates that small countries such as Cyprus and 
Malta were not the most vulnerable to exogenous asymmetric shocks. Cyprus and Malta have 
achieved high living standards despite serious exogenous shocks to their economies
32
. The 
perceived small state disadvantages have not prevented several small island states from achieving 
high levels of per capita GDP: Singapore, Malta and Cyprus are examples that a high level of 
aggregate income is possible, while Iceland indicates how vulnerable small islands are to sudden 
reductions of income. One does not need to see the possible advantages and disadvantages as 
contradictory; to paraphrase Krugman, there could be a range of conditions under which small 
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states can achieve high levels of income, but centripetal disadvantages outside their control mean 
that this might not be achieved
33
.  
 
Overview of the islands’ economic history  
 
An overview of the islands‟ economic history identifies the appropriate themes and perspectives to 
undertake the analysis of the GDP estimates. Since Cyprus and Malta have received limited 
coverage in the literature, key themes and development in the economic history of other 
Mediterranean states can provide useful insights. Prior to the 19
th
 century, most states on the 
Mediterranean developed a dual economic structure: an enclave of a “modern” productive sector 
that was sensitive to world prices, surrounded by a “traditional” subsistence sector34. Valerio argues 
that this two-tier economic system was particularly evident in Mediterranean island economies as 
foreign overlords imposed export oriented production directed to European markets, while the rest 
of the economy remained based on traditional working patterns
35
. 
 
Cyprus followed this pattern: foreign overlords introduced export crops without disturbing the 
traditional nature of the rest of the economy. Cash crops for European markets were established in 
Cyprus in the 14
th
 century by the Lusignan Kings and the major landowners, the Knights 
Hospitallers, but it was restricted to the areas directly under their feudal control. Lusignan Cyprus 
was considered one of the wealthiest domains in Southern Europe, exporting textiles and farming 
goods: some of those farming products were still important exports in 1921
36
.  
 
By the time the island passed under Venetian control in 1489, it had lost much of its prosperity, 
partly due to the conflict between the Lusignans and the Genoese. Under the Venetians the central 
Mesaoria plain was converted to grain production for export to Venice, as wheat was an important 
necessity. In addition substantial investment in farming infrastructure took place; irrigation channels 
established during the Venetian period were still used in 1921, although by then the island had 
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ceased to be a net exporter of grain
37
.  Cypriots were heavily taxed and the Orthodox Church was 
suppressed further, leading in a failed revolt in 1562.  
 
In 1571 the island was conquered by the Ottoman Empire after a particularly brutal campaign, 
where the main port city of Famagusta was ravaged by a prolonged siege; the Battle of Lepanto was 
the culmination of the long delayed expedition to save the island. The incorporation of Cyprus into 
Ottoman Empire seems to have had negative economic effects: the island was ravaged by war and 
was now in isolation from the lucrative East-West trade. Serfdom was partially abolished but the 
substantial investment in infrastructure initiated by the Venetians did not continue, leading to 
economic malaise and population decline. The population of Cyprus only managed to recover to its 
Venetian levels in the mid-19
th
 century, as the Ottoman Empire opened up to European trade, 
leading to the re-emergence of cash crop agriculture in Cyprus
38
. The European demand for cotton, 
wine and animal fodder resulted in a modest economic recovery in Cyprus during the last years of 
Ottoman rule
39
.  
 
Cyprus was occupied by the British in 1878; under the Cyprus Convention the island remained 
nominally under Ottoman suzerainty but all power was transferred to the British High 
Commissioner
40
. The change did not lead to a rapid modernisation of the outdated administration 
system: despite some improvement of the judicial system and the introduction of a limited 
constitution, the emphasis of the British administration was in maintaining the status quo and not in 
transforming the Ottoman system
41
. 
 
The lack of administrative modernisation was in part due to the heavy tax burden imposed on 
Cyprus due to the British occupation. An annual payment of £92,799 sterling, known as the Turkish 
„Tribute‟, was supposed to be commuted to the Sultan in lieu of the lost tax revenue from Cyprus. 
Although this amount was not a tribute but a payment of forgone tax revenues, it was labelled 
erroneously by the press as the „Turkish Tribute‟. The British administration raised most of the 
„tribute‟ from taxation in Cyprus, but the Ottoman government did not receive it as the British 
Treasury used the money to pay interest to the shareholders of the defaulted 1855 Ottoman loan, 
which it had guaranteed. Thus to the dismay of most Cypriots, a significant proportion of the yearly 
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tax revenue was transferred to the British Treasury, with no gain for the island. The „tribute‟ 
expropriated all the surplus of government revenue resulting in “the government machinery... 
run[ing] on a low current”42.After insistent protests the „tribute‟ was partially reduced by a 
permanent grant-in-aid of £50,000 in 1907; yet £42,799 of the „tribute‟ remained a burden to 
government expenditure until 1927
43
.  
 
Cyprus remained a British protectorate until 1914, when it was annexed with the declaration of 
hostilities against the Ottoman Empire; it was then formally declared a British crown colony in 
1925
44
. Despite the annexation of Cyprus, the „tribute‟ was still debited from Cypriot government 
expenditure even after the Cyprus convention was annulled. Thus, the „tribute‟ was seen as a severe 
constraint to development by Cypriots and British Governors of Cyprus
45
.  
 
In October 1931 mass riots erupted throughout Cyprus leading to violence and the destruction of the 
Governor‟s residence. Such events were unprecedented in the history of British Cyprus: the island 
was so trouble free that when the riots took place there was only one under-strength infantry 
company to suppress them
46
. The colonial government quelled the riots by rushing military 
reinforcements from Egypt and subsequently it abolished the constitution and restricted personal 
and press freedoms
47
. The abolition of the legislative council eliminated elected Cypriot 
representation under British rule at a national level, as only mayoral elections were allowed until the 
declaration of independence in 1960. The relationship between the Greek-Cypriots and the British 
was never the same again. From 1931 until independence the political discourse between British 
governors and Greek-Cypriot politicians was dominated by animosity: the conflict of 1931 set the 
stage for the anti-colonial war of 1955
48
. 
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The cause of the riots is contested in Cypriot historiography. The colonial government insisted that 
they were entirely due to the economic distress of the population, caused by the global trade 
conditions
49
. Greek-Cypriot historians argue that the riots were motivated by nationalistic 
sentiment, since their immediate cause were protests for union with Greece
50
. Thus there is a debate 
on whether the violence in October 1931 was motivated by economic frustration or nationalistic 
sentiment. This thesis argues that the economic situation during the depression and the inaction of 
the colonial government flamed the nationalistic aspirations, as analysed in depth in chapter 8.  
 
Malta exhibited a very different economic structure to Cyprus. Because of its strategic position, 
Malta was also ruled by foreign powers throughout most of its history. However the geography of 
the Maltese islands is very different than that of Cyprus: the Maltese islands are much smaller, with 
an area of just 316 km
2 51
. In addition the ground is rocky and quite barren, and the island has no 
endowment other than its natural harbours. Because of these limitations, Maltese development has 
been linked with its value as a maritime base to foreign powers.  
 
The establishment of the Knights Hospitallers on the island and their success in withstanding the 
Ottoman siege of 1565 transformed the island‟s fortunes. The knights fortified the islands of Malta 
and based their naval fleet in the Grand Harbour and Marsamxett, the natural harbours around their 
newly constructed capital of Valletta. The influx of military expenditure allowed the population to 
expand far beyond the subsistence levels dictated by local agriculture. Thus since the sixteenth 
century the population of Malta depended on military expenditure from the ruling power for its 
sustenance
52
. Most supplies came from abroad, with the Maltese farmers providing an ever 
declining share of foodstuffs for the cities around the Grand Harbour. 
 
One cannot underestimate the transformation of the island under the order of the Knights 
Hospitallers. The new capital, Valletta, was constructed and extensively fortified at great expense, 
becoming a centre of religious art, military engineering and medicine. The knights left behind a 
legacy of strong military fortifications and religious fervour as well as a paternalistic tradition of 
caring for the sick, having established a university that trained Maltese physicians. The island also 
became an entrepôt of east-west trade and a base for Christian corsairs, while the rural community 
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was integrated with the European market, making cotton twist for the Spanish market
53
. The knights 
focused their spending in Valletta and the naval dockyard in the Grand Harbour, thus making the 
area the nucleus of Malta‟s economy54.  
 
Malta‟s dependence on substantial defence expenditure inflows led to economic decline as the 
order‟s finances began to dry up during the 18th century. The knights‟ finances collapsed as the 
reduction of church power in Europe, combined with the French revolution, robbed the order from 
most of its income: as the inflow of foreign expenditure dried out, the population of Malta stalled.  
 
In 1798 Napoleon, en route to Egypt, ended the long rule of the Knights Hospitallers. However, the 
French occupation was brief: Britain removed the French garrison in 1800 with the help of a local 
rebellion and the Maltese islands were guaranteed as a British possession by the Treaty of Paris in 
1814. For Britain, the occupation of Malta ensured a naval base and a fortress against other 
Mediterranean powers, allowing it to project its power to the Middle East. The predominance of 
British military considerations in the occupation of Malta was emphasised by the fact that even in 
1938 the commander-in-chief stationed in Malta was also the island‟s governor55. For the British, 
Malta was first and foremost seen as a fortress. 
 
The occupation of Malta rejuvenated the inflow of military expenditure as Britain sought to 
continue the fortification program conceived by the Knights. New defence lines were constructed, 
while the Royal Navy improved the existing dockyard, making the Grand Harbour its principal 
Mediterranean base. As defence expenditure increased, the island became increasingly dependent 
on it: a negative consequence of the increased importance of the defence expenditure was the 
decline of the local cotton industry
56
. By 1935 the department of British overseas trade stated that 
“the presence of the [armed] services is a dominant factor in the economic and social life of the 
island”57.  
 
Malta‟s dependence on military expenditure meant that the economy did well in times of war and 
badly in times of peace, as economic growth was dependent on the number of British ships 
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stationed in the Grand Harbour
58
. The dependence of Malta on Royal Navy expenditure peaked 
during the interwar period as capital ships reached their peak sizes, thus compensating for the 
reduction of army personnel after the First World War.  
 
The dependence on military expenditure resulted in violent cycles of economic expansion and 
contraction caused by political events outside Malta‟s control. The second half of the 19th century 
led to unprecedented economic expansion: the Crimean war increased British defence expenditure 
while Malta also became an important coaling station for steamships on their way to and from the 
Suez Canal
59
. Yet, by the beginning of the 20
th
 century the importance of Malta as a coaling station 
declined due to competition from neighbouring countries and improved steamboat technology that 
made frequent stops unnecessary
60
. This coincided with the end of substantial military infrastructure 
construction on the island in 1905, leading to a significant reduction of defence expenditure inflows. 
As a result the island went through a prolonged period of economic distress that was only dispelled 
with the outbreak of the First World War
61
.  
 
The First World War was a mixed blessing for the Maltese islands. The war increased military 
expenditure as it was the principal base of supply for the Gallipoli and Balkan campaigns. Yet, the 
rising expenditure and declining shipping space lead to labour shortages and rapid inflation as the 
island depended on imports. Shipping losses during the war meant that inflation continued even 
after the end of the war, while military expenditure was reduced as British demobilisation kicked in. 
The Maltese labour in the Royal Navy Dockyard was reduced by half in 1919, while the 
Mediterranean fleet did not return to its Maltese station until after 1922. This led to a sudden 
reduction of income for many Maltese during a time of rapidly rising prices. The effects of 
demobilisation were serious, with the Governor stating that “many of the workers [were] indeed 
fighting off starvation”62. 
 
In June 1919 there was a riot in Valletta with some casualties: the riot was anti-British and had 
nationalistic overtones, with the Maltese crowd demanding political autonomy
63
. The official report 
blamed the riots on the unfavourable condition of the working classes rather than on Maltese 
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irredentism: the reduction of the Maltese workforce in the dockyard, combined with the rising 
prices, created substantial discontent against the colonial authorities
64
. Feelings of displeasure 
towards the British government were partly due to the dockyard not providing out-of-work pay to 
the discharged dockyard workers, unlike standard practise in the UK.  
 
After the riots a grant-in-aid of £250,000 was extended by Britain to Malta to lessen the shock of 
demilitarization. Bonnano states that the efforts of the British administration to alleviate the 
economic crisis were relatively successful: public works were constructed that led to “a certain 
degree of economic prosperity”65. Yet, the most important effect of the riot was to convince the 
colonial office to provide limited self-rule to Malta, in the hope that Maltese politicians would take 
the responsibility for the island‟s development66.  
 
The new constitution was implemented in 1921, and it introduced a system of dual governance. The 
constitution provided for a Maltese tiered assembly who would elect a prime minister and cabinet. 
They would be responsible for all matters that the British considered domestic, while all issues of 
foreign policy and the military were controlled by the commander-in-chief who was also the British 
Governor. The experiment of dual governance proved unsuccessful as the constitution was 
suspended due to escalating violence during the run up to the 1930 elections. 
 
By the mid-1930s the strategic benefits of Malta were being challenged: the island‟s importance as 
a naval base was undermined by the growth of airpower. The increasing sophistication of military 
aircraft made the British fleet in Malta vulnerable to air attack just as naval ships reached their peak 
size. During the Abyssinia crisis, when war with Italy seemed imminent, the Royal Navy was 
concerned that Malta was within reach of Italian aircraft. Thus in August 1935 it was decided to 
move to Alexandria, with grave economic consequences for Malta in 1936
67
. Although the fleet 
returned in 1937, it served a warning; in the future, Malta could not depend for its prosperity on 
foreign military expenditure. 
 
The economic situation facing Europe in the interwar period was one of “chaos, crisis and 
catastrophe” as the map of Europe was reshaped after the collapse of the continental empires of 
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Turkey, Russia and Austria-Hungary
68
. Interwar conditions were not conducive to accelerated 
growth in peripheral countries: global trade stagnated, international finance was in crisis and most 
European countries faced periods of hyperinflation and debt-default. The problems were especially 
severe in the South-European periphery since it was still suffering from a backlog of problems that 
were not resolved before the First World War. South-Eastern Europe was effectively at war from 
1911, a war which was only effectively concluded in 1923; at its conclusion several new states were 
created, which placed further barriers to trade. In addition the reduction of agricultural prices vis-à-
vis other products made the economic growth very difficult as these countries were dependent on 
agricultural exports. These further difficulties, combined with the slow growth of international 
trade, made rapid economic growth in Southern Europe problematic; per capita GDP growth was 
slower than the European centre, leading to further economic divergence from advanced European 
countries
 69
.  
 
However, new estimates of per capita GDP for the South-Eastern states indicate that these states 
managed to sustain quite rapid GDP growth, but the accelerated population growth deflated per 
capita GDP
70
. As a result the income gap between advanced European countries and Southern 
European did increase, but only because of the substantial expansion of their population. The 
increase of population was in part due to forced population exchanges between the new states after 
the First World War. 
 
The development level of Cyprus and Malta, relative to states, such as Turkey, Greece or Bulgaria, 
is unclear. Illiteracy was high in Malta and Cyprus, with Malta having one of the highest illiteracy 
rates in Europe: over 60.8% of the population could not read or write as compared to 46.1% in 
Cyprus. The high illiteracy in Malta was peculiar since Malta is not a rural nation: over 61.5% of 
the population in 1931 lived in urban or suburban areas
71
. Cyprus had better literacy rates despite 
having a low urbanisation rate of 18.8% in 1931
72
. According to Aldcroft, a high proportion of 
primary materials and semi-manufactures to total exports is an indicator of underdevelopment, and 
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an overwhelming percentage of both islands‟ exports fell in these two categories73. Using the new 
GDP series constructed here, the per capita GDP of Malta and Cyprus is found to be similar to 
Bulgaria as explained in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
Historians and interwar commentators had mixed views on the economic outlook of Cyprus during 
the interwar period. They can be divided into optimists and pessimists, as their opinions have been 
coloured by issues of nationalism. Colonial administrators argued that Cyprus was better off under 
British rule than under the Ottomans, or if united with Greece
74
. In their opinion, Cyprus did 
develop significantly in the interwar years as indicated by the expansion of the road network and the 
creation of a dynamic mining industry. Sir Ronald Storrs, governor of Cyprus from 1926, was 
upbeat about the economic conditions on the island even in 1931, despite the effects of the 
depression
75
. Storrs maintained that his government initiated more development projects than 
previous administrators, the „tribute‟ was abolished, an agricultural bank was established, the co-
operative movement was expanded; thus he felt that Cyprus was progressing economically on the 
basis of his reforms. Greaves corroborated these views, but argued that Cyprus was still “essentially 
a near eastern country in the standard of living, though it is improving, is still, according to western 
ideas, generally low”76.  
 
Other contemporary observers seem to think that the economic conditions in Cyprus were poor, 
with the rural majority facing a serious agricultural crisis, particularly during the great depression. 
Under pressure by the legislative council, a rural survey was commissioned in order to evaluate the 
living conditions of the rural population
77
. Surridge found the situation dire, with up to 25% of the 
rural population below his poverty line and the majority in debt to moneylenders
78
. 
 
The Cyprus government in the 1930s found itself in constant budget deficits that exhausted its 
limited reserves. This troubled the colonial office, which commissioned a report on the economic 
conditions of Cyprus, published in 1935. The report was very pessimistic about the future economic 
growth of Cyprus. For Oakden the agricultural situation was the critical deterrent of progress: 
saddled with insurmountable debts, farmers were unable to afford capital investment to raise their 
productivity. The possibility of increasing exports looked grim since the principal markets of Egypt 
and Greece were increasingly protectionist and world prices of agricultural products remained 
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low
79. Oakden‟s conclusion was categorical: “I see no hope of a speedy return to the conditions 
prevailing before the depression”80. 
 
It seems now clear that the prolonged drought that hit Cyprus during the great depression had a 
grave effect on Cypriot farmers. The drought hit the farmers in 1931, when they were already under 
pressure by the rapid decline in farming goods‟ prices. The lack of rain was consecutive, leading to 
the failure of many crops: rainfall in 1931-32 and 1932-1933 was under 70% of the average, while 
the rains in 1933-1934 were just between 71%-80%
81
. Thus, as global agricultural prices were 
declining, the yield of Cypriot agricultural products collapsed due to the lack of sufficient water. 
The combined decline in output and prices led to a collapse in the value of output; this especially 
affected grain farmers of the plain around Nicosia, who were completely dependent on rainfall. 
Oakden wanted increased protectionism to aid these grain farmers: the inclusion of Cyprus in the 
imperial tariff system did not help, since the increase of duty towards cheap Italian and French flour 
led to its replacement by Canadian flour and not to the increase in the use of Cypriot flour.
82
.  
 
Hill, in his seminal work on the history of Cyprus, argues the “remarkable progress which has been 
made” on what it was no longer fair to call a “Cinderella colony”83. Hill displayed measured 
optimism and admits that the British did not fully capitalise on the economic opportunities of 
Cyprus. Nevertheless, the economic conditions improved due to the administration being less 
corrupt than the Ottomans: yet, Cyprus could have been a developmental success story earlier if the 
„tribute‟, taxation reform and the agricultural crisis were tackled by the British administration prior 
to the Second World War
84
.  
 
Kesner is upbeat about the British period, arguing that “few imperial undertakings more readily 
exemplify the role of pragmatism in Britain‟s response to imperial problems than British efforts to 
improve the economic conditions on the island of Cyprus”85. For Kesner, the development 
expectations of the Cypriot population were unrealistic; Britain kept their vague obligation of 
development without overburdening British resources. He agrees that „tribute‟ was initially a heavy 
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burden to the economy of Cyprus, constituting 9.5% of total income in 1896, but Kesner argues that 
this was partially alleviated from 1907 onwards, releasing funds for investment projects
86
. The 
colonial government induced development even if some projects did not achieve their desired 
outcomes; the disappointment felt by the population was due to unrealistic expectations rather than 
administrative shortcomings
87
.  
 
Georghallides is much more pessimistic on the economic development of Cyprus during the 
interwar period. According to Georghallides, the British administration failed to transform Cyprus 
since “the country remained economically backward, without… facilities for the great majority of 
the people, the rural population”88. He argues that Cypriots had concrete and valid plans how to 
develop the island and how to solve the agricultural crisis that was plaguing Cyprus, but the 
recalcitrant stance of the colonial government checked the island‟s development. For him, Cyprus 
would have been better off if the government listened to the Cypriot representatives; none of the 
critical problems of Cyprus were resolved by the administration, and even colonial officials in 
London were aware of the colonial administration‟s failure89. Even when the government attempted 
to encourage economic development through irrigation investment and by establishing the 
Agricultural Bank, the results were dire due to poor planning. For Georghallides, Cypriots did not 
have unrealistic expectations, as claimed by Kesner; it was the inefficiency of the colonial 
government that led to slow economic growth
90
. Wilson seems to agree with Georghallides, stating 
that “overall, in economic terms, the results of the British occupation [in 1878] must be seen as 
disappointing in the early years”91. 
 
Lanitis, focusing mainly on the agricultural sector of Cyprus, argues that the agricultural sector in 
the interwar period was largely stagnant, and that  “the amount of progress that has been recorded 
either since the beginning of this [the 20
th
] century or even since 1918 is indeed negligible”92. For 
Lanitis, it was not until 1936 that economic conditions in Cyprus showed a marked improvement
93
.  
 
Christodoulou focused on the post-1945 period, but has significant sections on the interwar period. 
He agrees with Georghallides as for the backwardness of the island. While acknowledging that the 
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improvements of transport infrastructure during the interwar period helped sustain rapid post-War 
growth, for Christodoulou “the Cyprus Miracle” lays squarely in the post-1945 period94.  
 
Mayer with Vassiliou was primarily interested in planning for the development of Cyprus after its 
independence in 1960, but he argues that the Cypriot economy was permanently transformed by the 
growth of the copper mining industry. The Cyprus Mines Corporation (CMC) put in place the 
necessary investment in the 1930s to allow for an impressive expansion of output during the 1950s, 
when copper prices were soaring
95
. In addition the period 1935-1938 saw the expansion and re-
organisation of the village co-operative scheme under a separate department of co-operative 
development. These co-operatives were pivotal for growth in the 1950s as they aided the financing, 
packaging and marketing of agricultural products produced by the mainly rural population of the 
island
96
. Thus for Mayer with Vassiliou, the period 1921–1938 laid the foundation for future growth 
by setting in place infrastructure improvements which formed a basis for development after the end 
of the Second World War. 
 
Lavender analysed the development of the CMC and was positive about the British occupation of 
Cyprus. He believed that the British occupation of the island meant that “for the first time in their 
history the Cypriots found a foreign overlord who evinced interest in their well-being”, stressing the 
improvements in infrastructure (roads, irrigation and harbours) as well as in agriculture and 
forestry
97
. For Lavender the growth of the copper mining industry lifted Cyprus out of poverty; the 
industry became the largest exporter by 1925, replacing the staple agricultural exports which had 
suffered price reversals. Lavender sees the 1920s as a period of moderate growth for the copper 
mining sector, with growth being reversed in the great depression as the large mines of Skouriotissa 
and Mavrovouni closed temporarily in 1931 and 1933, before recovering and undergoing significant 
expansion until the start of the Second World War
98
.  
 
The most recent attempts to qualitatively evaluate the standard of living of Cyprus during the 
interwar period are by Angelides and by Brey. Angelides argues that the standard of living 
remained very low since Cyprus was still overwhelmingly rural in nature
99
. Brey is more optimistic, 
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stating that the changes implemented by the British in terms of facilities and administration 
transformed the Cypriot economy sometime in the 1930s
100
. However, both Brey and Angelides 
relied on qualitative information or post-1945 secondary sources; they did not attempt to make a 
quantitative analysis based on the very substantial amount of primary data available for the period. 
 
Many interwar commentators regarded Malta‟s development prospects with pessimism, arguing that 
its population was far larger than its limited domestic resources; thus for Greaves the greatest 
problem was “how to maintain and provide useful economic activities for her people”101. 
Emigration was considered as the best policy in improving the standard of living of the Maltese 
population. An emigration department was established early in the interwar period in order to 
provide training for potential emigrants, but it was not considered a success, since emigration was 
restricted by the potentially receiving countries of the new world.  
 
Historians argue that British defence expenditure impacted most households either directly or 
indirectly through increased demand for consumer products. Fenech argues that British military 
expenditure was so pivotal to the well-being of the Maltese that it created an “addictive reliance”, 
both at a personal and national level
102
. The 1931 census estimated British military personnel and 
their family dependents as 8.55% of the population, with 14,670 men serving on the ships of the 
Royal Navy
103
. The importance of the Royal Navy led to the majority of military expenditure was 
being spent in Valletta, and the „three cities‟ of Cospicua, Vittoriosa, and Senglea, situated around 
the Grand Harbour. This area had the Royal Navy Dockyard and the navy‟s victualling yards, and 
hence received the lion‟s share of infrastructure improvements and public expenditure104. Despite 
the overwhelming importance of Royal Navy expenditure, Bonnano and Abela argue that the self-
government was successful in promoting economic diversification projects, but this thesis argues 
that the success was limited, as discussed in chapter 6
105
. 
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Conclusion 
 
Despite Malta and Cyprus‟ success of maintaining high rates of GDP growth in the second half of 
the 20th century, no research has been undertaken to evaluate their performance between 1900 and 
1950. The thesis attempts to bridge the gap by providing GDP estimates for the period 1921-1938. 
This will enable the evaluation of the islands‟ development through a longer perspective in order to 
see whether the prerequisites to rapid growth were achieved prior to the start of the Second World 
War. In addition, the islands are to be compared with their European neighbours to establish the 
economic effects of being British colonies in Europe. This will enable a general comparison of 
different policies initiated during the great depression and evaluate their results vis-à-vis 
independent states. The fact that Cyprus and Malta were small economies will also be evaluated to 
see whether size was a help or hindrance during the interwar period. The period 1921-1938 was 
particularly important politically: it was during this period that the fundamental political 
relationship with Britain was challenged, and that their constitutions were suspended. The serious 
economic turmoil of the period had an impact on the political relations between the colonial 
authorities and the local people that has not been previously analysed.  
 
The historiography seems to suggest that Malta was developing at a satisfactory rate but it is unclear 
whether this progress was due to the increase of its dependence on the British military. Opinions on 
Cyprus are divided between those who see the colonial regime positively and those who consider 
the colonial administration as the architect of the island‟s misfortune.  
 
The methodology of the first comprehensive estimates of GDP is explained in chapter 2. Chapter 3 
provides the results for the aggregate economy. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 analyse the results for each 
sector, while chapter 8 evaluates the role of government and the interaction between the economic 
situation and the developing political conflicts. 
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
 
“We are led to the conclusion that in the framework of historical national accounts 
there is a greater tolerance for errors than for similar series that relate to current 
national statistical magnitudes… in constructing historical national accounts from 
scratch, one is expressing his conviction that it is better to have such series rather than 
the series not exist at all.”1 
Introduction to historical national accounting  
 
There have been attempts to estimate national income from the late 17
th
 century
2
. Their aim was 
comparative, as they sought to establish the relative prosperity of one nation vis-à-vis another
3
. 
Methodological progress was slow until after the First World War, but during the interwar period 
national accounts were constructed in several countries
4
. The estimates were not comparable to each 
other because the diversity of estimation procedures made comparison difficult. It was becoming 
increasingly clear that the methodological diversity restricted efforts to secure cross-country 
comparability.  
 
In an effort to introduce comparability, the International Association of Income and Wealth (IAIW) 
was established. The IAIW focused on creating a standardised international nomenclature in order 
to improve comparability, and in creating national accounts for more countries. By 1953 a general 
nomenclature and methodology had been adopted by the United Nations in order for member 
countries to estimate their income. These national accounting principles, collectively known as the 
System of National Accounts (SNA), have since been extensively revised in 1968 and 2003 and are 
the basis of national account creation today
5
. The creation of national accounts based on SNA 
practices enabled comparative research as it enabled economists to search for the reasons rather 
than for the evidence of economic growth
 6
. 
 
For pioneers of GDP estimation such as Kuznets and Lindhal, the creation of historical national 
accounts backwards was equally important in order to explain the past development. In their 
opinion the creation of historical national accounts (HNAs) was the key to help answer why the 
United States of America managed to develop into a high income economy while Latin American 
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countries floundered
7
. Hjerpe argues that HNAs, “have proved invaluable in the reconsideration of 
industrialisation and in other analyses of economic and social development”8. Thus estimation of 
GDP is not an aim in itself, but historical GDP provides a powerful analytical tool to help 
understand long-term economic growth
9
. 
 
The problem in creating historical national accounts is data and data quality. The variation in the 
quality of written records varies from country to country, and from one historical period to another; 
thus no homogenised system of HNAs has been developed to replicate the United Nations‟ SNA for 
current GDP estimation. Despite this, most European states have constructed HNAs, and efforts to 
improve them and harmonize them are ongoing
10
. This thesis is the first attempt to estimate HNAs 
based on primary data for Cyprus and Malta. As a result its focus is to collect and collate 
information from primary sources within a national accounting framework, while being transparent 
in method, thus allowing subsequent revisions as more primary evidence becomes available. 
 
The creation of HNAs is fraught with difficulties not experienced by statistical offices involved in 
estimating current GDP. The estimation is based on historical sources: the researcher cannot ask the 
economic agents for the information directly, while sometimes important pieces of information are 
missing, incomplete or damaged. Even when the relevant information is found in archives it will 
often have been written down in a form that is not necessarily useful to the researcher. For example 
there might be information measured on units of weights, volumes, and currencies but the amount 
measured by a unit has since been altered, or some information might only be provided in aggregate 
with no description of how it was collected. As a result creating HNAs in order to estimate GDP is 
an exercise of compromise between methodological robustness and data quality.  
  
                                                 
7
 Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy (1995) pp.118–119. 
8
 Hjerpe, R. “Understanding Economic Development Through Historical National Accounts” in Grytten, O.H. (ed.), 
Nordic Historical National Accounts Proceedings of  Workshop, IV (Bergen: NHH, 1998) pp.81–pp.97, p.81  
9
 Smits, J. “Historical National Accounts: Where do we go from Here?” in Gudmundur, J. Nordic Historical National 
Accounts: Proceedings of Workshop VI (Reykjavik: University of Iceland, 2003) pp.9-32, p.12, p.15, p.21 
10
 Van Ark, “Towards European…(1995), p.5 
Alexander Apostolides 
 31 
National accounting practices in Cyprus and Malta  
 
The first GDP estimate for Cyprus was made for 1950 and was constructed using the output 
approach, tacking information from censuses of employment, production and agriculture
11
. In 1959 
the GDP estimates for the period 1950-1959 were revised to incorporate the findings of the first 
input–output table12. The establishment of the republic of Cyprus in 1960 resulted in periodic 
revisions in order to adhere to SNA practices. However, it is unclear if all GDP estimates were 
revised to the newer standards. The Republic of Cyprus has brought its current statistical 
compilations to the level demanded by the European System of Accounts (ESA 1995), the national 
accounts nomenclature of the European Union
13
. Unfortunately, the statistical office has no plans to 
revise previous estimates of GDP to the ESA standard leading to methodological inconsistency 
within the GDP series
14
. 
 
The first GDP estimate for Malta was constructed in 1954 using just income and expenditure 
method, but not through the output approach
15
. The adoption of SNA practices remained incomplete 
in Malta until 2004, when Malta adopted the ESA 1995 in order to join the European Union
16
. The 
estimation of GDP through the output approach led to the discovery that the income and 
expenditure method miss-estimated the GDP level, creating a political controversy that still 
resonates in Malta today
17
. Unfortunately, the statistical office has no plans to revise previous GDP 
estimates, resulting to even greater methodological inconsistencies within the Maltese GDP series 
than in Cyprus.
18
. 
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Previous historical estimates 
 
Despite the fact that this is the first attempt to estimate the GDP using national accounts 
methodology for the interwar period, there have been previous spot estimates of the income of 
Cyprus and Malta. Without making his methods known, Fairfield estimated the total income of 
Cyprus in 1896 as £981,900 sterling, of which £176,000 was collected by the government through 
taxation
19
. 
 
The Cypriot population continued to complain of excessive taxation and as a result, following a 
request by the legislative council, a committee was set up in 1930 to evaluate the tax burden of the 
population
20. The committee members argued that “it is manifestly next to impossible in the 
absence of proper statistics to arrive at an accurate estimate”. Nevertheless they estimated the total 
income for 1927 as £3,500,000 Cyprus pounds, over 48% less than the thesis estimate in 1938 
constant prices
21. The committee‟s attempts to estimate output were admirable but their 
underestimate is unsurprising. The members did not have the necessary knowledge to correctly 
define and calculate the output of Cyprus and as a result it cannot be used as a reliable income 
estimate. It did not estimate the output of the whole economy as many sectors were omitted, and it 
failed to understand the nature of stock and flow concepts: capital stock (such as livestock) is 
included as an income measure while other flows (such as meat production) were not part of 
income. Further the committee was not aware of issues of double counting, thus unintentionally 
inflating their estimate. Christodoulou estimated the income of Cyprus in 1930 as £2.8 million 
Cyprus pounds, 46.7% less than the thesis
22
. Christodoulou did not reveal his methodology: in all 
probability his estimate was based on the flawed estimates for 1927.  
 
Clark evaluated Malta and Cyprus as being in different GDP per capita bands to each other
23
.  
Writing in 1940, Clark considered Malta‟s per capita income as comparable to Italy‟s, Finland‟s, 
Hungary‟s and Greece‟s. Cyprus was in the lower income band along with Turkey, Syria, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Albania
24. Although Clark‟s income bands were too wide to be very useful in 
estimating the GDP of Cyprus and Malta in the interwar period, his work suggests that the GDP per 
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capita level of Malta was substantially higher than that of Cyprus, which is contrary to the 
purchasing power parity comparisons presented in chapter 3.  
 
Maddison estimated the joint GDP of Cyprus and Malta for 1929. It is not possible to separate the 
joint output into the constituent national parts because the national population and income levels 
used were not recorded by Maddison. The estimation procedure is also unclear and it would seem 
Maddison also thought the result as unreliable: the joint Malta/Cyprus remained part of Maddison‟s 
“non-sample” estimates that were not included in his estimates of global GDP25. Maddison‟s 
research interest was to calculate a global estimate and not in creating exhaustive HNAs for all 
countries; as a result Cyprus and Malta were not at the top of his priorities. In subsequent revisions 
of his work, Maddison has merged the joint estimate of Cyprus and Malta within the set of “Small 
Western European Countries”. This category contains a joint estimate for 13 European countries, 
which are significantly diverse in terms of economic structure, geographical location and growth 
performance; it includes Malta, Cyprus, Iceland, Andorra and Luxembourg. A breakdown of 
population and income per country is not provided, and therefore an extrapolation of the GDP of 
Cyprus and Malta is not possible
26
. 
 
The joint Cyprus/Malta estimate placed the per capita GDP of the islands in 1929 below that of 
Greece and above that of Portugal. The hierarchy is identical to their relative per capita GDP in the 
1960s; this is not a coincidence since the estimation was not based on interwar sources. In order to 
estimate the GDP in 1929, Maddison extrapolated backwards from the income estimates for 
Cyprus/Malta in the 1960s. Output was extrapolated backwards by assuming that the growth of 
Cyprus/Malta was equal to the average growth of Southern European states and Ireland. Thus the 
estimate for Malta/Cyprus is based on the growth record of other countries: it was not an attempt to 
create HNAs for the islands
27
. Although such results might be justified in cases where information 
is not available for HNA construction, ample primary data allow for better estimates to be created
28
. 
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The need for comparable methodology 
 
The creation of GDP is based on established best practices in national accounting in order to 
achieve international comparability. The methodology used is based as close as possible on the 
current methodology used in the European Union, the ESA 1995. Any deviation from best practice 
was due by data constraints; in such cases the general principles established in European HNAs 
research were used as a guiding principle
29
. GDP was produced as much a possible through the 
output approach, disaggregated to industries. When data was limited, such as the output of most of 
the service sector, the value added of the industry was estimated from the income side
30
. Data 
scarcity limited the available price deflators due to the lack of price data
31
.  
 
The service sector used to be estimated on the basis of multiplying the labour force employed in the 
service sector by its wage and in effect assuming productivity is constant; this was used in the thesis 
for some service industries due to the lack of additional data
32
. Yet the importance of the service 
sector has been highlighted recently and thus there have been greater efforts for more accurate 
measures of output
33
. Where sufficient data was available, such as in the Cypriot banking sector, 
value added was calculated as suggested in the 1995 ESA
34
.  
 
The production possibility frontier of recorded output followed ESA 1995 practices, which includes 
production for home use but excludes household chores. However, rigid adherence to ESA rules 
was not always possible or desirable in establishing the output of Cyprus and Malta during the 
interwar period as the nomenclature intended for modern economies might be inappropriate for an 
economy in the 1920s
35
. As a result industries were classified with the most recent nomenclature 
with one alteration: on-farm food processing was assigned to the agricultural rather than the 
manufacturing sector, because in the 1920s this was rural and not part of the industrial sector
36
.  
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Output deflation can have a significant effect on GDP levels and growth rates
37
. Where direct 
physical volumes were available, their value was estimated by multiplying them directly with the 
price for 1938 prices. Where deflation was necessary the study used Laspeyres volume indexes with 
Paasche price indexes, with 1938 as the base year. The year 1938 is the benchmark year for the 
estimates due to the greater availability of both price and volume data
38
.  
 
The choice of a benchmark year is fraught with difficulty. An interwar period benchmark was 
deemed desirable: yet the beginning and the middle years were periods of recession. Choosing a 
benchmark during a recession might result in an intermediate consumption that is not representative 
of the economic structure of the whole period. A post-1945 benchmark was also not appropriate 
since both islands‟ economies were permanently altered during the war, making the estimation of 
intermediate consumption based on post-war values inappropriate. Thus the benchmark year was 
1938, the final year of the series; as a result Laspeyres volume indexes tend to understate GDP 
(when compared to other types of indexes) growth the further away one moves from the benchmark 
year
39
. Yet this effect was negligible in this study, as output is estimated for just seventeen years, 
and any underestimate is bound to be very small, as proven by the GDP for the Low Countries
40
.  
 
The study disaggregates GDP into several levels. The Eurostat NACE rev.2 nomenclature allows us 
to see the value added per sector by industry by grouping the estimated value added in alphabetical 
codes followed by one- /two-/ three-/ and four- digit numbers. The disaggregation of output into 
alphanumeric codes allows an in-depth analysis of the Cypriot and Maltese economies. The NACE 
codes first divide the economy into wide industrial sectors (e.g. manufacturing, agriculture), which 
are assigned a letter of the alphabet. These are broken down into industries using similar processes: 
thus the output of manufacturing (NACE CODE C), is broken down into two-digit numbers such as 
the chemical industry (code C20), and woodworking (C16). For some industries a third-level 
disaggregation was possible by separating the stages of a particular manufacturing process, such as 
separating the sawmilling of wood (code 16.1), from the manufacture of products from wood, cork, 
straw and plaiting materials (code 16.2). It was sometimes possible to separate industries at a four-
digit level, which separates all processes such as separating the manufacture of other builders‟ 
carpentry and joinery (code 16.23) from the manufacture of wooden containers (code 16.24)
41
.  
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Data sources, collection methods and data quality 
 
The primary data sources used to estimate the output of Cyprus and Malta were not collected with a 
national accounts framework in mind. Sometimes crucial data was not collected, or they were 
recorded only sporadically and in a way that was not useful for GDP estimation
42
. The usefulness of 
the estimates for analytical purposes is thus limited by necessary assumptions, interpolations and 
extrapolations that were necessary to estimate the GDP of Cyprus and Malta
43
. Thus understanding 
the quality and nature of the underlying data allows one to appreciate the usage limitations of the 
estimates. 
 
Hjerppe and Van Ark emphasise that the quality of HNAs relies primarily on the available data, but 
nevertheless an accurate picture of an economy can be created from historical sources that are far 
from perfect
44
. Research was undertaken in the national archives of Cyprus, Malta and the United 
Kingdom. This study largely focused in collecting data from published reports of the British 
colonial authorities of Malta and Cyprus. These authorities were obliged to collect a significant 
amount of quantitative information in order to construct the various annual reports demanded by the 
colonial office in London. Although some of these reports presented the collected data ad-hoc, 
major exercises such as census reports and the annual statistical (blue) books had to follow specific 
parameters dictated by the colonial office. Such information was complemented by annual reports 
of government departments to form the bulk of primary sources. To this information further 
appropriate information was added from government reports in response to a particular issue, such 
as Surridge‟s report on rural poverty, discussed in chapter 1. Occasionally, useful information about 
the interwar period existed in post-1945 publications: for example the Cypriot population census of 
the 1960s provided information on interwar buildings, while the agricultural census of 1978 
provided information on interwar breeds of livestock. Information remained woefully scant for 
some industries, such as construction; and thus archival research was mainly concentrated on 
various government files to cover such gaps. Drafts of annual reports of departments, files of 
colonial departments and correspondence contained additional data that was not included in the 
published reports
45
.  
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The annual statistical (blue) books were the first point of contact in data collection. The statistical 
(blue) book was a yearly compendium of statistics about the colony from all government 
departments, compiled in accordance with colonial office requirements. The information provided 
increased over time, but its format was quite homogenous and therefore allowed year-on-year 
comparisons. The statistical (blue) books provide enough information for estimates to be created for 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, communications and some manufacturing industries, as well 
as providing most price and wage data. The accuracy of the data recorded in the statistical (blue) 
books is hard to fathom. The small size of the islands made the collection of information less 
difficult than in other colonies. However, the quality of the enumeration is largely dependent on the 
competence of the enumerators while poor record keeping could have resulted in unreliable results 
despite the islands‟ small size.  
 
In order to minimise possible clerical and typing errors, the total estimates of agricultural 
production were aggregated from a district level. Agricultural data, import, export, government 
revenue and expenditure statistics are perhaps the most reliable data on the islands. This is because 
their accuracy was very important to the government: most of the tax revenue was collected from 
duties on imports and exports and agricultural taxes, while an accurate recording of government 
expenditure was required from London. Cyprus still had a tithe tax on the volume of major 
agricultural products in the 1920s, and the tax was collected by the government. This provided an 
added incentive for accurate information on agricultural production in Cyprus. Thus the colonial 
administrators had an incentive to record such data accurately.  
 
Another important information source were the decennial census reports. Malta had a census in 
1921, 1931 and 1948, and Cyprus in 1921, 1931 and 1946. The census results were particularly 
important in evaluating the occupational structure, the housing stock and some agricultural data. 
There is some concern that the methodology and survey design varied in each census. As a result 
some sections are not directly comparable from one census to the next
46
. The census taking methods 
in Malta were problematic. The census questionnaire was provided to the head of every household 
who was expected to fill in a schedule left at his dwelling by an official administrator, and was 
subjected to a fine if he did not complete the questionnaire. Literate neighbours were instructed to 
help illiterate heads of households
47
. This could create problems if one considers that most of the 
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population in Malta was classed as illiterate in 1931. As a result, there is a significant under-
reporting of women in employment, especially in agriculture
48
.  
 
The Cyprus censuses also suffered from some problems in their collection method. The census 
questionnaires were administered by colonial officials who were diverted from their normal 
occupations for the census, but in remote areas the questionnaires were completed by the village 
headmen (Mukhtars). Thus the returns from remote areas were probably less accurate than those 
directly collected
49
. Despite these concerns, studies have argued that the population information in 
the Cypriot censuses was accurate
50
.  
 
The issue that is problematic for this study is the under-reporting of females in agricultural 
employment in the census occupation data. The censuses record very low female employment, 
particularly in agriculture, with implications for productivity estimates
51
. The effect of 
overestimating total productivity has been corrected by increasing the number of women in 
agriculture, as discussed in chapter 4.  
 
It is difficult to evaluate the reliability of the annual reports of all government departments/offices. 
The annual departmental reports were the basis for the construction of the statistical (blue) book, 
but they provide much more extensive quantitative and qualitative information. Such reports were 
especially useful in the estimation of intermediate consumption and in providing producer prices, 
while the qualitative appraisal of the economy acted as a useful check to the calculated output 
estimates.  
 
Some product volumes were deemed spurious but there is information on the collection method of 
crop returns that indicates that most returns are quite reliable. In Cyprus, the system of agricultural 
estimates was reformed in 1921 in order to improve reliability. In this regard the director of 
agriculture, Bevan, stated that “much necessary guess work in the past will, in the future, be 
replaced by something more reliable”52. The estimates were important to the colonial government 
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since they formed the basis of the expected return of the annual tithe tax in Cyprus, and as a result 
care was taken in estimating production data. They were based on yearly surveys: officials of the 
department of agriculture would make village-by-village enquiries to estimate the area and the 
production of crops and would supplement such enquiries with reports from the Mukhtars. These 
were checked by officials and if the output was considered low the department would send its own 
team to estimate output. It is harder to judge the quality of data in ad-hoc reports, but such reports 
were produced by high ranking colonial officials with international experience in their field of 
research
53
.  
 
Feinstein and Thomas argue that the estimation of historical GDP suffers from three types of non-
random errors: errors of measurement, omission and procedure
54
. The scale of omission errors in 
Cyprus can be gleaned by comparing the range of products estimated with the products of the 
input/output table of 1977. The agricultural products omitted in 1938 produced 9.6% of the output 
in 1977. This is bound to be an overestimate since products not estimated in 1938 only significantly 
expanded their output after the Second World War. This is the case for poultry production, which 
represented half of the output that was not estimated according to the 1977 input/output tables, as it 
was placed on a mass-production basis only after the Second World War: as a result the percentage 
of agricultural volume omitted is significantly less than 9.6% reported above. In addition, errors of 
omission in manufacturing have been minimised by including output estimates for the handicraft 
sector. The largest emission in the service sector was the output of insurance services, for which 
there was no data.  
 
Other tests of robustness are included in the Appendix, particularly for agricultural output: for 
example the estimation of animals output shown in table 2.1 had a stronger correlation with rainfall 
and available fodder than other methods of estimating meat production. It was possible to estimate 
subjective margins of error for Cypriot agriculture as suggested by Feinstein and Thomas‟ since 
there was enough information on how the agricultural data was collected: the error band is 
estimated at +/- 7.1%, while the error band for Maltese agriculture is considered to be lower as there 
direct data collection by the government
55
. The total error band of GDP is bound to be higher as 
manufacturing and service sector estimations are less robust that those of agriculture.  
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Overall, data quality is sufficiently robust to allow for reliable estimation of output. There are issues 
of data quality mainly due to the under-reporting of female occupations in the census, but these 
weaknesses are partially addressed by re-calculating the proportion of women in agricultural 
employment. Yet, the reliability of the GDP estimates is not only based on the quality and quantity 
of the data sources: the methodology used has an impact on the reliability of the estimates. Thus a 
thorough analysis of the estimation procedures will allow one to better understand the possible 
limitations of the islands‟ historical national accounts.  
 
Estimation procedures 
 
A general description of the methods used to compile the GDP of Cyprus and Malta is necessary in 
order to evaluate cross-study comparability. This section is a synopsis of the major themes. A 
detailed Appendix is included in order to provide greater detail in the methodology used in creating 
these presented estimates.  
 
Gross Domestic Product derived using the production approach is defined as “the value of all goods 
and services produced in a period, minus the goods and services consumed in the production 
process during that period”56. Gross Value Added is defined “as the value of goods and services 
produced during a production period but not immediately used up in the production process of that 
period”57.  
 
Thus: 
                               (1) 
Where: 
 
 
 
  
        (2) 
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In order to estimate the GDP through the production approach, the value added of each industry is 
calculated separately and then combined in the general framework expressed in equation (2). The 
aim was to estimate the physical volume produced in each industry and multiply it with the 
product‟s price in 1938 in order to estimate the gross output per industry in 1938 prices58. With the 
exception of Malta‟s postal services, it was only possible to estimate intermediate consumption for 
the benchmark year, and assume that the value added share of gross output remained constant for 
the period 1921-1938. 
 
Due to data limitations, double deflation was not feasible as dictated by current best practice, which 
argues for a conversion of gross output and intermediate consumption to constant prices by two 
separate price deflators. This was not possible due to the lack of sufficient price data, particularly of 
intermediate consumption prices. The majority of output estimated was based directly on 1938 
prices. Where deflation was necessary an appropriate end-product deflator was used; however the 
limited price information meant that the Consumer Price Index was also used extensively. The 
explanation of how the consumer price index was constructed is included in the Appendix. 
 
The value added per industry was summed to obtain the total value added. Thus, the GDP estimate 
can be shown as a whole and subdivided by industries, which can be subdivided into NACE 
categories as explained above.  
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The industries are listed below
59
. 
       (3) 
Where: 
 
  ,    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sources available vary from sector to sector. As a result each industry necessitated different 
estimation procedures. In order to ensure comparability with other studies the procedures used were 
informed by HNA estimates of other Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Greece and Italy
60
. 
 
AG = Agriculture, forestry and fishing (Nace Code: A) 
 
The estimate of agricultural production was the most extensive in terms of products estimated and 
sources used. For Cyprus they were estimates of output for 85 products and 42 products in Malta. 
The products were grouped in 6 two-digit categories, which are sub-divided into 26 three-digit 
categories. 
 
The time period used for the underlying Maltese agricultural data was corrected because some 
series represented the volume for an administrative year (from April to March) rather than a 
calendar year. In addition the primary sources of Cyprus did not provide enough farm-gate prices. A 
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farm-gate price dataset was constructed by combining retail, export and import prices. The prices 
were adjusted in order to take account of the trade and transport margin and create a farm-gate price 
database for Cyprus
61
. This was checked with spot estimates of farm-gate prices, and found to be 
compatible. 
Some interpolation and extrapolation was necessary to fill in data gaps. For example the volume of 
Cypriot tomatoes and Maltese vetches were not recorded yearly. In some cases there was adequate 
supplementary information, such as annual yields from government-run farms that enabled output 
to be estimated. When such information was not available, the missing output of a product was 
interpolated based on a complete product series that was highly correlated. The detailed 
methodology is given in the Appendix.  
 
The method of wine estimation led to the output of modern wineries and rural wine production to be 
non-distinguishable in Cyprus. It was also impossible to disaggregate the output of semi-processed 
tobacco and cotton into agricultural output and agricultural processing. As a result the 
manufacturing sector‟s share in GDP is underestimated as wine and semi-processed tobacco are 
included in the agricultural sector, but the overall assessment of grape and vine products output is 
considered representative. 
 
The production of citrus fruit was also pivotal in post-war agricultural development in Cyprus. 
Unlike Maltese data, the Cypriot citrus data was sporadic and unreliable. Citrus production was 
estimated based on irrigation and citrus tree data that were provided in the Cypriot censuses, as 
described in the Appendix. This necessitated strong assumptions and resulted in a linear production 
growth. However the method seems to accurately capture that tree crops were less affected by 
drought than other products, because they relied on permanent irrigation rather than surface 
aquifers. However, there may be some overestimation of citrus production from 1931 onwards due 
to the likelihood of increased changes in land use to citrus orchards during the Second World War. 
Thus the production of Cypriot wine, citrus and fruit necessitated a departure from ESA 
methodology due to incomplete data. All the estimates were checked for plausibility both by 
comparing with post-WWII data as well as comparing the results with other countries as shown in 
the Appendix. 
 
For marginal products it was only possible to construct spot estimates and their production was 
considered constant throughout the period. However, such cases were limited to less than 1% of the 
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agricultural gross output. For a small range of products, there was no information available and thus 
no attempts were made to estimate their output
62
.  
 
Estimating the output of animal production was fraught with difficulty because the animals were 
both the unit of production and the product. The annual stocks of animals were available in the 
statistical (blue) books, but the conversion of the animals into animal products was unknown. In 
order to estimate the output of animal products in Cyprus, an adapted version of the Kostellenos et 
al. that maximised the primary information available was constructed and its detailed construction 
is described in the Appendix
63
. A summary of the model used to estimate animal products is given 
in table 2.1. Primary sources on annual animal slaughtering were in Malta in the annual report of 
animal slaughter houses. Thus the animal products model was used only for the estimation of milk 
and animal skin output in Malta. 
 
The adapted Kostellenos et al model has weaknesses: it assumes that the ratio of births, deaths, 
flock composition, milk yield and slaughter weight were constant. As a result the output of animal 
products is somewhat overestimated in periods of drought and underestimated in times of fodder 
abundance. However the output of animal production, using table 2.1, were much more favourable 
that other methods of animal output estimation.  
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Table 2.1: Animal production model. 
No. of 
Equation 
Explanation Notation Source: 
(1) Number of animals year t   Blue Books (1921-1938) 
(2) 
Number of animals year t -
1   
Blue Books (1921-1938) 
(3) Gross increase / decrease    (3) = (1) – (2) 
(4) 
Ratio of males to total 
flock   
Republic of Cyprus, Agricultural 
Census (1978), Bevan (1918), 
Kostellenos et al (2007) 
(5) Number of males year t-1    (5) = (2) * (4) 
(6) 
Number of females year t-
1       
(6) = (2) * (1 – (4)) 
(7) Reproduction coefficient  
Maule & Shevki (1935), Maule (1938), 
Constantinou (1981) 
(8) Lambs / kids  born      (8) = (7) * (6) 
(9) 
Natural Deaths / Disease / 
Culling  
Θ 
Maule & Shevki (1935), Gambles 
(1936) 
(10) 
Number of lost animals 
during Yt  
(10) = (2) * (9) 
(11) Net exports Yt  Blue Books (1921 – 1938) 
(12) 
Number of lambs / kids 
needed for Yt and net 
exports Xt 
 (12) = (3) + (10) + (11) 
(13) 
Number of lambs / kids 
consumed  
(13) = (8) – (12) 
(14) 
Number of adult animals 
consumed    
Maule & Shevki (1935) 
(15) No. animals consumed  (15) = (13) + (14) 
(16) 
Adult, meat per carcass 
(kg)  
Kostelenos et al., (2007) 
(17) 
Lamb / kid, meat per 
carcass (kg)   
Kostelenos et al., (2007) 
(18) Total meat produced   (18) = [(13) * (17)] + [(14) * (16)] 
(19) 
Wool per surviving adult  
male (kg.)  
Maule & Shevki (1935)  
(20) 
Wool per surviving adult  
female (kg.)  
Maule & Shevki (1935) 
(21) Total  wool produced 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑾𝒐𝒐𝒍 =   𝒘𝒇 𝒀𝒕 −  𝑬   𝟏 − 𝒓𝒎  
 +𝒘𝒎 𝒀𝒕 − 𝑬   
  
(21) = [[(1) – (12)] * [[1 – (4)] *(20)]] 
+ [[(1) – (12)] *(4)] * (19)] 
(22) 
Adult hide weight per 
slaughtered animal (kg.)   
Kostelenos et al., (2007) 
(23) 
Lamb / kid hide per 
slaughtered animal (kg.)    
Kostelenos et al., (2007) 
(24) Total hides produced     (24) = [(14)* (22)] + [(13)*(23)] 
(25) 
Milk per surviving female 
adult (ltr.)  
Government Farm Reports. Cyprus 
Agricultural Journal (1932 - 1938), 
Kostelenos et al., (2007)  
(26) Total milk produced  (26) = [[(1) –[ (12) * (1 – 4)]] *(25)] 
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The output of forestry was estimated for Cyprus only as Malta was not forested. The forest cover of 
Cyprus was extensive, as 18% of the total land area was under the administration of the forestry 
department
64
. The forestry department was one of the first set up by the British administration, and 
as a result a substantial amount of quantitative information was provided by the forestry department 
reports. The estimation of forest output is explained in detail in the Appendix. 
 
MG = Mining and quarrying (Nace Code: B) 
 
There was ample information on the volume and value of mining and quarrying exports in the 
statistical (blue) books; these were supplemented by information in the annual reports of the mining 
department in Cyprus. Only the output of sand in Cyprus and gravel and sand in Malta remain 
unaccounted for.  
 
The estimation of annual mining output creates certain difficulties since it is not always clear if the 
output recorded is the ore sold rather than the ore extracted. GDP estimation requires the volume of 
ore extracted in a given year and not just the amount of ore sold. Yet, some of the primary 
information seems to record the sale rather than the extraction of ore: the partial closure of the 
largest copper mines in Cyprus in 1931 and 1933 appears to affect copper ore extraction with a 
lag
65
. 
 
Fenoaltea argues that the estimation of the volume based on the the ore extracted can lead to 
unpredictable productivity results as the richness of the ore changes “from year to year, from batch 
to batch” 66. Fenoaltea did not estimate a conventional gross output to value added ratio, arguing 
that the specific attributes of the extractive industries will lead to an overestimation of intermediate 
production. Instead, he constructed value added directly from wages, returns on horsepower, and a 
residual surplus. It was not possible to estimate the intermediate consumption of the mining sector: 
all quarries and mines on the islands were private companies, whose business files have not been 
found. Other European HNAs, however, can provide the proportion of value added to gross output. 
Ivanov calculated the value added to gross output ratio in Bulgaria as 71.2%, and Schulze argued 
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that the ratio of Austrian mining activities was 82%
67. Kauppila‟s thorough input-output analysis of 
the Finnish mining sector estimates the value added to gross output ratio at 83.6%
68
.  
 
There is some information on the intermediate consumption of mining and quarrying for the post-
Second World War period. The ratio of value added to gross output in mining in 1950 was 41.2% 
for Cyprus. In Malta the value added ratio of quarrying in 1962 was 68.8%
69
. It is argued that the 
ratio of national accounts for Cyprus in 1950 is too low and unsuitable as the quality of the copper 
ore available in Cyprus declined during the late 1940s, thus reducing the share of value added to 
output. In addition the mechanisation of the mining and quarrying sector during the late 1940s 
raised both gross output and intermediate consumption (especially for fuel and repairs) as capital 
replaced labour, reducing the share of value added to output. Thus based on other European HNAs a 
conservative estimate of 75% for Cyprus and 70% for Malta was used to estimate value added
70
. A 
lower ratio was used for Malta as it only had quarries. The share of value added to gross output is 
assumed constant throughout the period.  
 
MF = Manufacturing and handicrafts (Nace Code: C) 
 
There were various data sources on manufacturing, but such sources were not necessarily 
compatible or complimentary. As a result the estimation of manufacturing varied from industry to 
industry in order to use the best data possible: some industries were estimated by the output 
approach, others using the expenditure approach and the handicraft sector was estimated by the 
income approach. Detailed explanation is available in the Appendix.  
 
The statistical (blue) books provided sufficient information for the largest industrial factories on the 
island. This allowed for an estimation of the value added of these industries from the output side. 
There was no information on the yearly change of stock in inputs making it necessary to assume 
that companies began and ended the accounting period with a constant level of inventories, and that 
all goods sold were manufactured on site. Annual output was estimated annually and value added 
was estimated by estimating the value added of 1938 and keeping the share of value added to output 
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constant. The disadvantage of not estimating the yearly intermediate consumption is the assumption 
that no technological change took place in those industries in the period 1921-1938. However, there 
simply is not enough information to allow the annual calculation of intermediate consumption. 
 
Where there was insufficient information available to provide estimates as above, the yearly output 
estimates were based on their industrial inputs. The statistical (blue) books of Cyprus also provided 
sufficient information in order to estimate value added for the 1938 benchmark for thirteen other 
industries, but not yearly output due to gaps in the data series. A yearly value added estimate was 
extrapolated from the benchmark year by assuming that the growth rate of these industries was 
similar to the average of the industries described above. Such industries constituted just 3.4% of the 
total manufacturing output in Cyprus yet they were important in Malta, were they constituted 
25.6%.of manufacturing. The reliance on such methodology for Malta is due to the limited evidence 
of its manufacturing. An extensive use of statistics within the statistical (blue) books and in 
censuses formed the basis for indirectly estimating the remaining manufacturing industry as 
explained in the appendix. 
 
The output of the handicraft sector was also estimated. This sector was important as it provided 
complementary income to agricultural activities. Its output was estimated using occupation statistics 
based on the method of Hjerppe et al
71
. Thus information was collected on employment and wages, 
in order to estimate the wage bill of the handicrafts industry. The handicrafts were divided into 
industries, and using information from Felner, the total wage bill was converted to the value added 
in 1938 prices
72
. More information is available in the Appendix.  
 
U = Electricity, gas and water supply (Nace Codes: D & E) 
 
There was not enough information to estimate any private provision of utilities. This was 
problematic for Cyprus, where utilities were all provided by municipal authorities and private 
companies. As no information was available for utility industries in Cyprus, the production of 
utilities was estimated on the basis of post war national accounts as 2.5% of the combined 
manufacturing and trade output. In Malta, centralised data was available for utility provision in 
relevant government reports, allowing for estimates of output, intermediate consumption and value 
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added
73
. The estimate of value added of Maltese utilities was calculated through summing of the 
cost of production as government run utilities were non-market producers charging less than the 
market prices
74
.  
 
CT = Construction (Nace Code: F) 
 
The census reports provided substantial information on the number of occupied and unoccupied 
urban and rural dwellings for Malta and Cyprus. In Malta there was annual information on the 
number of constructed houses and additions to existing houses in the annual report of the 
department of labour, with the 1938 report providing the average value of construction
75
. 
Agricultural buildings were also enumerated by the department of labour, but commercial 
construction was estimated by tracking the construction urban and sub-urban dwellings. The 
detailed methodology is provided in the Appendix. 
 
Yearly construction data were not available for Cyprus, but the total stock of housing for 1921, 
1931 and 1946, was known from the Cypriot censuses. Thus the total rural and urban houses 
constructed for the periods 1921-1931 and 1931-1946 was known. Modifying the method suggested 
by Prados de la Escosura, the imports and the domestic production of construction materials were 
added to create a construction materials index, weighted by the amount of material needed to 
construct a Cypriot house
76
. The construction materials were summed and the yearly shares of 
construction used to allocate the total houses constructed during the periods 1921–1931 and 1931–
1938. The construction of agricultural buildings was linked to the construction of rural dwellings, 
and the construction of commercial buildings was linked with the construction of urban dwellings. 
The value of building and the intermediate consumption of construction were estimated based on 
archive sources that included government housing initiatives for its staff, agricultural building 
construction costs, as well as a report on rural development published in 1938
77
. The methodology 
is described in detail in the Appendix.  
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The value added of public construction was estimated using information provided by government 
expenditure, deflated by a price index of construction of materials. The share of value added to 
gross output was estimated for the benchmark year and assumed constant for the period: substantial 
information of the intermediate consumption of construction was collected by the reports on 
government housing and agricultural building mentioned above.  
 
TTC = Trade, transport and communications (Nace Code: G, H, J) 
 
Trade output is estimated by comparing factory prices with retail prices, and multiplying the total 
tradable volume of goods by the trade mark-up
78
. This was the sector for which the least amount of 
information could be collected. This is hardly surprising as it is a sector dominated by private 
companies, and thus government archives do not provide sufficient information on wholesale and 
retail prices.  
 
The trade and transport margins were estimated using a combination of interwar sources and post-
Second World War statistics; more detailed explanation is provided in the Appendix. The 
estimation of trade was based on the trade margin of domestic trade and a mark-up on the sum of 
output of agricultural and manufacturing goods that were traded, while foreign trade was estimated 
on the basis of the volume of import and exports and retail and import price differentials. For the 
estimation of domestic trade, it was suggested that some output was not traded as explained in the 
Appendix. The value of the traded agricultural and manufactured goods was multiplied by the trade 
and transport margin to estimate the total output. The import, export and re-export margins were 
also calculated in constant prices, and added to the volume of domestic trade and transport to 
achieve an estimate of total output of trade. The proportion of intermediate consumption was 
estimated using post-Second World War data for Cyprus
79
.  
 
The transport of railways and trams has been estimated based on passenger miles and freight traffic, 
but it was a very small part of transport output in either Cyprus or Malta. The value added of goods 
freight was removed from the value added of transport to avoid double counting. The value added 
of railroad passenger traffic was added to the value added of other passenger traffic. Other 
passenger traffic was estimated by creating a benchmark for 1938 on the relationship of passenger 
and goods traffic, and then extrapolating an annual estimate by a transport index consisting on the 
yearly number of motor vehicles licensed in Malta and Cyprus.  
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Postal and telephone services on the islands were government controlled; thus ample information 
for the estimation of their value added was available from the annual reports of their departments. 
The value added of the rail and postal services was used to estimate telegraph output. It was not 
possible to estimate the output of other communication services.  
SF = Financial services (Nace Code: K) 
 
The output of financial services from the output approach requires information on the total deposits 
of the banks, as well as on the base interest rate and bank lending rates. The Cypriot statistical 
(blue) books provided information on the yearly total balances of the economy, lending rates and 
intermediate consumption costs were provided by archive work on the Cypriot branch of a British 
multinational bank
80
. The co-operative sector‟s output was estimated by estimating its size of key 
benchmark years and using that proportion to estimate the size of the co-op saving sector in that 
year. In Malta the only information available was occupational data. The output of the financial 
sector there was estimated on the basis of the wage bill. No estimates of insurance output were 
possible for either island. The detailed methodology is provided in the Appendix. 
 
S = Other services and Public administration (Nace Code: I, M, N, O, P, Q, R, 
S, T, U) 
 
This category includes a diverse range of occupations. Despite the growing awareness of the 
services‟ importance in the development of economies, and hence the need to more accurately 
reflect their output in HNAs, it is difficult to estimate the direct output of such services
81
. The 
government sector‟s value added was estimated by calculating the wages and pensions of 
government employees in current prices that are available in the annual reports on government 
expenditure in the statistical (blue) books; this was deflated to constant prices using the constant 
price index.  
 
The deflator was the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as there were insufficient price data to estimate a 
specific deflator for the government sector. The local government sector was not estimated. This is 
not a problem in Maltese GDP as local government did not exist prior to independence, but local 
government was established in Cyprus in the 1930s. Yet, the information that exists on municipality 
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expenditure does not distinguish between donations from the central government and local taxes. It 
was not possible to establish the share of the central government subsidy, which was considered to 
be a high proportion of local government expenditure and thus local government was excluded to 
avoid double counting.  
 
Government doctors and teachers were not included in the government sector but in the relevant 
sectors of health and education
82
. The value added of professional, entertainment and personal 
services was estimated using the occupational statistics provided by the censuses. The yearly 
number of practitioners was assumed to follow a linear growth rate from 1921 to 1931 and from 
1931-1946 (1921-1948 for Malta). The yearly number of practitioners was multiplied by their wage 
in 1938. The wage level per profession was varied according to the number of men, women and 
apprentices as recorded by the census; detailed information is available in the Appendix. 
 
The estimation procedure for the private sector assumes that the productivity of the most of the 
service sector employees remained constant throughout the period, while census occupation 
statistics are not an accurate indicator of current employment. Yet unless better information 
becomes available, estimating the professional and entertainment output as described above is the 
common practise.  
 
HI = Rental income from housing (Nace Code: L) 
 
The implied rental income from housing was estimated based on dwelling information in the 
censuses, as well as archival resources. The censuses provided decennial information on rural and 
urban housing construction. Estimates were made of the value of the dwellings based on archival 
material in the National Archives in Rabat and Nicosia as well as using other governmental sources. 
This was combined with the series on house construction produced to estimate housing 
construction. The housing stock of Cyprus and Malta was estimated decennially from 1851, and 
yearly for 1911 until 1960. The value of housing in both Cyprus and Malta was estimated using 
government reports and files of their respective public work departments
83
. Yet house values 
decrease with increased age as depreciation sets in
84
. The best method of calculating depreciation is 
the perpetual inventory method where the total stock of housing is depreciating at a constant rate 
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according to its age
85
. Using primary sources, it was estimated that the average lifetime of a house 
was 50 years. Thus the 1901 housing stock was extrapolated back to 1861 based on census reports. 
The yearly housing stock was added to the total housing stock and depreciated using the perpetual 
inventory method. The detailed method is described in the Appendix. 
 
The proportion of yearly rental income was imputed using rents of government houses in Nicosia 
and checks of buildings by the public works department in Malta; the implied value added from 
housing was estimated as a constant percentage of the housing stock value, creating different rent 
values for urban and rural buildings. 
86
. The share of rent to the total value was applied to the 
housing stock to estimate the implied rental income from housing for the period 1921-1938
87
. The 
imputed rental income was less than 4% of the GDP for either Malta or Cyprus throughout the 
whole period. 
 
GDP at factor prices and market prices 
 
By adding up the gross value added of each industry, one is estimating GDP at factor prices i.e. the 
income of the islands in the prices of the producers. This does not equal GDP constructed from the 
expenditure approach, which records expenditure by consumers
88
. Consumers purchase goods and 
services at the consumer price, which includes any taxes on products as well as any subsidies. In 
order to estimate GDP at market prices one needs to add the taxes of products such as import excise 
duties and to subtract any product subsidies
89
.  
 
However, due to the different estimation procedures used in calculating GDP for Cyprus and Malta, 
estimating GDP at market prices is difficult. One of the main problems is that the estimation 
method of trade, mining, or transport may lead to double counting as the prices of product specific 
taxes may have already been included in the prices used to estimate their value added share. In 
addition the provision of taxes and subsidies in the islands was complex as not all taxes and 
subsidies were controlled by the central government: in Cyprus, local communities added their own 
taxes on products to pay for education. Thus GDP at market prices is only estimated for 1938 
largely for completeness, and estimates are recorded at factor prices unless indicated otherwise. 
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Conclusion 
 
The GDP estimates provide an empirical base to structure our understanding of the living conditions 
on the islands during the interwar period as previous estimates of income have not clarified their 
economic performance. A structured and comprehensive estimation of GDP will provide the basis 
for detailed analysis of the islands‟ development. Using an extensive array of information from 
government sources, the quality of the data is judged to allow for relatively accurate estimates. By 
describing the methodology in detail, this thesis attempts to eliminate the ambiguities of past 
attempts with a clear, product-by-product analysis of the estimation procedure, making the 
estimates data fully transparent.  
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Chapter 3: Overview of Results 
 
“The reconstruction of historical national accounts is, of course, not an objective in itself”1. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the aggregate GDP for the islands for the interwar period. This 
is essentially the first time that data has been complied in a national accounts framework to provide 
yearly estimates for the interwar period that can be compared with other countries. The results 
confirm that their growth experience was lacklustre: the islands, particularly Malta, performed 
badly even when compared to other Southern European underperformers. Cyprus and Malta 
exhibited very different economic structures from one another. The Cypriot economy was akin to 
other colonial economies that depended on agriculture, while Malta was facing a peculiar type of 
underdevelopment: its economy was dominated by expenditure of the British armed forces. Cyprus 
was grievously affected by the great depression because it coincided with a serious drought; the 
recession was long and recovery took place mainly due to the rapid development of the mining and 
construction sectors. Malta experienced a slow but stable GDP trajectory and it was only marginally 
affected by the great depression; however, unlike Cyprus, Malta did not participate in the European 
post-depression recovery. 
 
Population estimates 
 
Estimating the annual population of the islands is necessary to evaluate the per capita GDP. The 
colonial government of Cyprus estimated the population yearly, but its derivation is unclear since 
there was no registration of migrants during the period, and the registration of births and deaths was 
unreliable
2
. Birth and death registration was the responsibility of the village elders, the Mukhtars. 
The reporting of deaths must have been quite inaccurate since Agathangelou argued this system led 
to gross underestimation of the death rate in Cyprus in the 1980s
3
. In Malta, birth and death 
registration was the responsibility of parish priests who then informed the chief medical officer of 
the colony; which could lead to results as unreliable as in Cyprus
4
. Migration was also a concern 
when estimating the population but successful migrants in the interwar period were much more 
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limited than before or after
5
. As a result migration did not significantly affect the estimation of the 
resident population. 
 
The census figures were preferred as a basis for estimating population since they provide accurate 
spot estimates rather than unclear yearly estimates. Censuses took place in 1921, 1931 and 1946 in 
Cyprus and in 1921, 1931 and 1948 in Malta. The annual population was linearly interpolated 
between these points. The growth rates of the population of Cyprus and Malta are shown in table 
3.1. 
Table 3.1: Average population growth (%) per annum, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1946. 
 Cyprus  Malta 
1921–1946 1.49  1921–1948 1.36  
Sources: Hart-Davis, Census…1931 (1932); Percival, Census...1946 (1947); Malta, Report of the Census of the Maltese 
Islands (Valletta: GPO, 1922); Malta, Census...1931 (1932); Malta, Eleventh Census…1948 (1949). 
 
The interpolation of 1931 to 1946 (1948 for Malta), could lead to population distortions, if 
population grew considerably during the Second World War. However, the effect of the war on 
population was quite the opposite
6
. The annual population figures used are presented in table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Yearly population estimates, Cyprus and Malta, 1921- 1938. 
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 212,258 310,715 1931 241,621 347,959 
1922 215,026 314,253 1932 245,001 353,982 
1923 217,830 317,830 1933 248,429 360,109 
1924 220,671 321,449 1934 251,905 366,342 
1925 223,549 325,109 1935 255,429 372,683 
1926 226,464 328,810 1936 259,002 379,134 
1927 229,417 332,554 1937 262,626 385,697 
1928 232,409 336,340 1938 266,300 392,373 
1929 235,440 340,169 1946 297,606 450,114 
1930 238,511 344,042 1948 305,991  
Sources: Hart-Davis, Census…1921 (1922); Hart-Davis, Census...1931 (1932); Percival, Census...1946 (1947); Malta, 
Census...1921 (1922); Malta, Census...1931 (1932); Malta, Eleventh Census...1948 (1949)
7
. 
 
Population growth was quite rapid when compared to previous historical periods and as a result it 
reduced per capita GDP growth. Table 3.3 indicates that the natural increase in the population was 
much more rapid than before with a result of Malta doubling its population in fifty-two years and 
Cyprus in fifty-one. If population growth in the period 1921-1938 was constant at the level of 
1901–1921, both islands would have higher per capita GDP growth: Malta‟s would have increased 
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by 0.67% per annum and Cyprus‟ by 0.13% per annum. However, the population was still growing 
slower than neighbouring countries which had faster rates of economic growth: Turkey‟s population 
grew at a average of 2.2% per annum for the period 1923-1938, while Bulgaria and Greece grew at 
1.6%  and 2.0% respectively during the period 1921-1938
8
. 
Table 3.3: Annual average population growth, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1960. 
 Cyprus (%)  Malta (%) 
1901–1921 1.36  1901–1921 0.70  
1921–1946 1.49  1921–1948 1.36  
1946–1960 1.80  1946–1957 0.30  
Sources: Hart-Davis, Cyprus…1931 (1932); Percival, Census... 1946 (1947); Cyprus, Census of Population and 
Agriculture 1960 (Nicosia: GPO, 1962); Malta, Census… 1931 (1932); Malta, Eleventh Census…1948 (1949); National 
Statistical Office Malta, Census of Population and Housing 2005, Volume 1 (Valletta: National Statistical Office, 2007). 
 
The increased rate of population growth was mainly due to a reduction of migration opportunities 
rather than improvements in medical provision. Migration was seen as a legitimate means to control 
the population in Malta: there was an established ideology within the colonial administration that 
argued that the Maltese population growth would always exceed Malta‟s potential for economic 
growth if migration was not encouraged
9
. Substantial resources were allocated to promote 
emigration during the interwar period but with little success: the reluctance of the new world to 
receive Maltese migrants and the destruction of established communities around the Mediterranean 
due to nationalism meant net migration was very low
10
. Many established Maltese communities in 
Turkey and the Maghreb were being forced out due to the unsettled political situation
11
. The 
situation was not improved by attempts to place migrants in Australia or the USA since both 
countries limited the opportunities for new migration: by 1935 the department of labour stated that 
all migration possibilities for the Maltese were closed
12
. The reduction in migration opportunities 
led to a faster growing population. 
 
In contrast to Malta, Cyprus was seen by the British administration as a target for immigration. In 
the 19
th
 century a Maltese settlement was set up but it quickly failed. Other attempts followed: in 
1902 plans were discussed to create an Armenian settlement in Cyprus with the aim of modernising 
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the island‟s agricultural sector13. Cyprus continued to be seen as a place of immigration, as well as a 
place of migration transit, by the colonial authorities during the interwar period, keeping net 
migration at very low levels. Cyprus was a key destination for “white army” Russian émigrés, 
Europeans ousted from Turkey and Jewish settlers on their way to Palestine. As a result net 
emigration was estimated at less than 1% of the total population
14
. 
 
Thus faster population growth was mainly due to the reduction of migration opportunities for the 
islanders. They were some improvements to the island‟s health systems that might have led to a 
reduction of the death rate, yet the health and sanitation systems were still basic, with Malta having 
one of the highest infant mortality rates in Europe and still experiencing outbreaks of cholera and 
plague
15
.  
 
The increase in population had direct repercussions for the standard of living on the islands. In 
order for the per capita GDP level to increase, output needs to increase faster than population. Thus 
the increase in the population created an additional pressure on the living standards of the 
population during a period of slow economic growth. However nearby states were sustaining a 
higher population growth and a faster economic growth, meaning that the poor per capita economic 
growth is also due to other reasons.  
 
GDP at market prices 
 
All estimates presented here are in factor prices as explained in chapter 2
16
. Market prices of 1938 
are shown here for completeness. A way of evaluating possible double counting is the differential 
between the GDP in factor and market prices compared with government revenue. Since the main 
difference in factor and market prices is the indirect taxation set by the government, the differential 
should be less than the total government revenue
17
. Because the results presented in table 3.4 seem 
to indicate that some of the indirect tax is included in the factor price estimate, GDP at factor prices 
is used as the main indicator of economic growth to avoid double counting. 
  
                                                 
13
 Georghallides, A Political… (1979) p.39; Geddes, P. “Cyprus and Some of its possibilities” in The Isle of Man, 
Gibraltar, Malta, St Helene, Barbados, Cyprus, The Channel Islands, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd, 
1902) pp.101-102 
14
 Oakden, Report on the Finances (1935), p.9. The mass migration of Cypriots and Maltese to Britain and the 
Commonwealth was a post-Second World War phenomenon. Angelides, “The Cyprus Economy…” (1996) p. 219; 
Bowen-Jones, et al, Malta: Background for Development (1961) pp.158-159 
15
 Bowen-Jones, et al, Malta: Background for Development (1961), pp.178-179 
16
 See: Chapter 2, p. 53, Section “GDP at factor prices and market prices" 
17
 Sir Ralph Oakden argued that it was not possible to estimate the total indirect taxation in government revenue due to 
the complicated taxation system.  Oakden, Report on the Finances (1935) p.56 
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Table 3.4: GDP of 1938, Cyprus and Malta, in Factor and Market Prices. 
 GDP at Factor 
Prices (1) 
GDP at Market 
Prices (2) 
Differential 
(2)-(1)=(3) 
Government 
Revenue (4) 
Indirect taxation 
on Value Added 
(%) (3)/(4)=(5) 
Cyprus  6,544,460 7,091,589 547,129 1,023,230 53 
Malta 7,416,814 8,084,281 667,467 1,287,191 52 
Note: Cyprus is in constant 1938 Cyprus pounds; Malta is in constant 1938 pound sterling. Source: Appendix B and C. 
 
GDP at factor prices 
 
Figure 3.1 indicates the GDP of Cyprus in the interwar period in constant 1938 Cyprus pounds. 
There was great volatility of aggregate output: this was due to the fact that agriculture constituted a 
large part of the economy and its output was dependent on the island‟s volatile weather. It must be 
noted that in 1921, the starting year of the estimates, was a year of worldwide recession that 
seriously affected the United Kingdom and its colonies
18
. The 1921 recession also affected Cyprus 
(and to a lesser extent Malta whose recession year was in 1919), as the price and volume of its 
agricultural exports dropped significantly
19
.  
 
Since 1921 was a recession year, the recovery from the slump in Cyprus was sluggish. Output 
growth was checked in 1924, and then went through violent expansions and contractions, reaching a 
peak in 1929. The great depression had a great impact on the economy of Cyprus, with GDP in 
1932 being 18.8% lower than in 1929 with recovery only being achieved in 1935. The combined 
drought and the great depression led to a large and sustained fall of GDP. After a slight downturn in 
1936, output increased rapidly during the last two years of peace.  
 
                                                 
18
 Feinstein, Temin & Toniolo, The European Economy… (1997), p.39 
19
 Angelides, “The Cyprus Economy Under British Rule” (1996) p. 214. 
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Figure 3.1: GDP, Exports, Imports, Cyprus, 1921–1938. 
 
Note: In constant 1938 million Cyprus pounds. Source: Table 3.5. 
 
Considering that Cyprus had no heavy industry and was lacking in most natural resources, the trade 
openness of the island was low. The combined proportion of imports and exports was at its lowest 
in 1923 (35.0% of GDP), but rose to 71.1% by 1938. The increase in trade openness was due to the 
explosive growth of the Cyprus Mines Corporation (CMC). The company imported all of the 
machinery needed for production, and exported large amounts of copper pyrites to Germany at the 
end of the 1930s, thus breaking down the self-sufficient nature of the Cypriot farm-based economy. 
 
Despite the relatively low trade openness of Cyprus, the correlation coefficient of GDP with 
imports (0.95) and exports (0.97) was very high. Thus the movements of imports and exports are 
good indicators of the state of the economy overall, which is of use to further HNA studies of the 
island. The high correlation of trade to GDP was mainly due to the currency board system of 
sterling exchange. The commissioner of currency issued Cyprus notes on condition that the 
equivalent amount in sterling was lodged with the crown agents in London, making demand and 
supply of trade dependent on the wellbeing of the economy
20
.  
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 For an explanation of the Cypriot monetary system: Phylatkis, K., The Banking System of Cyprus: Past, Present and 
Future (London: Macmillan, 1995),  pp.42-44 
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Table3.5: GDP, imports, exports, Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 GDP Imports Exports 
1921 3,732,544  926,625  520,519 
1922 4,001,854 1,001,137  572,935 
1923 4,125,691  806,076  636,845 
1924 4,029,952  914,858  904,673 
1925 4,342,975 1,162,627  847,314 
1926 4,169,484 1,111,652  744,163 
1927 4,678,897 1,103,766 1,030,349 
1928 4,574,781 1,315,656  984,934 
1929 5,189,706 1,670,070 1,331,550 
1930 4,911,844 1,329,007 1,070,103 
1931 4,605,234 1,338,918  930,556 
1932 4,213,399 1,292,490  822,245 
1933 4,232,438 1,234,848  796,451 
1934 4,755,859 1,435,596 1,017,667 
1935 5,318,422 1,537,664 1,155,342 
1936 5,237,377 1,483,244 1,518,462 
1937 6,226,713 2,193,544 2,069,726 
1938 6,544,460 2,267,204 2,386,303 
Note: In constant 1938 million Cyprus pounds. Source: Appendix B. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the aggregate output, exports and imports of Malta in constant 1938 pounds 
sterling. The growth performance of Malta is very different to that of Cyprus. Malta suffered its 
worst economic recession in 1919 due to the sudden reduction in military expenditure during 
demobilisation; by 1921 a gradual recovery was underway
21
. The recovery continued until 1927 but 
growth was slowing down, leading to a mild recession in 1928.  
 
                                                 
21
 See: Chapter 1, p.21, footnote 65. 
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Figure 3.2: GDP, exports, imports, Malta, 1921-1938. 
 
Notes: In constant 1938 million pounds sterling. Source: Table 3.6. 
The onset of the Great Depression (1929-1933) had a very limited effect on Malta. The global 
reduction of trade and output seemed to further slow down Malta‟s economic growth. Perhaps 
uniquely in Europe, Malta had positive GDP throughout the period of the great depression. The 
greatest effect of the depression was on the re-exporting business in Malta, which did not recover to 
the pre-depression levels.  
 
This unusual output trend exhibited by Malta was due to its high dependence on British military 
expenditure: Malta was not dependent on the global economy for its prosperity. The very large 
imbalance of exports and imports shown in table 3.6 indicates that Malta was reliant on indirect 
trade, namely military expenditure from Britain, in order to fund its large current account deficit. 
Such indirect income flows had declined from the peak of the First World War, but remained 
relatively stable during the 1920s and early 1930s
22
.  
 
Military expenditure in the interwar period did not provide the prosperity that it bestowed to Malta 
during the First World War. Although the total military expenditure spent in Malta could not be 
calculated, general British defence expenditure was gradually curtailed during the period 1919-
                                                 
22
 Military expenditure was slowly declining but at a slow rate: Bond, B. & Williamson, M. “The British Armed Forces 
1818-1939”  in Millet, A.R. & Williamson, M. (eds.) Military Effectiveness, Vol.II: The interwar period (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1988) pp.98-131, p. 101; Eloranta, J., “Military Spending in History”, 
 http://eh.net/encyclopedia/eloranta.military as consulted 2 Feb 2009,  Table 3.  
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1936
23
. In addition the Mediterranean had a lower priority in interwar strategic planning than other 
theatres, resulting in a gradual reduction of the defence capabilities of Malta, due to expenditure 
being diverted in military sectors, leading to a decline in military expenditure on the island
24
. This 
reduction must have been severe if judged by the very poor state of Malta‟s defence readiness at the 
start of the Second World War: the island had no offensive or defensive air capability, the capital 
ships in the grand harbour were outdated and the army‟s capability of resisting an invasion was 
minimal.
25
. Since the level of British military expenditure was the largest determinant of Maltese 
economic performance, the very gradual growth in the GDP of Malta in the 1930s was linked to the 
reluctance of Britain to re-arm in a substantial way until 1937
26
. Malta was affected more by British 
military decisions than by global trade conditions. 
 
It is not surprising that the greatest decline in output in Malta took place during the Abyssinia crisis 
in 1936. The imminent threat of war with Italy led to the decision by the Royal Navy to move its 
base from Malta to Alexandria, with an immediate repercussion to the Maltese GDP
27
. A recovery 
did take place in 1937 as the crisis was abated and the fleet returned to Malta, while at the same 
time the British remilitarisation expenditure began to trickle into the island. 
 
The correlation of trade to GDP is not high: unlike Cyprus, changes in trade do not provide 
information on the change in output, mainly due to the Maltese economy‟s relation to British 
military inflows. The highest the correlation coefficient of GDP is to exports at 0.65, despite exports 
representing such a small proportion of output. The correlation of GDP to imports (-0.13) and re-
exports (-0.40) is negative and low.  
  
                                                 
23
 For a exposition of the British armed forces strategy during the period see: Bond, & Williamson, “The British Armed 
Forces 1818-1939” (1988) pp.98-131, p. 101 
24
 Pratt,  East of Malta, West of Suez (1975), p10 
25
 Ibid. p.11; pp.120-121 
26
 Coghlan, F. “Armaments, economic policy and appeasement. Background to British foreign policy, 1921–7” History 
Vol.57 (2007) pp.205-216, pp.212-213; Eloranta,  “Military Spending in History”. 
27
 Pratt,  East of Malta, West of Suez (1975) pp.120-121 
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Table 3.6: GDP, imports, exports, Malta, 1921-1938. 
 GDP Imports Exports Re-exports 
1921 4,725,551 2,601,150 167,377 564,258 
1922 5,119,876 2,848,907 223,280 442,565 
1923 5,436,448 3,000,158 226,265 677,067 
1924 5,876,981 3,566,573 284,804 889,214 
1925 6,017,227 3,860,043 242,159 853,491 
1926 6,208,017 3,768,859 198,812 928,223 
1927 6,237,203 3,593,759 227,212 642,299 
1928 6,009,303 3,488,325 238,682 247,096 
1929 6,490,731 3,866,877 243,410 317,087 
1930 6,411,082 3,677,904 172,375 290,622 
1931 6,554,176 2,747,559 194,208 310,920 
1932 6,749,173 3,288,101 180,542 205,482 
1933 6,949,134 3,354,016 138,178 190,200 
1934 7,129,401 3,574,943 180,587 412,056 
1935 7,520,138 3,809,418 199,368 354,618 
1936 7,008,544 3,551,822 199,918 463,721 
1937 7,522,168 4,052,167 252,598 452,975 
1938 7,416,814 3,869,606 219,114 471,077 
Notes: In constant 1938 pounds sterling. Source: Appendix C. 
 
Malta was more open to trade than Cyprus at the beginning of the period. Trade openness (the sum 
of exports, re-exports and imports) was 58.6% of GDP in 1921, reaching a peak of 68.2% in 1925 
before falling back to 55.1% in 1938
28
. However, trade openness was still low, considering that 
Malta had to import all of the inputs for the Royal Navy Dockyard, as well as most of the food 
needed for the population and the British crewmen posted to the island.  
 
Malta‟s exports were minimal. The ratio of exports to imports was less than 8%, with exports never 
exceeding 5% of GDP. It is clear that the trade deficit was only sustainable due to the great inflow 
of British military expenditure. The lack of substantial exports helped cushion the blow of the great 
depression: the impact on Maltese exports did not affect the economy to any great extent, especially 
since the decline in world food prices allowed for a fall in the value of imports without a decline in 
the quantity of food imported. 
  
                                                 
28
 The trade openness indicator increases to 71.6% in 1921, reaching a peak of 82% in 1924 with the addition of re-
exports. 
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Table 3.7: Exports, re-exports to total imports, Malta, 1921-1938. 
Year Imports 
(1) 
Exports 
(2) 
Re-exports 
(3) 
Exports to Imports 
(%) 
(1)/(2) 
Re-exports to 
Imports (%) 
(3)/(1) 
1921 3,723,814 239,617  807,793 6.4 21.7 
1922 3,673,356 287,895  570,639 7.8 15.5 
1923 3,841,793 289,739  867,005 7.5 22.6 
1924 4,416,423 352,668 1,101,098 8.0 24.9 
1925 4,495,966 282,054  994,099 6.3 22.1 
1926 4,539,037 239,440 1,117,908 5.3 24.6 
1927 4,285,514 270,947  765,934 6.3 17.9 
1928 3,999,109 273,631  283,277 6.8 7.1 
1929 4,041,926 254,429  331,441 6.3 8.2 
1930 3,836,260 179,797  303,135 4.7 7.9 
1931 2,714,530 191,873  307,182 7.1 11.3 
1932 3,319,207 182,250  207,426 5.5 6.3 
1933 3,481,862 143,445  197,450 4.1 5.7 
1934 3,469,055 175,238  399,851 5.1 11.5 
1935 3,770,483 197,330  350,994 5.2 9.3 
1936 3,466,217 195,100  452,545 5.6 13.1 
1937 4,019,569 250,566 449,331 6.2 11.2 
1938 3,869,606 219,114  471,077 5.7 12.2 
Note: In current pounds sterling. Source: Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938) 
 
Per capita GDP at factor prices 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the per capita GDP, imports and exports of Cyprus for the period 1921-1938. The 
per capita GDP highlights the poor economic performance of the island: the increase of the 
population in Cyprus put pressure on output, making it difficult for Cyprus to maintain positive 
economic growth
29
. 
 
The combination of the great depression and the serious drought of 1931-1933 wiped out all per 
capita economic growth since 1921. Per capita GDP in 1932-1933 was less than in 1921, which was 
a year of severe recession in Cyprus. Thus any economic frustrations of the Cypriot during the 
October 1931 riots were understandable, as the depression wiped out ten years of economic growth 
and progress, with Cypriots being on average worse off than the recession of 1921.  
  
                                                 
29
 See: Chapter 3, pp.55-58, Section “ Population estimates” 
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Figure 3.3: Per Capita GDP, Exports and Imports, Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 
Note: In constant 1938 Cyprus pounds. Source: Table 3.2; Appendix B. 
 
The great depression led to four years of recession in Cyprus with per capita GDP in 1933 being 
23% lower than its 1929 level. The combined effects of a serious and prolonged drought and the 
trade depression resulted in a severe reversal of output and thus of average income, especially for 
the rural majority. It is worth noting that figure 3.3 charts the decline in constant prices, yet the fall 
of output in current prices was much more serious, with dramatic effects to the agricultural industry. 
Figure 3.4 indicates that the global prices of agricultural goods declined faster than the prices of 
manufactured products, and this was no different in Cyprus, as indicated by the substantial price 
decline of the main agricultural products seen in table 4.5 with wheat and carobs, two important 
products in agriculture, also experiencing even more dramatic falls. The consumer price index 
declined by 64% from 1921 to 1934, and prices of key products did not recover by 1938; food 
prices declined even further, falling by 85% and remaining at low price levels until 1938
30
. Thus the 
terms of trade moved against the value of the main products of Cyprus, at a time when the drought 
was reducing the output of these products: the simultaneous reduction of volume and price brought 
about a „perfect storm‟ of declining values and volumes of agricultural output, leading to a 
tremendous decline in the incomes of Cypriot farmers. Rural Cyprus experienced very serious 
hardship during the period 1929-1934. 
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  Source: Consumer Price Index, Appendix H. 
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Figure 3.4: Global index of prices of agricultural products relative to manufactures, 1913 -1950 (1938 = 100). 
 
Source: Grilli, E. R and Yang M. C. “Primary Commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods Prices, and the Terms of Trade 
of Developing Countries: What the Long Run Shows” The World Bank Economic Review, (1988), issue. 2, no.1, pp.1-
47, Appendix 1. 
 
Overall, the development of Cyprus in the period was poor, considering that the starting year was 
one of recession. The results fit in with the historiography of Cyprus‟ development. They help 
explain the disagreement between the optimists and the pessimists on Cypriot economic 
development. Optimists were looking at the end of the 1930s and the rapid increase of output, while 
historians interested in the long-term welfare of the population were pessimistic due to the slow 
recovery of per capita income after the 1921 recession. 
 
Per capita income data vindicate historians who are pessimistic about Cypriot development during 
the interwar period. Although the optimists can point out that the average growth rate would double 
the income of Cyprus in 36 years, the pessimists can show that the growth rate was less that of than 
other Mediterranean countries (table 3.13), and much lower than the island‟s post-1945 rates of 
growth. The variability of its economic growth was very detrimental to welfare of the population, 
since the violent fluctuations in output had a disproportionate negative effect on the agricultural 
sector, which was mainly comprised by small landowners with limited means.  
 
However, the Cypriot economy participated fully in the European recovery from 1935 to 1938. As 
chapter 5 will indicate, the recovery did not percolate to the large rural base of the population in 
Cyprus as the recovery was due to a rapid expansion of the copper mining sector. The rapid increase 
in mining output did not generate sufficient jobs to alleviate the stagnation in farming output. In 
0
50
100
150
200
250
19
13
19
15
19
17
19
19
19
21
19
23
19
25
19
27
19
29
19
31
19
33
19
35
19
37
19
39
19
41
19
43
19
45
19
47
19
49
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities / Exported Manufactures Food Products / Exported Manufactures
Alexander Apostolides 
 68 
addition the large profits expatriated by foreign mining firms indicate that the recovery was smaller 
in terms of GNP than the GDP estimates suggest.  
 
Figure 3.1 can be used to check opinions expressed by historians and interwar contemporaries. 
Georghallides was wrong to state that the national income had been falling from the end of 1928 to 
the end of 1929 by 20%, since 1929 was a peak year in terms of GDP in Cyprus, with the economy 
performing better than either 1928 or 1930
31
. The governor of Cyprus was wrong to be so optimistic 
about signs of recovery in 1931, since the economy remained in recession until 1934. Oakden was 
correct in arguing that there was gradual growth until 1929, and that Cyprus was still in bad shape 
in 1934
32
. Lanitis argued that the economic recovery was well under way in 1936, but the GDP 
estimates argue that although the recovery was rapid in 1937, 1936 was a year of recession
33
. 
Christodoulou argues that the impact of the great depression was a decline in GDP of 18% from its 
1927 level which he considered a peak of the pre-depression output. Yet the peak-to-trough decline 
in per capita GDP was larger at 23%
34
. Angelides argued that the economy was largely stagnant in 
the 1930s, yet GDP in 1938 was substantially higher than in 1930, even if the majority of the rural 
population might have not felt the benefits
35
.  
 
Figure 3.5 shows the per capita GDP of Malta. The economic growth during the period 1921 to 
1938 was slow, with a doubling of income every 51 years. As in Cyprus the per capita GDP of 
Malta indicates that output was just creeping ahead of the growing population, despite Malta‟s 
slower population growth rate. 
                                                 
31
 Georghallides, Cyprus and the Governorship… (1985) p.327 
32
 Oakden, Report on the Finances (1935) p.23 
33
 Lanitis, Rural Indebtedness… (1944; revised 1992)  pp.39 - 40 
34
 Source: Appendix B; Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle (1992) p.xxxi 
35
 Angelides, “The Cyprus Economy Under British Rule “ (1996) pp.214-215 
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Figure 3.5: Per Capita GDP, Exports and Imports, Malta, 1921-1938 
 
Note: In constant 1938 Pounds Sterling. Source: Table 3.2; Appendix C. 
 
Figure 3.5 confirms that Malta did not experience a reduction in output during the great depression 
in per capita terms: its economic performance was different from that of Cyprus or any other 
Southern European country. The very different economic structure of Malta led to its unusual 
performance: its economic growth was dependent on British defence expenditure inflows which 
isolated it from global economic downturns. Unlike Cyprus, Malta was not experiencing a deep 
recession in 1930 when the acute political disturbances led to the Maltese constitution to be 
suspended. The remaining chapter will confirm that the islands dependence on British defence 
expenditure compromised its economic growth, experiencing income stability at the expense of 
prosperity.  
 
The stability meant that Malta did not participate in the European recovery after the great 
depression, despite the rapid recovery of other countries within the sterling bloc
36
. As a result 
Malta‟s per capita output in 1938 was just 14.3% higher than in 1929, while in Cyprus the 
corresponding figure was 26.1%.  
 
The per capita GDP estimate confirms Bonnano‟s view of the 1920s as a good time for the Maltese 
economy, due to the lack of volatility, but neither Bonnano nor Abela seemed to understand that the 
per capita GDP growth was close to being stagnant during the interwar period
37
.  
 
                                                 
36
 Feinstein, Temin & Toniolo, The European Economy… (1997), pp.170-171 
37
 Bonnano, Capital Accumulation…(1989), pp.15-16; Abela, Malta, A Developing Economy (1963) p.3 
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Purchasing power parity 
 
GDP at factor prices for Cyprus and Malta was calculated in the currencies used on the islands at 
the time: in Cyprus pounds and in pounds sterling in Malta. A comparison of GDP levels in the two 
economies requires their conversion to a common denominator.  
 
The GDP of the two countries is compared by using exchange rates, a consumer goods basket and a 
GDP deflator in order to establish the purchasing power differential and count the Cypriot GDP in 
the Maltese price level.  
 
Firstly the economies are compared using exchange rate conversion. The Cyprus pound was 
controlled by a strict currency board system similar to other British colonies, where the board was 
obliged to keep the Cyprus pound at a fixed parity with the pound sterling
38
. It held sufficient 
reserves in sterling to cover all Cypriot notes and coins and thus the exchange rate of the Cyprus 
pound to the pound sterling was very stable
39
. The comparison of the two economies on the 
exchange rate basis essentially converts Cypriot pounds to sterling at parity. On an exchange rate 
basis, the Maltese GDP was 11.8% higher in 1938, despite having a smaller population than 
Cyprus.  
 
Table 3.8: GDP of Cyprus and Malta based on exchange conversion, 1921-1938. 
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 4,725,551 3,732,544 1930 6,411,082 4,911,844 
1922 5,119,876 4,001,854 1931 6,554,176 4,605,234 
1923 5,436,448 4,125,691 1932 6,749,173 4,213,399 
1924 5,876,981 4,029,952 1933 6,949,134 4,232,438 
1925 6,017,227 4,342,975 1934 7,129,401 4,755,859 
1926 6,208,017 4,169,484 1935 7,520,138 5,318,422 
1927 6,237,203 4,678,897 1936 7,008,544 5,237,377 
1928 6,009,303 4,574,781 1937 7,522,168 6,226,713 
1929 6,490,731 5,189,706 1938 7,416,814 6,544,460 
Note: In constant pound sterling of 1938. Source: Appendix B and C. 
 
However, such a comparison is not representative of the true GDP level due to the different prices 
for goods between the islands. Lower prices in Cyprus meant that the average income of the Cypriot 
would be higher than suggested in table 3.8
40
. Thus the differential in prices from the point of view 
of the average consumer was factored in: the above comparison has been adjusted through the price 
differential of an identical basket of consumer goods in the two economies. 
 
                                                 
38
 Phylaktis, The Banking System of Cyprus (1995), p.42 
39
 Ibid, p.43. The exchange was kept within very narrow bounds: in the period 1921-1938 the largest monthly deviation 
from par was 0.5%. Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books (1921-1938). 
40
 Varchris, M.A & Thomas, J., “International price comparisons based on purchasing power parity” Monthly Labour 
Review, Volume 122, (October 1999), pp.3-12, p.4 
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In 1938 the Maltese government initiated a survey on the nutrition of the Maltese population
41
. The 
survey recorded the weekly expenditure and nutrition pattern of fifty Maltese families. Using the 
average volumes consumed of each item, the value of the weekly food and fuel budget was 
estimated using Maltese and Cypriot prices. Thus the food budget of the average Maltese was used 
to compare the price differential with Cyprus for the benchmark year of 1938
42
. Consumer prices in 
Malta were more expensive than those in Cyprus, raising the Cypriot GDP by 18.5% as shown in 
table 3.9.  
 
Table 3.9: GDP of Cyprus and Malta, adjusted by a consumer basket, 1921-1938.  
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 4,725,551 4,423,604 1930 6,411,082 5,821,245 
1922 5,119,876 4,742,775 1931 6,554,176 5,457,868 
1923 5,436,448 4,889,540 1932 6,749,173 4,993,487 
1924 5,876,981 4,776,076 1933 6,949,134 5,016,051 
1925 6,017,227 5,147,053 1934 7,129,401 5,636,380 
1926 6,208,017 4,941,442 1935 7,520,138 6,303,098 
1927 6,237,203 5,545,169 1936 7,008,544 6,207,049 
1928 6,009,303 5,421,776 1937 7,522,168 7,379,555 
1929 6,490,731 6,150,552 1938 7,416,814 7,756,131 
Note: In constant pound sterling of 1938. Source: appendix B and C. 
 
However, adjusting for the prices of the average food and fuel budget is not representative of the 
prices in an economy as a whole. The different structures of the two economies made it possible 
that Cyprus had lower prices than Malta in food products, but higher prices in other sectors
43
. In 
order to discount this factor the purchasing power parity (PPP) was also estimated using a GDP 
deflator.  
 
The methodology is based on the work of Bassino and Var der Eng
44
. The output of Malta was 
estimated using Cypriot prices and the output of Cyprus was estimated using Maltese prices for the 
benchmark year. Thus the prices of each country are weighted by the volumes of the comparison 
country in order to take into account their differences in economic structure.  
  
                                                 
41
 National Archives, Rabat. File: GMR 1368, “Report of the commission approved to inquire and report on the 
question of nutrition in Malta & Gozo” Appendix A & B. 
42
 It was not possible to estimate non-food items as the description of the items was not specific enough to allow a 
comparison with similar items in Cyprus. 
43
See: Chapter 3, pp. 78-84,“Sector Breakdown of GDP” 
44
 Bassino, J.P & Van der Eng, P. “Economic Divergence in East Asia: New Benchmark Estimates of Levels of Wages 
and GDP, 1913-1970” XIII IEHC, Buenos Aires (2002), p.2, p.4 
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Thus: 
 
             (4) 
where: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝐶 = 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑕𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝐶𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑  
𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑕𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
 
 
 
 
 
It was not possible to match all of the quantities of Cyprus with the prices of Malta or vice versa, 
due to limited comparative price data. Overall 55% of the Maltese and Cypriot total output was 
matched, the majority of which was in the agriculture, quarrying, construction and service 
industries. The resulting purchasing power parity ratio indicated that the general price level in Malta 
was substantially higher in all sectors. Thus in order to establish Purchasing Power Parity, the GDP 
of Cyprus increased by 178%. Thus all Cypriot GDP estimates were multiplied by that factor to 
produce Cypriot GDP in pound sterling as adjusted to the Maltese price level. This allows for level 
comparisons between Cyprus and Malta. Thus, comparing the GDP of Cyprus and Malta on an 
exchange rate basis is grossly misleading: in PPP terms, the aggregate output of Malta was 36.4% 
less than that of Cyprus in 1938. 
 
Table 3.10: GDP, Cyprus and Malta, PPP adjusted, 1921-1938. 
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 4,725,551 6,646,683 1930 6,411,082 8,746,707 
1922 5,119,876 7,126,253 1931 6,554,176 8,200,715 
1923 5,436,448 7,346,775 1932 6,749,173 7,502,960 
1924 5,876,981 7,176,289 1933 6,949,134 7,536,863 
1925 6,017,227 7,733,700 1934 7,129,401 8,468,938 
1926 6,208,017 7,424,759 1935 7,520,138 9,470,715 
1927 6,237,203 8,331,890 1936 7,008,544 9,326,395 
1928 6,009,303 8,146,485 1937 7,522,168 11,088,144 
1929 6,490,731 9,241,507 1938 7,416,814 11,653,968 
Note: In 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: appendix B (PPP adjusted) and C. 
 
The per capita, PPP, GDP in Malta and Cyprus in table 3.11 indicate that the per capita income 
level was quite similar throughout the interwar period due to the lower population in Malta. 
Contrary to Clark‟s estimation, Malta was not substantially ahead in terms of per capita GDP, 
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despite being more urbanised than Cyprus
45
. The slow growth of per capita GDP in Malta meant 
that Cyprus overtook Malta in per capita GDP, but the Maltese did not suffer the repeated recession 
felt by the Cypriots.  
 
Table 3.11: Per capita GDP, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Cyprus Malta Year Cyprus Malta 
1921 21.4 22.3 1930 25.4 26.9 
1922 22.7 23.8 1931 23.6 27.1 
1923 23.1 25.0 1932 21.2 27.5 
1924 22.3 26.6 1933 20.9 28.0 
1925 23.8 26.9 1934 23.1 28.3 
1926 22.6 27.4 1935 25.4 29.4 
1927 25.1 27.2 1936 24.6 27.1 
1928 24.2 25.9 1937 28.7 28.6 
1929 27.2 27.6 1938 29.7 27.9 
Note: In 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: appendix B (PPP adjusted) and C, Table 3.2. 
 
The fact that Malta did not have a higher per capita GDP level than Cyprus before the Second 
World War is important, as the national accounts of the Malta for in 1954 indicate that the island‟s 
per capita GDP was 17.6% lower than that of Cyprus
46
. Thus the belief of a higher income level in 
Malta in the interwar period was based on the assessment of British officials who found amenities 
not present in Cyprus but failed to take account of the general poverty of the population. It would be 
very difficult for Malta to have had a higher income in 1938 as in PPP terms the per capita GDP of 
Malta in 1950 was 53.6% lower than that of Cyprus; thus for this to be true Cyprus would have to 
grow at an implausible rapid rate in the middle of War
47
.  
 
Although they are not estimated of output for the 1940s the results confirm that the transformation 
of the Cypriot economy took place during that decade. Cyprus benefited by being integrated in the 
nearby markets through the Middle East Supply Centre during the war, while Malta suffered a 
prolonged siege and blockade that caused considerable hardship and damage, leading to a 
significant decline in income
48
. In addition the Second World War increased Cyprus‟ strategic 
importance, while downgrading Malta‟s, thus further opening the income gap between Cyprus and 
Malta. 
 
The GDP estimates on purchasing power parity can be used as a base for converting the constant 
prices of 1938 into internationally comparative units. However such a comparison necessitates a 
                                                 
45
 See: Chapter 2, p. 32, footnote 19 
46
 However, the comparison is flawed as it was based on exchange rate parities. Source: Central Office of Statistics, 
Malta, National Accounts of the Maltese… (1964), Appendix 3 
47
 Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, (2006) 
48
 Wilmington. M.W., The Middle East Supply Centre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971) p.4; 
Castillo, The Maltese Cross (2006) p.159, p.217 
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long term price series, which does not currently exist. More research is necessary prior to the 
creation of such a robust price series, since the existing price indexes use different baskets of goods 
and benchmark years, and quite often an index series ends before a new series begins, creating data 
gaps.  
 
Nevertheless an attempt has been made to make the estimates internationally comparative as 
explained in appendix H. It entails converting the Cypriot estimates that were in constant 1938 
Cyprus pounds to constant prices of 1950. This enables a conversion of the estimates to the 
international measures used by Maddison and by the Penn World Tables
49
. The estimates suffer 
from significant index number problems due to the necessary assumptions made in order to bridge 
price indexes that had differing benchmark years. In addition the estimates in Geary-Khamis dollars 
seem to suffer additional problems due to the misrepresentation of the GDP of Malta in the 1950s as 
explained in the appendix. 
 
Despite the problems in converting the GDP estimates to internationally comparative units, the 
results inspire confidence in the estimated income of Cyprus and Malta. In 2005 international 
dollars, the per capita GDP of Malta and Cyprus in 1938 was I$1,693 and I$1,588 respectively. This 
implies that the average income in Cyprus and Malta in 1938 was higher than the per capita income 
in Egypt (I$1,298) and lower than that of Turkey (I$1,680) in 1950
50
. 
 
In Geary-Khamis 1990 dollars the per capita GDP of Cyprus and Malta in 1938 is GK$1,260 and 
GK$1,160 respectively. Thus the islands were poorer than what was previously thought as the per 
capita GDP of Turkey in 1938 was substantially higher at GK$1,724
51
. This is contrary to the view 
of Madison who estimated the joint per Capita GDP of Cyprus and Malta in 1929 as GK$1,727, 
placing Cyprus and Malta at a higher income level than Turkey
52
. In fact the joint GDP of Cyprus 
and Malta was only GK$1,139, 34% less than Maddison‟s53. The joint estimate of Cyprus and 
Malta for 1929 would place the islands in the Maddison dataset in same income bracket as Bulgaria 
(GK$1,180) and Romania (GK$1,152), and behind Turkey (GK$1,213) and Greece (GK$2,342)
54
.  
 
                                                 
49
 The estimates were converted to 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars (Maddison) and 2005 international dollars (Penn World 
Tables). 
50
 Source: Appendix H 
51
 Pamuk, “Estimating Growth in the Middle East since 1820”, (2006) p.815, Table 1. 
52
 Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy (1995) p.224 
53
 Source: Appendix H 
54
 Maddison, Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison 
 as accessed 9 March 2009 
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The interwar per capita GDP of Cyprus and Malta can also be compared with the islands‟ post-1945 
performance, which is considered as one of the most successful development catch-ups in Europe
55
. 
Malta‟s per capita GDP grew by 4.1% per annum in 1955-1963; post-war growth was particularly 
rapid in Cyprus, with per Capita GDP growing by 4.7% per annum from 1950 to 1959
56
. The rates 
of growth during the interwar period were much lower. Thus, the economic growth experienced by 
the islands before and after the Second World War was centred on different trends: the post-war 
performance of the islands was not simply a continuation of interwar trend, but a new phase of 
economic growth. 
 
Figure 3.6: Per capita GDP, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
 
Note: In 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: table 3.11. 
 
  
                                                 
55
 Crafts. “The Great Boom…” (1998), p.43 
56
 Source: Central Office of Statistics, Malta, National Accounts of the Maltese Islands (1964) p.12; Republic of 
Cyprus, Statistical Pocket Book, no.2 (1980) p.18  
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Growth and cross-country comparisons  
 
Table 3.12 emphasises how the volatile was the interwar period, with Cyprus facing seven years of 
recession, with Malta experiencing five in a seventeen year period. Although Maltese output was 
more stable than Cypriot output, the decline in output in 1929 and 1936 would be considered as 
major recessions today.  
 
Table 3.12: Yearly per capita GDP growth, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938. 
Year Malta Cyprus 
 GDP (%) Per Capita (%) GDP (%) Per Capita (%) 
1921–1922  8.3 6.9  7.2  6.0 
1922–1923  6.2 4.8  3.1  1.9 
1923–1924  8.1 6.7  -2.3  -3.4 
1924–1925  2.4  1.1  7.8  6.6 
1925–1926  3.2 1.8   -4.0   -5.1 
1926–1927  0.5 -0.8  12.2   11.0 
1927–1928 -3.7 -4.9   -2.2    -3.3 
1928–1929  8.0  6.6  13.4   12.2 
1929–1930 -1.2 -2.5  -5.4   -6.4 
1930–1931  2.2  0.9  -6.2   -7.3 
1931–1932  3.0  1.6  -8.5  -10.1 
1932–1933  3.0  1.5    0.5    -1.3 
1933–1934  2.6  1.2  12.4    10.5 
1934–1935  5.5  4.0  11.8     9.9 
1935–1936 -6.8  -8.1  -1.5   -3.2 
1936–1937  7.3  5.8 18.9 16.9 
1937–1938 -1.4 -2.8   5.1   3.3 
1921–1938 2.7 1.3 3.4 1.9 
1921–1929 3.5 2.1 3.1 1.9 
1930–1938 1.8 0.4 3.7 2.0 
GDP Peak to Peak 
(1925-1937) 
1.9 0.6 3.0 1.6 
Note: In 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: see appendix B and C. 
 
In order to minimise issues of cross-country comparability, one compares per capita GDP growth 
rather than per capita GDP levels, as this eliminates errors in GDP levels and allows comparison 
between GDP estimates that were constructed using a different production possibility frontier. Thus 
one is not measuring how advanced an economy was in relation to another, but whether an 
economy was growing as rapidly as its neighbouring economies as shown in table 3.13. Such 
comparisons are to the advantage of the least developed country in the sample since an economy 
that is the furthest from its steady-state rate of growth can have higher growth rates than an 
advanced economy
57
. 
 
 
                                                 
57
 Abramowitz. M. “The Catch-up factor in Postwar Economic Growth. Presidential Address to the Western Economic 
Association, 21
st
 June, 1989”, Economic Inquiry Vol.XXVIII, (1990) pp.1-18, p.10  
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Table 3.13: Average per capita GDP growth, South European countries and colonies. 
  Period Currency 
Growth rate per 
annum (%) 
Turkey  1923–1939 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars  3.0 
Italy 1921–1938 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars  1.6 
Spain 1921–1938 1980 Pesetas -0.6 
Greece 1921–1938 1914 Drachmas  1.6 
Bulgaria 1921–1938 1911 Levas  1.7 
Cyprus  1921–1938 1938 Pounds Sterling (Maltese Prices)   1.9 
Malta  1921–1938 1938 Pounds Sterling (Maltese Prices)  1.3 
Source: Bulgaria- Ivanov "Bulgarian National Income" (Unpublished) Table A.O; Turkey- Pamuk, “Intervention during 
the Great Depression - Another Look at Turkish Experience”, Ch.12 in Pamuk and Williamson, The Mediterranean… 
(2000), p.321, Table 12.1; Greece - Kostelenos, et al, Ακαθάπιστο… (2007), Table 8-Ib; Italy- Maddison, A., Statistics 
on World…(2009);.Spain- Prados De la Escosura “Spain‟s Gross Domestic Product…” (1993), Appendix D, Table D2; 
Malta/Cyprus- Table 3.12. 
 
Cypriot growth rate was similar to the experience of other Southern European countries while 
Malta‟s economic growth was slower that most of Southern European countries58. The economic 
performance of Cyprus was as lacklustre as other Southern European countries, with Malta growing 
slightly slower by 1938. Perhaps surprisingly, both islands were part of the greater Southern 
European group of countries who saw their income disparity with the developed nations grow, 
despite the fact that they did not suffer serious negative consequences due to the First World War.  
 
It would seem that their small size did not provide them with an advantage over their neighbours in 
terms of per capita GDP growth: the existence of a large copper ore body relative to the island‟s 
size on Cyprus and the presence of the Royal Navy in Malta did not result to Cyprus and Malta 
becoming non-typical growth overachievers. The colonies of Cyprus and Malta were doing as badly 
as Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria. Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece who were in a real mess: the First 
World War finished late for them as local conflicts continued after the end of fighting in the western 
front, with Greece and Turkey fighting a war until 1922. In addition these countries faced civil war, 
political and economic instability as their borders were re-assessed after the First World War. The 
negative repercussions of the First World War also led to their governments having to provide for 
the forced repatriation of refugees and tackle with hyperinflation. Cyprus and Malta faced none of 
these problems after the First World War: the war was very beneficial to their economies, while 
their status as British colonies meant that they were not affected by war damage. Yet despite this, 
Cyprus and Malta did as badly Bulgaria and Greece; looking at the annual rates of GDP growth, it 
is evident that the growth performance of the colonies (and of Malta in particular) lagged behind in 
the post-depression recovery, while Cyprus had a much larger fall of GDP during the recession than 
the independent states that were battling with so many additional problems.  
                                                 
58
 The growth rate of Turkey is somewhat misleading. The start year coincided with the end of a series of devastating 
conflicts for Turkey that began in 1912 while the end year is the peak year. Thus the growth rate captures a trough with 
a peak, thereby overstating the growth rate. 
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Sector breakdown of GDP 
 
The lacklustre economic performance of Cyprus did not preclude significant changes in the 
economic structure of Cyprus. Establishing the industrial shift is important as economic growth 
becomes sustainable when it is complemented by a change in the economic structure away from the 
primary and towards the more productive secondary and tertiary sectors
59
. If such a shift does not 
take place then the basis for sustainable increases in output is eroded
60
. Thus the GDP estimates in 
Malta and Cyprus are broken down into sectors in order to capture any structural shift and to 
pinpoint why the islands did not perform better that the countries surrounding them.  
 
The GDP of Cyprus is broken down into the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, and is 
presented in absolute terms (figure Figure3.7) and as a percentage of the total value added (figure 
3.8). Due to the short time span, structural changes were expected to be minimal. However, it is 
clear that in Cyprus the primary sector, driven by the expanding mining industry, increased its 
relative size at the expense of the other sectors. This is particularly evident from 1934 onwards; thus 
the recovery after the depression was almost exclusively based on the rapid rise in mining output. 
The economic structure of Cyprus was more advanced than other Southern European countries. The 
proportion of agriculture to GDP in 1938 was 24.5% in Cyprus, as compared to 62.2% for Bulgaria, 
and 39% for Greece and Turkey
61
. Agriculture is still important in the Cypriot economy, but not as 
overwhelmingly important as in Bulgaria.  
 
                                                 
59
 Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth (1966), p.25, p.87 
60
 Schulze, M., “Origins of Catch-up failure: Comparative Productivity Growth in the Hapsburg Empire 1870–1910”, 
European Review of Economic History, (2007) vol.II, pp.189-210, pp.195-196 
61
 Ivanov, M. & Tooze A., “Convergence or Decline on Europe's South-eastern Periphery? Agriculture, Population, and 
GNP in Bulgaria, 1892–1945”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 67, No.3, (2007) pp.672–704, p.685; Pamuk, 
“Intervention during the Great Depression”, (2000), p.321, Table 12.1 
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Figure 3.7: GDP by sector in Cyprus, in 1938 Cyprus pounds (millions), 1921-1938. 
 
Source: Appendix B. 
Figure 3.8: GDP by sector in Cyprus, as a percentage to GDP (%), 1921-1938  
 
Source: Appendix B. 
 
The broad generalisation in sectors does not allow an adequate understanding of the structural 
changes that took place within sectors, especially as the mining sector is to be included, under 
Eurostat classification, in the primary sector. Hence GDP is broken down by industry in figure 3.9 
to better understand the changes in economic structure. It is clear that the growth during the 1920s 
took place across the board: there was no single industry that surged ahead of the others. This 
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partially explains the volatility of Cypriot output in the 1920s as output was still dependent of 
farming and food processing, which was dependent on the weather. Thus the rapid rise of mining 
was clearly a phenomenon of the latter half of the 1930s. In 1921 the mining industry produced 
1.5% of Cypriot GDP, but rose to 17.3% by 1938. The development of new copper sulphate mines 
altered the economic structure of the island and enabled Cyprus to be part of the European post-
depression recovery, as explained in chapter 5
62
.  
 
Figure 3.9: GDP by industry in Cyprus, as a percentage to GDP (%), 1921-1938 
 
Source: Appendix B. 
 
However as figure 3.9 and appendix B indicate, the relative increase of mining was also due to the 
stagnancy of the agricultural industry as agriculture did not rapidly recover from the effects of the 
depression and the drought. The industry was locked in a prolonged crisis, explained in chapter 4. 
The construction sector also experienced rapid growth, increasing its share of GDP from 2.5% in 
1921 to 8.2% in 1938, explained in detail in chapter 6.  
 
Of interest is the reaction of the government to the great depression. Figure 3.9 indicates that the 
share of government was rising over the whole period with a sharp increase during the great 
depression as government expenditure declined less than output: this is analysed in detail in chapter 
8.  
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Malta‟s economic structure is different to any other country of the southern periphery. Malta‟s had a 
“peculiar form of underdevelopment”, which arose from the lack of sufficient agricultural land, and 
the dependence on servicing the British armed forces as a source of employment
63
. The resulting 
effect was a manufacturing industry dominated by the Royal Navy Dockyard, coupled with a 
service economy that catered to the needs of servicemen. Its economy was not just growing slowly 
but it was also not diversifying away from its dependence on the British military presence. 
 
The sector breakdown of Malta‟s GDP is shown in absolute (figure 3.10) and relative (figure 3.11) 
terms. The economic structure of Malta was strikingly different from that of Cyprus with just 7.5% 
of output in 1938 being produced by agriculture. Despite being considered an underdeveloped state, 
with similar per capita GDP levels to Cyprus, Malta‟s primary sector was not an important sector of 
the economy, since at no point did it produce more than 11% of GDP. This is due to its dependence 
on external income flows and its geography, and it is clear that the majority of population of Malta 
would be unsupported if agriculture was the main occupation
64. Malta‟s underdevelopment was an 
underemployment of the urban population, and not due to the lack of structural shift towards the 
secondary and tertiary sectors. 
 
Figure 3.10: GDP by sector in Malta, in 1938 Pounds Sterling (millions), 1921-1938 
 
Source: Appendix C. 
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 Fenech, Responsibility and Power… (2005) p.249 
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 Charlton, “Trends in the Economic…” (1960), pp.29-30 
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Figure 3.11: GDP by sector in Malta, as a percentage to GDP (%), 1921-1938 
 
Source: Appendix C. 
 
Figure 3.12 and appendix C indicate that the small primary sector was affected less than other 
sectors during the 1936 recession, which was caused by the withdrawal of the British fleet. In 
addition, although structural change is less dramatic than in Cyprus, there was some change in 
Malta, as manufacturing declined and construction increased as a share of GDP during the 1930s. 
The increase in construction was substantial enough to be commented on by historians and 
contemporaries. Part of it was due to a surge in public works spending by the Maltese self-
government, but the largest increase was in private housing construction, as analysed in chapter 6. 
The role of government shows a distinctive rising trend in Malta, as discussed in chapter 8. 
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Figure 3.12: GDP by industry in Malta, as a percentage to GDP (%), 1921-1938 
 
Source: Appendix C.  
 
It would seem from the aggregate estimates that Cyprus was engaging with the global economy that 
left it open to the vicissitudes of the interwar period. Malta was dependent on military expenditure, 
but as expenditure remained constant and population growth accelerated, Malta headed towards 
economic stagnation. The explanations behind such disparate growth paths are set out in the 
following chapters, which provide a sector by sector analysis of the two economies, in order to 
understand the causes behind the islands‟ poor growth performance. 
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Labour productivity, growth contribution and shift share analysis 
 
The desegregation of output into sectors allows for sector estimates of labour productivity. 
Multifactor productivity was not estimated due to the lack of capital stock estimates
65
. The labour 
productivity that could be estimated here is value added per worker. The absolute number of labour 
used is shown in table 3.14. The information was collected by occupation statistics for the censuses 
of 1921 and 1931; the occupation statistics for 1938 are the log-linearly interpolated results of the 
Cypriot census of 1946 and of the Maltese census of 1948. Some corrections were necessary, thus 
altering the occupation results presented in the censuses. The occupations were re-classified in order 
to fit the correct definition of what constituted primary, secondary and tertiary sector. In addition 
those who were classified as labourers with other occupation were assigned to the manufacturing 
and construction sector, since in the 1921 census labourers were defined as belonging to that sector. 
As a result there can be no distinction between construction and manufacturing and the labour 
productivity is given for the combined secondary sector. 
 
Some additional alterations of the census result were needed to correct known underreporting in the 
occupation data. The women employed in agriculture were revised upwards, as explained in chapter 
4. An upward revision also took place in the employment in mining and quarrying in Cyprus in 
1921 since mining statistics were deficient prior to the establishment of the department of mining in 
1926. The output per worker based on occupation statistics in the 1921 census were clearly too low 
as the miners could not complete the number shifts reported by the public works department in 
1921
66
.  
Table 3.14: Labour force, Malta and Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
Malta Total Labour 
Force 
Agriculture Mining and 
Quarrying 
Manufacturing and 
Construction 
Service 
1921 89841 27931 944 25101 35865 
1931 93304 25678 2246 25281 40099 
1938 95036 24143 1457 24468 44968 
Cyprus Total Labour 
Force 
Agriculture Mining and 
Quarrying 
Manufacturing and 
Construction 
Service 
1921 160708 107024 1377 31560 20747 
1931 178663 110644 3431 35532 29056 
1938 199835 109748 16861 34773 38453 
Sources: Percival, Census...1946 (1947); Hart-Davis, Cyprus…1931 (1932); Hart-Davis, Cyprus...1921 (1922); Malta, 
Eleventh Census...1948 (1949); Malta, Census...1931 (1932) Malta, Census...1921 (1922) 
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 Note however that single productivity in agriculture can be misleading: Federico, Feeding the World…(2005) p.68 
66
 They were 74,469 shifts recorded in 1921 for the mining sector, which could not be covered by the persons occupied 
in the 1921 census. Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle…(1992) p.75.Thus out of 2006 labourers of 1921, 1000 
were assigned to the mining sector in order to be able to work the shifts mentioned by the Public works department in 
1921.  
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Labour productivity was estimated by dividing the sector output by the number of employed 
persons in that sector
67
. However, due to problems in the numbers of persons employed, the labour 
productivity estimates shown in table 3.15 are less robust than the GPD results and need to be 
treated cautiously.  
 
Table 3.15: GDP per employee (Labour Productivity), Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938  
  Cyprus   Malta 
  1921 1931 1938   1921 1931 1938 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
20.1 23.0 26.0 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
13.3 20.4 23.0 
Mining & Quarrying 70.2 109.0 119.5 Mining & Quarrying 26.7 68.1 98.0 
Manufacturing, Handicraft, 
Construction  and Utilities 
58.9 61.3 83.6 
Manufacturing, Handicraft 
Construction  and Utilities 
61.4 89.2 98.0 
Services 113.8 109.2 93.5 Services 72.7 86.3 91.5 
Total Output Per Worker 41.4 44.8 58.3 Total Output Per Worker 50.6 68.5 75.8 
Note: The implied rental income from housing was removed from the GDP before calculating productivity. In 
constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. 
Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted), Appendix C; Table 3.14. 
 
Bearing in mind the limitations, labour productivity growth in Cyprus and Malta was quite 
significant during the interwar period: GDP per employee grew by 2.4% per annum in Malta and by 
2.1% in Cyprus during the period 1921-1938. However, as the estimate does not account for any 
increase in the hours worked this productivity growth, part of the growth of GDP per worker may 
be due to an increase in the average hours worked.  
 
The slower growth of Cypriot productivity was due to the problems facing Cypriot agriculture, 
which prevented it from becoming as productive as it could have been, as analysed in chapter 4. 
The lack of progress in Cypriot agriculture can be seen by the fact that by 1938 Maltese farmers 
were more productive than Cypriots, despite the inherent advantages of farming in Cyprus. The 
dynamic growth of mining in Cyprus was not just a phenomenon in terms of output: mining was 
also becoming very productive, overtaking the service sector as the most productive industry. The 
secondary sector‟s productivity grew substantially during the interwar period, yet it is not possible 
to see if such advances took place in the manufacturing or the construction industry, as explained in 
chapter 6. The decline in the service sector productivity in Cyprus is in part due to the estimation 
method of service output, since a great deal of service value added was estimated using constant 
productivity assumptions; however it is possible that the rural unemployed and underemployed who 
                                                 
67
A better way of estimating productivity would be taking into account the number of hours worked. However, this is 
not possible since there were a lot of people employed in other sectors who were also part time farmers. Since the 
number of hours worked in each sector is unknown, productivity estimates per labour provide us with better estimates. 
Source: Antoniades, A., Mavrogenis, A.P, & Papayiannis, C., Part-time Farming in Cyprus, (Nicosia: Agricultural 
Research Institute, 2001), “Introduction”. 
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were facing the agricultural crisis entered in low productivity service in order to make a living, thus 
reducing the productivity of the sector
68
. 
 
Table 3.16 multiplies the growth rate of each sector by its initial share of GDP in order to quantify 
the relative contribution to economic growth. It confirms that the mining sector was pivotal in 
Cypriot growth, both in the 1920s and in the 1930s. However, it also indicates how in the 1920s the 
tertiary and secondary sectors, as well as the agricultural industry, were more important: despite 
growing more slowly than mining, their large share to GDP meant that their contribution was more 
significant. This changed in the 1930s as mining grew even faster and agriculture stagnated, 
dragging Cypriot growth down; if Cypriot agriculture did marginally better in the 1930s the overall 
growth rate of Cyprus would be much more rapid and closer to the rapid achievement of Turkey. 
On the other hand Maltese growth was centred on the service sector, and the manufacturing sector, 
but it was the slowdown of the service sector that led to the slowdown of GDP in the 1930s. 
 
Table 3.16: Relative contributions to growth (%), Cyprus and Malta, Peak-to-Peak 
  Malta 
  
GDP growth 
per annum Agriculture Mining 
Manufacturing, 
Handicrafts, 
Utilities and 
Construction Service 
1925-1937 1.88 0.05 0.06 0.84 0.91 
1925-1929 1.91 0.27 0.22 0.56 0.82 
1929-1937 1.86 -0.07 -0.01 0.97 1.34 
  Cyprus 
  
GDP growth 
per annum Agriculture Mining 
Manufacturing, 
Handicrafts 
Utilities and 
Construction Service 
1925-1937 3.0 0.16 0.62 0.87 0.91 
1925-1929 4.6 0.91 0.87 0.92 1.69 
1929-1937 2.3 -0.20 0.83 0.81 0.52 
Note: Measurement for all sectors from peak to peak in GDP 
Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted), Appendix C.  
 
The output per worker allows us to make some first estimates of the impact of structural change on 
productivity growth using shift share analysis. The results are indicative rather than definitive due 
to the problems of labour productivity described above, but serve to highlight what underpinned 
growth in Cyprus and Malta. The methodology used is the same as in Schulze and in Fagerberg, 
where growth in aggregate output per worker is decomposed into three elements, with the „residual‟ 
being given an explicitly economic interpretation
69
. The increase in total productivity is broken 
                                                 
68
Clerides, I., Ελεςθεπία, 30 July 1927 
69
 Schulze, M., “Origins of Catch-up failure” (2007) pp.199-201; Fagerberg J., “Technological progress, structural 
change and productivity growth: a comparative study”, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics (2000) vol.11 
pp.393-411, pp.400-403 
Alexander Apostolides 
 87 
down in sectors and into the sector shares of labour to total employment in order to isolate three 
effects: 
 The static shift effect indicates the increase of productivity that is due to the allocation of 
labour. Thus the effect is significant and positive when the employment share of sector with 
high productivity increases at the expense of those of low productivity. 
 The intra-sector effect indicates the contribution to productivity growth from within 
individual sectors as weighted by their respective employment shares 
 The dynamic shift effect measured the impact of the interaction between changes in 
productivity within industries and changes in the allocation of labour between industries. It 
will be high if the sector with the largest productivity growth also has the largest relative 
labour inflow. 
 
A formal explanation is provided below. Define  
Q= aggregate value added  
P= value added per employee 
L= total labour input 
 
𝑃 =  
𝑄
𝐿
=  
 𝑄𝑖
 𝐿𝑖
=     
𝑄𝑖
𝐿𝑖
  
𝐿𝑖
 𝐿𝑖
                                                                           (5) 
 
With i = sector (i = A, G, ..., H)  shown in (3). 
 
Define 
 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖                                                                  (6) 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖                                                                  (7) 
 
Thus substituting (5) and (6) into (4) 
 
𝑃 =   𝑆𝑖𝑃𝑖                                                                                                                      (8) 
 
Further 
∆P =  Pt − P0 and ∆s = St − S0  
 
Where t= final year and 0=start year 
 
From (7) follows: 
∆P =  (Pi0 ∆Si + ∆Pi∆Si + Si0∆Pi)                                                                          (9) 
 
As growth rate: 
∆P
P0
=   
P i0∆S i
P0
 +   
∆P i∆S i
P0
 +   
S i0∆P i
P0
                                                                (10) 
 
The results of the shift share analysis are presented in table 3.17 
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Table 3.17: Shift share decomposition of labour productivity (% per annum), 1921-1938.  
 Percentage change of 
output per worker 
Static Shift Intra-sector Dynamic Shift 
Cyprus     
1921-1938 2.06% 1.10% 0.81% 0.15% 
Malta     
1921-1938 2.41% 0.32% 2.05% 0.04% 
Note: The implied rental income from housing was removed from the GDP before calculating productivity. 
Source: Table 3.14, Table 3.15. 
 
The static shift of Cyprus is based on the mining and service industries since they are the only 
industries with an increasing share of the labour force. People were moving out of low productivity 
agriculture and into services that had a higher productivity. However, the productivity of the service 
sector declined as the additional labour did not induce productivity improvements, which explains 
the very limited impact of the dynamic shift effect. Only the mining sector had a positive dynamic 
effect, but its impact is limited due to the fact that other increasingly productive industries, such as 
manufacturing, were shedding labour in Cyprus. The intra-sector productivity effect is important, as 
the secondary sector and to a lesser extent agriculture, maintained their output despite the relative 
decline of labour they employed.  
 
This intra-sector effect is particularly important in Malta, with 85% of the increase in productivity 
coming from sectors maintaining output despite shedding labour. This was particularly true in the 
secondary and tertiary sector. The only industry with some static and dynamic effect was the service 
industry, but such effects were much less powerful that the intra-sector effect. The low value of 
static and dynamic shift imply that labour was not moving to the faster growing sectors and that 
structural change in terms of output and labour shift was limited.  
 
The results of labour productivity and of the shift share analysis are contrary to expectations: they 
imply that the lacklustre growth of the islands was due to the failure in providing enough 
employment for the growing populations of the islands and not due to the lack of productivity 
growth. This was especially true for Malta: the inability of Malta to providing enough employment 
is seen by the divergence of the per capita GDP and per worker GDP. This implies that the 
lacklustre growth was due to the fact lack of employment opportunities, since those in employment 
managed to substantially increase their productivity. Greaves was correct to see the problem in 
interwar Malta of one of lack of additional opportunities for employment
70
. Thus the population 
was growing faster than the opportunity to employ them remuneratively employment.  
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 Greaves.  Report on Economic Conditions…(1935)  p.38  
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The substantial growth in labour productivity might indicate a story of “haves” and “have-nots”. 
The population was rising rapidly in both Malta and Cyprus, while labour productivity was rising at 
a faster rate than per capita GDP. Thus employment grew slower than population; as a result more 
and more people must have become unemployed or underemployed. This suggests that the limited 
spoils of the islands‟ lacklustre growth were not shared equally. This was not indicated in the 
bibliography: this excess in human labour might have created an underclass of the population, 
providing the tinder for the political upheavals that struck Cyprus and Malta in the 1930s. If 
Surridge‟s estimates were correct, and 25% of the rural population in Cyprus was below his 
minimum poverty lines, it is likely that these persons are the same ones who were not fully 
participating in the nation‟s economy71 The unequal distribution of the gains of growth seems to 
have also occurred in Turkey and Egypt, and it explains the limited urbanization during the period, 
since “real wages increased for those who had a job, but unemployed migrants could not hope to 
benefit from urban life... thus the rural people remained in their villages and tried to make both ends 
meet”72.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The per capita GDP growth performance of Cyprus and Malta was not spectacular, with the 
predominantly agricultural economy being the prime cause of violent expansions and contractions 
of Cypriot GDP. Such contractions had calamitous outcomes: the combination of drought and the 
great depression led to a large and sustained drop in output in constant and current prices, leading to 
the eruption of violence in Cyprus. Recovery did not come from the agricultural sector but from the 
rapidly emerging mining and construction industries, whose dynamism would also underpin the 
rapid economic growth after the Second World War. The failure of the farming sector to provide for 
the growing rural population was the reason that Cyprus did not grow faster than its South 
European neighbours; the potential was there if the agricultural crisis could have been abated, as 
discussed in chapter 4.  
 
Maltese economic growth was much more stable, but slower than other South European economies: 
the dependence on British military expenditure in Malta led to relatively stable but slow economic 
growth, as military expenditure in Malta gradually declined
73
. This dependence led to Malta 
experiencing trade cycles which were at odds with global economic conditions. It was perhaps the 
only country in Europe not to experience a reversal of GDP during the great depression, but to 
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 Greaves.  Report on Economic Conditions…(1935)  p.32 
72
 Rothermund. D., The Global Impact of the Great Depression 1929-1933 (New York: Routledge, 1996) p.81 
73
 Eloranta, “Military Spending in History”, (2009), Table 3.  
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experience a recession in 1936 as the Royal Navy abandoned the island due to fears of an Italian 
attack
74
. The slow GDP growth was threatened by the increase in the population due to the lack of 
migration opportunities, and the economy found it difficult to employ the increased population. The 
political disturbances that led to the suspension of the constitution in Malta did not take place in a 
background of serious economic distress but of continuing economic stagnation. The economic 
structure of the island encapsulated the British armed forces dominance: the Royal Navy Dockyard 
overshadowed the island‟s manufacturing industry, while the service industry catered the needs of 
British servicemen. Primary production was not so important in Maltese development and the seeds 
of future post-1945 growth were not yet sown in interwar Malta.  
 
Comparing Cyprus and Malta in terms of per capita, PPP, GDP, indicates that incomes were quite 
similar in 1921, but that Cyprus pulled ahead by 1938. The post-1945 income gap between the two 
states is a legacy of the interwar period: as Cypriot mining drove the economy forward, the Maltese 
dependence on military expenditure caused it to lag behind, only for their differing fates during the 
Second World War to increase their income divergence.  
 
The estimates of labour productivity indicate that there was an increase in productivity; it was not 
possible to distinguish if this increase in productivity was due to longer work hours or better 
technology. The productivity increases were across the board but was slower in the agricultural 
sector. The secondary sector exhibited a great increase in productivity but its share of the labour 
force was reduced; with the exception of Cypriot mining, labour was not going to the sectors with 
the largest productivity growth. Most worryingly for the societies of Malta and Cyprus, the results 
of labour productivity seem to indicate a story of insiders in employment reaping the benefits of 
growth and an increasing number of unemployed outsiders that drifted in and out of employment 
and poverty. 
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Chapter 4: Agriculture 
 
“Anyone who writes about farming is likely to be writing critically of the way the 
farming is carried out … government reports are aimed at seeking weaknesses and 
correcting them; the speeches and writings of political leaders … are aimed at 
stressing the effect of bad weather or wrong policy; and even the farmers 
themselves are usually writing with the idea of securing easier credit or better 
prices and therefore paint the gloomiest possible picture. With such a background 
one is apt to overlook the big achievements of the Cyprus farmer, who in the face 
of great climatic and political handicaps has for many centuries supported a 
considerable population and has established a remarkable range of products”1. 
 
This chapter sheds light on the agricultural sector of the islands, which lagged behind the rest of the 
economy, creating a drag on the development of the islands. It is the first time that a detailed 
analysis of agricultural value added has been constructed for the interwar period, and the robustness 
of the underlying data ensures that this is by far the most reliable from all the sector estimates 
presented in the thesis. The agricultural output failed to keep up with the rest of the economy and 
with Southern European agriculture. The sector was not that important to Malta, but it was the main 
employer in Cyprus. As a result of the sector‟s poor growth Cyprus missed the opportunity to 
experience faster economic growth in the interwar period and become the non-typical success story 
of Southern Europe. The problems plaguing the island‟s agricultural sector were not dissimilar to 
those in other peripheral European states but were combined in a particularly serious way: the 
reluctance of the colonial government in introducing radical measures meant that the sector 
remained in crisis until the Second World War. 
 
Agricultural output  
 
The value added of agriculture in Cyprus is shown in figure 4.1. Agriculture was important to the 
Cyprus economy, but its relative importance was falling over time since it failed to keep up with the 
islands lacklustre growth. The share of agriculture in GDP fell from 32.2% in 1921 to 24.5% in 
1938, even though the value added in absolute terms increased. The agricultural sector and the rest 
of the economy were in two different growth patterns particularly after 1935: the recovery of the 
agricultural sector was sluggish while the rest of the economy was experiencing rapid growth. As 
the majority of the population were dependent on agricultural output for their income, the 
stagnation of the industry meant that the income growth of the rural population was slower than per 
capita GDP growth.  
                                                 
1
Percival, Census... 1946 (1947) p.59  
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Figure 4.1: Value added of agriculture, Cyprus, 1921-1938 
 
Note: In 1938, PPP, pounds sterling and as share of GDP. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted). 
 
The relative decline of agriculture would not have hindered Cypriot economic development if 
another sector provided sufficient and more productive employment. In the majority of cases, the 
transformation of a developing country to a developed country necessitates the transfer of 
underemployed agricultural labour to higher productivity employment in the manufacturing and 
service sectors
2
. Yet the previous chapter indicated that this was not the case: some were employed 
by the mining sector but most remained in the countryside leaving the Cypriot economy stuck in 
mid-transition. 
 
The value added of agriculture in Malta is shown in figure 4.2; it was not especially important to the 
economy since the island was transformed into a service-led economy by the middle of the 19
th
 
century
3
. The share of agriculture in GDP remained relatively stable, despite the fact that total 
agricultural output increased in absolute terms.  
 
Weather was an important influence on farming output. The extreme output variation in Cypriot 
agriculture was due to the island‟s erratic rainfall. This was highly problematic for Cypriot farmers, 
since the uncertainty in the possible future output prevented agricultural investment and accentuated 
                                                 
2
 Federico, Feeding the World (2005),p.1.  
3
 Busuttil, S., “Agriculture in Malta: A Historical Note” Options Méditerranéennes (1993) Ser.B, no.7, pp.10-26, p.10 
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problems of rural indebtedness
4
. Malta‟s weather was less variable but poor rainfall in 1936 did lead 
to a reduction in agricultural output
5
.  
 
Figure 4.2: Value added of agriculture, Malta, 1921-1938 
 
Note: In 1938, PPP, pounds sterling and as share of GDP. Source: Appendix C. 
 
The per capita value added of the sector, shown in figure 4.3, confirms the stagnant state of 
agriculture in both islands as it barely kept up with the accelerated increase in their population. This 
situation was particularly apparent in Cyprus, were the per capita value added of agriculture growth 
was just 0.3% per annum for the period 1921-1938. 
 
                                                 
4
 See: Chapter 4, pp. 99-116, Section “Constraints and missed opportunities” 
5
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Table 4.1: Value added of agriculture, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 372,866 2,149,381 1930 526,603 2,866,276 
1922 424,437 2,481,483 1931 523,480 2,543,614 
1923 441,760 2,695,722 1932 507,588 2,305,174 
1924 487,282 2,489,443 1933 499,427 2,124,251 
1925 508,524 2,595,692 1934 607,110 2,573,071 
1926 531,002 2,498,420 1935 543,143 3,009,268 
1927 530,010 2,736,282 1936 449,767 2,553,666 
1928 515,842 2,498,803 1937 542,685 2,743,500 
1929 577,392 2,888,322 1938 554,996 2,851,240 
Note: In constant, PPP, pound sterling of 1938. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted); Appendix C. 
 
The recovery from the slump of 1921 proved unsustainable in Cyprus. The great depression led to a 
sustained fall in agricultural output due to it coinciding with a severe drought; production slipped to 
levels even lower than the recession of 1921. Recovery in the farming sector was slow: the peak per 
capita output of 1929 was not reached until after the start of the Second World War.  
 
Figure 4.3: Per capita value added of agriculture, Malta and Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Table 4.1, Table 3.2. 
 
The agricultural estimates for Cyprus seem to agree with contemporary perceptions. The British 
department of overseas trade estimated Cyprus‟ agricultural output at £1.4 million Cypriot pounds 
during normal conditions, falling to £1 million during drought conditions
6
. This is close to the 
current estimates of £1.4 million during the 1920s, falling to £1.2 million during the serious drought 
of 1933
7
. The report of the director of agriculture for the year 1938 estimated the output of Cyprus 
                                                 
6
 Greaves, Report on the Economic Conditions… (1935) p.3. Deflating Greaves‟ estimates by the CPI to 1938 constant 
prices: £1,011,535 under drought and £1,416,150 under normal conditions. Source: Appendix B 
7
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as £1.3 million Cypriot pounds, with the current estimate being £1.6 million
8
. The same report 
estimated the local production of meat was £700,000 Cypriot pounds, which is close to the current 
estimate of £700,125 Cyprus pounds for 1938
9
. 
 
The results do quantitatively indicate the great agricultural crisis of Cyprus, which was the primary 
concern of contemporary observers
10
. The majority of households were rural, and a part of their 
income was supported by farming activities. Yet in per capita terms the growth of agriculture was 
minimal at 0.3% for the period 1921-1938. This was a calamity that was made worse by the drought 
and the great depression; growing households found their income squeezed despite being near or 
below the poverty line. The situation was particularly bleak, especially for the producers of grain. 
From the mid-1920s grain farmers faced competition from the more productive North Atlantic 
prairies, making it increasingly difficult to make a profit from growing grain
11
. The dire warnings 
on the state of the agricultural sector in Cyprus issued by Surridge and Oakden in the 1930s were 
sound
12
. Surridge argued that the grain farmers of the Mesaoria plains faced competition from 
cheap imported flour, and thus the income of dry land farmers was squeezed and the government 
needed to ensure some protection from foreign products. As appendix B indicates, the output of 
grain in Cyprus stagnated throughout the interwar period.  
 
The situation was no different in Malta. Stockdale argued that although the agricultural sector was 
small it was still important in terms of employment
13
. He argued that the dry farming methods for 
certain crops had already been developed to a high degree of efficiency, but as the hard local wheat 
could not compete with softer imported flour the grain producing farmers were in crisis and needed 
government intervention in terms of import quotas or subsidies
14
. The results are confirmed by 
appendix C, as the output of grains in Malta also stagnated in the period.  
                                                 
8
 National Archives, London. File: CO69/45, Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture 1938, p.1  
9
 Source: Appendix B.  
10
 The examples are numerous such as: Clerides, Ελεςθεπία, 5 Jan 1924 
11
 Federico., G., “Not Guilty? Agriculture in the 1920s and the Great Depression” The Journal of Economic History, 
Vol.65, No.4 (December 2005) pp. 949-976, pp.950-951. However Federico argues that the issue was not one of 
overproduction, but resulted from excess exposure to credit accumulated during the First World War 
12
Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life (1930) p.63; Oakden, Report on the Finances  (1935) p.11 
13
 Stockdale, F.A., Report on the Present Condition of Agriculture in the Maltese Islands (Malta: GPO, 1934), p.v 
14
 Ibid. p.viii 
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Table 4.2: Per capita value added of agriculture, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938. 
Year Cyprus Malta Year Cyprus Malta 
1921 6.9 1.8 1930 8.3 2.2 
1922 7.9 2.0 1931 7.3 2.2 
1923 8.5 2.0 1932 6.5 2.1 
1924 7.7 2.2 1933 5.9 2.0 
1925 8.0 2.3 1934 7.0 2.4 
1926 7.6 2.3 1935 8.1 2.1 
1927 8.2 2.3 1936 6.7 1.7 
1928 7.4 2.2 1937 7.1 2.1 
1929 8.5 2.5 1938 7.3 2.1 
Note: In constant, PPP, pound sterling of 1938. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted); Appendix C; Table 3.2. 
 
Table 4.3: Yearly growth of agriculture, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Malta Cyprus 
 Value added 
(%) 
Per Capita (%) Value added 
(%) 
Per Capita (%) 
1921–1922 13.8 12.4 15.5 14.2 
1922–1923   4.1   2.7   8.6   7.4 
1923–1924 10.3   8.9 -7.7  -8.7 
1924–1925   4.4   3.0  4.3   3.1 
1925–1926   4.4   3.1 -3.7  -4.8 
1926–1927  -0.2  -1.5 9.5   8.3 
1927–1928  -2.7  -3.9  -8.7 -9.7 
1928–1929 11.9  10.5 15.6 14.3 
1929–1930 -8.8 -10.0   -0.8  -1.9 
1930–1931 -0.6  -1.9 -11.3 -12.3 
1931–1932 -3.0  -4.4  -9.4 -10.9 
1932–1933 -1.6  -3.0  -7.8  -9.4 
1933–1934 21.6 19.9 21.1 19.1 
1934–1935 -10.5 -11.8 17.0 15.0 
1935–1936 -17.2 -18.3 -15.1 -16.6 
1936–1937 20.7  19.0   7.4   5.6 
1937–1938  2.3   0.9   3.9   2.2 
1921–1938   2.4   1.0  1.7  0.3 
1921–1929   3.9   2.6  3.2  2.1 
1930–1938   0.7  -0.7 -0.1 -1.7 
GDP Peak to Peak 
(1925-1937) 
0.5 -0.8 0.5 -1 
Note: In constant, PPP, pound sterling of 1938. Source: Appendix B; Appendix C. 
 
The growth of the agricultural sector was particularly disappointing especially in per capita terms. 
Federico argues that under certain conditions an increase in agricultural output can aid development 
by also providing food for the workers in other sectors, by creating a market for local 
manufacturing and by earning foreign currency
15
. Despite the fact that open economies can 
substitute the functions of the agricultural sector, it is still vital for a developing economy that the 
agricultural sector can increase its output to feed the increasing population while at the same time 
releasing labour to other sectors
16
.  
  
                                                 
15
 Federico, G., “Italy” p.8; http://www.eui.eu/HEC/People/Faculty/Profiles/federico-publications.shtml as consulted on 
12 Jan 2008  
16
 Federico, “Italy” p.9 
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Table 4.4: Average annual agricultural growth, Southern European countries and colonies, 1921–1938. 
  Period Currency 
Agricultural Value Added 
growth per annum (%) 
Turkey  1923–1938 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars  4.4 
Italy 1921–1938 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars   0.85 
Spain 1921–1938 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars  -1.3 
Greece 1921–1938 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars  5.1 
Bulgaria 1921–1938 1911 Levas  4.0 
Cyprus  1921–1938 1938 Pounds Sterling (Maltese Prices)   1.7 
Malta  1921–1938 1938 Pounds Sterling (Maltese Prices)  2.4 
Source: Bulgaria - Ivanov & Tooze “Convergence or Decline on Europe's South-eastern Periphery?” (2007), p.695; 
Turkey - Pamuk, “Intervention during the Great Depression - Another Look at Turkish Experience”, Ch.12 in Pamuk 
and Williamson, The Mediterranean… (2000), p.321, Table 12.2; Italy, Spain, Greece – Federico, Feeding the World, 
(2005) Statistical Appendix; Malta / Cyprus – Table 4.2. 
 
The poor growth of the islands is stark when compared to the agricultural sectors of Turkey, 
Bulgaria and Greece, shown in table 4.4. For most Southern European countries, the interwar period 
saw an acceleration of agricultural output; this took place despite the general reduction of the prices 
of agricultural products from their peak First World War levels
17
. This increase was mostly due to 
an expansion of inputs (land, fertiliser and labour), aided by the increasing government investment, 
regulation and protectionism
18
.  Greece and Turkey achieved a substantial increase in yield and 
output through a greater use of new varieties, and combined in Greece with increased government 
intervention, agriculture achieved rapid growth after the depression
19
. For these countries the 
agricultural industry was a driving force of their economies. The agricultural industry of Malta and 
Cyprus did not sustain the islands growth, becoming a drag to their economies and falling behind 
neighbouring countries in terms of growth.  
 
However, it is worth noting that the share of agriculture in GDP of the islands was much lower than 
in Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece, perhaps indicating that the sector was already at a higher level of 
development
20
. Even so the growth rate of Cypriot agriculture indicated stagnancy as more 
advanced neighbouring colonies were using the agricultural sector as an engine of growth
21
. A 
better performance of the agricultural sector would have led to the islands, particularly Cyprus, 
having rapid economic growth. 
 
                                                 
17
 Source: Output, Federico, G., Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture 1800–2000, (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), p.18. Prices: Federico., G., “Not Guilty?” (2005), p.951 
18
 Federico, Feeding the World (2005), pp.2-3; Ivanov, M. & Tooze, A., “Convergence or Decline on Europe's South-
eastern Periphery?”, (2007) p.693  
19
Mazower, M., Greece and the Interwar Economic Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) pp.238-239 p.243 
20
 Pamuk, “Intervention during the Great Depression” (2000), p.326,  Kostis, K., Αγποτική Οικονομία και Γευπγική 
Τπάπεζα: Ότειρ τηρ Ελληνικήρ Οικονομίαρ το Μεσοπόλεμο vol. 1 [Agricultural Economy and Agricultural Bank: 
Visions of the Greek Economy in the Interwar Period], (Athens: Cultural Institute of the National Bank of Greece, 
1990), p.32 
21Such as the Mandate of Palestine. See: Metzer, “Economic Growth and External Trade in Mandatory Palestine…” in 
Pamuk & Williamson The Mediterranean response... (2000), p.365, pp.375-377 
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The lacklustre growth of the industry in the interwar period contrasted greatly with the island‟s 
experience after the Second World War. In Cyprus the growth of output in agriculture accelerated 
prior to independence in 1960, but was still growing at a slower rate than GDP
22
. The independence 
of Cyprus made possible government development projects aided by international contributions. 
These projects were successful in providing the infrastructure needed for irrigation and in providing 
incentives to intensive citrus production. Thus agricultural output increased through productivity 
gains, allowing labour to be available for the secondary and tertiary sectors
23
. As a result the output 
of agriculture in the period 1960-1969 grew by 9.9% per annum, faster than GDP, despite 
employment falling both relatively and absolutely. Agriculture was one of the dynamic drivers of 
Cypriot economic development after the war
24
.   
 
The post-war growth of agriculture was paralleled in Malta. Maltese data after the Second World 
War are not as robust due to their dependence on the income approach, which can be problematic 
with farming communities that rely on unpaid family labour. Despite such limitations the 
agricultural sector increased its relative share of GDP from 1954 to 1963, mainly due to government 
investment in aquifers and incentives towards the production of cash crops such as flowers
25
.  
 
Thus the key question in agriculture is to explain why the islands did not manage to achieve higher 
growth rates of production in the interwar period. The following sections will look at the sector in 
detail and argue that the islands were suffering from problems familiar to other Southern European 
countries. What made the islands different was that these problems were more extreme in the 
islands, which as colonies had governments who were less willing to intervene in order to resolve 
them. 
  
                                                 
22
 Source: Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Pocket Book, No.1. The Cyprus Economy in Numbers and Main Socio-
Economic Indicators (Nicosia: Statistics and Research Department, 1978); GDP growth in constant 1950s prices 4.7% 
p.a., agricultural output growth 2.6% p.a.  
23
 Christodoulou, D. Contributions Towards a Development Plan for Cyprus Agriculture (Nicosia, ROC, 1960), p.2 
24
 Apostolides, A. & Apostolides, C. “Introducing Cyprus in the Economic Debate: The Resilience of Cypriot 
Agriculture in the 20
th
 century 1921–2000” in Hendrickson, K.E., & Pappas, N.C (eds.), Interpreting the Past: Essays 
from the 4
th
 international conference on European History (Athens: ATINER, 2007), pp.271-286, p.277. Source: 
Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Pocket Book, No.1 (1978) 
25
 Source: Central Office of Statistics, Malta, National Accounts of the Maltese Islands (1964), p.vi. 
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Constraints and missed opportunities 
 
The historiography of Southern Europe suggests that countries where agricultural output during the 
interwar period underwent a belated “green revolution”: the farming industry produced more mainly 
due to an intensification of labour effort through the use of labour-intensive cash crops
26
. Such a 
transformation could only take place when farming households were not subsistence farmers since 
the crop was produced exclusively for the market: by the interwar period most of the farmers of 
Southern Europe, including the Cypriots and the Maltese, were highly integrated into the market 
and willing to alter production in response to sufficient incentives
27
. 
 
The belated “green revolution” was aided by the increased intervention by government in the 
agricultural sector: Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria all underwent a process of land reform and 
increased government intervention. Some of the policies were necessary due to the problems 
resulting from the forced resettlement of refugees, and the need to induce autarky in order to save 
on foreign exchange
28
. The increase in output was partly due to increased yields: the yield of wheat 
in Greece during the period 1921-1938 increased by 2.6% per annum, while in Turkey it increased 
by 7% per annum from 1923 to 1938
29
. Yet the main reason for rapid output growth was mainly due 
to a switch to products with a higher value added for which the area held a comparative advantage, 
such as citrus fruit, tobacco and dairy products.  
 
The increased government intervention in agriculture was a worldwide phenomenon during the 
interwar period. Intervention was growing prior to 1929, but the onset of the Great Depression led 
to a “real quantum leap of state intervention” as the political pressure to protect cereal production 
and aid indebted farmers mounted
 30
. Many states were pushed reluctantly into more protectionist 
regimes, but as the interwar period progressed, the increase of protectionism became permanent
31
. 
European countries raised duties on agricultural products and introduced the mandatory use of 
domestic products. Southern European countries also implemented such policies: Greece increased 
                                                 
26
 Ivanov, „Bulgarian National Income…‟, (Unpublished) p.12; Kostis, Αγποτική Οικονομία... Τομ.1 (1990), p.32 
27
 Munting, R. & Holderness, B.A., Crisis, Recovery and War: an Economic History of Continental Europe 1918–1945, 
(Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 1991), p.206; Pamuk, “Intervention during the Great Depression” (2000), p.48 
28
 Kostas, K. & Petmetzas, S., “Growth and Stagnation in the Greek Economy 1830–1940” (2007) p.10, Munting, R. & 
Holderness B.A., Crisis, Recovery and War (1991), p.206, Pamuk, “Intervention during the Great Depression” (2000), 
p.334 
29
 Sources: Metric tons per hectare from Kostis, K., Αγροηηθή Οηθολοκία θαη Γεωργηθή Τράπεδα: Όψεης ηες Ειιεληθής 
Οηθολοκίας ηο Μεζοπόιεκο. Τοκ. 2 [Agricultural Economy and Agricultural Bank: Visions of the Greek Economy in 
the Interwar Period. Vol. 2], (Athens: Cultural Institute of the National Bank of Greece, 1990); Pamuk, S. “Agriculture 
and Economic Development in Turkey 1870–2000” in Lains P. & Pinilla V. (eds.) Agriculture and Economic 
Development in Europe since 1870 (Routledge: Forthcomming) 
30
 Federico, Feeding the World, (2005) p.194 
31
 Mazower, Greece and the Interwar... (1991) p.203, p.214 
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duties on grain by over 50% during the great depression
32
. The result was a deep routed and 
persistent agricultural depression in many developing economies due to overproduction: British 
West Africa experienced similar issues of violence and rural debt as Cyprus
33
. 
 
The depressed price of wheat in the international market kept the price of grain at very low levels in 
Cyprus and Malta. Yet protectionism was not an option: their colonial status prevented the islands 
from taking independent decisions on tariff protection. As parts of the British Empire the islands 
were required to provide imperial preference towards Britain and the Commonwealth, with some 
Commonwealth members being extremely efficient cereal producers
34
. As a result the introduction 
of imperial preference in 1932 did not increase the price of wheat in Cyprus and Malta: cheap 
European flour was replaced by cheap flour from the British Empire
35
. This was to the benefit of the 
urban minority of Cyprus but worked against its rural majority, especially in the populous villages 
of Mesaoria. In 1932 the Cypriot department of agriculture reported that the volume of flour 
imported had increased by 61% while the value remained constant during the great depression, 
placing further pressure on the incomes of domestic grain producers at a time when their output was 
already low due to the ongoing drought
36
.  
 
It was not only the cereal producers whose income was squeezed during the interwar period. 
Exports of carobs and potatoes were also reduced due to the islands‟ being tied to the gold standard. 
The decision by Britain to go back on the gold standard in 1925 hurt Cyprus‟ farming exports to 
Greece and re-aligned trade towards the UK and Egypt. Malta, being overwhelmingly dependent on 
food imports, must have been a net beneficiary of such change, even if it reduced its limited exports 
of potatoes. The decision to leave the gold standard in 1931 should have provided agricultural 
exporters with some respite, allowing for an increase in exports. However, Cyprus‟ major export 
partners, Greece and Egypt, reinforced their own protectionist regimes
37
. Britain and Greece did not 
sign a clearing trade treaty, which prompted the Greek government to discourage trade with the 
Empire in order to save on foreign exchange
38
. Egypt increased the duties on all agricultural 
products including those of the empire in 1929, thus eliminating the second largest market for 
Cypriot exports. The protectionist measures of Egypt were a great blow to Cypriot farmers as it 
eliminated the significant exports of fresh fruit, leading to a decline of Cypriot agricultural 
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 Munting, & Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War (1991), p.33 
33
 Brown, I., The Economies of Africa and Asia in the inter-war depression (Padstow: T.J. Press, 1989) p.3, p.78, p.81 
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 Meredith, “The British Government and Colonial Economic Policy, 1919–1939”, (1975), p.485, p.497. 
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 Oakden, Report on the Finances (1935) pp. 160 - 162 
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 Department of Agriculture, “Introduction” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, part 4, Vol.XXVII (1932) 
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exports
39
. The added benefits of the imperial tariff system did not materialise until 1937 because the 
realignment of Cypriot exports towards the British market was slow due to the scarcity of direct 
transport links. 
 
The relatively low price of agricultural products led to the rise rural debt in real terms, leading to 
massive debt default. During the First World War the international price of grain was high. As table 
4.5 indicates the prices of agricultural products rose during the First World War. The price of wine, 
cotton, wheat and cheese more than doubled during the war, leading to farmers borrowing from 
moneylenders to buy more land to increase their production. The unsettled situation around the 
Mediterranean meant that prices did not fall until 1921, but the reduction in prices was very sudden. 
This drop in agricultural prices led to a dramatic increase in farm debt, making repayment next to 
impossible
40
. In response to the debt the moneylenders forced farmers to sell their land, but by the 
mid-1920s the price of forced land sales was so low that land sales petered out. The debt of rural 
producers was the most important issue in the Cypriot press and the problem remained unresolved 
until the start of the Second World War
41
. 
  
                                                 
39
 Oakden, Report on the Finances (1935) p.18 
40
 Lanitis, Rural Indebtedness… (1944; revised 1992) , p.18, pp.22-23; Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book 1921 (Nicosia, 
GPO, 1922), Section: “A Summary of Industrial Development”. 
41
 Lanitis, Rural Indebtedness… (1944; revised 1992)  p.15 
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Table 4.5: Price Indexes of Cypriot products, 1912-1938 
 
Carobs Potatoes Wine Cotton 
Wheat 
(Wholesale) 
Wheat 
(Retail) 
Goats Cheese 
1912 90 88 305 130 148 90 300 108 
1913 90 86 338 135 131 100 300 131 
1914 88 83 283 132 134 100 200 96 
1915 98 133 259 116 260 160 150 96 
1916 106 210 534 129 322 230 290 92 
1917 107 173 526 253 342 240 250 82 
1918 121 254 506 322 329 200 350 121 
1919 133 250 763 292 329 360 350 157 
1920 164 263 933 460 452 360 325 323 
1921 93 196 275 152 226 200 260 323 
1922 91 186 275 158 159 160 200 254 
1923 81 158 175 206 130 110 110 185 
1924 93 194 125 195 213 150 200 197 
1925 113 159 175 168 227 180 150 185 
1926 93 142 175 164 216 180 150 195 
1927 95 156 175 163 197 180 200 185 
1928 128 154 163 217 242 180 200 156 
1929 135 150 138 197 202 140 225 179 
1930 64 106 125 123 140 130 175 154 
1931 45 138 125 103 117 110 100 159 
1932 65 107 125 22 106 100 100 133 
1933 77 79 125 120 112 80 100 103 
1934 89 104 125 129 105 80 100 97 
1935 95 111 125 136 98 100 100 77 
1936 83 104 125 - 137 100 100 77 
1937 95 90 125 132 - 100 100 100 
1938 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1911-1938).  
 
Under pressure from the Cypriot legislative assembly, a rural survey was commissioned to evaluate 
the debt of the rural population. The survey report argued that majority of rural households had 
unserviceable debt
42
. It argued that peasants were prevented from repaying due to a vicious cycle of 
low agricultural prices, small and fragmented land holdings, and the high interest charged which 
meant that if a repayment was missed the interest on the missed payment made the debt 
unserviceable
43
. The report argued that while there were some unfair practises used by the 
moneylenders, the interest charged by the moneylenders is necessary due to the high rate of debt 
default and due to the lack of alternative venues for credit
44
. Matters were especially grim for grain 
producers in the large Mesaoria valley surrounding the capital, Nicosia. The grain farmers could not 
compete with imported flour due to the small size of their plots and outdated methods of production 
and as a result the report suggested protection from foreign flour imports as a policy to alleviate 
                                                 
42
 Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life (1930) p.32 
43
 Feinstein, Temin,  & Toniolo, The European Economy…(1997) p. 73, fig 4.2; Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life 
(1930), p.63 
44
 Despite its perceptive conclusions the report failed to spot the problem of a reduction of money lending credit due to 
the debt crisis which is discussed below. 
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their plight
45
. The colonial government responded to the reports‟ suggestions by placing import 
duties on flour and wheat, as well as a minor duty on flour from the British Empire. However, the 
duties were too low to be effective: Oakden regarded them as inadequate in protecting the Cypriot 
grain farmer, believing that their sole purpose was to increase government revenue
46
. He argued that 
the way to improve the situation of grain farmers was by giving incentives to switch to other 
products, since domestic wheat was of a hard type that was considered inferior and thus imported 
flour would always be preferred by Cypriot millers. 
 
Yet for the reasons argued below, it was not possible to switch to another product without outside 
support. The survey indicated that at 1929 prices, the average grain farmer‟s profit was very 
marginal, and profit was only guaranteed on years of exceptionally good rainfall
47
. Yet the price of 
grain continued to decline throughout the 1930s, further squeezing the income of grain 
farmers
48
.When farmers make a loss on a crop they will go on producing as long as revenues cover 
their variable costs, unless it becomes more profitable to move to the city for work, since farmers 
did not have the capital for a shift to another crop
49
. Chapter 3 has indicated however, that with the 
exception of mining, the demand for labour in manufacturing was not increasing and as a result the 
grain farmers continued to produce grain. The situation was not different at the end of the period: 
department of agriculture experiments from 1934 to 1939 attempted to find the most profitable 
combination of labour, capital and fertiliser in order to grow cereals, but the research argued that no 
method was profitable because of the depressed value of cereal prices
50
. The only way for the 
indebted grain farmers to maintain their income was by producing other products.  
 
Yet, as figure 4.4 indicates, Cyprus remained largely dependent on its staple products. The increase 
in fruit production was very gradual, thus the shift towards labour-intensive products was slow. 
Cereals and carobs remained key products despite not being able to compete against imported flour 
and industrial animal fodder. Livestock production and animal products were already a significant 
sub-sector producing 25.7% of total output in 1921, and its relative share was expanding. However, 
the drought of 1931–1933 checked the sector‟s growth since the mass livestock deaths during the 
drought led to the de-stocking of the flocks. Although growth continued after 1933, the rate of 
growth was slower as the livestock capital was only gradually restored to its pre-drought levels. The 
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 Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life (1930), p.63; Munting, & Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War (1991) p.17 
48
 The retail prices of wheat in Nicosia declined in 1934 to 57% of their 1929 level, and remained at a low level until 
1938. Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921–1928) 
49
 Federico, “Not guilty?” (2005) p.972 
50
 Department of Agriculture, “Summary of work at the central experimental farm” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal 
vol. XXXIV, issue.1 (1939) p.10 
Alexander Apostolides 
 104 
inability of Cypriot farmers to change the crops they produced was behind the very low agricultural 
growth rates. 
 
Figure 4.4: Agriculture per sub-group as share of value added (%), Cyprus, 1921–1938.  
 
Source: Appendix B. 
 
Figure 4.5 indicates that Malta also did not switch production to more labour-intensive products. 
Bowen-Jones et al stated “that the importance of cereal cultivation remains so great, in spite of 
growing dependence on imported grains, seems strange”51. The staple products (tomatoes, potatoes 
and cereals) remained important throughout the period, with the increase in fruit production being 
gradual. In the animal industry there were changes within the industry, with an increase in pork 
production due to the demands of the Royal Navy for bacon
52
. The abandonment of the Malta by 
the fleet led to a rapid decline in demand for animal products, with animal products falling back to 
its 1921 of output. 
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 Bowen-Jones, et al, Malta: Background for Development (1961) p.188 
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 National Archives, Rabat.  File: The M.H. Hirst Documents, “Radio broadcast by M.H. Hirst on 31 Aug 1942” p.2 
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Figure 4.5: Agriculture per sub-group as share of value added (%), Malta, 1921–1938. 
 
Source: Appendix C. 
 
Thus the failure of the islands in producing comparable growth rates to other South European 
industries was the lack of a shift to crops that were labour-intensive. This is particularly evident in 
cereals: it was simply not possible for the Cypriot or Maltese farmer, armed only with primitive 
farming methods and equipment, to compete with the more fertile and productive cereal regions of 
the New World. What stopped the switch was a host of problems of which credit was the most 
significant. 
 
The lack of a product switch was partly water related. The greatest limitation to agricultural 
production on the islands was the lack of aquifers
53
. The rainfall in the central and eastern 
Mediterranean is erratic and variable. The agricultural output of Cyprus and Malta, presented in 
table 4.2, was closely correlated with the level of rainfall. In Cyprus there is an even chance of high, 
average or low rainfall every year. Yet during the interwar period the lowest three years of rainfall 
were consecutive, from mid-1931 to mid-1934
54
. The catastrophic results of the drought have been 
mentioned above. Low rainfall in 1935 and 1936 was also a contributing factor to the steep 
reduction in agricultural output in Malta
55
. Bowen-Jones et al argued that the lack of water 
resources was the most serious problem facing Malta under British rule, and that it remained critical 
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until the 1960s
56
. It was clear to contemporaries that increased irrigation would enable an increase 
in output by replacing grain with citrus orchards: experts in Malta suggested that the irrigated area 
“could doubtless be considerably extended… were capital available”, while the governor of Cyprus 
argued that with additional irrigation the island could be turned into the market garden of Britain
57
.  
 
However additional irrigation entailed huge capital investment which the farmers of Malta and 
Cyprus could not undertake, as they exhausted all the water resources that were accessible within 
their limited means
58
. Other European governments took an active interest in investing in irrigation 
projects during the interwar period but such projects were very expensive
59
. There were some 
efforts in Cyprus by the government through the Western Mesaoria Project and the Artesian 
Mesaoria Project, but the results were less than impressive. The substantial increase of water on the 
Mesaoria took place after the Second World War, as post-war irrigation investment transformed a 
large part of the plain into citrus orchards, whose productivity per acre was as efficient as that of the 
advanced orchards in Israel
60
. 
 
Thus the government did try to aid agricultural investment, but the execution of the irrigation 
projects was inefficient and produced poor results: the government was unwilling to spend 
substantial amounts and thus focused on schemes that were small and on trapping water runoff. As 
a result water was available only in the spring and only when rain was abundant
61
. The projects 
could not be used to convert the Mesaoria plain into orchards as citrus fruits needed an annual 
rather than a seasonal water supply. Thus water was expended on grain crops with little gain and as 
a result these projects were abandoned by 1945 as they were costly, wasteful and inefficient
62
. 
Government drilling did discover underground water resources in the western part of the plain, but 
the funds for their exploitation were not released until after the Second World War.  
 
The lack of sufficient water in Malta was just one reason for the lack of further specialisation in the 
agricultural sector. Malta had clear geographical limits on agricultural development. The islands are 
formed by steep limestone hills with very thin soils, limiting the quantity and quality of cultivated 
soil. As a result, fields in Malta are constructed rather than cultivated. The limestone is cut and 
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placed as a wall to create terraces, which are then covered by any soil found during the excavation 
of the limestone. The resulting fields are very small, and have only a thin layer of soil, and thus are 
not amenable to mechanical cultivation methods
63
. The only way to intensify production was with 
the introduction of more water and more soil, which required substantial investment and know-how. 
However such investment was not forthcoming from private or government sources, and as a result 
the arable farmers of Malta continued producing grain while trying to find part-time work in the 
service sector
64
. 
 
These geographical limits in Maltese arable agriculture did not prevent the livestock sector from 
becoming quite labour intensive prior to the First World War. This was the case in beef production 
and bacon production, which developed very intensive forms of production attuned to the needs of 
the military presence on Malta
65
. The beef and cow milk sector was aided by the presence of a large 
British community, with a preference for beef and for cow‟s milk, and with a higher purchasing 
power than the local Maltese community
66
. These industries minimised the use of scarce fodder by 
importing large numbers of lean stock for a short period of fattening. The fattening of bullocks took 
place in stalls with intensive feeding using imported feeds of high caloric value
67
. The product was 
not of high quality, and value added per head of cattle was low because production was dependent 
on imported stock and fodder, but the sector was efficiently limiting the opportunity cost of 
producing fodder on scarce land. The intensive production of the beef and dairy milk sector 
overtook the staple goat sector in terms of output. 
 
Goats provided most of the milk drunk by the local population but goat husbandry was far from an 
intensive use of agricultural land and labour. Yet the shepherds delivered their product by directly 
by taking their goats to the city to deliver at the doorstep intensifying the labour of shepherds who 
took care of both the production and retailing of their product
68
. Thus there were ways to intensify 
animal production, even if the intensification of arable production depended on additional water 
resources. 
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Thus for Malta the lack of potential for further agricultural growth was clear: although its prospects 
were also affected by issues of land fragmentation, the main problem behind its growth 
performance was that the island was already operating as intensively as the geographical limitations 
and water resources allowed. Its arable sector was challenged by geographical limits, while the 
animal sector was already a labour intensive sector, transformed by the demand for of the British 
armed forces. Alleviating issues of credit, land fragmentation, and mechanisation would have 
improved its performance but such growth would still be limited by the geography and the lack of 
water. 
 
Water was not the only constraint in intensified labour effort. Another serious constraint on 
agricultural performance was the very fragmented ownership structure on the islands
69
. Land was 
not just broken down into unsustainable fragments but also scattered in several plots around a 
village. This created farms that were uneconomic and thus it was more difficult to switch to other 
products. Although this problem was common in South Europe, land reform reduced its impact in 
the area; yet as table 4.6 indicates, the fragmentation of land ownership was very serious in Cyprus 
and Malta.  
 
Table 4.6: Agricultural population and farm size in Southern Europe, circa 1930. 
Country 
Agricultural population 
per Km
2
 of arable land 
Percentage of population by farm size, (%) 
1-5 ha 5-10 ha 10-50 ha 
Over  50 
ha 
Bulgaria 95.4 29.1 37.3 32 1.6 
Czechoslovakia 69.4 20 19.5 39.4 21.1 
Greece 86.7 16.9 11.7 21.6 49.8 
Hungary 63.1 14.6 12 22.1 51.3 
Italy 53.4 17.5 13.6 26.3 42.6 
Poland 86.9 14.8 17 20.9 47.3 
Romania 79.7 28.1 20 19.7 32.2 
Spain 34 18.8 7.1 15 59.1 
Yugoslavia 100.1 28 27.9 35.3 9.7 
Cyprus 95.6
+
 38.4 44.5 16.9  N / A* 
Malta 1048.5
+
 70 30 N / A* N / A 
Notes: * Some large estates did exist but were not enumerated separately for Cyprus and Malta; they did not make a 
large section of arable land. 
+
For Cyprus and Malta the rural population was used. Source: All countries except Malta 
and Cyprus- Ivanov and Tooze, “Convergence or Decline on Europe's South-eastern Periphery?”  (2007) p.688; Malta - 
Malta, Census...1931 (1932), Malta, Statistical (Blue) Book 1926(Malta: GPO, 1927), Bowen-Jones, et al. (1961) p.289 
Cyprus- Hart-Davis, Cyprus…1931 (1932); Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life… (1930)  pp.54-58, Lanitis, Rural 
Indebtedness… (1992), p.9. 
 
What is apparent is that Malta was unique in having such a large number of people living on 
agricultural land. This is a function of the population pressure brought to bear on a limited amount 
of cultivated land, but also due to the fact that most rural inhabitants only worked on the land part-
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time. The agricultural industry acted as a buffer for the armed forces: employment in serving the 
navy would take up most of the time of the rural population during times of demand, only for 
people to fall back on agriculture at times when the fleet was not in harbour
70
. Bowden-Jones 
argues that the function of the sector as a buffer resulted in a “technical static, status declining and 
credit starved industry which from time to time lost its most vigorous and enterprising young 
workers or gained a flood of generally poor and semi-skilled workers”71. 
 
There are no data on how many of the population classed as farmers worked full time in the sector. 
In 1961, only 14% of those who stated that they were farmers had agriculture as their only 
occupation
72
. In 1891 it was estimated that 71% of farmers worked full time: this suggests that there 
was a decline in the number of people working full time in agriculture from 1891 to 1963
73
. This is 
corroborated by Richardson and Thorp who argued that there was a gradual increase of the number 
of farmers working part time in agriculture in the interwar period in Cyprus and Malta
74
. What is 
surprising is that Cyprus was being considered by the British authorities as a target for rural 
immigration, and yet the area of farmland available was very small, with the population pressure on 
the land being as bad as the worst in Southern and Eastern Europe
75
.  
 
A greater hindrance to intensifying production was the average size of the farm. The optimal size of 
a farm community is a hotly debated topic: there is no consensus since optimality is dependent on 
climate, soil fertility, farm management and the crops produced
76
. Family farms can be more 
efficient than large estates, yet they can also be inefficient if they are too small and unable to invest 
sufficient capital to introduce mechanised production methods or introduce new crops. As table 4.6 
indicates, Cyprus and Malta had the largest number of farms under five hectares in all of Southern 
and Eastern Europe. Even if the farmers worked on their farms intensely, such fragmented land 
ownership resulted in uneconomical farms, especially since their land was scattered in several plots 
around a village and not consolidated in a single holding
77
. The owners of small farms could not 
consolidate their land and switch easily to producing other products, and sought other employment 
to compensate their income when possible
78
. There are examples how small size could prevent 
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product diversification in Greece: the areas around Komotini and Drama switched from tobacco to 
cereals when the relative price of products reversed, but the areas around Kavalla and Xanthi found 
diversification difficult since landholdings were tiny at 1 hectare or less
79
. Thus small and 
fragmented landholdings acted as a barrier to intensive agriculture and prevented product 
diversification.  
The fragmented landholding was partly due to the land ownership system in place. Cyprus 
maintained the Ottoman system of inheritance that provided all relatives with a share of the 
property of a deceased family member and allowed for all inheritance to be split into shares. This 
system of inheritance tended to fragment land, water rights and even trees into unsustainable 
shares
80
. The inheritance system prevented change since land kept fragmenting into pieces unless 
the farmer had enough credit to buy out all other parties and covert the land to other production. 
There were very few large farms in Cyprus since the majority of the population held small rural 
holdings: Cyprus was an island of rural smallholders.  
 
The system of land ownership in Malta was also problematic. Most land in Malta was owned by the 
British armed forces, the church or local nobles. The land was given to tenants on long freeholds, in 
theory on an emphyteutic lease, in order to maintain the terraces and improve the quality of the 
farmland
81
. However, in practice the leases were frequently revised and given to new owners, 
leading to the gradual parcelization of land into ever smaller farms
82
. The reason behind the 
reduction of the share of land is apparently related to the growth of the Maltese population, which 
created an ever increasing class of landless peasants. This was a situation that the church was 
anxious to avoid, and therefore freeholds were being broken down into ever smaller portions by the 
church
83
. Thus the combination of geology and population pressure led to the total fragmentation of 
Maltese farmland making it very difficult for Maltese farmers to change production or invest in 
mechanical methods. 
 
All these issues made a shift to labour-intensive products difficult, yet the main reason for the lack 
of a “green revolution” were the twin issues of credit and debt. As mentioned previously, Cyprus 
suffered from high levels of defaulted rural debt as land was purchased during the First World War, 
leading farmers overexposed to moneylenders after the sudden decline in prices in 1921. The rural 
debt was the major economic issue of the day, prompting angry newspaper criticism and several 
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governmental reports. Surridge estimated in 1929 that rural debt was as high as £1,769,043 Cyprus 
pounds. Oakden argued that the defaulted debt increased during the great depression and drought, 
suggesting that the debt increased by 1934 as £2,000,000 Cyprus pounds
84
. Thus the rural debt of 
Cyprus grew from 36% in 1930 of GDP to 42% in 1934. The continued low prices of the main 
arable products also increased the debt that became unserviceable. The issue was considered so 
detrimental to the war effort that a Debt Settlement Board was set up in 1940 in order to settle the 
interwar debt that was still outstanding
85
. The board estimated the total rural debt had increased to 
£2,329,000 Cyprus pounds. The Debt Settlement Board allowed farmers and creditors a forum to 
renegotiate any loans in order to liquidate any outstanding rural debt, with great success since it put 
pressure the creditors to accept punitive settlements, leading to many moneylenders settling outside 
the board
86
.  
 
The most important reason for the stagnation of Cypriot agriculture in the interwar period was that 
the defaulted debt disrupted the credit cycle, leading to a credit crunch. The defaulted rural debt 
reduced the capital available by moneylenders for farming credit. Credit was necessary for farming 
in Cyprus due to the variable weather and the fact that all the main crops were harvested in the 
summer. The farmer would borrow money prior to the sowing of a crop in order to pay for its 
production costs and for his upkeep until harvest time: the moneylender charged a high rate of 
interest on that amount, usually secured on mortgaged property
87
. The market for farming credit 
was still controlled by moneylenders, although co-operative credit societies and an agricultural bank 
were established during the period, as explained below
88
. Quite often the moneylenders in Cyprus 
and Malta were also the wholesalers of agricultural products, and they would ensure they purchased 
the harvest from the farmer at a lower price predetermined when the loan was taken
89
.  
 
The failure of farmers to repay their loans from 1921 onwards led to the freezing of a large part of 
the capital held by moneylenders. The farmers found the price of their products decrease in the 
interwar period, making the repayment of their loans unsustainable. The moneylenders found most 
of their capital frozen in defaulted loans; their efforts to recapture their investment through the 
forced sale of land and by sequestering crops brought very limited results as the price of land and 
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crops declined. The drought and the great depression killed off the moribund credit market. The 
consecutive poor rainfall led to a failure of most crops, increasing the defaulted loans, while the 
moneylenders could not afford to buy the crop from the farmers since the harvest price was even 
lower than the predetermined sale price. Thus the dual calamity of the great depression and the 
drought in Cyprus led to a complete dislocation of the rural credit system: the moneylenders had no 
money to lend and the farmers could not sell their crops at remunerative prices. The results are 
described by Clerides: The cycle of credit was in a logjam: even people with substantial capital and 
credits became insolvent as they could not collect their investment from their debtors
90
. The lack of 
re-payment led to a mass of expensive lawsuits, which resulted in even solvent farmers losing their 
property, leading them to flock to the city to seek work as labourers. Yet the lack of industry meant 
that the landless tried to make a living as peddlers and petty vendors. 
 
Thus the issue of the debt problem and credit were interrelated. The traditional credit market could 
not be operational without restoring liquidity to the moneylenders, and the only way for the 
moneylenders to reclaim their debt was by the return to profitability of the farmers. Yet most 
farmers could only raise their income with product diversification; such diversification required 
substantial capital that was more than what the farmer could borrow or the moneylenders could 
lend. The Cypriot press argued that only a long-term agricultural recovery plan that took into 
account the need for credit provision and product diversification could lead Cyprus out of the crisis 
and that only the government could implement such a plan
91
. 
 
The case study of the Mesaoria plain can be used to best explain the critical role of credit and the 
need for government intervention. Mesaoria was a large central plain primarily used for cereal dry-
farming. It was clear to contemporaries that where underground water was discovered the land 
could be converted to intensive citrus production with sufficient investment in irrigation and trees
92
. 
 
However, the cost of converting land to citrus production was prohibitive for the farmer: using the 
costs provided in the Cyprus agricultural journal, the cost for converting an acre of land to citrus 
production was £737 Cyprus pounds in 1938, more than 44 times the annual per capita income
93
. 
The high cost is due to the fact that a newly established citrus plantation required four years from 
when the trees are planted until the first crops were produced, while needing constant attention and 
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expense prior to the production of the first crop. Thus converting production to citrus was only 
possible with the aid of a large investor such as some citrus orchards outside Limassol, Larnaca and 
Famagusta, which were funded by Jewish interests
94
. Since other larger investors were not 
forthcoming, the funds necessary to covert parts of Mesaoria into orchards needed to be provided by 
the government. It was not possible for the owners of small and scattered plots to borrow such an 
amount, yet only with a shift of products produced would the “green revolution” take place in 
Cyprus. 
 
The pivotal importance of credit is made clear from the way in which Cypriot farmers reacted to the 
falling agricultural prices. Farmers found it difficult to secure the large capital needed to shift to 
more intensive forms of production, thus smallholders attempted to increase the productivity of 
their land on the products they were already producing, by invested in smaller capital outlays that 
they could afford, such as increasing the use of artificial fertiliser. As a result, Surridge claimed that 
the use of artificial fertiliser in cereal production was at times excessive
95
. The farmers wanted to 
invest in their land and did so in any way that they could.  
 
The local press and the Cypriot legislative councillors were aware that the lack of credit was 
harming the largest sector of the economy. Georghallides convincingly proved that their chief 
demands were for urgent action on the issue of rural debt, often providing suggestions of real 
merit
96
. The government of Storrs shared their view and attempted to solve the issue. However it 
attempted to do so without disturbing the central policies of balanced budgets and government non-
intervention in the economy. Yet, the necessary credit to transform Cypriot farming necessitated a 
much greater intervention by government, the only institution in Cyprus that could provide finance 
towards increasing the amount of land brought under labour intensive cultivation crops. Ad-hoc 
measures such as the failed agricultural bank absorbed significant government expenditure while 
better, well-thought out plans of the Cypriot legislative councillors were ignored.  
 
The problem was not that the government did not attempt to solve this problem, but that its 
parochial efforts led to limited results at great cost. Governor Stevenson was very reluctant to 
intervene, but after sustained pressure from the Cypriots in the legislative council, a small 
agricultural bank was jointly set up by the government and the Imperial Ottoman Bank in 1925. Its 
aim was to provide medium term loans to farmers but is loans were not linked with efforts to 
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restructure production towards more remunerative crops: the maximum a farmer could borrow was 
£100 and that was far less than what was needed to convert an acre of land into a citrus orchard. 
Cypriot council members warned the government that the original capital of £50,000 was too small 
and the banks operating method increased the chances that the bank would collapse but their 
warnings went unheeded by the colonial government
97
.  
 
Unusually for a British governor, Stevenson‟s replacement, Sir Ronald Storrs (governor from 1926–
1931) was eager and willing to intervene in order alleviate the rural crisis. Storrs expanded the 
available capital of the agricultural bank, thus expanding the loans to farmers via their co-
operatives
98
. This led to a rapid expansion of the co-operative system, which was placed on an 
unsecured footing: credit was made available to farmers by the agricultural bank through of the co-
operative societies yet the societies themselves were not liable for the loan and they did not have 
any of their own money invested. As a result co-operative credit societies were created in order for 
villages to access loans by the agricultural bank, yet these societies were poorly run and were not 
established on the co-operative principles of mutual liability and co-operation
99
. In 1925 there were 
just 29 co-operative credit societies in Cyprus, but they grew to 326 in 1930 as a result of Storr‟s 
expansion of available credit; yet very few societies were capable in keeping their accounts in 
order
100
. The great depression led to the collapse of this unsound lending system.  
 
The moribund agricultural bank, who already had a substantial share of its capital tied in 
unserviceable debt, saw its remaining capital disappear due to the additional debt defaults of 
farmers hurt by the depression; as a result over a third of the co-operative credit societies were 
subsequently liquidated
101
. Under Storrs the bank capital was expanded by a government loan, 
floated in London at 5%, for £200,000 pounds sterling, while the Imperial Ottoman bank placed 
another £50,000 as additional capital
102
. The bank would theoretically loan to co-operative credit 
societies for a ten year period at the rate of 8%, and co-operatives would then loan the same amount 
to a farmer for ten years for an interest of 9% or 10%; however in practise the bank made such 
advances directly to the farmers, with the co-operatives having no incentive or ability to enforce 
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repayment, as none of their capital was being invested
103
. The rate of interest was not as high as 
moneylending but high enough to attract farmers who were pushed by their moneylenders for a 
repayment of their loans. As a result the least solvent farmers were those who borrowed from the 
bank to repay their moneylenders and then defaulted to the bank. This resulted to the bank rescuing 
moneylenders rather than alleviating the problem of credit agriculture. As a result the bank failed to 
get a return to its investments even on good years; by 1929 over 67% of its loans were in arrears, 
only to be killed off by additional bad debts during the depression
104
.  
 
Thus the ad-hoc efforts by Storrs to alleviate the farming crisis were ineffective; efforts to correct 
them during the period 1936-1940 proved expensive for the government. The agricultural bank was 
liquidated in 1939 at the government‟s expense, while substantial government expenditure was 
spent at restructuring the co-operative sector. By 1938 the co-operative industry was placed on a 
very sound basis: a department of co-operation was established in order for the societies to be 
regulated, while a co-operative central bank was established (as a joint venture by the government 
of Cyprus and Barclays (D.C.O)) in order to operate as a lender of last resort for credit societies in 
trouble
105
. 
 
The lack of focused government intervention in agriculture was thus a great handicap for the British 
colonies dependent on agricultural production
106
. Although Storrs government wanted to improve 
the agricultural production, it was ineffective in planning a coherent response leading to substantial 
expenditure for limited results: agricultural projects were half-hearted and did not take account the 
opinion of Cypriot legislators, and as a result they ended up costing more than planned. This was 
the opinion of an assistant undersecretary of the colonial office, who argued that “Agriculture, 
Forestry and Public Health, though they received somewhat spasmodic and amateurish attention, 
were never, I think, regarded as being within the main field of government activity”107. Even if the 
colonial administration did not want to intervene in the economy directly, the government could 
have alleviated the rural crisis through a combination of substantial increase of tariff protection and 
by providing incentives, in terms of water rights, tax waivers and credit, to induce the conversion of 
cereal land into citrus gardens. But to do so would have led to a level of micro-management of the 
island‟s affairs and in co-operation with Cypriot notaries that would have been at that time 
unprecedented in colonial affairs.  
 
                                                 
103
 Angastinotis, Ο Σςνεπγατισμόρ…(1965), pp.64-65 
104
 Lanitis, Rural indebtednes …(1944; revised 1992) p.45 
105
. Angastinotis, Ο Σςνεπγατισμόρ…(1965) pp.62-63; Lanitis, Rural indebtedness and …(1944; revised 1992) p.106   
106
 Example of India: Rothermund. The Global Impact of the Great Depression (1996) pp.95-96 
107
 As cited by Georghallides, Cyprus and the Governorship… (1985)  p.181 
Alexander Apostolides 
 116 
In contrast the Greek government, having to consider some of the demands placed by its rural 
majority, successfully promoted crop diversification by shouldering the burden of land reform and 
of the resettlement of Asia Minor refugees. In addition the government of Greece allowed for a 
revival of the rural economy during the depression by announcing a debt moratorium on what it was 
owed by farmers for five years and by suspending taxation on most
108
. These acts were known to by 
Greek-Cypriots legislators who wanted the colonial government to follow similar policies. However 
the government ignored the Cypriot legislative council as they were under not under similar 
pressure to Greece to accommodate the inhabitants‟ wishes. The colonial authorities did not feel the 
pressure for action as forcefully as in other independent states and thus they were less willing to 
intervene in the rural economy. 
 
As protectionism policy for Cyprus was effectively set in London due to the need of substantial 
imperial preference discounts, the usually interventionist governor Sir Storrs tried to alleviate the 
farming crisis by expanding credit to farmers through the co-operative credit societies and the 
agricultural bank. However, poor planning led to an expensive meltdown of the agricultural bank, 
which led to substantial government funds being wasted. It does not mean that the colonial 
government could have had saved the Cypriot farmer from all the effects of the twin calamities of 
the great depression and drought, but by listening to the Cypriot legislators the government could 
have partially alleviated the farming crisis through the implementation of a coherent recovery 
scheme. 
 
Thus a substantial amount of money was dribbled away to small improvements in agriculture, 
whose subsequent failure necessitated costly restructuring. Although the government did provide 
loans through the rural co-operatives and a small agricultural bank, these were efforts to placate 
local complaints, and thus credit was parcelled out in small amounts to as many farmers as possible 
rather than provide a solution to the many problems of the farmers. Tackling the issue as assertively 
as independent Southern European countries would have been a better option, but such 
interventionist measures were radical departures from the prevalent colonial mentality of the role of 
the state in an economy. Although more comparative research is needed, it seems that rural colonies 
such as Cyprus were disadvantaged during the interwar period, as British colonial governments did 
not feel enough pressure to solve agricultural problems as in independent states.  
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In the end it took the huge stimulus of the Second World War and the setting up of the Debt 
Settlement Board to kick start the rural economy of Cyprus, as explained below
109
. The War 
introduced higher prices and a huge demand for agricultural products, being placed openly in 
neighbouring markets through centralised allocation system (the Middle East Supply Centre) 
established by the British. The Debt Settlement Board led to the elimination of the rural debt, 
unfreezing the local rural credit market and enabling investment to flow through the restructured co-
operative sector
110
. 
 
Labour productivity in agriculture  
 
One would ideally estimate the hours worked on agricultural activities in order to estimate labour 
productivity, since agriculture is a sector with significant part-time activity. However since an 
unknown proportion of the population employed only worked part time in agriculture, labour 
productivity based on those who enumerated it as a primary occupation was deemed more 
appropriate
111
. Labour productivity was estimated by dividing the sector output by the number of 
persons in employment in that sector
112
. This only included persons who stated agricultural 
employment as their first activity; thus it is not the best estimate of labour productivity, which 
would necessitate estimating also the persons who worked on the land as a secondary activity. As 
mentioned in chapter 2 there was underestimation of the number of women occupied in agriculture, 
but the number of men is considered accurate
113
. Therefore the number of women employed in 
agriculture was corrected by raising the participation rate for women to be similar to that of men in 
each census.  
 
Employment in agriculture was given only in the censuses of 1921, 1931 and 1946 (1948 for 
Malta); the figures for the intervening years were log-linearly interpolated. The output per worker in 
agriculture for Malta and Cyprus is shown in figure 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. What is interesting is 
that the results of Malta and Cyprus are similar to the results of Egypt; despite a poor growth in 
value added terms, productivity was increasing at a faster pace as the number of farmers employed 
in farming declined in relative or absolute terms
114
.  
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Figure 4.6: Value added per agricultural employee in Cypriot agriculture (Labour Productivity), 1921-1938.  
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Table 4.1; Hart-Davis, Census…1921 (1922); Hart-Davis, 
Census…1931 (1932); Percival, Census...1946 (1947). 
 
Figure 4.7: Value added per agricultural employee in Maltese agriculture (Labour Productivity), 1921-1938. 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Table 4.1; Malta, Census…1921 (1922); Malta, 
Census...1931(1932); Malta, Eleventh Census …1948 (1949). 
 
Comparing figures 4.6 with 4.7 indicates that productivity per worker in Cyprus was higher than in 
Malta at the start of the period. However, Maltese productivity was growing much faster than 
Cypriot agricultural productivity. Labour productivity was increasing in Cyprus and Malta during 
the period 1921-1938, at 1.53% and 3.25% respectively.  
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Part of the rapid growth in labour productivity in Malta is due to the very low productivity base of 
the industry and the relative and absolute fall of people employed in farming, enabling rapid catch 
up in agricultural productivity. However, another reason for the growth is likely to be the increase 
of part-time farming, which might not be fully captured despite the correction made to 
accommodate the unremunerated female employment in the sector. The productivity growth of 
Cyprus was low and more akin to pre-First World War economies, since there was a marked 
acceleration in European labour productivity in the interwar period that seemed to bypass Cyprus
115
.  
 
It is possible to estimate the output of Cypriot agriculture in 1946 on the basis of an estimate 
provided in the Cyprus census for that year, and by using a Fisher price index to adjust it to 1938 
constant prices. The results are presented in table 4.7 below. By 1946 agriculture was in much 
better shape: the debt crisis was resolved, the government was investing in irrigation projects, while 
prices for Cypriot products such as wine, fruit and citrus were at an all-time high due to the demand 
during the war. This allowed for a rapid conversion of land to more productive uses, while work for 
the army led to a reduction of rural underemployment and thus boosted the industry‟s productivity. 
Thus the “green-revolution” of Cypriot agriculture took place towards the end of the Second World 
War.  
 
Table 4.7: Cypriot agricultural output before and after the Second World War  
 Per Capita Value Added of 
Agriculture 
Output of Agriculture 
1938   7.3 2,851,240 
1946 10.42 4,688,539 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Percival, 1947 pp.87-88, Appendix B (PPP adjusted).  
 
Table 4.7 indicates that the agricultural sector grew substantially during the war. By 1944 the 
expansion of agriculture was already underway; by 1946 value added in agriculture increased both 
in aggregate and in per capita terms
116
. The rapid expansion of the agricultural sector was directly 
related to the needs of the African front, which created a huge demand for agricultural products
117
. 
Due to the centralised planning of the front by the Middle East Supply Centre, Cyprus was able to 
supply agricultural products to markets that were previously protected by heavy tariff barriers
118
. 
Like other colonies the farming crisis in Cyprus was only dispelled through the outbreak of war
119
. 
                                                 
115
 Feinstein, Temin, & Toniolo, The European Economy… (1997) p.11; Federico, Feeding the World… (2005), p.73; 
Cypriot productivity is more akin to the Austrian agricultural productivity growth before the First World War: Schulze, 
“Origins of Catch-up Failure…” (2007) p.196 
116
 National Archive, Nicosia. File: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book 1944 (Unpublished); File: V5/56 
117
 Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Centre (1971) p.21 
118
 Ibid. p.4 
119
 Rothermund. The Global Impact of the Great Depression (1996) p.133 
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Thus the war acted as a great stimulus to Cypriot agriculture, and paved the way for the post-war 
expansion of key industries, such as animal products, grapes, citrus fruits and potatoes. 
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Chapter 5: Mining and Quarrying 
 
“Mavrovouni and Skouriotissa, mountains intractable, naked. 
Cursed like Prometheus; like him doomed to have their innards taken out, 
For daring to give light to man, for daring to give copper, so many eons ago”1.  
 
This chapter evaluates the effect of the mining and quarrying industries on the islands‟ economies. 
Although they was not a lot of information about small sections of the industry, data for the major 
of mining and quarrying industries was plentiful and thus the estimates are deemed reliable. The 
fortunes of the two islands in terms of natural mineral resources were dissimilar. Cyprus has been 
associated with copper since the Bronze Age: the mines of Skouriotissa and Lymni were also in 
operation during classical times
2
. The island‟s copper sulphate industry was reinvigorated by 
significant investment in the mining industry, which was the driving force of the island‟s post-
depression recovery. In contrast, Malta has no natural mineral resources, but has an extensive 
supply of limestone
3
. As a result the sector remained very small in terms of output and GDP 
growth.  
 
Mining and quarrying output 
 
The relative failure of the Cypriot agricultural sector in the 1930s, as analysed in chapter 4, is 
placed in sharp contrast to the dramatic growth of mining, particularly of the copper mining 
industry. The mining sector employed far fewer workers than the agricultural sector but grew by 
leaps and bounds from the mid-1930s onwards. In 1921 the sector was small, based mostly on an 
asbestos mine which was fully operational only in the summer. The discovery of new copper 
sulphate resulted in the rapid explosion of output; by 1938 the mining sector was providing 44% of 
the primary sector‟s value added. It is clear that the mining sector transformed itself from an 
insignificant part of the economy in 1921 to the main driver of growth in the post-depression 
recovery. In terms of size, agriculture was still the most important sector in Cyprus. However, in 
terms of growth and increasing productivity, this sector was the important sector of the Cypriot 
economy in the 1930s. Figure 5.1 captures the dramatic rise of mining in Cyprus from an 
insignificant part of the economy to the main driver of growth in just seventeen years. Value added 
expanded by a factor of 20.8, implying a per annum average growth rate of 19.6% during 1921–
1938.  
                                                 
1
 Extract from the  poem “Τα Μεηαιιεία” [The Mines] by Kostas Montis, as narrated in Μεταλλυπύσυν Μνήμερ 
[Miners‟ Memories], DVD, Pancyprian Labour Federation, Nicosia, 2007. 
2
 Baer, L.M., The Mineral Resources and Mining Industry of Cyprus (Nicosia: GPO, 1963), p.1 
3
 The island of Malta has large supplies of globigerina and coralline limestone used in construction both in Malta as 
well as exported aboard. 
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Figure 5.1: Value added of mining and quarrying, Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted). 
 
The industry‟s growth was not linear: the fall in mineral prices during the depression checked the 
growth achieved in the latter half of the 1920s as mineral prices fell faster than all other prices: 
output remained at anaemic levels until 1934
4
. The majority of interwar growth took place from 
1934 onwards, since Cypriot copper ore proved essential to German re-armament
5
. Cypriot ore 
provided three crucial raw materials in which Germany was not self-sufficient: iron, copper and 
sulphur. Before 1934, Germany it imported most of its ore from the biggest European producer of 
copper sulphate, the Spanish mines of the Rio Tinto Company
6
. Yet Rio Tinto was facing an 
increasingly difficult situation in Spain, with constant labour unrest and threats of violence in the 
early 1930s: as a result Riot Tinto limited the investment in its Spanish mines which led to a 
reduction of their output, thus created a large supply-gap in the European copper sulphate market
7
.   
 
Asbestos mining also increased its output during the 1920s, but failed to keep up with the rapid 
growth of the copper sulphate mines in the 1930s. Quarrying of stone, terra umbra (a pigment used 
in dyeing) and gypsum was a significant part of output in 1921, constituting 39.9% of the industry‟s 
value added. Yet, its importance declined as output growth was low at a time when copper mining 
output increased dramatically, reducing quarrying to just 1.7%  of the industry‟s value added in 
1938. 
                                                 
4
 Grilli & Yang “Primary Commodity Prices…”, (1988), Appendix 1. 
5
 Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle…(1992), p.70. 
6
 Harvey, C.E., The Rio Tinto Company: An Economic History of a Leading International Mining Concern 1873–1954 
(Penzance: Alison Hodge, 1981) p.273 
7
Ibid. p.259, 261 
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The growth of the mining sector in Cyprus was essentially based on the exploitation of large copper 
deposits, situated in the west of the island. The discovery and subsequent exploitation of copper 
ores on the island was intractably linked to the rise and development of the Cyprus Mines 
Corporation (CMC), an American free-standing company based in California, whose sole concern 
was the mines in Cyprus. The extraction of copper on an industrial scale is linked to the growth of 
the CMC, with the company becoming a catalyst for the economic, technological and social 
transformation of Cyprus
8
.  
 
Before the company started operations the excavation of copper ore had virtually ended: there was a 
feeble attempt to restart the ancient Lymni mine in the 1880s but with no success. Charles Godfrey 
Gunther discovered copper ore in Skouriotissa in 1914 and established the CMC in 1916 with the 
support of Californian mining entrepreneurs. Skouriotissa was the site of an ancient mine, with an 
estimated eight million tons of cupreous, non-arsenical, sulphate ore
9
.  
 
The value added of quarrying in Malta is shown in figure 5.2. Most of the output went to provide 
materials for the domestic construction industry, and a limited amount of Globigerina limestone was 
exported. There was some salt extraction in Gozo, but it remained an insignificant part of output. 
The sector was little affected by international prices as the output was used for domestic 
construction. As a result the quarrying sector output followed the business cycles of the 
construction industry: a steady increase in the second half of the 1920s, followed by a very rapid 
expansion in the second half of the 1930s. The quarrying sector increased by a factor of 5.6 in the 
period 1921–1938, achieving an annual average growth rate of 10.8%. Thus Malta managed to 
substantially increase its quarrying output. However, the quarrying sector remained a relatively 
small part of GDP because of its low starting base in 1921.  
 
Almost nothing is known about the quarrying sector of Malta, and thus the analysis of the Maltese 
estimates is quite limited. It seems that quarrying was not mechanised, and took place in small 
quarries, each employing very few people. Limestone is plentiful and scattered throughout Malta, 
and therefore there was no need for the large centralised companies which characterised the mining 
sector of Cyprus. Thus the industry achieved substantial output growth in both islands, but only in 
Cyprus did it grow to a sufficient size to counterbalance the stagnation of the agricultural sector. 
                                                 
8
 Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle…(1992), p.70. 
9
 Dr G. Konstantinou, as interviewed in Μεταλλυπύσυν Μνήμερ [Miners‟ Memories], DVD, 2007; Lavender, The Story 
of…(1962), p.244 
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Figure 5.2: Value added of quarrying, Malta, 1921-1938. 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix C. 
 
The comparative value added and value added per capita is shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2. Despite the 
substantial output growth in the quarrying sector in Malta, the increase in output of mining in 
Cyprus meant that the sector‟s share of per capita GDP pulled ahead of Malta‟s.  
 
Table 5.1: Value added of mining and quarrying, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 25,161 96,720 1930 144,962  463,969 
1922 60,356 136,479 1931 153,038  373,834 
1923 75,896 173,383 1932 163,547  302,129 
1924 87,003 332,160 1933 157,790  411,393 
1925 83,564 363,220 1934 145,472  435,884 
1926 99,791 385,456 1935 133,906  760,263 
1927 134,861 548,898 1936 137,655  986,593 
1928 146,053 598,150 1937 143,304 1,621,523 
1929 149,474 714,889 1938 142,834 2,014,430 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted); Appendix C. 
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Table 5.2: Per capita value added of mining and quarrying, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Cyprus  Malta Year Cyprus  Malta 
1921 0.31 0.12 1930 1.35 0.61 
1922 0.43 0.28 1931 1.07 0.63 
1923 0.55 0.35 1932 0.85 0.67 
1924 1.03 0.39 1933 1.14 0.64 
1925 1.12 0.37 1934 1.19 0.58 
1926 1.17 0.44 1935 2.04 0.52 
1927 1.65 0.59 1936 2.60 0.53 
1928 1.78 0.63 1937 4.20 0.55 
1929 2.10 0.63 1938 5.13 0.54 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Table 5.1, Table 3.2  
 
The growth of mining output in Cyprus could have been more rapid in the early 1920s, but a lack of 
funding led to a shortage of capital investment and to the slow development of the ore findings by 
the CMC. Excavation, transport, refining and loading were done by hand, and it was not until 1924 
that candles were replaced by carbide lamps in the underground tunnels
10
. Most ore was exported 
with minimal processing, and thus the company failed to garner more of the value added chain of 
copper production. This held back the development of Skouriotissa mine until 1924. By the late 
1920s the CMC managed to successfully increase output by undercutting the price of the Pyrites 
Producers Association cartel, but had reached a ceiling on what it could sell without direct access to 
the large German chemical market, which was effectively controlled by the Pyrites Producers 
Association
11
. 
 
The lack of any heavy industry in Cyprus meant that the firm had to import machinery and then set 
up workshops to maintain even the most basic equipment. The CMC imported the first 
oxyacetylene torch, the first x-ray machine, as the local market could not provide any technological 
products. Lavender argues that the company increased the technological capacity of the island by 
getting Cypriots acquainted with new machinery that led to local people setting up their own 
workshops to repair and reproduce machinery imported by the company
12
. 
 
The rapid increase in mining output led to a rapid re-organisation of society within a very short 
period of time, especially in terms of labour relations. The CMC was the largest industrial employer 
in Cyprus: it created its first proletariat who organized themselves in coherent groups. This was 
partly due to the fact that the company outsourced its labour, housing and supplies to contractors, 
leading to mass profiteering. The workers, with the aid of the emerging communist movement, 
began organising the first strikes over pay and conditions, the first affecting Mavrovouni in 1936
13
. 
                                                 
10
 Lavender, The Story of…(1962), p.193, p.195 
11
 Harvey, The Rio Tinto Company (1981) p.208. In 1936 alone, the Rio Tinto mine in Spain had twelve major strikes 
between February and July: p.265-266 
12
 Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle…(1992) p.80 
13
 Ibid, p.82 
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Unionisation was resisted by the company until 1939 but the miners union became pivotal in the 
growth of the pan-Cyprian federation of labour (PEO) and the communist party of Cyprus, AKEL, 
with important political consequences in the history of Cyprus. This was not unusual; the same 
process took place in Spain as strikes against the Rio Tinto Company were pivotal in the 
development of the Spanish labour movement
14
. Thus the CMC was a catalyst for the formation of 
a strong communist movement in Cyprus, with the strike against the CMC in 1948 initiated a new 
era in labour and political relations on the island
15
.  
 
Figure 5.3: Per capita value added of mining and quarrying, Malta and Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Table 5.2. 
 
The rapid growth of the period 1934-1938 was due to the stockpiling of extracted ore during the 
depression, significant capital investment increasing the extracted output, the discovery of the 
Mavrovouni mine and high value metallic ores of silver and gold. Mavrovouni had over seventeen 
million tons of copper and other precious ores and its discovery was deemed so significant that the 
Rio Tinto Company attempted to purchase a majority share in the CMC in order to restrict its 
output
16
. Although the buyout did not go ahead, Rio Tinto agreed to allow CMC‟s copper sulphate 
to be marketed through the European Pyrites Corporation (EPC), an organisation that was the main 
purchasing agent for German chemical companies, thus released the CMC from marketing 
                                                 
14
 Harvey, The Rio Tinto Company (1981) p.177 
15
 Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle…(1992)  pp.83-84 
16
 Harvey, The Rio Tinto Company (1981)  p.209 
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constraints
17
. In order to be accepted by the EPC, the CMC agreed in 1928 to limit its output to 
below 225,000 tons, but broke its promise in 1928, 1937 and 1938
18
.  
 
The discovery of Mavrovouni transformed the CMC as a main player in the global copper market. 
The ore was high in copper content, and for technical reasons it was ideally and uniquely suited to 
the German industry; the only smelter in Europe capable of treating the company‟s copper 
concentrate was in Hamburg
19
. Thus the CMC was able to capitalise on the changing demand for 
copper sulphate: previously low grade copper sulphate was used mainly in the production of acid, 
and the copper content was seen as an auxiliary material. The introduction of the brimstone 
processes in acid manufacture meant that the CMC‟s copper sulphate, which contained a high 
concentration of copper and iron and had no other metal impurities, became much more attractive to 
copper and iron manufacturers
20
. Mavrovouni began intensive production in 1929 and reached full 
capacity in 1934. Unlike the slow growth of Skouriotissa, the discovery of Mavrovouni led to a 
massive investment programme which ensured than the new mine would rapidly increase its 
production. The company invested in a modern processing plant at Xeros, which was completed in 
1934. The plant enabled the CMC to sell purified copper concentrate as well as other metal 
precipitates, thus greatly increasing the value of its output
21
. The processing plant completed served 
both Skouriotissa and Mavrovouni through a private railway that linked the mines to the 
government railway and to the new jetty at Karavostasi.  
 
The company‟s rapid growth was further aided after discovering complex deposits containing silver 
and gold around Mavrovouni: prospecting unearthed small deposits of gold and silver near Apliki, 
Agrokipia, Kokinopezoula, Mathiatis and Troulli. The export of gold and silver from 1934 to 1938 
increased output due to the high prevailing price of gold; thus the rapid growth after the great 
depression was a combination of new ores and significant investment, brought to full capacity by 
the vociferous demand for copper by Germany. Following the success of the CMC, other companies 
backed by foreign interests were also established in Cyprus: the most successful being the Hellenic 
Mining Company, which extracted copper, silver and gold at Kalavassos and Mitsero. From 1929 to 
1938 the number of active mines doubled, but the CMC remained by far the largest in terms of 
output and employment.  
  
                                                 
17
 Ibid. p.210 
18
 Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books of 1928, 1937 and 1938. The volume of exports of copper sulphate mined by 
the CMC was above the limit agreed with Rio Tinto. 
19
 Lavender, The Story of…(1962), pp.265-266 
20
 Harvey, The Rio Tinto Company (1981) p.167, p.210 
21
 Lavender, The Story of…(1962), pp.265-266 
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Table 5.3: Yearly growth of mining and quarrying, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Malta Cyprus 
 Value added 
(%) 
Per Capita (%) Value added (%) Per Capita (%) 
1921–1922 139.9 136.8  41.1 39.5 
1922–1923  25.7  24.1  27.0 25.6 
1923–1924  14.6  13.2  91.6 89.4 
1924–1925  -4.0  -5.2    9.4   8.1 
1925–1926  19.4  17.9    6.1   4.9 
1926–1927  35.1  33.4  42.4  40.8 
1927–1928   8.3   6.9    9.0    7.7 
1928–1929   2.3   1.0  19.5   18.2 
1929–1930  -3.0  -4.3 -35.1 -35.8 
1930–1931   5.6   4.2 -19.4 -20.3 
1931–1932   6.9   5.4 -19.2 -20.6 
1932–1933  -3.5  -4.9 36.2 33.8 
1933–1934  -7.8  -9.1   6.0   4.2 
1934–1935  -8.0  -9.2 74.4 71.5 
1935 –1936   2.8   1.4 29.8 27.6 
1936–1937   4.1   2.7 64.4 61.6 
1937–1938   -0.3  -1.7 24.2 22.1 
1921–1938 10.8    9.3  19.6  17.9 
1921–1929 21.5 19.9  19.0  17.7 
1930–1938  -0.2  -1.6  20.1  18.2 
GDP Peak to 
Peak 
(1925-1937) 
4.6 3.2 13.3 11.7 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Table 5.1. 
 
The rapid increase of the relative importance of copper over all other mining and quarrying 
products in Cyprus is shown in figure 5.4. The copper sulphate mines also produced other metallic 
ores that were in the same ore body, such as iron, magnetite, manganese, gold, silver and zinc. The 
relative importance of the copper mines rose from 16.3% in 1921 to 87.2% in 1938. The output of 
asbestos was much more volatile, expanding rapidly in absolute and relative terms but suffering a 
dramatic drop in output in 1932, as the company was in financial distress. Despite the restructuring 
of the company and the reduction of asbestos royalties paid to the government, the company 
recovered its former output levels. The excavation of terra umbra and terra verta, natural pigments 
used in dyeing, reached a peak in output in 1921 and dramatically declined afterwards, with a 
sudden increase in 1937
22
. Almost nothing is known about this industry in this period. The amount 
of quarrying stone produced increased until 1925, when it fell back and remained steady at the 
levels of 1922. Again not much is known about this industry other than they were over 200 small 
scale quarries operating in Cyprus
23
. 
                                                 
22
 Baer, The Mineral Resources… (Nicosia), p.130 
23
 Oakden, Report on the Finances (1935), p.22 
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Figure 5.4: Mining and quarrying per sub-group as share of value added (%), Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 
Source: Appendix B. 
 
The importance of limestone excavation in Malta has already been mentioned and is shown in 
figure 5.5. The output of lime and limestone seemed to follow similar rates of expansion and 
contraction with the construction industry, with a correlation coefficient of 0.81, suggesting that 
they were extracted as domestic market construction materials.  
 
Figure 5.5: Quarrying per sub-group as a share of value added (%), Malta, 1921–1938. 
 
Source: Appendix C. 
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There was very little domestic consumption of mining output in Cyprus thus the ore was exported 
providing foreign exchange at a time when the value of traditional agricultural exports was 
declining. Mining exports increased from 7.7% of total exports in 1921 to 62.3% in 1938, 
increasing exports from the island despite the decline of agricultural exports. Its ability to procure 
foreign exchange was important in preventing a reduction of money supply in Cyprus. The Cypriot 
pound was tied at par to sterling through a sterling currency board
24
. This meant that in the event of 
a trade deficit the government would withdraw domestic currency from circulation, since the 
currency board required one pound sterling to be deposited in London for every Cypriot pound 
issued. The net exports of the mining companies eliminated the possibility of a large deficit 
becoming a drain to the Cypriot money supply
25
.  
 
Thus the development of the mining sector had real tangible benefits for Cypriots in terms of 
employment, capital investment and in securing foreign exchange. Some farmers who lost their land 
because of their debts to money lenders became miners allowing the poor villagers on the Troodos 
mountain range to minimise the reduction of their income from the sustained fall in agricultural 
prices. In the villages of the Pitsilia area of the Troodos range, such as Agros, farmers delegated the 
farming work to their children during the summer asbestos mining season and worked in the mines 
in order to support the family until the late summer harvest
26
. 
 
In terms of employment, the CMC and the Cyprus Asbestos Corporation (CAC) were the largest 
employers on the island. Data on employment prior to the establishment of the inspectorate of 
mines in 1926 are not robust, but the figures are more reliable from 1926 onwards. The proportion 
of total wages to total value added was estimated, by multiplying the average number of daily 
workers in each mine by the daily wage, and then multiplying the outcome by the total days on 
which the mine was active. The total wage was then divided by the value added at current prices in 
order to evaluate how much of the value added was spent on wages, and how much was either 
capital investment or profits. The results shown in figure 5.7 indicate that the company managed to 
maintain a relatively constant share of revenue spent on wages, despite rapidly increasing 
production, thus increasing its absolute profits. 
  
                                                 
24
 Phylaktis, The Banking System of Cyprus (1995), p.43 
25
 The mining companies also expropriated profits abroad, thus the positive contribution to balance of payments  was 
positive but less than the total mining goods exported.  
26
 Interview with Georgios Kyprianou, former secretary of the Agros village co-operative in the 1930s, 18 July 2008 
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Figure 5.6: Mining exports as a share to total exports, Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 
Note: In current Cyprus pounds. Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book, (1921–1938) 
 
Despite the industry‟s impressive increase in output there is debate on the contribution in terms of 
national income. Christodoulou argues that the sector had a limited effect, “since mining, being 
practised as an enclave economy, had no multiplier effect of any significance on the island‟s wider 
economic activity”27. In contrast, the British colonial authorities were very positive about the 
mining companies, considering Mavrovouni and Skouriotissa as the “the island‟s most valuable 
assets… being exploited in the most efficient way possible by a first-class organisation”28. 
Christodoulou is right to point out that the demand multiplier was lower than suggested by the value 
added because of extensive expatriation of profits deflating the value added in GNP terms.  
 
It was not possible to calculate the profit of mining companies, but there is enough information on 
the activities of the companies in the annual reports of the government inspectorate of mines and 
labour to place limits on the possible magnitude of such profits. The department was established in 
1926, and contains information on tax, wage and capital expenditure, allowing for an estimation of 
potential profit as a residual. 
 
The mining companies spent money on capital goods, purchasing intermediate consumption goods, 
paying wages, and on taxes. The cumulative value added in current prices for the period from 1926 
to 1938 was £7,320,356 Cyprus pounds. As seen in figure 5.7, the cumulative sum of wages of 
                                                 
27
 Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle…(1992) pp.77-78 
28
 Oakden, Report on the Finances (1935) p.21 
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Cypriots in the sector for the same period was £2,545,942. Georghalides and Oakden provide 
estimates of imported capital expenditure by the CMC totalling £750,000 Cyprus pounds
29
. Since 
the CMC constituted 80% of the market in terms of output and employment, an additional 20% was 
assumed to be invested in capital by the remaining companies.  
 
The construction of buildings was recorded for the years 1930–1932 in the annual reports of the 
inspectorate of mines and labour. The average expenditure in building construction for the three 
year period is assumed to have been constant for the years with no information. Additional capital 
expenditure was necessary to open Mavrovouni and on that basis an additional 20% was assumed to 
have been invested for the Hellenic Mining Company to open the much smaller Kalavassos mine. 
The total amount invested for the years 1926–1938 was £1,433,345 Cyprus pounds. The cumulative 
royalty payments to the government were £177,345. Thus by subtracting the total wage, total 
investment and total taxes on production from the cumulative value added, the potential profit of the 
foreign mining firms for the period 1926–1938 was estimated as £3,163,724 or 43.2% of the total 
value added. 
 
This estimate errs on the side of caution since the other foreign mining companies did not invest as 
much in capital as the CMC, and there may be an overestimation on the level of investment, biasing 
the result against a large residual. The results seem to indicate that the value added sent abroad as 
profit must have been significant. Thus, even if the growth of output was helpful to Cypriots in 
GDP terms, it was less helpful in GNP terms thus, limiting the multiplier effect of the great mining 
boom.  
 
Figure 5.7 also indicates that the mining companies, like other large foreign companies in British 
colonies, were quite successful in pushing the burden of the depression on its employees by 
containing the share of total wages to total value added
30
. Figure 5.8 shows that from 1926 to 1930 
labour productivity increased along with employment. Figure 5.1 indicates that output was 
increasing until 1929, while figure 5.7 shows that the share of wages to value added remained 
constant. This means that the mining companies were successful in reducing the wages of the 
miners, even though the miners were becoming increasingly more productive. The mass 
underemployment in rural Cyprus, as analysed in chapter 4, helped to keep the wages of the miners 
down throughout the interwar period. 
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During the depression the mining companies reduced employment: the major copper and asbestos 
mines closed for a significant period of time, wages were reduced, while those employed were 
required to work longer shifts. As a result employment fell faster than output, falling from its pre-
depression peak by 72% in 1932 while wages were reduced. The drought increased the supply on 
unskilled ex-farmers hoping to work on the mine: when Skouriotissa re-opened in January 1933 the 
influx of labour was so large that it lead to disorder
31
. The increase in the supply of labour led to 
significant and sustained reductions in wages for both underground and surface workers, while the 
completion of the processing plant at Xeros led to further worker productivity gains.  
 
As a result employment and wages recovered to their pre-depression levels more slowly than 
output; the mining companies were successful in pushing the costs of the depression to their 
employees. Output recovered to its 1929 level by 1935, employment recovered in 1936, while the 
daily wage paid to underground workers recovered only in 1937
32
.  
 
Figure 5.7: Wages expenditure in mining and the share of wages to value added, 1926-1938. 
 
Source: Chapter 5, footnote 32; Appendix B; Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book (1921–1938).  
 
Although the limited taxation imposed by the government enabled the investment in the mining 
sector, it is clear that the free standing mining companies were also successful in minimising their 
contribution to the government revenue. As we have seen above, the cumulative amount of taxation 
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collected by the Cypriot government was very limited, while the government was eager to provide 
assistance to the mining companies in every way possible.  
 
Support was given at all times and from all levels of government. Fatal accidents in the mines were 
common with Skouriotissa mine having a particularly serious fire in 1925
33
. Under Cypriot law, 
mining fatalities initiated a government inquiry, which could force the company to pay 
compensation if the coroner deemed that the company was to blame. Yet from 1926 to 1938, there 
was not a single case where the company was found to be at fault. This was extraordinary: in 1930 a 
man was electrocuted at the underground works of Skouriotissa, as the company had failed to 
insulate its electrical equipment, but the inquiry into the man‟s death did not find CMC at fault34. In 
addition the government co-operated to such a degree that the police would imprison workers in 
cases of gross neglect of their duties in the mines
35
. This relationship worked both ways as the 
mining companies offered their assistance to create special relief works in order to alleviate 
unemployment during the depression at the request of the inspector of mines
36
.  
 
The eagerness of the government to aid mining companies applied at all levels of government. 
When the Cyprus Asbestos Company asked for a modification of the companies‟ law in July 1931, 
the government took the unprecedented step of calling both the executive and legislative council up 
to the summer quarters in order to pass the law during the summer recess
37
.  The British 
government saw the foreign mining companies as natural allies against local intransigence: when 
the colonial office considered replacing the troublesome legislative council with a new body, the 
government considered placing an unelected official chosen by the mining companies to sit in the 
Cypriot assembly
38
. 
 
Despite the support of the government, its revenue from the mining companies was minimal. 
Capital goods and some other goods considered essential were not subjected to any duties, thus 
significantly reducing the yield of government customs duties. The only taxation levied on mining 
companies was fixed, pre-agreed mining royalties. The royalty was paid at a variable rate on the 
amount of ore that was exported. Yet, as figure 5.8 shows, the share of value added that was 
                                                 
33
 Varnanva, P., General Secretary of the local Greek Labour Union of the CMC, Μεταλλυπύσυν Μνήμερ [Miner‟s 
Memories], DVD, (2007). The numbers of dead were unknown as the company failed to keep an accurate check on the 
employees working underground.  
34
 National Archives, London. File: CO69/42 “Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines 1930” p.4. 
35
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received by the government as tax was minimal as taxation averaged at just 3.4% of the value added 
of the sector and the average proportion of royalties to total government revenue was just 1.5%. 
During the great depression the government was facing a serious budget crisis, yet it still suspended 
some of the industry‟s royalties in order to help companies weather the financial crisis. The 
royalties paid to the government fell faster than the drop in output in the period 1930–1935, since 
the government reduced some royalties and suspended those for asbestos and gypsum
39
. 
Considering the high level of profit potential of the mining companies, it is clear that the 
government failed to receive sufficient remuneration for providing the right to excavate on the 
island. As a result the government did not ensure that it received sufficient funds to finance its 
proposed development programmes. 
 
Figure 5.8: Royalties received from the mining sector, 1924-1938. 
 
Source: Chapter 5, footnote 32; appendix B; Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book (1921–1938). 
 
Labour productivity in mining 
 
The section here uses the data available in the inspectorate of mines and labour in order to create an 
accurate annual labour productivity estimate. Unlike chapter 3 the productivity here is estimated on 
the basis of the average labour per mine per day, which is a much more accurate measure than the 
occupation statistics provided in chapter 3. It confirms that labour productivity was at a high level 
but its growth was slow until 1929: it was only when substantial capital investment and extended 
work hours during the depression that output per worker continued an upward trend.  
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Figure 5.9: Value added per employee in mining and quarrying, Cyprus (Labour Productivity), 1926-1938.  
 
Source: Chapter 5, footnote 32; Appendix B (PPP adjusted) 
 
The mining companies‟ growth in the interwar period set the stage for Cyprus‟ catch-up after the 
Second World War, providing employment and capital investment, as well as foreign exchange, at a 
time when Cypriot farming was in crisis. These benefits were very important, even thought the 
multiplier in the economy was less than suggested as the exported profits deflated the value added 
in GNP terms. At the forefront of the mining expansion was the emerging copper industry, and in 
particular the CMC. Companies such as the CMC managed to shift a substantial burden of the 
depression on their workforce and thus maintained significant profits from 1929 to 1933. At the 
same time, despite the very close relationship between the mining companies and the government, 
the royalties paid as tax were so low that they did not alleviate the government‟s growing deficit 
crisis.  
 
Despite the stellar performance of the sector, it could not prevent Cyprus from having a lacklustre 
income growth in the interwar period. Without it, the GDP growth performance of Cyprus would be 
stagnant. However, the rapidly emerging mining sector was not a panacea for the problems facing 
the agricultural industry: large profits of the mining industry were expatriated, while employment 
was not enough to alleviate the mass underemployment in agriculture.  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
£0
£50
£100
£150
£200
£250
£300
£350
Cypriot Labourers
P
P
P
, 
P
o
u
n
d
s 
S
te
r
li
n
g
Labour Productivity
Labour productivity in mining Cypriots employed in mining
Alexander Apostolides 
 137 
Chapter 6: Manufacturing, Handicrafts, 
Utilities and Construction 
 
“While no appreciable growth was registered in the manufacturing industry during these years, or 
for many years afterwards, there was one sector – the building trade – that grew significantly, 
driven by both public funds and private capital”1. 
 
This chapter focuses on the secondary sector. Although this is the first documented estimate of 
industrial output, the available data required substantial extrapolation, and as a result the estimates 
as less robust than those of agriculture. The progress of the manufacturing sector was disappointing 
in terms of output. Malta and Cyprus could only partially participate in the increased dissemination 
of industrial innovation in Europe, due to their small economic size and the turbulent interwar trade 
conditions. The development of foreign markets was prevented by the faltering European trade, 
while their small size precluded the development of large industrial units. In addition the domestic 
markets were eroded by external competition and the lack of colonial protectionism led to further 
limitations on industrial development. The empire‟s protectionist system was designed to enable a 
greater penetration of colonial markets by British manufacturing products and not in promoting 
manufacturing production in Cyprus and Malta. All this led to a lack of investment and 
modernisation, and as a result the manufacturing industry in Cyprus was dominated by artisans who 
found it increasingly difficult to compete with factory-made imported goods. On the other hand, the 
construction industry rapidly increased its output in both colonies, supported by increased public 
works construction and the growing demand for housing. Urban housing demand was building up 
for some time and with the establishment of bus routes the potential was released, as the bus 
network allowed for an expansion of the metropolitan area.  
 
Manufacturing and utility output 
 
At 30.9%, the share of manufacturing in GDP in 1921 was greater in Malta than in Cyprus. The 
Maltese manufacturing sector was dominated by the Royal Navy Dockyard, constituting 42.3% of 
manufacturing value added. Thus, the growth of the Maltese economy largely depended on a good 
performance of the manufacturing sector, and of the dockyard in particular: a decline in Dockyard 
output acted as a significant drag on the rest of the economy. The output of the dockyard grew until 
1924, aiding the Maltese economic recovery, but then went through a slow decline until 1935. This 
led to a slowdown of manufacturing output, leading to a decline of the share of manufacturing in 
GDP. This continued even after the Second World War: by 1963 the manufacturing sector 
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contributed just 16.8% of GDP despite significant post-war investment: there was no industrial 
take-off for Malta in the 20
th
 century
2
.  
 
Figure 6.1: Value added of manufacturing, handicrafts and utilities, Malta, 1921-1938 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix C. 
 
The manufacturing industry in Cyprus was struggling to keep up with the rest of the economy in 
terms of output growth. As figure 6.2 indicates, Cypriot manufacturing output grew very slowly in 
the early 1920s, while experiencing deep and repeated reversals in the 1930s. The volatility was due 
to the importance of the food, drinks and tobacco sector which constituted 41.5% of manufacturing 
value added; this sector was depended on the prevailing conditions in agriculture. Thus the poor 
growth of agriculture in the 1930s also dragged this large section of manufacturing to poor output 
growth affecting manufacturing output. As a result, the share of manufacturing in GDP declined 
from 25.4% in 1921 to 16.8% in 1938. Similarly to Malta the decline of manufacturing to GDP 
continued, falling to just 12.3% of GDP by 1959
3
. Thus the economies of Cyprus and Malta after 
the Second World War did not develop by expanding industrial production but by an expanding 
service sector.  
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Figure 6.2: Value added of manufacturing, handicrafts and utilities, Cyprus, 1921–1938 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted). 
Table 6.1: Value added of manufacturing, handicrafts and utilities, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938 
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 1,449,565 1,689,395 1930 1,717,798 1,631,485 
1922 1,528,482 1,725,612 1931 1,780,284 1,611,058 
1923 1,624,335 1,708,541 1932 1,814,032 1,499,000 
1924 1,720,517 1,425,490 1933 1,909,765 1,647,408 
1925 1,722,841 1,684,777 1934 1,794,103 1,766,122 
1926 1,749,853 1,372,266 1935 2,079,597 1,723,611 
1927 1,750,331 1,640,325 1936 1,809,414 1,584,237 
1928 1,650,967 1,549,314 1937 1,957,967 2,060,644 
1929 1,769,353 1,866,604 1938 2,042,281 1,954,388 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: see appendix B (PPP adjusted), appendix C. 
 
Table 6.2: Per capita value added of manufacturing, handicrafts and utilities, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Cyprus Malta Year Cyprus Malta 
1921 5.44 6.78 1930 4.74 7.27 
1922 5.49 7.07 1931 4.63 7.45 
1923 5.38 7.43 1932 4.23 7.48 
1924 4.43 7.78 1933 4.57 7.77 
1925 5.18 7.71 1934 4.82 7.20 
1926 4.17 7.74 1935 4.62 8.22 
1927 4.93 7.65 1936 4.18 7.06 
1928 4.61 7.14 1937 5.34 7.53 
1929 5.49 7.57 1938 4.98 7.74 
Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted), appendix C; Table 3.2. 
 
The output of the utility sector in Cyprus was very low and is included in the estimates above. 
Although data constraints make the output of the utilities sector precarious it is clear that the low 
output represented the lack of basic infrastructure throughout the island. There was no substantial 
government expenditure on water, sewerage and electricity, which were left to localised efforts by 
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municipalities and private companies
4
. Malta was fortunate to have some infrastructure already in 
place prior to 1921 as the urban area surrounding the Grand Harbour had been electrified and 
connected to a water system during the reconstruction of the harbour area prior to First World War. 
 
Both islands were energy deficient: the Cypriot sources of energy were firewood and charcoal, 
which were available quite cheaply from the local government forests
5
. The lack of sufficient 
transport links to the outside world made imported coal expensive, resulting in the use of charcoal 
in coal fired machinery, hampering its efficiency
6
. Electricity generation was at an embryonic stage: 
some large businesses established their own generators, and Larnaca, Limassol and Famagusta had 
their own private power stations. The provision of electric light was a significant step forward for 
Cypriot cities, since gas lighting was non-existent. The government had its own electric generator in 
Nicosia, but it was used only to light government buildings
7
. However the stations were small and 
inefficient, leading to electricity generation being limited and expensive, and largely focused on 
providing electric light rather than electric power
8
. The situation did not change until after the 
1950s, when the lack of electricity was seen as the key stumbling block to future economic 
development
9
. This could have been an added stumbling block to manufacturing growth in the 
interwar period: Cyprus would have found it difficult to adapt to energy-intensive practices 
introduced in Europe during the interwar period, due to the lack of fuel sources. Jalava indicated 
that Finland managed to catch up to the wealthier European states during the interwar period due to 
the increase in productivity in manufacturing, which was mainly the result of the great diffusion of 
electrical machinery through the use of electricity
10
.Yet more research is needed to test if energy 
deficiency acted as a check to manufacturing growth in Cyprus and Malta.  
 
In Malta the availability of energy reinforced the split in the economy, with the military-oriented 
Grand Harbour area being adequately supplied, while the rest of the colony was devoid of energy 
resources. A large coal fired power station in the Grand Harbour area provided adequate energy for 
the Royal Navy Dockyard and also supplied electricity to the neighbouring cities of Valetta, 
                                                 
4
 Electricity Authority of Cyprus, “The History of Electricity in Cyprus and the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC)” 
http://www.eac.com.cy/EN/ourorganization/Pages/History.aspx as consulted 10 Jun 2009. 
5
 Christodoulou, D., The Evolution of the Rural Land Use... (1959), p.103 
6
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Cospicua, Vittoriosa, and Senglea
11
. Yet the rest of Malta was completely lacking in utilities, while 
domestic fuel resources were very limited. 
 
The Maltese parliament wanted to expand the area connected with the utility network in the late 
1920s and provided funds for the extension of sewerage, electricity and water. The dual government 
constitution provided for joint financing of utility projects at a ratio of 3:4 with the imperial 
government. Yet, the British treasury refused to provide its share of capital, stalling the efforts of 
the Maltese government, while the capital put aside for investment was exhausted by the British 
military‟s refusal to pay for their use of electricity or water services12.  
 
The disparate effects of the depression on Cyprus and Malta discussed in chapter 3 were evident in 
the manufacturing sector, as shown in table 6.3. Cypriot manufacturing declined as dramatically as 
the output of agriculture, during the recession while Malta did not suffer from manufacturing output 
reversal, but saw a slower growth of output. 
 
The manufacturing output was divided into a formal manufacturing and a handicraft sector. Even 
within the formal manufacturing the majority of output took place by self employed artisans with 
low productivity. There was no real drive towards industrialisation in Cyprus, and there were no 
industrial units of a substantial size on the island. The handicraft output was carried out by artisans 
in their homes. It was differentiated by the manufacturing industry due to the different modes of 
production and separate estimation procedures, as explained in chapter 2
13
. The formal 
manufacturing sector was essentially an urban affair, but the handicraft sector extended throughout 
the islands. The handicraft trades were dominated by textile makers, tailors, milliners, glove 
makers, carpenters, shoemakers and blacksmiths: output per worker in the handicraft was lower 
than similar occupations in the formal manufacturing industry. Greaves suggested that Cyprus was a 
rural, agricultural country with a small manufacturing industry in the hands of artisans. This is 
verified as formal manufacturing (with bread making removed) represents just 4.8% of GDP in 
1938
14
. Cypriot handicraft output constituted 7.9% of GDP in 1938 while Malta‟s was 4.4%; thus 
Cypriot handicraft was much more important than in the Maltese economy. 
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Bonnici, J.  & Cassar, M., A Chronicle of Twentieth Century Malta, (Malta, Book Distributors Ltd, 2004), p.138.  
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 Fenech, Responsibility and Power…, (2005), pp.216-217 
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Table 6.3: Yearly growth of manufacture, handicrafts and utilities, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938. 
Year Malta Cyprus 
 Value added (%) Per Capita (%) Value added (%) Per Capita (%) 
1921–1922  5.6   4.3   2.1    1.0 
1922–1923  6.5   5.1  -1.0   -2.1 
1923–1924  6.1   4.7 -16.6 -17.5 
1924–1925   0.3  -1.0  18.2  16.9 
1925–1926  1.7   0.4 -18.6 -19.5 
1926–1927   0.2  -1.1  19.5  18.2 
1927–1928 -5.5  -6.7  -5.6   -6.6 
1928 –1929  7.3   6.0  20.5  19.1 
1929–1930 -2.7  -3.9 -12.6 -13.6 
1930–1931  3.8  2.5  -1.3   -2.4 
1931–1932  1.9   0.5  -7.0   -8.5 
1932–1933  5.2  3.8   9.9    8.0 
1933–1934 -6.0  -7.3   7.2    5.4 
1934–1935 15.7  14.1   -2.4   -4.1 
1935–1936 -12.8 -14.1  -8.1   -9.7 
1936–1937 8.1   6.6  30.1  27.9 
1937–1938 4.3   2.8   -5.2   -6.8 
1921–1938 2.1  0.8   0.9  -0.5 
1921–1929 2.1  0.8 -0.4  -1.5 
1930–1938 2.2  0.8   2.3   0.6 
GDP Peak to 
Peak 
(1925-1937) 
1.1 -0.3 1.7 0.3 
Source: Table 6.1. 
 
The output of manufacturing in Malta can be divided into its constituent industries, as indicated in 
figure 6.3. The general manufacturing is a catch-all category, out of which the Dockyard 
represented 98.3% of its output in 1938: thus the output of this category is an accurate 
representation of dockyard output. There was no other heavy industry in Malta other than the 
dockyard which was massive in relation to the size of the country as it was one of the largest 
dockyards of the British navy
15
. Its size can be appreciated from the fact that it employed over 
10,000 Maltese workers in 1939, at a time when only 31 industrial firms employed that number in 
the UK
16
. The dockyard was a state-of-the-art facility: Fenech argues that it was an industrial unit of 
modernity stuck on an island of limited technical progress
17
. The importance of the dockyard to the 
Maltese economy should not be underestimated. It directly provided 54.8% of total manufacturing 
output in 1938, which constituted 12.8% of the Maltese GDP. Its importance was appreciated by 
contemporary writers and historians, who considered that the health of the Maltese economy 
depended on the decisions of the Royal Navy regarding the dockyard
18
. Despite downsizing 
employment during demilitarisation in 1919, the dockyard‟s output showed a steady increase after 
1921, while substantial investment began to increase its capacity. By the late 1920s a new floating 
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 Ellul, M., H.M. Naval Dockyard, Malta: Society, Work and Industrial Relations in a British Naval Base 1900-1939, 
(Unpublished M.A, University of Malta, 2004), p.41 
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1994) p.3 
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dock and goliath cranes were installed which were, capable of repairing the largest capital ships and 
in addition new mooring quays were constructed
19
.   
 
Figure 6.3: Manufacturing and utilities per sub-group, Malta, as share of value added (%), 1921–1938. 
 
Source: Appendix C. 
 
The second largest category was the food and drinks processing, which experienced slow and 
steady growth until 1927, and then went through violent expansion and contraction, peaking in 
1935. As a result its share of formal manufacturing declined from 40% in 1921 to 26.8% in 1938. 
The decreasing share of food and drinks industry was replaced by an increase in the shares of output 
by tobacco, wood processing and iron founding industries, partly due to incentive measures initiated 
by the Maltese self-government discussed below. However, these industries still remained a 
relatively small part of output in 1938.  
 
In Cyprus there was no large industry equivalent to the Maltese dockyard. Figure 6.4 confirms that 
the manufacturing industry of Cyprus mostly comprised of food, drink and tobacco processing: 
these produced 81.6% of formal manufacturing output, representing 6.7% of GDP in 1938. This 
was the only significant industry in Cyprus in terms of output and it remained important throughout 
the interwar period. The chemical industry exhibited rapid growth, but remained a small part of 
output since it hardly existed in 1921, while the manufacture of construction goods increased 
rapidly as the construction sector boom increased the demand of materials. 
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Figure 6.4: Manufacturing and utilities per sub-group, Cyprus, as share of value added (%), 1921–1938. 
 
Source: see appendix B (PPP adjusted). 
 
The manufacturing industry did not become the focal point of economic growth during the interwar 
period, although it was undergoing substantial technological change in the rest of Europe. The 
failure to industrialise condemned the islands to slow growth during the interwar period, 
particularly Malta, whose GDP was dominated by the Royal Navy Dockyard. It is clear that for 
Malta industrial growth was based on the performance of the Dockyard whose output was flattened 
out after a promising start in the 1920s. The next section attempts to understand why manufacturing 
did not achieve faster growth. 
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Why was industrialisation so slow? 
 
The decline of the relative share of manufacturing in Cyprus and Malta during the interwar period 
was contrary to the development of the European periphery. European manufacturing in the 
interwar period underwent a rapid growth in labour productivity, resulting in significant output 
growth
20
. The First World War delayed the uptake of new technology by European states and thus 
after the war, the adoption of production enhancing technology in Europe accelerated. The greater 
diffusion of general purpose technology such as electricity and automotive transport further 
accelerated European manufacturing growth during the period 1921-1938 since it was combined 
with the spread of new industrial products and processes. The diffusion of technical knowhow was 
also occurring geographically as peripheral European countries had the opportunity to assimilate to 
some extent the processes that provided rapid industrial growth in the advanced European 
countries
21
. 
 
The great depression divided the experience of developing European countries: for countries 
focused on export-led industrialisation, the depression acted as a check in growth performance, 
while for others the depression encouraged autarky and import-substitution, leading to faster 
industrial growth. Greece, Turkey and Romania achieved substantial progress in industrial output, 
but Czechoslovakia and Poland found industrial recovery difficult
22
.  
 
Table 6.4 places the manufacturing performance of Cyprus and Malta within a European 
perspective. Industrial output growth in Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria was substantially faster than 
in Cyprus and Malta during the period 1921-1938. Cyprus and Malta were the only economies in 
Table 6.4 whose relative share of manufacturing declined during the interwar period. One could 
argue that the rapid output growth of other Southern European countries was due to their low 
manufacturing share in GDP, since catch-up growth is faster when a nation is further behind the 
leading industrial country
23
. While it is true that the manufacturing share in GDP in Cyprus and 
Malta was larger than in other peripheral countries, this could be due to differing estimation 
procedures in each study. In addition, table 6.4 indicates that even the developed countries of 
Europe were achieving higher industrial growth rates than Cyprus and Malta. The Netherlands, a 
relatively small developed country of Western Europe, achieved much higher industrial growth 
rates than either colony. The development of British manufacturing during the interwar period was 
considered particularly poor, and yet the growth of industrial output was faster than in either Cyprus 
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21
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22
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or Malta. The islands‟ manufacturing performance was particularly poor when compared to other 
European states, which demands explanation. 
 
Table 6.4: Manufacturing output growth in Southern European countries and colonies, 1921–1938.  
 Period Currency 
Manufacturing value 
added growth per annum 
(%), 1921-1938 
Share (%) of 
manufacturing to 
GDP in circa 
1921 
Share (%) of 
manufacturing 
to GDP in 
circa 1938 
Turkey 1923–1938 
1990 Geary-Khamis 
Dollars 
7.7 
12.0
*
 17.0 
Greece 1921–1938 1914 Drachmas 5.4×    7.2    9.8 
Bulgaria 1921–1938 1911 Levas 3.7    8.8     9.6
+
 
Cyprus 1921–1938 
1938 Pounds 
Sterling, PPP 
0.9 
25.4 16.8 
Malta 1921–1938 1938 Pounds Sterling 2.1 31.1 27.7 
Britain 1924–1937 1938 Pounds Sterling 3.2  30.9
†
  34.8
†
 
Netherlands 1921–1938 1913 Guilders 4.1 27.5 36.9 
Notes: 
*
Share of Manufacturing in Turkey to GDP in 1923; 
+
Share of Manufacturing in Bulgaria to GDP in 1939 
†
 
Share of Manufacturing in Britain in 1924 and 1937. 
×
The growth rate of Greek industry for 1921-1938, as suggested by 
Christodoulaki, ranges from 5.1-4.9%. Sources: Bulgaria- Ivanov, & Tooze “Convergence or Decline...” (2007), p.685; 
Turkey- Sevket Pamuk, “Intervention during the Great Depression...”, Ch.12 in Pamuk and Williamson, The 
Mediterranean… (2000), p.325; Greece– Kostelenos et al., Ακαθάπιστο…(2007), Appendix. The share of manufacturing 
was estimated based on the maximum GDP estimates (Table 7-II). Christodoulaki, I., “Industrial growth revisited: 
Manufacturing output in Greece in the interwar period” Working Paper London School of Economics, Department of 
Economic History, no. 50 (1999) p.21. Malta / Cyprus- Table 6.3. Britain- Matthews, R.C.O, Feinstein, C.H., Odling-
Smee, J.C, British Economic Growth 1856-1973 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), p.222, p.228  
Netherlands- Smits, J.P, Woltjer, P.J., and Ma, D., 'A Dataset on Comparative Historical National Accounts, ca. 1870-
1950: A Time-Series Perspective', Groningen Growth and Development Centre Research Memorandum (2009), GD-
107. 
 
Evidence from Greece argues that industrial growth was already rapid during the 1920s, but that 
there was a rapid acceleration when Greece shifted towards autarky and protectionism in the 
1930s
24
.The success of the Greek industrialisation would not have been possible without increasing 
tariff protection during the tumultuous 1930s, as global trade was distorted by tariffs and its 
separation into distinct currency groups
25
. The shift to autarky that took place in most peripheral 
countries (that were not colonies) was a mixture of import substitution and protectionism 
stimulating industrial growth in the interwar period at a cost of poor future performance
26
. Mazower 
argues that the growth of manufacturing in Greece was purely due to import substitution
27
. Thus, 
the 1930s was a unique period in European history: it was a decade where import substitution and 
protectionism formed a winning strategy for growth, shielding peripheral economies from the 
effects of the collapsing world trade and beggar-thy-neighbour policies
28
. Pamuk concurs, arguing 
                                                 
24
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25
 Mazower, Greece and the Interwar... (1991), pp.250-256; Feinstein, Temin & Toniolo, The European Economy… 
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26
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27
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that the success of South European countries in promoting manufacturing was due to exchange 
control barriers and tariffs rather than the direct government intervention in the economy
29
.  
 
This caused a problem for British Colonies as they could not independently impose their own tariff 
barriers: the colonial office had the final say on tariff levels, and exceptions had to be made for 
other members of the Commonwealth
30
. The failure to raise tariffs at a sufficient level hurt colonial 
manufacturing and textile production in particular
31
. Cyprus and Malta were historically important 
centres of textile production, but the industry was in decline before the First World War, although it 
remained important in terms of female employment
32
. The industry suffered from serious 
competition during the interwar period from cheap imports from Italy and Japan, and was hampered 
by the colonial governments imposing export duties in order to boost government revenue
33
. These 
imports were cheaper than the local cloth and thus dominated the local textile market, resulting in a 
decline of output in domestic clothing and textiles, leading to a significant reduction in the 
employment of women in the economy
34
. The imperial tariff system, established in 1933, allowed 
Malta and Cyprus to impose very restrictive duties and quotas on Japanese and Italian imports, but 
the preferential duty towards British products resulted in the textile market being dominated by 
British goods, with the domestic industry just recovering to its pre-depression level
35
.  
 
However, even if tariffs were significantly raised, the small domestic markets of Cyprus and Malta 
could not justify the private investment that was necessary to modernise the industry. The small size 
of the two economies was the main factor in the islands‟ poor manufacturing performance since the 
market size was limited and industry could not export a substantial quantity of its output. Even if 
the protectionist and interventionist policies of Greece and Turkey were implemented in colonial 
Cyprus and Malta, they would have been less effective due to the islands‟ small market size. The 
small population of the islands, combined with their low income level, meant that the domestic 
market had a very limited capacity to absorb manufactures; any substantial manufacturing industry 
would have to rely on exporting most of its products to the surrounding region
36
. However, during 
the interwar period the high tariffs throughout the Mediterranean precluded export-led 
                                                 
29
 Pamuk, “Intervention During the Great Depression”, (2000), p.323 
30
 The tariff level was considered low by Oakden, Report on the Finances (1935) pp.160-162 
31
 For example of India: Rothermund. The Global Impact of the Great Depression (1996)  p.93 
32
 Cyprus was a key centre of cotton during the Middle Ages, and Malta was an important centre of cotton twist until 
the 18
th
 century. Source: Abel, B., “The Economy of Cyprus in the Venetian Period” in Karageorghis, V. & 
Michaelides, D. (eds.) The Development of the Cypriot Economy... (1996), pp.185-192, p.186; Charlton. “Trends in the 
Economic…” (1960) pp.30-31  
33
 Greaves, Report on Economic Conditions…(1935), p.6, p.42 
34
 Ibid. p.20 
35
 Ibid. p.12 
36
 Feinstein argues that small markets during the period were a disincentive for investment: Feinstein, Temin & Toniolo. 
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manufacturing growth, while the low colonial tariffs meant that domestic manufacturing industries 
were in fierce competition in their own limited domestic markets. The size of the domestic markets 
of Cyprus and Malta, combined with the fragmented economic relationships of the Mediterranean, 
ensured that the islands‟ development was not through industrialisation.  
 
Thus small states with limited domestic markets need trade liberalisation in order to stimulate 
manufacturing output through exports. Small states have less to gain through import substitution 
because their local market may be smaller than the minimum efficiency scale of modern 
technology
37
. The decision by neighbouring countries to adopt protectionist policies made 
investment in modernisation difficult. Only an unusual expansion of the domestic market, combined 
with government incentives, would provide significant investment for new manufacturing units, 
which were capable in raising output and productivity. 
 
Such expansion occurred regularly in Malta through the visits of British servicemen. The presence 
of several British army, navy and air force bases in Malta expanded the domestic market for 
consumer products. The British navy personnel stationed, or on shore leave, in Malta were 
particularly numerous, comprising at times up to 10% of the Maltese population and creating a 
vociferous demand for beer, spirits, cigarettes and uniform apparel. The expansion of demand for 
such products during shore leave could be quite staggering: navy personnel alone consumed over 5 
million cigarettes per month in Malta
38
. The additional demand was large enough for new industrial 
units to be established. A brewery was established in 1926 and it by 1938 it was exporting small 
quantities of beer while catering for the large servicemen market
39
. A small factory was also 
established by British American Tobacco to produce cigarettes in Malta. Both industries were 
indirectly aided by the government in 1927 who, in its attempts to improve government revenue, 
placed excise duties on foreign beers and cigarettes
40
.  
 
Size was the primary constraint to faster industrialisation but the manufacturing industry was also 
faced with other problems. The technological advances of the interwar period were concentrated in 
sectors that were largely absent from the islands. The interwar period initiated new products and 
processes and allowed for a dramatic lowering of prices, which enabled great increases in output in 
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sectors such as electrical goods and motor vehicles
41
. Yet the islands‟ small size and their limited 
resource endowments precluded the development of such industries and thus the islands could not 
capitalise on the technological advances that led to the fastest industrial growth.  
 
Even with such industries being largely absent Southern European countries successfully increased 
their output through investment in the staple industrial sectors such as food processing, textiles and 
chemical production. The impetus of modernisation in Turkey and Greece stemmed from their 
increasingly interventionist governments. These governments were facing a possible debt default 
and foreign exchange scarcity: as a consequence, they desired their economies to be geared towards 
greater self-sufficiency. National and quasi-national banks, facing pressure from nationalistic 
governments, responded by providing the required capital to modernise staple industries. In Greece, 
the funding for investment was actively provided by the National Bank of Greece, which was by 
then the sole note issuer
42
. At the request of the government, which wanted to reduce its reliance on 
imported manufactures, the bank took the role of a universal bank by providing investment loans to 
domestic factories
43
. These factories were aided by government policies of autonomy and import 
substitution: governments raised tariffs on products that could be domestically produced, while 
providing a major stimulus to domestic manufacturing through the cancellation of the rural debt, 
which was transferred to semi-government institutions and subsequently annulled. The elimination 
of rural debt liquidated a major restraint on consumption in the economy and it created a market of 
rural consumers for locally produced industrial goods. The Greek government did not have an 
overreaching plan for raising the country‟s industrial output: the ad-hoc policies put in place were 
due to successive crises of the drachma, the national debt and the budget that made the government 
increasingly interventionist. Interwar growth came at a cost that was made evident later as the 
competitiveness of an industrial sector dependent on import substitution was poor, leading to a 
gradual stagnation in terms of productivity and technological know-how in the 1950s and 60s
 44
. 
However, in the short term, the increase in industrial output was the most impressive in Europe after 
the Soviet Union. The description of the Greek industrialisation indicates that government 
intervention was necessary for the modernisation of industry in the interwar period, particularly 
after the great depression.  
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Yet, Pamuk assures us that the British colonial governments of the Mediterranean, unlike the 
independent countries of Greece and Turkey, did very little to stimulate manufacturing output
45
. 
British colonial orthodoxy at the time was based on the principles of non-intervention and balanced 
budgets, and considered British colonies as lucrative markets for British manufactured exports 
rather than as a source of manufacturing production
46
. Thus colonies were expected to provide raw 
materials and markets for British manufacturing, while the establishment of a domestic 
manufacturing industry in the colonies was to be actively discouraged
47
. The colonial development 
act of 1929, as well as the imposition of empire-wide tariffs, had the primary aim of stimulating 
British exports for the economic benefit of Britain
48
.  It was not until the Second World War that 
the outdated conventions of fiscal orthodoxy and non-intervention were seriously challenged within 
the colonial office by more positive development policies
49
.  
 
Even if the possibility of industrial growth was limited in Cyprus and Malta due to their market 
size, there were some efforts to stimulate manufacturing. The Maltese self-government was eager to 
promote manufacturing employment, while Cyprus under Sir Ronald Storrs had a governor who 
was willing to intervene in the economy
50
. Such efforts were limited as both governments struggled 
to find the funds to intervene in the economy while trying to maintain fiscal surpluses. The efforts 
of Maltese self-government were more successful than of the Cypriot colonial government, yet even 
in Malta, the overall effect remained small.  
 
The Maltese self-government attempted to stimulate manufacturing in 1925 by granting production 
monopolies for fifty years for a number of products
51
. These industries were not protected by 
imports, and thus competition for the domestic market was not eliminated. All products experienced 
increases in output, with the largest being in the production of canned fruit, tobacco pipes and 
oxygen gas
52
. Despite the increase in production these monopolies remained small industries, and as 
a result their impact on overall manufacturing sector was minimal, while there were complaints 
about the inferior quality of their products
53
. 
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The Cypriot colonial government provided incentives for British interests to invest, while also 
investing directly in manufacturing projects that were seen as complementary to agricultural 
development. The Cyprus Tannery Company established a modern tanning plant in Cyprus in 1929, 
with the government allowing the firm to import capital and intermediate consumption goods duty-
free but the company did not survive the depression and the factory closed down by 1931
54
. 
 
More controversial was the decision by governor Storrs to award a monopoly to a British company 
for Cypriot wine exports to Britain and the empire, on the condition they invest in a modern winery. 
The governor acted unconstitutionally since he was not at liberty to provide such a monopoly 
without the consent of the legislative assembly: however, he argued that such a move was 
imperative in order to attract investment to improve the quality of Cypriot wine
55
. Despite the 
resistance of the legislative assembly, the monopoly was maintained, often in surreptitious ways
56
. 
The measure backfired as there were mass protests by grape producers, while no investment was 
made by the British monopoly company: the greatest investment in wine manufacturing came from 
the establishment of KEO, a company of Greek and Cypriot interests
57
.  
 
The colonial government of Cyprus also attempted to encourage industrial production within the 
areas where the empire was deemed not to be self-sufficient. Such attempts were wholly within the 
colonial orthodox mentality. The government‟s wish to establish a modern silk cocoon processing 
industry was based on sound principles. The island already had a cocoon industry, and silk 
production was carried out at handicraft level in the west of Cyprus. Cyprus was the second largest 
producer of cocoons in the British Empire, yet it exported most of the cocoons unprocessed to Italy 
and France. The establishment of a modern filature would enable Cyprus to capture more of the 
value added chain of silk production while using a locally produced raw material and securing the 
raw material for the empire
58
. The government provided a three year monopoly and customs 
concessions to the British company of Henckell, Du Buisson & Co to establish a modern silk 
filature in 1925
59
. The results were unimpressive as the filature closed down within five years, 
because it did not receive sufficient quantities of cocoons for processing due to the very low prices 
it offered to the farmers who found it much more profitable to export their cocoons to France. The 
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filature only reached at maximum capacity in 1927 and was run at a loss, closing permanently in 
1930
60
. The government also secured funding by the Empire Marketing Board in order to establish a 
modern flax industry in the Paphos area, but it was not successful and operated at loss
61
.  
 
The lack of investment in modernised methods of production resulted in the local artisans of Cyprus 
and Malta being unable to compete in terms of price and quality with imported factory products. 
This placed handicraft production under serious pressure as their methods of production were 
becoming obsolete. Artisans found themselves outcompeted by imported manufactured products. 
The shoe making artisans in Malta and Cyprus, working in small workshops, could not provide 
similar quality at the prices of Czechoslovakian factory-made shoes
62
. These shoes were made at 
Bat‟a factories where mass production techniques in the mid 1920s increased productivity, allowing 
for an increased production from 3.5 million to 15.2 million pairs
63
. As a result, the Maltese 
shoemakers were squeezed out of the market by the import of cheap, factory-made shoes. The 
Maltese and Cypriot governments responded by imposing high tariffs on Czechoslovakian shoes in 
1933, but the local shoemakers could not cover the shortfall: even if they increased the hours they 
worked, they simply could not produce the same quality of shoes for the price of the imported 
factory shoes
64
. As a result Bat‟a increased its market share in Cyprus and Malta even after the 
imposition of the tariff
65
.  
 
Cyprus and Malta did not experience an industrial performance similar to neighbouring countries 
due to their small market size, the lack of tariff protection and the lack of sufficient government 
intervention. The islands failed to keep up with the manufacturing growth of other Southern 
European peripheral states, since the international situation, combined with their limited domestic 
market made modernising their manufacturing industry difficult. Other factors also hindered faster 
industrial growth: the domestic market was competitive due to the lack of sufficient tariffs, while 
the islands‟ artisans could not compete with the price of factory-made imports. The government 
interventions were limited when compared to other countries and they provided limited results. 
Thus manufacturing was not the answer for either island as output and investment could only rise 
with increased trade, but the interwar period saw a steady increase of protectionist barriers. Without 
growth in regional trade the small size of the islands a disadvantage, as the demand for industrial 
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products was not enough for private investment in the new industrial processes; only with the 
liberalisation of trade after the Second World War could the islands manufacturing industry be 
modernised.  
 
Construction output 
 
The relatively poor performance of the manufacturing sector on the islands was in contrast to the 
experience of the construction industry. The growth of construction was spectacular for both Cyprus 
and Malta as construction output doubled as a share of GDP. Table 6.5 shows the development of 
Cypriot construction in the interwar period, which can be separated into three phases. From 1921 to 
1925 the construction sector was largely stagnant. There was a jump to a higher level of activity, 
followed by a prolonged period of slow growth until the depression led to a drop in construction 
activity in 1932. The sector recovered rapidly from the depression, since by 1933 a construction 
boom took place in Cyprus with an annual average growth rate of 28% for the period 1932-1938. 
The overall growth for the period 1921-1938 was very rapid, with an annual average growth of 
10.7%.  
 
The growth in the 1930s was as spectacular as the growth of mining, making construction one of the 
most dynamic sectors of the Cypriot economy. Out of the 22,270 dwellings constructed during the 
period 1921-1938, 55.4% were built in the last six years. The rapid expansion of output in the late 
1930s was linked to the rapid urban expansion in Cyprus: 81.4% of all urban houses built during the 
interwar period were constructed between 1932 and 1938. 
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Figure 6.5: Value added of construction, Cyprus, 1921–1938 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted). 
 
Growth in the Maltese construction industry was similarly rapid, with the industry being the most 
dynamic in the interwar economy. Table 6.5 indicates the rapidity of construction growth: despite 
being much smaller than Cyprus in terms of population and geographical size, Maltese construction 
output outstripped Cypriot construction from 1930 to 1936, despite being a much smaller economy. 
Figure 6.5 indicates that there were three stages in the development of the interwar Maltese 
construction industry. Growth was steady until 1929, and then accelerated rapidly until 1934. 
Surprisingly, the construction sector was not affected by the great depression: output kept 
increasing throughout the global downturn. The industry reached a plateau and subsequently 
experienced a very sharp output reduction in 1938, with value added declining by 47.2%. This 
recession in construction was deep, wiping out the gains in output made in the 1930s. The annual 
average growth of the Maltese construction industry prior to the 1938 decline (i.e. for the period 
1921-1937) was 13.2%. The sharp reversal in 1938 was partly due to a reduction in public 
construction: public construction value added fell from £200,967 in 1937 to £94,753 in 1938. At the 
same time the weakness of Malta‟s strategic position, exposed during the Abyssinian crisis in 1936, 
made investors reluctant to continue building as the clouds of war thickened prior to the Munich 
conference in September 1938.   
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Figure 6.6: Value added of construction, Malta, 1921-1938 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix C. 
 
The construction in Malta was centred in the areas of Sliema and St-Julian. These areas were 
previously just beyond commuting distance of the Grand Harbour urban area. By the end of the 
1930s they were completely transformed since buses allowed faster communication with the main 
urban areas: over 62% of new housing was constructed in the suburbs of existing urban areas, 
creating new urban areas radiating outwards from Grand Harbour. On the other hand, traditional 
urban areas experienced population decline as people flocked to better and more affordable 
accommodation in the suburbs: fewer than one hundred of the 11,008 houses constructed during the 
period were built in urban centres.  
 
The rapid growth of construction brought lasting benefits to the economies of Cyprus and Malta. 
Table 6.6 indicates that construction industry rapidly raised its profile on the islands‟ economy, as it 
was one of the few industries were demand was fuelled by the increased population growth. The 
new houses and roads constructed increased the capital stock, which in turn increased output in 
terms of a higher rental income from housing and by the easing of transport bottlenecks. The 
construction boom that took place during the interwar period permanently shaped the appearance of 
the islands‟ cities: the iconic Phaneromeni area in Nicosia and the palm tree promenade of Larnaca 
were all constructed during this period, while in Malta the boom led to the apartment blocks and the 
promenade road that links Sliema and St. Julian to Valletta
66
. 
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Table 6.5: Value added of construction of Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921   92,034 168,270 1930 394,718 328,581 
1922 120,988 160,842 1931 474,906 305,654 
1923 148,498 145,771 1932 543,857 216,168 
1924 184,890 156,877 1933 580,259 264,183 
1925 210,814 183,972 1934 685,005 342,373 
1926 239,299 319,797 1935 650,832 462,326 
1927 247,597 329,797 1936 677,922 599,481 
1928 279,616 376,809 1937 673,733 791,404 
1929 301,546 304,923 1938 355,449 951,438 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted); appendix C 
 
Table 6.6: Per capita value added of construction of Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Cyprus Malta Year Cyprus Malta 
1921 0.54 0.43 1930 0.96 1.65 
1922 0.51 0.56 1931 0.88 1.97 
1923 0.46 0.68 1932 0.61 2.22 
1924 0.49 0.84 1933 0.73 2.34 
1925 0.57 0.94 1934 0.93 2.72 
1926 0.97 1.06 1935 1.24 2.55 
1927 0.99 1.08 1936 1.58 2.62 
1928 1.12 1.20 1937 2.05 2.57 
1929 0.90 1.28 1938 2.42 1.33 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Table 6.5, Table 3.2. 
 
The principal reason for the rapid increase in housing construction was the population pressure on 
the existing housing infrastructure, particularly in and around cities. In chapter 3 it was seen that the 
decreased migration opportunities led to increased population growth: this exerted pressure on the 
existing housing stock of Malta and Cyprus. The housing stock in 1921 was already under pressure 
as the First World War put a halt to construction while the war increased profits. This combined 
with the growth of population, created great demand for housing, especially in Malta. Population 
pressure increased the demand for housing even in rural areas during the interwar period.  
 
The demand for new houses was even greater in urban and sub-urban areas. In cities there was a 
need for new housing as many household improvements that were becoming the norm in the 
interwar period (such as running water, kitchens and plumbing) could not be installed in old 
buildings without additional cost. This combined with the ability to introduction of commuting due 
to the arrival of motor vehicles led to the rapid expansion o f sub-urban areas described below. 
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Table 6.7: Yearly growth in construction, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938. 
Year Malta Cyprus 
 Value added (%) Per Capita (%) Value added (%) Per Capita (%) 
1921–1922  31.5 29.8  -4.4   -5.5 
1922–1923  22.7 21.2  -9.4 -10.4 
1923–1924  24.5 22.9   7.6    6.4 
1924–1925  14.0 12.6 17.3 16.0 
1925–1926  13.5 12.1 73.8  71.9 
1926–1927   3.5    2.1    3.1   2.0 
1927–1928  12.9 11.5 14.3  13.0 
1928–1929   7.8    6.5 -19.1 -20.0 
1929–1930  30.9 29.2    7.8     6.6 
1930–1931  20.3 18.8   -7.0   -8.0 
1931–1932  14.5 12.9 -29.3 -30.5 
1932–1933   6.7   5.2 22.2    20.1 
1933–1934  18.1 16.4 29.6    27.4 
1934–1935  -5.0  -6.3 35.0    32.7 
1935–1936    4.2    2.7 29.7    27.5 
1936–1937   -0.6   -2.0 32.0   29.8 
1937–1938 -47.2 -48.0 20.2   18.2 
1921–1938   8.3   6.8  10.7  9.0 
1921–1929 17.6  16.1   7.7  6.5 
1930–1938  -1.3  -2.7  14.2  12.4 
GDP Peak to 
Peak 
(1925-1937) 
10.2 8.7 12.9 11.3 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Table 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.7 divides the value added of construction of Malta in four constituent parts: public 
construction, commercial building construction, agricultural building construction and housing. 
Fenech argues that public construction projects, such as the construction of a new general hospital 
and the development of the “Harper area”, primed the building boom in Malta67. Figure 6.7 
indicates that public construction was indeed a very important part of the industry, and credit is due 
to the Maltese parliament for financing substantial construction projects in an attempt to kick-start 
the economy in the early 1920s. The proportion of public construction to total output peaked at 
77.2% in 1921, but gradually declined as housing construction took off in the suburbs. The sharp 
drop in output in 1938 was due to a reduction in output in all sub-sectors of construction activity, 
including government, thus leaving the relative shares in terms of value added unchanged.  
                                                 
67
 Fenech, Responsibility and Power…, (2005), p.175, p.270 
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Figure 6.7: Construction per sub-group Malta, as share of value added (%), 1921–1938. 
 
Source: Appendix C; appendix F; Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938). 
 
Figure 6.8 shows that there are similarities and some important differences between the Maltese and 
Cypriot construction industries. Agricultural buildings were more important in Cyprus than in 
Malta: in fact, the majority of Cypriot houses constructed were still located in the rural areas, as the 
rate of urban construction accelerated only slightly in the 1930s. Government expenditure on roads 
and public buildings was particularly important for Cyprus from 1921 until the middle of the 
decade. Yet the role of the Cypriot government was never as dominant as in Malta, with public 
construction reaching a peak in Cyprus of 36.2% in 1930. Substantial public projects were 
completed during the latter half of the 1930s by constructing a new governor‟s palace, an English 
School and the general hospital. As a result the absolute expenditure of the government increased 
from £59,039 in 1936, to £111,098 in 1938. Yet, the construction boom of Cyprus was mainly due 
to increased house building and less due to public expenditure.  
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Figure 6.8: Construction per sub-group, Cyprus, as share of value added (%), 1921–1938. 
 
Source: Appendix B; appendix F; Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938). 
 
The introduction of motorised vehicles helped sustain the rapid increase in construction. Before the 
First World War, the transport links on the islands were limited, as explained in chapter 7. This 
aided the construction industry by lowering costs through the cheaper transportation of raw 
materials, but most importantly by bringing more areas around the cities within a commuting 
distance
68
. This was very important in Malta. Malta‟s cities had the highest urban concentration 
ratio in Europe, creating great problems in terms of hygiene. The population density around the 
Grand Harbour, comprising of Valletta, Floriana, Cospicua, Senglea and Vittoriosa, was 48,112 
persons per square mile in 1921, with Valletta and Senglea registering 79,339 and 102,737 persons 
per square mile respectively
69
. The heart of the interwar economy of Malta was located in the Grand 
Harbour and without any cheap and efficient  way to commute, the population needed to live as 
close to it as possible often in expensive and substandard accommodation 
70
.  
 
Due to the overcrowding conditions, housing in the Grand Harbour area was expensive and 
unhygienic, forcing even well-off workers to live in slums
71
. Infant mortality in Maltese cities was 
one of the highest in Europe, and there were frequent outbreaks of disease, with an outbreak of 
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70
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bubonic plague occurring in 1936
72
. The new dwellings in the Maltese suburbs were relatively 
inexpensive apartments with toilets and running water, providing well off labourers and clerks 
cheaper accommodation with better living conditions
73
. The population density of urban areas was 
not a serious issue in Cyprus, but the provision of modern amenities and cheaper accommodation 
did create a demand for new housing construction: as a result the number of persons per house in 
the urban area of Cyprus remained unchanged, despite a growing urban population
74
.  
 
The housing boom in Cyprus and Malta seems to add another piece of circumstantial evidence that 
the lacklustre economic performance impacted the population unevenly. The artisans and farmers 
were the clear losers since they faced the declining values of their products, and increased the pool 
of unskilled workmen, keeping real wages down. Yet they seem to have been clear winners in this 
period through investment in substantial property. In Cyprus the large debt to moneylenders led to 
forced sales of property: as a result some moneylenders made significant gains in land on which 
they constructed houses in order to acquire a steady supply of rental income
75
. Fenech argues that 
the large profits made by some in Malta during the First World War led to an accumulation of 
capital which was invested in the building of houses, as there were no other investment 
opportunities available domestically while investment abroad became troublesome in the turbulent 
monetary conditions of the period
76
. The lack of other investment opportunities, the speculative 
nature of the industry, and the fact that housing investment was considered a safe and reliable 
option at a time of global insecurity seemed to spur construction further
77
. 
  
                                                 
72
 Infant mortality: Bowen-Jones, et al, Malta: Background for Development (1961), pp.178-179; Plague: National 
Archives, London. File: CO161/123 “Report of the Public Health and Veterinary Department 1936-1937”, Incidence of 
Plague  
73
 National Archives, London. File: CO161/124 “Report of the Public Health and Veterinary Department 1937-1938”, 
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74
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 Fenech, Responsibility and Power…, (2005), p.270 
77
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Labour productivity in the secondary sector 
 
The census of occupation did not allow for a separation of manufacturing from construction 
workers as the relevant occupations seem to change definition from one census to the next. As a 
result there is an underestimation in workers in construction: as some builders were enumerated as 
carpenters and brick makers and thus classed in manufacturing
78
. In addition there is an issue of 
unspecified labourers, which are classed in the secondary sector: without additional information it is 
simply not possible to distinguish how many worked in construction rather than in manufacturing, 
handicrafts and utilities. Thus a joint estimate of value added per worker was made, which prevents 
a detailed discussion on the productivity differentials between these industries.  
 
The estimates of output per worker are less robust than those of the primary sector since some of the 
estimation procedures used to estimate the output of manufacturing and handicraft production 
assume constant productivity. Therefore the results should be treated with caution.  
 
Table 6.8: Value added per employee (Labour productivity), in the secondary sector 1921-1938. 
  Cyprus   Malta 
  1921 1931 1938   1921 1931 1938 
Manufacturing, 
Construction  and Utilities 
58.9 61.3 83.6 
Manufacturing, 
Construction  and Utilities 
61.4 89.2 98.0 
Total Output Productivity 41.4 44.8 58.3 Total Output Productivity 50.6 68.5 75.8 
Note: In constant 1938 pounds sterling. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted) and Appendix C; Table 3.14. 
 
Table 6.8 is a reproduction of table 3.15, focusing on the secondary sector. It indicates that the 
value added per worker in Malta was higher than in Cyprus, which is not surprising as Malta was 
relying less on handicraft output and more on the output of the Dockyard. The combined growth of 
value added of the secondary sector from 1921 to 1938 was 2.7% for Malta and 2.6% for Cyprus 
since the rapid growth of construction overturned the poor performance of the manufacturing, 
handicrafts and utility industries. The growth in value added after 1931 did not lead to an increase 
in employment in the sector as the total number of workers in secondary occupation fell in both 
Malta and Cyprus (Table 3.14). There was significant growth in value added per worker for the 
period 1921-1938: Malta‟s grew by 2.4%.and in Cyprus‟ by 2.0% but that suggests that the benefits 
of the increased productivity were shared by those in employment and their employers with the 
sector remaining closed to underemployed farmers. 
 
                                                 
78
 Maltese building workers numbered 602 in 1921 and 2,715 in 1931. These totals do not include general workers, 
which results in the separate estimate of productivity of construction at high and improbable levels for the period 1921-
1931. Source: Malta, Census… 1921(1922); Malta, Census...1931 (1932). 
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The growth of output per worker in Cyprus from 1921 to 1931 was just 0.8%, following the slow 
growth of 0.3% of the value added of the secondary sector. In contrast, Malta‟s productivity in that 
period was as rapid at 3.1% following the rapid growth of value added of the secondary sector at 
3.9%. During the 1930s (1931-1938) the trend was reversed: Cypriot secondary sector productivity 
was faster, growing by  3.8% as the secondary sector value added grew by 6.1%, while Maltese 
secondary sector productivity grew at 1.5% per annum while output growth grew by 0.9%. 
 
Due to the problems of the secondary sector the rapid growth of the value added per worker can 
only be partly explained. It is clear that the growth of construction took place without a great 
increase of the aggregate number of workers of the secondary sector. This creates two possible 
scenarios: either the manufacturing industry became more productive and shed workers to the 
construction industry, or the construction industry became much more productive and did not poach 
workers form the manufacturing industry
79
. Most likely a combination of these two scenarios took 
place: manufacturing and construction became more productive, while there was a shift of labour 
from manufacturing to construction. Without a breakdown of employment to its respective sectors 
no definitive answer can be provided.  
 
However, the rapid increase in the value added per worker might not be just due to an increase in 
labour productivity. It may also be that the artisans working the manufacturing and handicraft 
industries who were faced with increasing competition from imports, reacted by extending their 
hours of work in an effort to maintain their income level, perhaps reducing the time they spent in 
other activities such as agriculture.  
                                                 
79
 Some of the productivity growth may have resulted from the introduction of new construction materials, such as 
Portland cement, that were relatively unused on the islands before 1921, thus increasing the labour productivity of the  
construction sector. 
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Chapter 7: The Service Sector 
 
“So far as the writer is aware, no calculation has been made of the value of the presence of 
services, but it is obviously the dominating factor of the economy”1.  
 
It is relatively recently that the output of the service sector has been seen as important in the 
economic wellbeing of a developing nation. The pioneers of national accounting focused on 
estimating the secondary and primary sectors, as the development theory of the time argued that a 
sustained increase in income entailed a shift of resources from agriculture to manufacturing
2
.  The 
service sector was considered to have a minimal potential for productivity increase and thus it was 
less important in development. The underestimation of the sector‟s significance was partly due to 
the difficulties in estimating service sector output
3
. Unlike the output of the primary and secondary 
sector, there was great ambiguity in which service activities should be in GDP: paid housework is 
considered part of GDP but own housework and DIY assembly are not.  
 
Even if the services to be included in GDP were clearly defined, estimating service sector output 
presents serious challenges. It is sometimes difficult to measure output as for example in trade 
where the value added is part of the value of a product paid by the consumer. Other services are 
public goods that do not operate under market prices, while for some industries their output cannot 
be clearly defined: the correct method to measure the output of defence, healthcare and education 
still befuddles statisticians today. Output may not be measured in physical units, prices might not be 
profit maximising and it employee productivity is difficult to fathom. Previously HNA studies 
estimated the sector as a residual or assumed that the number of employees multiplied by their 
wages equalled the value added of the sector. As the importance of the sector was re-evaluated there 
have been changes in what is included and how it could be measured. Current practice includes an 
estimate of the implied income of houses, which was not originally included in the SNA and better 
methods of estimating the sector‟s output were devised4.  
 
It has not been possible to consistently use up-to-date methodology in this study in estimating the 
sector‟s output due to problems of poor data availability, yet the islands‟ implied rental income, 
trade, transport and communication industries, as well as the Cypriot banking sector were estimated 
                                                 
1
 Greaves, Report on the Economic Conditions… (1935) p.42 
2
 Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, (1966) p.6 
3
 Lee. C., “The Service Industries” in Floud, R., and McCloskey, D., The Economic History of Britain Since 1700 
(Second Edition): Volume 2 1860-1939 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.117-144, p.119 
4
 Vanoli, A History of National Accounting (2005), p.249; Van Ark, “Towards European...” (1995) p.5, p.11 
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by adapting current best practise
5
. Due to the weakness of the underlying data, output in the service 
sector is the least robust. As a result the labour productivity of the sector is not provided because a 
great part of the service sector output was estimated based on wage and employment data, which 
assumes constant productivity, while the employment of the industries where output was directly 
estimated could not be established separately from total service sector employment. 
 
Service sector output 
 
The service sector was the most important sector of the Maltese economy, constituting 58.3% of the 
total economy in 1938. Yet as figure 7.1 indicates, the sector grew more slowly than the aggregate 
economy, resulting in a slight fall of its relative share to GDP. This slow growth was in complete 
contrast with its rapid expansion after independence in 1964, where transport, tourism and shipping 
were central to Malta‟s post-1945 success story6. 
 
Figure 7.1:Value added of the service sector, Malta, 1921-1938 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix C.  
 
The performance of the Cypriot service sector is shown in figure 7.2. The growth rate was slower 
than the booming mining and construction industries, but faster than agriculture. As in Malta, the 
Cypriot service sector during the interwar period was underperforming when compared to post-war 
                                                 
5
For the methodology see: United Nations, Department of international economic and social affairs, Handbook of 
National Accounting, Series F, No.39: Accounting for Production: Sources and Methods, (New York: United Nations, 
1986), Chapter 6 and 7. 
6
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growth. Growth in the period 1950-1959 was quite phenomenal, leading to the sector becoming 
pivotal in the successful post-war development of the island
7
.  
 
Figure 7.2: Value added of the service sector Cyprus, 1921-1938 
 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix C (PPP adjusted). 
 
Table 7.1: Value added of the service sector, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Malta Cyprus Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 2,785,927 2,542,917 1930 3,627,002 3,456,396 
1922 2,985,613 2,621,837 1931 3,622,468 3,366,556 
1923 3,145,958 2,623,358 1932 3,720,149 3,180,489 
1924 3,397,289 2,772,318 1933 3,801,894 3,089,628 
1925 3,491,483 2,906,040 1934 3,897,711 3,351,488 
1926 3,588,070 2,848,820 1935 4,112,661 3,515,247 
1927 3,574,404 3,076,588 1936 3,933,788 3,602,418 
1928 3,416,825 3,123,409 1937 4,204,479 3,871,072 
1929 3,692,966 3,466,769 1938 4,321,253 3,882,471 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted); Appendix C. 
 
Table 7.2: Per capita value added of the service sector, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.  
Year Cyprus Malta Year Malta Cyprus 
1921 8.18 13.13 1930 15.21 10.05 
1922 8.34 13.88 1931 14.99 9.68 
1923 8.25 14.44 1932 15.18 8.98 
1924 8.62 15.40 1933 15.30 8.58 
1925 8.94 15.62 1934 15.47 9.15 
1926 8.66 15.84 1935 16.10 9.43 
1927 9.25 15.58 1936 15.19 9.50 
1928 9.29 14.70 1937 16.01 10.04 
1929 10.19 15.69 1938 16.23 9.89 
Note: In constant 1938, PPP, pounds sterling. Source: Appendix B (PPP adjusted); Appendix C; Table 3.2. 
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 Source: Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Pocket Book…, (1980). 
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Table 7.3 indicates that the service sector in the interwar period was not in crisis, but it was not a 
medium of rapid growth for the Maltese and Cypriot economies. There are similarities between the 
Maltese and Cypriot service sectors since both experienced faster growth during the 1920s. 
 
Table 7.3: Service sector growth rates, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938. 
Year Malta Cyprus 
 Value added (%) Per Capita (%) Value added (%) Per Capita (%) 
1921–1922 7.2 5.7 3.1 2.0 
1922–1923 5.4 4.0 0.1 -1.1 
1923–1924 8.0 6.6 5.7 4.5 
1924–1925 2.8 1.4 4.8 3.7 
1925–1926 2.8 1.4 -2.0 -3.1 
1926–1927 -0.4 -1.6 8.0 6.8 
1927–1928 -4.4 -5.6 1.5 0.4 
1928–1929 8.1 6.7 11.0 9.7 
1929–1930 -1.8 -3.1 -0.3 -1.4 
1930–1931 -0.1 -1.4 -2.6 -3.7 
1931–1932 2.7 1.3 -5.5 -7.2 
1932–1933 2.2 0.8 -2.9 -4.5 
1933–1934 2.5 1.1 8.5 6.6 
1934–1935 5.5 4.1 4.9 3.1 
1935–1936 -4.3 -5.7 2.5 0.7 
1936–1937 6.9 5.4 7.5 5.7 
1937–1938 2.8 1.4 0.3 -1.5 
1921–1938 2.6 1.1 2.5 1.3 
1921–1929 3.6 2.8 3.9 2.3 
1930–1938 2.2 -0.2 1.5 0.8 
GDP Peak to 
Peak 
(1925-1937) 
1.6 0.2 2.4 1.0 
Source: Table 7.1. 
 
It is very difficult to compare the service output of Malta and Cyprus with other Southern European 
countries due to the different estimation procedures used. The exclusion of industries such as the 
implied rental income from housing can have significant effects on the growth rate, making cross-
study comparisons difficult
8
. In general it seems that the slow growth of services‟ output seemed 
indicative of the Southern European periphery. Services output in Greece grew by 2.1% for the 
period 1921-1938, growing slower than the total economy
9
. The fact that the service sector was not 
a spectacular provider of economic growth during the interwar period is not just a South European 
phenomenon: the proportion of GDP growth accounted for services in Britain fell to a third in the 
interwar period
10
. 
 
The service sector of Malta is divided into industries in figure 7.3. It must be noted that the section 
of public administration indicates the size of the administration rather than the full scope of 
                                                 
8
 For example Ivanov could only estimate the implied rental income of city dwellings due to the lack of data. Source: 
Ivanov, Bulgarian National Income  (Unpublished) 
9
 Source: Kostelenos, et al, Ακαθάπιστο Εγσώπιο Πποφόν (2007), “Appendix”. 
10
 Lee, “The Service Industries”  (1994) p.143 
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government expenditure, which is presented in chapter 8. The expenditure of the Maltese 
administration in wages more than doubled during the period, rising from £138,061 in 1921 to 
£347,144 in 1938. Yet public administration remained a small section of the economy at 8% of 
GDP in 1938. The education sector increased its output both relatively and absolutely in the effort 
of the Maltese self-government to increase primary education.  
 
The largest service industries in Malta were trade (domestic and foreign) and transport, constituting 
33% and 29.3% of the total service output in 1938 respectively. The aggregate economy of Malta 
was little affected by the great depression, but these industries were seriously affected with output 
declining yearly from 1926 to 1931. Personal services relating to the presence of the British armed 
forces formed a high proportion of the sector‟s employment but were less important in terms of 
output due to the low wages of those employed. Employment in personal and domestic services 
remained high in Malta, despite the fact that such occupations were declining across Europe during 
this period.  
 
Figure 7.3: Services per sub-group, Malta, as share of value added (%), 1921-1938. 
 
Source: Appendix C. 
 
The service sector of Cyprus is divided into industries in figure 7.4. Public administration in Cyprus 
held a larger share of the service sector due to the fact the Cypriot service sector was much smaller 
than in Malta. Expenditure on government administration increased rapidly, rising a peak of 15.1% 
of total services output in 1928, but falling to 11.9% by 1938. The banking industry grew from 
£11,237 in 1921 to £134,735 in 1938 in PPP constant pounds sterling. As a result the banking 
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industry grew from 0.8% of the service sector value added in 1921 to 6.2% in 1938, confirming that 
the interwar period was a seminal period for Cypriot banking development. 
 
Figure 7.4: Services per sub-group, Cyprus, as share of value added, 1921–1938. 
 
Source: Appendix B. 
 
The rapid growth of banking output was partly because of the success in attracting new depositors 
that were previously excluded from the formal banking market by the emerging domestic banks
11
. 
The growth of formal banking was matched by the expansion of co-operative banking, since the 
number of co-operative societies rose from 25 in 1925 to 224 in 1932
12
.  
  
                                                 
11
 See: Apostolides. A., and Gekas, A. “Banking Expansion, Success and Failure in the British Mediterranean; The 
Ionian Bank 1840s–1920s” in Tortella, G., Consiglio, J., Martinez-Oliva, J.C., (eds.) Banking in the Mediterranean: A 
Historical Perspective (Ashgate Publishing, Forthcoming) 
12
 See: Chapter 3 pp.114-115. 
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An analysis of the service sector’s performance 
 
The increasing importance of the service sector in the modern economy has led to a re-evaluation of 
its role in economic growth: growth could also be sustained by shifting service employment 
towards high productivity market services
13
. Market services create value added directly through 
the market and do not rely on government payments, unlike non-market service industries which are 
in part reliant on taxation revenue.  
 
Trade was one of the most important market services in Malta and Cyprus and its output was 
affected by the global volatility, especially in the 1930s. The 1930s resulted to the virtual 
elimination of Malta‟s role as an entrepôt. During the middle of the nineteenth century, Malta 
became an important entrepôt and coal bunkering station for the traffic to and from the Suez Canal, 
but by the beginning of the twentieth century Malta‟s role was eroded as shipping technology 
improved and competition increased
14
. The First World War interrupted trade and the volume of 
Maltese re-exports in 1921 did not recover the pre-War level
15
. The depression caused a further 
decline and as a result Maltese re-exports in 1938 were still 58% of the 1921 level
16
. The decline in 
re-exports led to a decrease of shipping traffic in the harbour, reducing the output of coal bunkering 
services.  
 
The previous chapters indicated that for the islands to have faster economic growth this would need 
to take place through the service sector. This is especially true for Malta, since it had limited 
agricultural land, it was devoid of resource endowments, and because industrialisation was very 
difficult for small islands during a time of rising protectionism. Service sector output is not as 
reliant on raw materials, while market size is less of a disadvantage for market services. In addition, 
the service sector could capitalise on an abundant resource of people. Yet the islands‟ service 
sectors could only achieve higher growth rates during the interwar period through modernisation 
which would entail a move away from the „counting house‟ and step towards the „modern office‟. 
The „counting house‟ describes a diverse mercantile operation, where insurance, trade and banking 
were carried out without any specialised equipment or skills and without any division of labour. The 
employee in a „modern office‟ is specialised and focuses in providing services for the mass market 
by providing a high volume of transactions with a low profit margin, thus maximising labour 
                                                 
13
 Broadberry, S. Market Services and the Productivity Race, 1850-2000: Britain in International Perspective, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006), p1,.3. 
14
 Castillo, The Maltese Cross (2006) p.129 
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productivity
17
. The shift to the „modern office‟ was well under-way in Europe during the interwar 
period but it was difficult for Malta and Cyprus to adopt such practises as their low per capita 
income limited the demand for modern services
18
. As a result merchants did not specialise and 
attempted to achieve a high profit margin on a low volume of transactions. In Malta the baker 
Blackley was also a broker, as well as packer and exporter of oranges, while the Tagliaferros were 
bankers, grain merchants and ship chandlers as well as real estate operators
19
. 
 
Cyprus and Malta were labour abundant economies but the transition to the „modern office‟ was 
limited by the low levels of human capital accumulation. Specialised staff needed high levels of 
education to capitalise on communication, organisation and management technology, while 
sufficient literacy was necessary by the consumers in order for mass market services to be accepted 
and understood. As a result, investment in human capital was an important factor in the increase of 
the labour productivity in services: the expansion of the service sector depended on the educational 
capabilities of an economy. However, Cyprus and Malta had high levels of illiteracy with 60.8% 
and 46.1% of the population over ten on Malta and Cyprus not being able to read and write in 
1931
20
. Malta did have its own university which provided graduates in law and medicine, leading to 
more service professionals than in Cyprus, but in both countries the population density of skilled 
professionals was low with less than a one lawyer or notary for every 1000 persons; at the same 
time Malta had one priest for every 133 persons
21
. 
 
There were some attempts to increase the human capital of the population in Malta. Although 
primary education was not compulsory during the interwar period, the increase in students attending 
primary schools was rapid
22
. The representative bodies of the indigenous population in both Malta 
and Cyprus considered the high rate of illiteracy as a serious failing, and increased funds for 
primary education
23
. However, any increase of human capital entails a time lag; as a result, the 
introduction of compulsory education in Cyprus in the 1920s enabled the modernisation of the 
service sector after the Second World War: by 1946 both islands had a young population with a 
higher ability in reading, writing and numeracy than ever before.  
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The rapid growth of the Cypriot banking sector provided the basis of rapid growth after the Second 
World War. The majority of credit in 1921 was in the hands of moneylenders who operated a low 
volume, high margin service that needed modernisation. Moneylenders were a diverse group often 
also being lawyers, general merchants and village storekeepers. They provided a valuable financial 
service to farmers, but they did so in a way that was expensive, wasteful and inefficient
24
. The 
farmer could be indebted for the rest of his life through a combination of high, and sometimes 
exorbitant, interest rates, while the moneylender was at risk of losing his capital if there were 
consecutively poor harvests that would leave most farmers unable to repay him
25
.  
 
Although moneylending was not eliminated, the financing of the Cypriot economy was transformed 
by the rapid progress of the banking and co-operative sectors. New domestic banks, employing 
Cypriot staff and resources, were created from the urban savings societies that were established 
before the First World War. Although initially small these societies were to be transformed into 
banks, two of which, the Bank of Cyprus and the Cyprus Popular Bank, are the largest banks in 
Cyprus today
26
. These domestic banks were very successful in attracting the deposits of a section of 
Cypriot society which was excluded from the formal banking sector: school teachers, urban 
housewives and professionals, entrusted their savings to domestic banks
27
. The growth of Cypriot 
domestic banks during the period was impressive. In 1920 Cypriot banks held £83,900 in deposits, 
constituting 18.8% of total deposits; by 1938 the domestic banks held £780,899, or 38.5% of total 
deposits
28
.  
 
Rural money lending was also minimised through the combined action of the credit crunch, the 
development of the co-operative sector and the debt settlement board established during the Second 
World War, as described in chapter 4. Although the co-operative societies did not operate with the 
„for profit‟ motive, as were the moneylenders, their introduction did gradually lead to the 
modernisation of rural finance. Despite the co-operative societies‟ problems that were previously 
described, the co-operative sector was important in introducing hierarchical management in the 
rural credit market. In addition the structure of each co-operative allowed for specialisation: 
although related, the village co-operatives separated their functions between the credit societies, 
marketing societies and retailing societies. Most significantly, the co-operative credit societies 
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pooled the small amount of savings of each farmer, thus allowing for high volume, low margin 
loans for their members
29
. Consequently, the co-operative sector transformed the rural society in 
Cyprus: by 1958 about 50% of the island‟s agricultural produce were marketed through direct or 
indirect assistance from the co-operatives
30
.  
 
The transport industry underwent important changes during the interwar period through the 
diffusion of motor vehicles. Motor vehicles were scarce prior to 1921 and their introduction allowed 
for greater ease of transport and trade. The Maltese islands were very poorly connected in terms of 
transport before 1921, and as a result substantial regional price disparities still existed despite the 
small distances between villages. Despite Malta‟s small size, most goods were still transported by 
cart since Malta‟s narrow-gauge railway (just 7.5 miles long) that connected Valletta to Rabat did 
not carry freight
31
. The expansion of the urban area around the Grand Harbour increased the need to 
commute since the area was inadequately served by horse drawn carts and electric trams, 
supplemented by small boats and a steam ferry
32
. The introduction of automobiles led to the rapid 
creation of a comprehensive bus network that serviced the urban area. As table 7.4 indicates, the 
small size of the island and substantial investment by the government meant that the main motor 
roads were largely complete by 1930, and the Maltese road network was denser than Cyprus due to 
its small area. The small size of the island made bus services a cheap and rapid method of transport: 
by 1924 there were over 124 routes between Valetta and Sliema. In 1927 the government regulated 
the bus network, fares and schedule, leading to a complete network of services by 1932
33
. As a 
result the Grand Harbour economy was opened up to even the most remote parts of the island: 
farmers were able to sell their produce directly in the city rather than through middlemen, and up to 
3,000 people commuted daily by bus from Luqa, Ghaxaq and Sliema to the dockyard in 1931
34
. The 
buses were an efficient way of providing transport, and as a result railway and tram services were 
terminated in 1931. 
 
Table 7.5 indicates the number of vans and cars in Malta increased rapidly allowing for an 
integration of the domestic economy: The sale of commercially baked bread took place within 4 
miles where it was baked in 1919, yet by 1932 the area of Qorrmi was providing bread to the whole 
eastern half of the island
35
.  
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Table 7.4: Road network and density in miles, Malta and Cyprus, 1921-1938.   
Malta Cyprus 
Year 1
st
 
Class 
Road 
2
nd
 
Class 
road 
Total Road Density: 
Area / Road  
Year 1
st
 
Class 
Road 
2
nd
 
Class 
road 
Village Total Road 
Density: 
Area / Road  
1921 269 114 383 1.95 1921 174 117 803 1094 0.19 
1925 270 114 384 1.96 1925 187 117 879 1183 0.21 
1929 287 119 406 2.07 1929 189 117 970 1276 0.22 
1934 290 121 411 2.09 1934 665 212 2030 2906 0.51 
1938 379 93 472 2.40 1938 670 196 1716 2581 0.45 
Note: First Class Road was suitable for all weather; Second class road was impassable during bad weather, and village 
roads were village dirt tracks. Sources: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921 -1938); Source: Malta, Statistical (Blue) 
Books, (1921 -1938)  
 
The introduction of a greater number of automobiles in Cyprus did not have as great an effect as in 
Malta. The road density (table 7.4) and number of vehicles per capita (table 7.5) were far higher in 
Malta. Cyprus was much larger and more mountainous, and despite the expansion of the road 
network several areas of the island were still poorly served. Yet the introduction of motor vehicles 
led to an improvement in transport connections: before their introduction there was just a narrow-
gauge government railway that connected the island from the east (Famagusta) through the capital, 
Nicosia, and to the west (Evrykhou)
36
. The railway did allow ease of access for goods and 
passengers in between Famagusta, Morfou and Nicosia but the main axis of trade was south to north 
(Limassol-Troodos Mountains-Nicosia) and it was not served by the railway
37
.  
 
Table 7.5: Vehicles per capita registered in Malta and Cyprus, 1921-1938   
Malta Cyprus 
Year Buses Cars Vans 
Motor 
Cycles 
Total 
Vehicle
s/ 
Populat
ion 
Year 
Cars, 
Buses 
and 
Vans 
Motor 
Cycles 
Total 
Vehicle
s/ 
Populat
ion 
Active 
Driving 
Licence 
1921 19 200 6 130 355 0.167 1921 21 224 245 0.079 N/A 
1925 75 743 38 332 1188 0.531 1925 114 582 696 0.214 695 
1929 428 1447 143 351 2369 1.006 1929 314 1500 1814 0.533 649 
1934 567 2081 445 386 3479 1.381 1934 325 1872 2197 0.600 797 
1938 611 3725 762 406 5504 2.067 1938 521 2702 3223 0.821 1160 
Note: The Vehicles / Population were multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes. 
Source: Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921 -1938); National Archives, Nicosia. Files: SA1/260/ “Annual report of 
the Police Commissioner” (1921-1938).  
 
The introduction of vehicles in Cyprus enabled a greater interaction of the villages with the island‟s 
market towns. Greaves stated in 1935 that the “advent of good road enables them [the villagers] to 
visit the towns more frequently”38. The central highland of Cyprus was completely isolated before 
the introduction of automobiles: Bus services connected the villages with the market towns, leaving 
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in the morning and returning at night, enabling some villagers to acquire work in cities
39
. In the 
mountain villages of Pitsilia, the introduction of the bus service led to the breakdown of the 
exploitative relationship with the manager of the general store: the cost of transporting goods was 
reduced, enabled the co-operative society to establish its own retail shops by buying goods directly 
from the city of Limassol and selling their farming products directly to the city‟s merchants40. 
 
By 1938 Maltese traffic was transferred almost exclusively to motorised traffic, and yet non-
motorised transport was still an important part of Cypriot traffic, as the number of registered horse 
drawn casts and pack camels were still significant at the end of the period
41
. Thus the transportation 
revolution was not yet complete in Cyprus, and it would only take place after the end of the Second 
World War. The communication lines connecting the island to the outside world were poor: Malta 
had up to ten liners visit the island per month, allowing it to have frequent mails to Europe, while 
Cypriot mail bound for Europe needed a 15 day turnaround due to the limited number of liners 
docking in Cyprus. 
 
The industries in Malta that remained buoyant were those servicing the British military and their 
dependents. From the infamous “gut” area of Valletta to the washerwomen of the “three cities”, the 
Grand Harbour area was geared to catering for the needs of the British sailors and officers. The 
naval dockyard was upgraded to accommodate the growing size of capital naval ships and as a 
result the naval personnel increased to over 21,000 persons, providing low income service 
employment for the inhabitants of the Grand Harbour area
42
. Towards the end of the 1920s, the 
number of naval personnel stationed in Malta rose as a result of the increase in ship size: thus the 
Royal Navy dominated all other arms of the military in terms of expenditure in Malta. The 
employment opportunities of the British naval base must not be underestimated: prostitutes, 
barmen, boatmen, seamstresses, tailors, washerwomen, photographers, petty vendors, and domestic 
servants earned their living by offering their services to naval personnel, and they all suffered when 
the navy left Malta for extended period of time
43
. These occupations were not particularly 
productive, rarely providing enough income to ensure a decent standard of living. In addition by 
1938 many of these occupations became obsolete: ferries could take the seamen speedily to shore, 
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thus endangering the livelihood of the 1300 local oarsmen who had the monopoly right to bring 
men off the ships
44
.  
 
The development of the service sector in Cyprus and Malta was the key in their rapid economic 
growth in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet in order for the market services to become 
more productive, modernisation from the „counting house‟ to the „modern office‟ had to take place. 
This did not occur evenly during the inter war period: a large part of the sector in Malta was 
catering for the British military‟s needs, resulting in many and low income employment. Thus 
during the interwar period the growth of the sector was not rapid enough to counter the slow growth 
of agriculture and manufacturing, with the output of trade declining due to the global volatility. 
Nevertheless finance, education, healthcare and transport underwent substantial changes during the 
interwar period that underpinned the rapid economic growth after the Second World War. 
 
Improvements in transport due to the mass introduction of motor vehicles provided benefits 
throughout the economy while the Cypriot banks created a strong deposit base within the local 
population. The rural co-operatives, after a disastrous beginning, began the breakdown of the 
money lending system by successfully pooling together the farmers‟ meagre savings. All of these 
changes that took place during the interwar period were the foundations on which rapid economic 
growth was achieved after the Second World War. The Maltese and Cypriot governments‟ 
increased expenditure in primary education ensured that the generation entering employment after 
the Second World War was better educated than ever before, thus increasing the human capital of 
the population. The creation of strong domestic banks in Cyprus and the establishment of a 
comprehensive bus system in Malta were the type of changes that raised the technical competence 
of their workforce and established firms with a business plan focusing on low margins and high 
volumes, showing the way for other market services to follow after the Second World War.  
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Chapter 8: The role of government in 
economic growth 
 
“Developing economies that shifted to protection and inward-looking policies generally fared 
better during the Great Depression... [but] on the whole colonies of European Powers adhered 
more closely to the orthodox regimes”.1 
 
The thesis has up to now focused on the estimation and analysis of GDP for Cyprus and Malta. The 
new quantitative evidence confirms the poor growth suggested by some in the historical literature. 
The islands‟ economic performance was similar to other neighbouring states, whose performance 
was considered poor within a broader comparative European perspective. The lacklustre 
performance of Cyprus and Malta was surprising since, unlike independent Southern European 
states, the islands did not have to face substantial obstacles to their development due to the First 
World War. The reasons for the slow economic growth of Cyprus and Malta have been analysed in 
relation to the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, where emphasis was given to the colonial 
responses to specific industrial problems. This chapter focuses on the overall role of the government 
and its impact on the islands‟ growth. 
 
The actions of the government were not a panacea against the problems facing Cyprus and Malta: it 
has already been argued that the global trade conditions in the interwar period were not conducive 
to the development of the European periphery
2
. In addition Cyprus and Malta suffered from the 
disadvantage of being small island economies as global protectionism was on the rise. The 
economies also suffered from island specific problems which were not caused by the direct actions 
of their colonial government: Malta‟s growth was too dependent on British Military expenditure 
while Cyprus was facing an intractable agricultural crisis. Yet these problems could be partially 
alleviated by government action. The Turkish and Greek governments managed to promote 
economic growth through policies of autarky and increased government intervention in the 
economy, checking the fall of output during the depression and promoting post-depression 
recovery.  
 
Unlike Greece and Turkey, the rigid enforcement of budgetary balance by the British colonial 
authorities in London meant that the colonial governments of Malta and Cyprus were left with very 
little room to manoeuvre. In addition even within this limited room the Cypriot and Maltese 
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governments proved ineffective in tackling the main problems affecting the islands. The Maltese 
self-government could not impose its decisions on the British armed forces, which undermined the 
government‟s efforts for greater economic diversification. In Cyprus, the government‟s reluctance 
to limit wage expenditure in order to initiate policies requested by the legislative council set the 
stage for violent confrontation during the great depression. Being a British colony was a 
disadvantage during the interwar period, as the colonial authorities were reluctant in actively trying 
to alleviate the islands‟ problems.  
 
The limited government efforts, combined with the worsening poor economic conditions during the 
great depression, led to increased political tensions. The local press was very aware of the 
interventionist developments in neighbouring countries and argued that the colonial governments‟ 
were not trying hard enough to alleviate the islands‟ problems3. The limited government 
intervention and the increased pressures created by the great depression led to the breakdown of 
order and the abrogation of the Cypriot and Maltese constitutions.  
 
This chapter is separated in three sections. The first section focuses on government revenue and 
expenditure. The second looks at the efforts to diversify the Maltese economy by its self-
government. The final section looks at the Cypriot colonial government and its relations with the 
Cypriots in the legislative assembly in an effort to understand the ultimate causes of the October 
1931 riots.  
Government revenue and expenditure 
 
The governors of Malta and Cyprus were not independent actors in terms of economic policy: each 
had to follow directions from London. British governors could not decide on issues such as 
exchange rates, trade policy, government loans, development projects or budget shortfalls without 
first consulting the colonial office in London, which had to consult the treasury. This had important 
economic ramifications on the islands as tariff and exchange rate policy was being decided at an 
empire-wide level, far removed from the needs of Cyprus and Malta. In addition, colonial governors 
were expected to act within a framework of what was considered good colonial governance in 
London, where budget surpluses were more desirable than development
4
.  
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Table 8.1 presents the revenue of expenditure. Government expenditure was more than the value 
added of the government in GDP since it included transfer payments which were not included in 
GDP. The growth of government revenue and expenditure in Malta and Cyprus were faster than 
GDP growth: Cypriot government revenue grew by an annual average of 5.4% and expenditure by 
4.7% from 1921 to 1938, while Maltese expenditure grew by 3.6% and revenue by 5.0%. As a 
result government expenditure as a share of GDP in Cyprus increased from 11.1% in 1921 to 13.9% 
in 1938. The expenditure of the Maltese government in 1921 was exceptional as it received a 
British grant-in-aid of £250,000 in order to support the new dual administration system. Thus if one 
uses 1922 as the starting base for expenditure, Maltese government expenditure grew from 10.9% 
of GDP to 18.3% in 1938. 
 
Table 8.1: Government revenue and expenditure as a share (%) of GDP, Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938  
 Government Revenue  Government Expenditure 
Year Cyprus Malta Year Cyprus Malta Year Cyprus Malta Year Cyprus Malta 
1921 11.2 12.2 1930 13.8 14.0 1921 11.1 15.9 1930 15.2 13.9 
1922 11.8 11.2 1931 15.8 14.5 1922 9.8 10.9 1931 16.1 15.4 
1923 10.3 10.6 1932 18.1 14.3 1923 10.6 9.7 1932 17.8 14.2 
1924 10.8 10.5 1933 17.7 13.4 1924 9.8 10.2 1933 16.5 13.6 
1925 11.3 11.2 1934 16.3 15.4 1925 10.5 10.9 1934 15.2 15.5 
1926 10.7 11.6 1935 16.9 15.8 1926 11.1 11.2 1935 16.1 14.5 
1927 9.7 12.3 1936 15.7 17.1 1927 9.1 11.2 1936 14.5 17.5 
1928 11.1 12.0 1937 15.4 16.3 1928 10.6 12.9 1937 13.4 16.8 
1929 12.3 12.9 1938 15.6 17.6 1929 11.6 12.1 1938 13.9 18.3 
Source: Table 8.2, Appendix B, Appendix C. 
 
The rapid growth of government expenditure indicates that Cyprus and Malta followed the general 
European pattern of an increasing government sector despite the fact that they were colonies. The 
need for additional revenue caused friction, particularly in Cyprus, as additional government 
revenue raised without reforming the antiquated and inefficient tax system. The taxation system was 
based on farming taxes and import and export duties; property tax was a very small share of 
revenue and income tax was not levied. It was particularly regressive as it relied heavily on the 
taxation of staples such as petrol, flour, sugar, salt and tobacco as well as the taxation of pigs, trees 
and the tithe tax
5
. The reliance on trade and farming taxation meant that a trade recession reduced 
government revenue by more than the reduction of GDP. Thus the Cyprus government increasingly 
sought to raise additional taxation to fund its growing need of revenue during the great depression
6
. 
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The local press argued that the rapid increase of government revenue and taxation should be 
accompanied by active government solutions to the economic problems of Cyprus
7
. 
 
Table 8.2: Maltese and Cypriot government revenue and expenditure, 1921-1938  
Cypriot government revenue and expenditure in constant 1938 Cyprus pounds 
Year Revenue Expenditure 
Budget Deficit / 
Surplus Year Revenue Expenditure 
Budget Deficit/ 
Surplus 
1921 418,112 415,599 2,513 1930 677,372 747,559 -70,187 
1922 471,461 393,196 78,265 1931 727,766 742,164 -14,397 
1923 424,504 435,959 -11,455 1932 761,123 748,050 13,073 
1924 435,785 393,591 42,194 1933 748,102 698,357 49,745 
1925 489,381 453,850 35,531 1934 776,723 722,396 54,327 
1926 444,797 463,148 -18,351 1935 899,557 853,725 45,832 
1927 455,657 427,200 28,456 1936 824,552 760,560 63,992 
1928 507,504 483,490 24,014 1937 956,656 835,170 121,487 
1929 637,223 602,063 35,160 1938 1,023,230 908,024 115,206 
Maltese government revenue and expenditure in constant 1938 pounds sterling 
Year Revenue  Expenditure 
Budget Deficit/ 
Surplus Year Revenue  Expenditure 
Budget Deficit/ 
Surplus 
1921 568,414 740,893 2,151 1930 893,621 891,719 1,902 
1922 564,373 551,007 13,365 1931 951,430 1,009,406 -57,976 
1923 568,739 518,793 49,946 1932 962,210 958,125 4,085 
1924 607,922 587,160 20,762 1933 930,577 943,990 -13,413 
1925 663,677 650,757 12,920 1934 1,094,026 1,100,731 -6,705 
1926 715,941 688,108 27,833 1935 1,172,585 1,076,674 95,910 
1927 765,607 691,920 73,687 1936 1,190,306 1,217,516 -27,210 
1928 718,003 774,165 -56,161 1937 1,219,220 1,261,491 -42,271 
1929 837,246 785,685 51,561 1938 1,301,858 1,349,297 -47,439 
Note: Deflated using the CPI provided in appendix H. Source:  Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938) 
“Government Revenue and Expenditure”; Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938)  “Government Revenue and 
Expenditure”; Appendix . 
 
Table 8.2 indicates that the Cypriot and Maltese colonial governments maintained a strict budget 
balance. The budget deficits were small and infrequent, being less than 1.5% of GDP in either 
island for the period 1921-1938
8
. Cyprus was in deficit for only four years during some of the most 
turbulent decades of European economic history, despite being so negatively affected during the 
great depression. The rigid enforcement of balanced budgets led to pro-cyclical government actions, 
as the government expenditure was substantially reduced as Cypriot GDP dipped in recession.  
 
This is one of the greatest differences between the British colonies of Malta and Cyprus and the 
independent states of Greece and Turkey. Greece was forced to run substantial deficits throughout 
the interwar period due to the effects of continued war and refugee repatriation, while both 
countries were forced to look inwards after defaulting on their foreign debt. Despite the revulsion of 
the politicians in power, who would have preferred to maintain a balanced budget, the budget policy 
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of Greece was anti-cyclical as politicians were forced to use government funds to respond to the 
economic problems facing the country. When Greece suspended the repayment of its international 
debt because of budget and balance of payments imbalances, the government maintained the budget 
deficit in order to alleviate the economic impact of the great depression as it feared that a failure to 
do so would lead to intensified civil strife
9
. As a result, Greece had just a mild recession during the 
period 1929-1933, followed by one of the strongest industrial recoveries in Europe during the 
period 1933-1939
10
. 
 
The colonial governments of Cyprus and Malta did not alleviate the economic impact of the great 
depression through budget deficits, nor did they reduce the size of government revenue demanded 
by the population, which kept rising despite the worsening economic situation. Unlike independent 
countries of the region, they were not forced to more radical measures when faced with the 
economic repercussions of the great depression on the indigenous population. This was due to the 
fact that colonies were expected to be self-sufficient. Balancing the budget was a key performance 
criterion for British governors in order to prevent the colonies from being a burden on the British 
taxpayer; as a result the colonies maintained a budget surplus while expanding the revenue of the 
government, even if the colonies were facing great hardship; this caused the Greek-Cypriot press to 
claim that the British were only interested in maintaining the government no matter the cost to the 
population
11
. This policy was not unique to Cyprus and Malta: the colonial government of India 
maintained harsh deflation policies, while maintaining tribute payments, despite the unpopularity of 
the policy by Indians
12
.  
 
Thus colonial governments did not face the same pressure as independent countries to alleviate the 
economic effects of the great depression. In fact the surplus collected by Cyprus and Malta was 
quite substantial. From 1911 to 1938 the total saved by the Cypriot government was £670,608 
Cypriot pounds, of which £478,199 was transferred to the British treasury through the Turkish 
„tribute‟ and through the mandatory contribution to imperial defence of £10,000 per annum that 
replaced it
13. Malta‟s insistence on budget surpluses was not as great as in Cyprus, but still collected 
                                                 
9
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a Maltese surplus of £143,334 sterling in the period 1921-1938
14
. It is clear that larger budget 
surpluses in Cyprus were necessary in order for the island to pay the „tribute‟, and the enforced 
surpluses were resented by the Cypriots
15
.  
 
The desire for substantial budget surpluses was a constraint that limited the available room for 
manoeuvre of the colonial governments during a crisis, especially since exchange rates and 
monetary policy were effectively controlled by London. It is not known what was the monetary 
policy towards the islands, but evidence indicates that London limited the money supply of the 
colonies leading to deflation throughout most of the interwar period
16
. This could have been the 
case in the islands as the consumer price index, shown in appendix H, indicates that the prices in 
Malta and Cyprus were strongly experiencing deflation from 1921 to 1933. The limitations on 
government economic initiatives due to the self-imposed fiscal restraints placed by the colonial 
government were resented by the local population, especially since the size the government revenue 
demanded that taxation was rising despite the dire economic situation.  
 
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 indicate the value added of the government sector according to its use
17
. The 
tables are not exactly comparable to each other since the categories of expenditure in Cyprus and 
Malta could not be identically matched due to the differences in the two societies: the Cypriot 
church was separate from the state and thus its expenditure is not included in figure 8.1, while in 
Malta the church, education and some charities were partly funded by the government and are 
included in figure 8.2. Another problem is the mismatch of government educational expenditure: 
unlike Malta, the cost of education in Cyprus was charged to the communities, who paid additional 
taxation to establish their own independent educational systems, with the government partially 
subsidising this. As a result education in figure 8.3 represents the government subsidy and not total 
education expenditure. 
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Figure 8.1: Government per sub-group, Cyprus, as share of value added (%), 1921-1938. 
 
Source: Appendix B; Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938). 
 
Figure 8.1 indicates that the largest share of the Cypriot government‟s value added were wages of 
government administrators. The expenditure on wages increased in absolute terms until 1930, then 
declined slightly and stabilised. Relative to government value added, the share of government 
administration peaked in 1927 at 41.2% and declined to 31.6% by 1938, which was lower than its 
starting level in 1921. Police and legal expenditure increased until 1931, reaching a peak of 30.2% 
of government value added, before being reduced to 18.9% by 1938. The expenditure on 
government sectors that provided technical competence to the economy declined during the 1920s, 
as the combined value added in the departments of agriculture, forestry, co-operation and public 
works decreased in absolute terms from 1921 to 1928. However they became increasingly important 
in the 1930s, representing 30.4% of the value added in 1938. Thus after 1931 there was a shift away 
from wages of bureaucrats and towards expenditure on public works and technical competence that 
could aid the economy.  
 
The expenditure in education was very low, at just 1.8% of government value added in 1938: the 
weight of education expenditure was borne directly by the Cypriot communities
18
. This caused 
problems to the colonial authorities since their unwillingness to carry the cost burden of universal 
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education allowed the Cypriots to use the education system as a focal point of their nationalism in a 
way that troubled the British administration
19
.  
 
Figure 8.2: Government per sub-group, Malta, as share of value added (%), 1921-1938. 
 
Source: see appendix C; Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938). 
 
Figure 8.2 indicates that the Maltese self-government had different priorities as medical and 
charitable institutions were the largest share of governmental value added in 1921 at 20.7%, 
growing in absolute terms year-by-year. In addition the Maltese government was heavily involved 
in communication and utilities constituting 15.9% of the government‟s value added in 1921, an 
industry from which the Cypriot government was completely absent. Public work expenditure grew 
very rapidly until 1937, rising to 25.6% of the government‟s value added. Thus there was a greater 
emphasis of the government‟s value added towards welfare and service provision and less on 
government administration expenses. Although such expenses grew relatively and absolutely, the 
share of government value added remained much smaller in Malta than in Cyprus. The wages of 
government bureaucracy remained a smaller share of its value added suggesting that the existence 
of a representative domestic parliament may have resulted in greater expenditure on social issues 
and public works in colonial Malta than in colonial Cyprus. Yet the Maltese parliament was not a 
complete master of its own house: the next section focuses on the limitation of Maltese self-
government and its failure in economic diversification.  
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Economic diversification and the Maltese self-government 
 
Prior to the First World War the British record in administrating the crown colonies was poor, since 
“The crown colonies were not greatly considered in the imperial family. Occupied for a particular 
purpose and not much valued apart from it, they were left to shift as they could... progress of these 
colonies lagged and in the vast empire they drifted into the backwater”20. The governor would be 
under pressure from London only if the colony‟s administration failed to be financially self-
sufficient or if a colony revolted: thus there was an incentive for administrators to avoid radical 
changes, as their consequences could be unpredictable, threatening the primary objectives of peace 
and self-sufficiency: a colonial governor‟s mandate focused on the need of stability over 
development, keeping institutional changes to the minimum
21
.  
 
During the interwar period there was a movement for change within the colonial office: some 
members believed in encouraging governors to initiate positive development measures, with an aim 
to forge the empire into a more prosperous and concrete whole
22
. The appointment of Leo Amery as 
secretary of state for the colonies strengthened the hand of these „new imperialists‟23. There was 
substantial resistance to such views within the colonial bureaucracy: as a result colonial officers 
who wanted more active development measures were not always successful, especially if such 
measures would involve British expenditure and thus necessitating approval from the British 
treasury. However, Amery sometimes succeeded in placing those who shared this point of view in 
key posts: he was instrumental in appointing Sir Ronald Storrs, as governor of Cyprus in 1926
24
.  
 
The situation that arose in Malta in 1919 provided a possibility for the „new imperialists‟ to change 
the political structure of the island. Up to that point the British military commander-in-chief of 
Malta was also the civilian governor, with complete control. Maltese representation was limited to 
an advisory council of the Maltese elite (Church and landowners) with no decision making powers. 
As described in chapter 1 the demobilisation of the British armed forces after the First World War 
hit Malta particularly hard as the Royal Navy Dockyard dismissed half of the Maltese workers 
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without compensation
25
. These job cuts took place at a time of rapidly rising inflation, resulting in 
popular protests against British rule, which culminated in the bloody Sette Giugno riots in Valletta 
on the 7
th
 of June 1919
26
.  
 
The riots convinced the colonial office that the political system in Malta led to the association of the 
Maltese economic hardship with British rule, thus fuelling nationalist opposition. It was felt by the 
„new imperialists‟ that it was possible and desirable to decouple the use of Malta by the British 
military from the demands by the Maltese for the British to solve their problems. The plans for a 
new constitution that would increase Maltese representation in the decision making process were 
expedited in order to achieve this
27
. This new constitution was given to Malta in 1921. It provided 
for two governments: an imperial government, as represented by the governor, and a Maltese 
government, which had a chief minister and a cabinet who were elected by a bicameral parliament. 
It was intended that the two governments would have separate spheres of influence: The governor, 
who would be chosen by the military and was the commander-in-chief, had an absolute say in 
foreign relations, defence, defence infrastructure, navigation, external travel, and any matter that 
affected the British armed forces stationed on the island. The Maltese government would be 
responsible for all domestic affairs. The constitution was a departure from the traditionally colonial 
constitutions as it gave substantial decision making powers to the population of a crown colony. 
However in practise the pervasive presence of the British armed forces meant that the imperial 
government frequently intervened in domestic affairs to implement the wishes of the military
28
. The 
colonial office was successful in detaching the grievances over the economic conditions in Malta 
away from the British governor and onto the local Maltese politicians, but as we shall see the self-
government was never given enough power to be able to successfully limit the island‟s dependence 
on British military expenditure.  
 
The bicameral parliament gave the right to vote for the commons to men paying rent of £5, or 
having an income of £5, producing an initial electorate of 30,000 out of 212,258 Maltese
 29
. 
Eligibility to vote for the senate was restricted to literate men paying £20 in rent or being of 
substantial property, leading to a very exclusive senate franchise
30
. The senate operated on the same 
principle as the House of Lords, but without the parliamentary right of the commons to overrule the 
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upper house. The senate was made up of seventeen members, with only seven being elected. Eight 
senate seats were given to appointed representatives of the church, professional organisations, the 
nobility and the landowners. The colonial office introduced a new player in Maltese decision 
making by giving two seats to the trade union council, which was mainly composed of dockyard 
workers
31
. It was thought that the union senators would ensure a pro-British voice in the chamber, 
since the union movement‟s existence was dependent on the British Navy‟s goodwill. However, 
their presence in the upper house heightened the divisions between the Nationalists and the pro-
British party, aggravating the polarisation that would lead to the dissolution of the constitution
32
.  
 
The Maltese parliament was divided into three main parties. The Unione Politica Maltese (UPM) 
were nationalists that looked to Italy, and were the largest group in the parliament
33
. On the other 
side was the Constitutional party which was staunchly British and pro-imperialist. The smaller 
Labour party became the coveted partner to both sides in order for the larger parties to be able to 
form a government. By the late 1920s the constitutional / labour party coalition which was in 
government was undermined by a legal ruling that declared the union movement representatives 
positions void, producing a hung parliament that could not pass legislation or approve the budget
34
. 
The Governor of Malta, seeing how the deadlock threatened the viability of the dual governance 
system, allowed the pro-British Prime Minister Strickland to pass laws using imperial orders-in-
council, thus by-passing the will of the Maltese parliament
35
. This further exacerbated the fractious 
relationship between Lord Strickland and the Nationalist party, which was supported by the Church: 
during the run-up elections in 1930 the archbishop decreed that “you may not, without committing a 
grave sin, vote for Lord Strickland and his candidates, or for those, even of other parties, who in the 
past have helped and supported him”36. The announcement further heightened tensions between the 
two main parties culminating in the attempted assassination of the Prime Minister and the 
suspension of the constitution on the 26
th
 of June, 1930. Thus the constitution was not a success in 
terms of creating a stable government. After its suspension, the governor reverted to ruling directly 
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through imperial decrees and Malta remained without effective political representation until the 
Second World War.  
 
Even in the sphere of domestic issues where the self-government could enact laws, its ability to 
enforce them was limited by the presence of the British forces. In the eyes of the Maltese 
parliamentarians, Malta‟s dependence on British military expenditure was both a blessing and a 
curse since they were aware of how such dependence caused the deep recessions of 1912 and 1919 
when military expenditure in Malta was suddenly reduced
37
. Thus even during the nationalist and 
the constitutional parties‟ increasingly heated differences, in the Maltese parliament, there was a 
consensus that Malta needed to diversify its economy away from British military expenditure
38
. 
Both nationalist and constitutionalist governments attempted to encourage output in sectors which 
were not dependent on British military expenditure while maintaining the balanced budgets 
requested by London. The Maltese self-government created technical government departments for 
agriculture, migration (later replaced by an office of labour) and tourism
39
. However, figure 8.2 
indicates that the expenditure of new departments only increased gradually, constrained by the lack 
of sufficient funds
40
. The need to maintain budget balance also led to the Maltese self-government 
attempts to promote manufacturing without government expenditure by the introduction of 
production monopolies as described in chapter 6.  
 
The efforts of the Maltese government to decrease the island‟s dependence on the British Military 
were not effective partly due to the lack of funds caused by the need to maintain the budget in 
balance, and partly due to its remit being limited even in domestic affairs. The attempts to 
encourage economic diversity were checked by the decisions of the British military, which “tended 
to take the definition of Malta as a „fortress‟ rather too literally, a taxing viewpoint given Malta‟s 
small territory and density of population”41. The imperial government, as commander-in-chief, 
always sided with the military in any disagreement the armed forces had with the self-government, 
thus nullifying the efforts of the Maltese parliament. Several examples indicating this are presented 
below.  
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Policies of the British armed forces drained the resources of the Maltese government. The Royal 
Navy Dockyard wanted to create a reserve of skilled workers for strategic flexibility, but without 
having to pay for them. Thus the dockyard spread the work between as many workers as possible by 
placing the workers on short shifts, while it prevented skilled workers from emigrating. This created 
a “reserve army of the unemployed” around the Grand Harbour area, who were supported by the 
rudimentary system of charitable welfare that was in part financed by the Maltese state, thus 
draining on the self- government‟s resources42.  
 
In addition the British armed forces did not accept Maltese legislation as binding towards them. The 
Royal Navy Dockyard refused to accept the factories regulation law of 1924 that stipulated 
maximum hours of work, as well as the banning of children form some tasks. The Royal Navy 
argued that the dockyard fell outside the remit of any law passed by the Maltese parliament, since as 
an imperial institution it was only under the governor‟s authority. As a result all laws relating to 
trade, industry and commerce were largely ineffectual since they did not cover the countless 
Maltese working for the military or for military establishments such as the Navy, Army and Air 
Force Institute (NAAFI). 
 
The self-government was also unable to represent the concerns of Maltese pressure groups against 
the British armed forces as exemplified by the NAAFI. Yet the institute continued to expand in size 
in Malta to the dismay of the local shopkeepers. They claimed that the institute damaged commerce, 
since it sold duty-free goods to an expanding circle of clients who often shopped on behalf of the 
Maltese, leading to a decline of business for shopkeepers, cinema owners, bumboatmen and 
victuallers who felt they could not compete with the NAAFI‟s duty free prices. Vassallo states that 
for the Malta Chamber of Commerce no other issue was more important to its members
43
. The local 
government complained in vain, despite the fact that its revenue suffered, with over 4% of the total 
Maltese imports in 1933 entering duty free for the NAAFI
44
. The failure to check the growth of the 
NAAFI in Malta indicated the Maltese government‟s impotence in confrontations with the British 
armed forces even in domestic matters that were supposed to be under its remit. 
 
The armed forces further undermined the power of the Maltese parliament in domestic affairs by 
taking their demands directly to the governor. In 1926 the forces demanded that no damage 
compensation claims could arise from military training exercises and despite the objections of the 
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Maltese government, the law was enacted by the imperial government in 1927. The imperial 
government refused the request of the Maltese government to take the issue to arbitration as 
provided by the constitution
45
.  
 
Most importantly infrastructure development plans were also derailed due to British military 
intransigence, while the limited funds available to the Maltese government were used up by unpaid 
bills of the armed forces. As analysed in chapter 6, the British military refused to pay for the 
provision of electricity and sewerage in its bases, thus running down Maltese government funds that 
were put aside for the expansion of the utility network. This expansion was then derailed by 
imperial government, who refused to fund its allotted share of the cost despite prior agreement
46
. 
The British armed forces did not want any alteration of their rights on the island, refusing to pay 
rent for the extensive land and real estate under their command. During the discussions for a new 
constitution it was decided to appoint a British arbitrator to determine which military properties 
could be given to the Maltese government in lieu of rent in order to provide space for civil projects 
and government offices. The arbitrator decreed that the military forces should hand over all land 
and property not in current use, with priority any buildings in and around the crowded Grand 
Harbour area, and suggested that the military‟s right to veto all construction if deemed to reduce the 
line of sight of a military establishment should be restricted
47
. The war office refused to accept the 
arbitration ruling, only giving to the Maltese government a small area outside Valletta in 1927
48
. 
The navy also continued its expansion of its establishments around the Royal Dockyard, gradually 
expanding to take over the adjacent Marsamxett harbour, displacing the last commercial harbour 
around the „three cities‟ area and Valetta. Maltese businessmen requested the use of the dockyard‟s 
loading quays during periods of low military activity in order to alleviate the problem of 
commercial docking, but the navy refused
49
. As a result re-export, bunkering and victualling 
industries suffered since work had to be done by lighter rather than by direct docking.  
 
The above examples serve to highlight how the British forces‟ intransigence undermined the 
legitimacy of the Maltese government. The armed forces were reluctant to change the balance of 
power on the island, thereby nullifying the limited attempts of the Maltese self-government in 
stimulating economic diversification. As a result Malta became ever more dependent on British 
military expenditure and government employment: the largest two employers became the Royal 
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Navy Dockyard and the Maltese government, with a combined share of GDP peaking at 30% in 
1937. The vulnerability of Malta towards the possible reduction of military expenditure was 
perpetuated despite the limited efforts of the Maltese government made within the constraints 
imposed by maintaining a budget surplus. Thus when the rapid improvement of military aviation 
would reduce its strategic role, the Maltese economy was devoid of other ways of attracting 
significant expenditure. No political party in Malta found the position of the Maltese government 
vis-à-vis the imperial government satisfactory, and both nationalist and constitutional governments 
unsuccessfully attempted to increase the powers of the self-government during their term in office
50
. 
However, the self-government remained powerless against the pre-eminence of the British military 
priorities on the island.  
 
Amery may have been successful in absolving the British presence of the economic problems of 
Malta, but he never gave the Maltese government the power to solve such problems; such power 
remained firmly with the British military and the imperial governor. The Maltese government 
protested, but it was powerless against the demands of the British armed forces which were 
supported by the imperial government. This limitation of the domestic parliament was evident to 
Amery even prior to the establishment of dual governance, stating that “the Maltese must be 
content... in a... constitution in which the decisive voice in all matters ultimately rested with the 
imperial authorities, drawing their compensation from the economic advantages of the existence of 
the naval and military establishments”51.  
 
The suspension of the Maltese constitution left the island in limbo: no major decisions could be 
made without the consent of the suspended parliament, or an order-in-council. As a result no major 
economic decision was taken during the period 1930-1938: the Governor of Malta effectively 
reverted to the laissez-faire policy in economic affairs that dominated colonial thinking in Malta 
before 1921.  
 
The agricultural crisis and the Cypriot government 
 
The backward nature of Cyprus was completely contrary to the aspirations of British and Cypriot 
statesmen at the time of the island‟s occupation in 1878. Control of Cyprus was seen by some 
British statesmen as a possible blueprint for the development of the Ottoman Empire with economic 
development considered as a main goal; Lord Beaconsfield stated that after maintaining peace “our 
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next [consideration] is the development of the country”52. However, the subsequent occupation of 
Egypt removed the strategic purpose from the occupation of Cyprus, leaving “a lingering quality of 
being bereft, verging on pointlessness, which British rule there could never shake off”53. The annual 
„tribute‟ of £92,799 that had to be paid to the British treasury led to colonial inaction and to “the 
tendency for the administration to fall into existing Ottoman grooves”54. Over time, British rule was 
increasingly challenged by the idea of Enosis, union with Greece, strengthened by the establishment 
of an independent Greek-Cypriot education system staffed by teachers educated in Greece.  
 
From the 31
st
 of July, 1920 to the 29
th
 of November, 1926 Cyprus was ruled by Sir Malcolm 
Stevenson. Stevenson was an old-fashioned colonial officer who believed in maintaining the status 
quo, as “the nature and aims of his rule... possessed no creative vision”55. The standard of the 
Cypriot administration was considered by the colonial office as being very poor: J.C.C. Davidson, 
stated that “Cyprus had become a kind of dust heap for Africa, where people who had either defects 
in their characters or their minds were sent for service”56.  
 
The Cypriot constitution, given in 1882, had many faults. From the colonial point of view, the 
Cypriot constitution was problematic since the colonial government had to appease either the 
majority Greek-Cypriot or the minority Turkish-Cypriot community in order to have a smooth 
running of the legislation and of the government‟s budget. This heightened communal tensions that 
were already present on the island. For the Cypriots all power and influence remained with the 
colonial government, and the communities were unable to push the government into action in 
matters of their concern.  
 
The Cypriot constitution was much more limited than Malta‟s: it provided for an executive council 
of government bureaucrats and invited members of the public who could draft laws, and an elected 
legislative council that could only accept or reject legislation and government fiscal appropriation 
bills. If the legislative council rejected a law, then the executive council could alter it and re-submit 
it; the legislative council had no right to suggest legislation. The executive could also circumvent 
the council with an order-in-council by the British monarch. The franchise for the legislative 
council was unusually wide, with the right to vote given to all men over 21 years old who paid their 
very low property tax. The council included six government officials, nine Greek-Cypriots and 
three Turkish-Cypriots, with the Greek and Turkish Cypriots elected exclusively by their own 
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communities. In the case of a tie, the governor, who was also the president of the legislative 
council, cast the deciding vote
57
. Thus the government could overrule the wishes of the Greek-
Cypriot majority as long as it could ensure that the Turkish-Cypriots voted in line with the colonial 
officials. 
 
The constitution provided the Cypriots with a council that could only be effective if the 
communities were united in their opposition to the government, and even then they could only force 
colonial government to listen, but not to comply, with their opinion. Prior to the First World War 
the colonial government effectively disregarded the council, since the elected Turkish-Cypriot 
councillors voted with the government. This was in part due to the fear of the fate that would befall 
on their community if the Greek-Cypriot achieved Enosis. The government ensured the loyalty of 
the Turkish-Cypriots councillors through the use of substantial government patronage bestowed on 
them
58
. By 1926 this use of divide et impera was considered by the colonial office reformists as 
“derogatory to the dignity of the Government”, since it exacerbated the underlying tensions between 
the two communities
59
. However, the divide and rule nature of the constitution was preserved in the 
new constitution granted to the island when it was declared a colony in 1925, as a combination of 
Turkish-Cypriot and government legislative councillors could still outvote the Greek-Cypriot 
members. Unlike the Maltese constitution, the Cypriot constitution maintained both the power and 
the responsibility for Cyprus firmly in the hands of the British authorities. Thus the colonial 
government bore the brunt of complaints over the island‟s poor economic performance during the 
interwar period. The Greek-Cypriots were aware of their weakness in controlling their own destiny 
and they resented the way the constitution was set up, since “so much power was given to 
foreigners while maintaining the Cypriots in positions of great weakness”60. 
 
Through the interwar period, the Greek-Cypriot leadership was divided in how to promote their 
demand of union with Greece (Enosis)
61
. Moderates were willing to work with the colonial 
government to develop the island, hoping to convince the British that they could be trusted with 
some form of self-government. They saw the constitution given to Malta in 1921 as a possible 
reward for continued cooperation, since “Britain did not deny complete political freedom to the 
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Maltese, who owe their economic livelihood to Britain... There is no reason not to give similar 
freedom to the Cypriots who can be economically self supporting... and willing to ensure imperial 
military interests”62. The moderates believed that after achieving self-government Britain might be 
convinced to cede Cyprus to Greece, as it did previously with ceding the Ionian Islands protectorate 
in 1864, and in aiding Cretan Enosis in 1913
63
.  
 
Extremists argued that cooperation perpetuated the British occupation of Cyprus. They argued that 
only the union with Greece would solve all the economic and social problems of the island, since 
Cypriots would be cared for by a government who had their national interests at heart. Such a union 
could be expedited through a policy of resistance against colonial rule. The extremists were 
ennobled by events in First World War: Britain officially annexed Cyprus, thus eliminating the last 
legal claims of the Ottoman Empire on the island
64
. In addition the British government made a 
public offer of Cyprus to Greece in return for Greece joining the war on the side of the Entente, an 
offer rejected by the Greek government who at that time wanted to remain neutral
65
. This 
encouraged Greek-Cypriot nationalists who thought of Enosis as imminent; many fought for the 
Greek state during War, and upon their return they demanded the launching of a non-violent 
struggle to expedite the union with Greece
66
. The offer of Britain to Greece, combined with the 
Greek advance in Asia Minor inflamed hopes for union, making this the dominant view leading to 
the Greek-Cypriot leadership, which was organised by the Church, to abstain from the legislative 
council until the principle of self-determination (and thus their desire for union with Greece) was 
granted to Cyprus
67
.  
 
Although the intransigence of the Greek-Cypriot elite annoyed Stevenson, it did allow for an 
interrupted running of the government administration: the legislative council lacked a sufficient 
number of elected Cypriot members to oppose the government. This enabled the government to 
pass laws that were unpopular to the Turkish-Cypriots, such as increasing taxation. In addition the 
government ignored calls by Turkish-Cypriot delegates for government measures to alleviate the 
agricultural crisis that was made evident after the 1921 recession
68
.  
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By the end of 1922 the defeat of Greece in Asia Minor caused a rethink of Greek-Cypriot national 
policy. The extremists were disheartened because Greece did not make any claim on Cyprus during 
the negotiations for the treaty of Lausanne
69
. Moderates gained the upper hand and argued that co-
operation with an aim to gain self-government similar to Malta‟s was a much more viable policy70. 
As a result some Greek-Cypriots returned to the legislative council in 1923. However the decision 
to cooperate with the colonial government was not accepted by all, and extremist sections attacked 
the Greek Cypriot councillors in the press, arguing that they would not be able to achieve anything 
other than to legitimise British rule, since the colonial government was not interested in cooperating 
for the prosperity of the island
71
. 
 
The returning Greek-Cypriot members placed a great attention on the major economic problems of 
the island in their discussions within the legislative council, especially in trying to push the 
government to do more to alleviate the unfolding agricultural crisis that was described in chapter 4. 
The focus on economic issues was an attempt to find common ground with the Turkish-Cypriots 
and thus present a common front in the council. Farming measures had a greater chance of 
receiving bi-communal support since in other important issues, such as majority rule and self-
determination, the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots were in complete disagreement. This policy was 
spearheaded by the Bishop of Kition, the Metropolitan Nikodemos Mylonas: he was one of the 
most astute legislative councillors, and was willing to work with the British authorities and his 
Turkish-Cypriot colleagues in order to modernise the island
72
. Thus the legislative councillors 
found common ground in appealing to the government for remedial policies in agriculture in an 
attempt to achieve tangible results. Yet, the returning Greek-Cypriots were very frustrated by the 
set-up of the legislative council, since they could not suggest laws, nor force the government into 
any action. Results were important due to the internal conflict in the Greek-Cypriot community; the 
moderates in the council would only be supported by their community if they achieved reforms, and 
a failure to do so would strengthen the extremists who argued that their presence only legitimised 
British rule.  
 
Stevenson‟s government did not appreciate the precarious position of the Greek-Cypriot leadership, 
and remained determined to follow a policy of laissez-faire. Faced with combined pleas of all 
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Cypriot legislators for government action in aiding agriculture, the government dragged its heels 
and went ahead with its own limited relief measures without consulting the legislative council, 
making the councillors appear immaterial. Clerides argued that “the legislative council‟s goodwill 
stalls in front of government machinations, as their role is checked, their disagreements ignored and 
their voices drowned out”73. The disappointment by some Greek-Cypriot moderates who supported 
the return to the legislative council is telling: in April 1924 councillor Everiades resigned arguing 
that the council was unable to place any issue for consideration by the government and as a result 
the council was useless in its attempts to solve the problems of Cyprus
74
. 
 
The examples described below indicate how Cypriot frustration towards the government, stoked by 
the government‟s reluctance to listen to the requests of the legislative council, increased to the point 
where cooperation became impossible, and violence became likely. With the return of the Greek-
Cypriots in the council, the elected members implored the High Commissioner to mitigate the 
developing agricultural crisis through government action. The Cypriot councillors asked the 
government in 1923 to consider establishing an agricultural bank and to abolish the tithe in order to 
help the farmers
75
. However, the government frustrated the councillors by only bringing forward 
bills that served the government‟s interests, while assuring the councillors that the government was 
considering the establishment of an agricultural bank in the immediate future
76
. It was made clear to 
the members that the unfolding agricultural crisis was considered to be outside the government‟s 
remit, even though the Cypriot members were willing to pass laws and release funds that would 
allow the government to react to the crisis. The government unwillingness to intervene in the 
agricultural industry led to tensions with the Cypriot councillors when Stevenson demanded that the 
council approve increased taxation, threatening that a failure to approve the tax increases would 
lead to the shelving of the government‟s future plans for an agricultural bank77.  
 
The government‟s continued inaction in trying to tackle the farming crisis led to the appearance of 
rifts in its relationship with the Turkish-Cypriot councillors. The Turkish-Cypriots were the 
minority community on the island and the recent plight of the Cretan Muslims confirmed their fear 
of Enosis. Turkish-Cypriot leaders saw the perpetuation of British rule as the community‟s most 
effective method in ensuring their continued existence on the island; this created a close relationship 
between the community and the colonial government. Turkish-Cypriots were overrepresented in the 
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government bureaucracy while most Turkish-Cypriot legislative councillors held government 
positions, mainly in the government-run Muslim charity of EVKAF. Yet, by 1924, some Turkish-
Cypriots, perhaps influenced by the etatism of Ataturk, were willing to incur the wrath of the 
colonial government and vote against unpopular laws, and were especially against any further 
increases of taxation without government intervention in the agricultural economy or a cut in 
government expenditure
78
. The councillor Dr. Eyoub voted regularly against tax increases, arguing 
that the government should first check its rising expenditure, especially in terms of civil service 
salaries
79
. However, his efforts were not coordinated with the Greek members and thus the tax 
increases were passed thanks to some Greek-Cypriots voting for the government.  
 
Dr. Eyoub‟s attitude was a warning sign that the attitude of the Turkish-Cypriot community was 
changing: its representatives found it increasingly difficult to justify to their community further 
increases in taxation during a period of severe agricultural distress. As the economic situation 
deteriorated, the Turkish-Cypriot councillors were under pressure to vote against measures that 
would further reduce the income of their community, which led to the breakdown of the „divide and 
rule‟ system used by the colonial government in order to bypass local opposition. Dr. Eyoub‟s 
actions were a warning sign that went unheeded by the colonial government. The need for increased 
taxation during the great depression and drought that so seriously affected Cyprus would cost the 
government the support of the Turkish-Cypriots, forcing it to raise revenue through direct orders 
from the king or by surrendering additional powers of budgetary control to the legislative council.  
 
The reluctance of the government to act decisively in solving the rural crisis led to a loss of 
goodwill by the Cypriot representatives and their communities. Cypriot councillors wanted the 
government to bring the tax system up to date, with Greek and Turkish members urging the 
government to abolish the tithe tax
80
. The taxation system of Cyprus was in need of modernisation 
as it was still based on the inherited Ottoman system. Although the aggregate tax rate was modest at 
14.7% of GDP in 1924, the taxation laws were regressive against farmers, as a disproportional 
amount was extracted from the agricultural sector through taxes on production and capital
81
. The 
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tax system was complex and hard to administer: Sir Ralph Oakden, a finance specialist, found it 
impossible to estimate how much taxation was paid by the poorest but confirmed that the weight of 
taxation was on small farms
82
. The tithe was particularly expensive to collect and enforce, while it 
placed a great burden on smallholders
83
. Yet the administration dithered with its abolition until 
February 1926, as it was worried that abolishing the tithe would lead to a loss in revenue: the 
government would only consent to its abolition if it could ensure that government revenue remained 
unaffected by introducing additional taxation
84
. The related tax increase was resented by all Cypriot 
councillors, since the GDP data in chapter 3 indicate that the island was in a recession; thus they 
reiterated their concerns with the continual increases in taxation without an assessment of possible 
government savings. Stevenson resorted to threatening the council, stating that if the tithe abolition 
bill was rejected it would be withdrawn and not resubmitted
85
. Thus the government‟s reluctance to 
give the legislative council the right to provide suggestions for upcoming legislation led to the 
elimination of any political benefit that would arise from the abolition of the tithe: by 1926 the 
working relationship of the Cypriot legislative councillors and the government was breaking down. 
Meanwhile the Cypriot councillors were aware that the additional tax increase would cause dismay 
in their communities and this would undermine their positions as community leaders.  
 
The colonial government also exhausted the goodwill of the legislative council on the issue of the 
agricultural bank. The chief secretary of the colony assured members in the opening session in 1921 
that an agricultural bank was under consideration, but such a bank was not established until 1925; 
the government did not allow the legislative council to have any input in the creation of the bank, 
despite the insistent calls by Cypriot councillors for its creation
86
. The establishment of the 
agricultural bank and its rapid collapse are described in chapter 4; the bank was badly planned and 
poorly capitalised, and thus had a limited positive impact in easing the rural credit crunch that was 
the key to solving the Cypriot agricultural crisis
87
. The legislative council members warned the 
government of the risks the bank faced prior to its creation, but their concerns were ignored. The 
Metropolitan Mylonas argued that “the council could not, however, consider as adequate a bank 
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with a capital of £50,000 for a place where the debts of the population exceeded one million 
pounds”, since a bank with such a limited capital base would be speculative rather than benevolent 
in character: it would not offer long-term loans at low interest, in contrast to the established system 
in Greece
88. The bank‟s subsequent failure increased the frustration of the Cypriot councillors who 
forewarned about its inappropriate set-up, but saw their suggestions ignored by the government.  
 
By the time Stevenson left Cyprus, the relations between the government and Cypriot politicians 
was at an all time low. The recession of 1926 exposed the legislative councillors to accusations of 
inertia by extremist press, especially when compared to what the more active governments of 
Greece and Turkey did in terms of agricultural policy
89
. In an effort to force the government into 
action, the council members bridged their inter- and intra-communal differences to make a show of 
force and demand the abolition of the „tribute‟. The legality of the British Treasury‟s collection of 
the „tribute‟ expropriation expired with the annexation of the island by Britain at the start of the 
First World War. The „tribute‟ was a cash payment in lieu of lost tax revenue to the Ottomans that 
was deferred to the British treasury as it guaranteed defaulted Ottoman loans. The annexation of 
Cyprus meant that the island was not Ottoman territory under British occupation, but a British 
possession, thus invalidating the justification for the „tribute‟. Yet, the British Treasury would have 
none of it: it decided that Cyprus would bear a share of the debt of the collapsed Ottoman Empire, 
despite not being part of the Empire since 1878, and continued demanding an amount equal to the 
„tribute‟ from the Cypriot government, renaming it “Cyprus‟ share of the Ottoman debt”90. Cyprus 
continued to pay the tribute even after being declared a crown colony in 1925 and despite the 
abolition of the Ottoman Empire, and the refusal by other countries to repay Ottoman debt. 
 
The renaming of the „tribute‟ had unintended consequences in the legislative council. Prior to 1914 
the „tribute‟ was a tenuous connection to the Ottoman Empire‟s claim to Cyprus if the British 
occupation ended and thus Turkish-Cypriots supported the raising of the charge. The dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire meant that the Turkish-Cypriot delegates had no reason to defend the charge 
anymore, especially since it represented 7.4% of government expenditure in 1926 that went to the 
British treasury. In consultation with the Greek-Cypriot members, the Turkish-Cypriot councillors 
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agreed to throw out the appropriation bills of 1927 in order to show their displeasure towards the 
policies of the outgoing governor. 
 
The fierceness of the attacks against the government from both Turkish and Greek-Cypriot 
members surprised the acting governor as they were not just aimed against the debt charge but the 
government as whole.  Stavrinakis and the Metropolitan Mylonas attacked the wasteful employment 
of highly paid British officials when better trained Cypriots were available, the government‟s 
continued increases in taxation and the very limited attempts by the government to revive the 
farming economy
91
. Dr. Eyioub also argued that the assembly‟s “earnest desire was that this sum 
might remain in the island for the benefit of the island”92. Even moderate Turkish-Cypriot delegates 
like Djeladedin Effendi linked the charge to “a viper sucking the blood of the Cypriots. The item 
could no longer be tolerated in the budget and [we] were obliged to raise a voice of revolution 
against it. Had this amount been used as capital for an Agricultural Bank 25 years ago this country 
would be... far better”93. The result was a usual defeat for the Cyprus government as the Cypriot 
united to throw out the budget for 1927. The divide et impera policy broke down in the face of 
increasing economic distress and perceived government indifference.  
 
This might not have mattered much if the British monarch would approve for the governor to rule 
through the issue of orders-in-council indefinitely, yet it was made clear to the Governor that ruling 
by decree was a temporary measure: the new governor had to work with the legislative council
94
. 
As a result the new governor had to work with the legislative council or else risk not having 
approval for the colonial government‟s budget. Unless co-operation was achieved the governor 
would have to accept the growing influence of the legislative council or persuade the colonial office 
to abolish the constitution. The colonial government‟s unwillingness to allow the legislative council 
real power over the use of government revenue created a political stalemate that led to violence in 
1931.  
 
The appointment of Sir Ronald Storrs as governor at the end of 1926 was an effort by the “new 
imperialists” to rectify the flaws of Stevenson‟s administration. Storrs was a rising star, who shared 
Amery‟s views for more active development policies as a bulwark against the nationalism in the 
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colonies
95
. Storrs quickly made a favourable impact to the Cypriots by being very active in creating 
new institutions which Cyprus lacked: he established a public library, the chamber of commerce, 
the medical society and a music school. In addition he successfully lobbied for the appointment of a 
Cypriot to the position of solicitor-general, which was unthinkable under Stevenson‟s 
administration
96
.  
 
Yet the legislative council remained determined to reject all appropriation bills unless the burden of 
the Turkish Debt Charge was removed, meaning that neither the governor nor the colonial office 
could ignore the issue any longer. The details of the abolition of the „tribute‟ are lengthy and best 
described in Georghallides, but it is clear that the legislative impasse created a momentum which 
forced the Treasury to revoke the charge early in 1927
97
. The revoking of the charge was not 
unconditional: Storrs committed the Cypriot government to an annual charge of £10,000 for 
imperial defence, releasing £32,799 for other purposes. However, the treasury demanded that the 
unspent assets of the tribute would remain with the British treasury, despite not having a legal claim 
on the money
98
.  
 
These assets were a property of the Cypriot state, and such an amount constituted a huge bonus to 
the island if invested for development projects. The legislative council knew about the existence of 
the assets but Storrs did not notify the council that he accepted the treasury‟s demand of keeping the 
money
99
. Storrs‟ deceit was not revealed until 1931, and it was pivotal in propelling the escalating 
political crisis into violence.  
 
It was the mutual wish of the colonial office and the Cypriots in the legislative council that the 
£32,799 saved by the elimination of the „tribute‟ would be used for a small development loan. 
However, the colonial government mismanaged windfall. Its development plan was described as a 
“very amateurish document” by the colonial office, since no investment was centred on the farming 
industry, where it “would be the most quickly reproductive”100. This led to lengthy negotiations 
between teh government and the colonial office; as a result by the time the government applied for a 
loan the money saved by the „tribute‟ was spent on government wages in connection to healthcare 
improvements
101
. 
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By the elections of 1930 the worsening economic situation had strengthened the hand of the 
nationalist extremists: Munir Bey, the chief supporter of the government, and beneficiary of 
significant patronage was defeated by Kemalist Nejati Bey, while only the Metropolitan Mylonas 
held his seat from the Greek-Cypriots. The new Greek-Cypriot politicians were hardliners, who 
wanted to use the council as a public forum to oppose the government. As a result the new 
legislative council was much more militant and eager to block all government requests exactly 
when the great depression necessitated co-ordinated action.  
 
It was the deep and sustained recession in Cyprus during the great depression that caused an acute 
political crisis, and the combined effects of the political crisis, drought, and the great depression led 
to the October 1931 riots. The new Cypriot legislative councillors wanted immediate measures to 
alleviate the drought-stricken farmers, while the government, facing a severe revenue shortfall, 
wanted to increase government revenue through new tax increases
102
. As seen in chapter 1, Storrs 
remained optimistic on the condition of the Cypriot economy even as the recession took a turn for 
the worse and he was reluctant to ask the legislative council for an increase in taxation that would 
antagonise the Cypriot legislative council
103
. Thus, the government used up its limited reserves to 
pay the widening budget deficit, but as table 8.2 indicates the reserves of £90,000 were used up by 
the end of 1931.  
 
The economy slipped further in recession in 1931, making it evident that the government budget in 
1932 unless there was a decrease in expenditure / increase in revenue. London was appalled at 
Storrs‟s policy of running down the reserves of the colony, and reprimanded the governor for not 
increasing taxation effectively forcing Storrs to go to the legislative council for the approval of 
additional taxation
104
. The new, nationalistic, legislative council would not allow any tax increases 
unless the government first reduced its wage expenditure, particularly by the wage expenditure of 
British colonial officials and by replacing expensive British officials by lower paid Cypriots.  
 
The council‟s complaint against the rising share of expenditure in wages, and of British officials in 
particular, was becoming ever more important due to the great depression
105
. Figure 8.3 indicates 
that the Cypriot legislative councillors were right to worry that the government cut non-wage 
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expenditure more than wage expenditure in an effort to balance its budget during the period 1930-
1931: as a result the share of wages to total government expenditure peaked to 61.7% of total 
expenditure by 1931. A substantial amount of the wage expenditure was being received by three 
dozen British officials, who dominated all important posts and were paid at a higher scale than local 
bureaucrats. The government reduction of non-wage expenditure limited government aid to the 
drought-stricken framers: projects such as the construction of an experimental farm and some 
irrigation schemes were scrapped, precisely when Cypriots councillors were demanding additional 
government measures in order to reduce unemployment and provide relief to the countryside. The 
disagreement between the council and the government led to a political deadlock that prevented 
concerted action to help the farmers, further adding to the frustration for the lack of sufficient 
government action by the Cypriots. 
 
Figure 8.3: Wage and British Wage
*
 expenditure as share of government revenue, Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 
Note: * British wages calculated by selecting the highest salaried officials and removing those whose last name 
suggested Turkish, Greek, Armenian or Maronite descent. Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938). 
 
The government did not allow the legislative council to dictate its budget as Cypriots would decide 
on the amount of British officials who would remain in employment
106
. Thus by April 1931, the 
government was forced to pass further tax increases through orders-in-council. The recession 
deepened, Nicosia was inundated by grain farmers from the surrounding Mesaoria plain, who had 
lost their livelihood as the prices of grain were slashed while their crop failed due to the drought. 
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Their presence made the political deadlock potentially explosive; as Cypriot councillors felt 
something had to be done to help farmers immediately. The Cypriot government was squeezed 
between the colonial office which wanted a budget deficit to be avoided at all costs, and the 
legislative members who wanted to reduce employment of British personnel and increase 
government expenditure on agriculture
107
. 
 
The government‟s continued use of orders-in-council led to increasing calls for the Greek-Cypriot 
members to resign since they were deemed impotent in guiding government policy. The extremist 
press argued that cooperation failed and that the goal of the community should be to begin a policy 
of resistance for union with Greece
108
. Some Greek-Cypriots argued that British legitimacy in 
Cyprus was based on the promise of shared prosperity given during the island‟s occupation in 1878: 
the lack of development and the prolonged recession led to the reneging of the British promise, 
eliminating Britain‟s legitimacy over the Greek-Cypriots.  
 
The growing pressure by the press eliminated any room for manoeuvre of important Greek-Cypriot 
moderates, such as the Metropolitan Mylonas, who were afraid of losing the leadership of the 
Greek-Cypriot community. The constant use of orders-in-council led to some Greek-Cypriot 
councillors to issue a manifesto. It argued that the reluctance of the government to rid itself of 
overpaid British officials made it clear that prosperity did not lie with Britain: the fifty-year British 
rule had convinced them that prosperity could not be achieved under political bondage and from 
now on union with Greece was the first prerequisite for economic recovery
109
. Leaders such as the 
Metropolitan Mylonas chose to keep their authority by taking the lead in organising a struggle 
against British rule rather than risk losing his leadership by insisting on cooperation with a 
government who failed to take account the wish of the legislative council. 
 
In this volatile situation, the news of the agreement in relation to the Cypriot assets held in the 
British treasury that Storrs kept secret was made public in the British parliament, leading to a 
massive loss of trust by the Cypriots towards the Governor; this consolidated the common front of 
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot legislative councillors against the government in order to force 
it to reduce wage expenditure before any additional taxation was raised
110
. On the 28
th
 of April 
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1931, all but one of the elected Cypriot councillors rejected further tax increases without the 
government first reducing wage expenditure and British wage expenditure in particular. The 
government asked for a further order-in-council, but its issuing was delayed as the colonial office 
checked the budget to ensure budget balance since the reserves of the colony were exhausted. 
 
However, the government could not agree to the demands of the legislative council as it did want to 
give it the right to dictate employment in the colonial government as then Cypriots would dictate 
the number of the British officials in the government. On the 16
th
 of October 1931, the Metropolitan 
resigned his seat as a legislative councillor, decaling through a public letter that his resignation was 
an action against the “tyrannical” use of orders-in-council and restating that economic prosperity 
was only possible with an immediate union with Greece. However the Metropolitan‟s resignation 
escalated the conflict with the government, since he publicly proclaimed the immediate union of 
Cyprus with Greece and called for mass civil disobedience in order to force the British to accept 
it
111
. This was combined with a protest march that concluded in violence and the burning of the 
Governor‟s house: the riots spread throughout the island, leading to several Cypriot deaths112. 
Military re-enforcements led to the quelling of the unrest, and in contrast to the British policy after 
the 1919 riots in Malta, British rule became authoritarian and repressive: the constitution was 
suspended, Greek-Cypriot political leaders were deported and others imprisoned, and freedoms of 
speech and of political action were severely curtailed. Storrs was replaced by a military governor, 
and the budget deficit of 1931 was covered through a punitive tax against the Greek-Cypriot 
population, collected until 1936, as the Greek-Cypriots were judged by the government to be at 
fault for the October riots.  
 
The Cypriot constitution was flawed for both Cypriots and the British. The British could not 
enforce their will through the legislative council if the economic interests of both communities were 
directly threatened, and yet they were unwilling to allow the council to draft laws. For Cypriots, the 
council did not allow them to legislate on their problems as they saw fit and could only stimulate 
the government to act if there was a governor in place who was willing to intervene in the economy. 
Sir Ronald Storrs was willing to intervene to aid the agricultural industry, but he was not willing to 
give the legislative council control over the employment of British officials. The economic situation 
of the government allowed the Cypriots, once they united under economic issues, to forcefully 
present their demands to the government, only for the colonial administration to circumvent the 
legislative council through orders-in-council, increasing the frustration of Cypriot politicians who 
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demanded greater government intervention. The economic malaise that befell on Cyprus during the 
great depression added a sense of urgency in the actions of the Greek-Cypriots, with the elected 
leaders violently rejecting the legitimacy of the government.  
 
It seems clear that the worsening economic conditions of the 1930s acted as a catalyst for the events 
and they led to their deterioration to the point of violence. The worsening economic conditions 
soured the political relations between the Cypriots and the government. This, combined with the 
ongoing rural crisis, made worse by the great depression and drought, created conditions for mass 
unrest. The impact of the great depression in Cyprus was far more severe than Storrs realised; the 
increased taxation requested by the government was further squeezing the disposable income of the 
rural population at a time when it was substantially reduced by the effects of the depression and 
drought. In addition the credit crunch affected the moneylenders who had their savings wiped out 
through mass rural defaults. The agricultural crisis affected Greek-Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
equally and as a result there was a consensus across class and community lines that more should be 
done to alleviate the plight of the agricultural industry by the colonial government.  
 
The failure of the government to work with the legislative council during the 1920s made 
cooperation during the great depression impossible. The government‟s reluctance to act according 
to the wishes of the council led to the radicalisation of the Cypriot nationalistic policies, and thus 
making cooperation difficult. This took place in many British colonies during the interwar period: 
the colonial policy of deflation resulted to “the British unwittingly drove the peasants in the arms of 
the congress” opposition in India, while the imposition of additional taxation in order to balance the 
budget led to riots in the early 1930s in most of the British territories of West Africa
113
. The drought 
and the great depression do not exonerate the Cypriot government from the responsibility of the 
riots: the government refused to listen to the increasingly frustrated calls of the councillors who 
wanted something to be done to help the struggling farming sector and stop the continual tax 
increases. The resignation of some of the Greek-Cypriot councillors was the spark for the riots, but 
it could have been prevented if the government was willing to accommodate the desire of the 
Cypriots for a voice in economic policy. 
 
The October 1931 riots had serious long term effects and coloured the relations of the British and 
the Greek-Cypriots, eventually leading to the anti-colonial conflict. Holland and Markides argued 
that “the rupture of October 1931 was to define the polarities of colonial Cyprus for a long time 
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ahead”114. The riots resulted in the final rupture of any sentiments of cooperation that remained in 
Greek-Cypriot moderates, leading to the EOKA conflict after the Second World War. The Greek-
Cypriot leaders moved away from economic considerations and thus lost the ability to present a 
united front with the Turkish-Cypriots against the British, fostering inter-communal tensions. The 
declaration of Enosis, without prior cooperation with the British became the aim of the Greek-
Cypriot leadership, leading to direct confrontation against the British and the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. 
 
Conclusion: the limited role of colonial government 
The role of the colonial governments in the economic development of interwar Malta and Cyprus 
was limited. Some of the issues facing the islands were beyond the scope of either government to 
solve: the domestic markets of the islands were far too small to be able to promote growth when 
global protectionism was on the rise, while the global downturn of trade and prices during the great 
depression was outside the control of the Maltese and Cypriot governments.  
 
Yet, during the interwar period, there was a substantial increase of government revenue as a share 
of GDP. This contravened the spirit of small government and laissez-faire policies that colonial 
governments had previously adhered to, thus increasing demands for government solutions to the 
islands‟ problems. Unlike Greece, the colonial governments of Cyprus and Malta maintained a strict 
budget balance despite increasing government expenditure, as the two main criteria for a colonial 
governor was his ability to maintain peace and government surpluses. As a result government 
expenditure was pro-cyclical with recessions, which proved counterproductive as it pushed Cyprus 
into a political crisis that led to a violent rejection of British rule.  
 
There was an alternative way to the island‟s budget policy: independent Southern European states 
also increased government expenditure, but at the same time they reluctantly expanded the budget 
deficit in order to prevent civil unrest. This stimulated industrial recovery and alleviated the 
economic downturn during the great depression. A similar policy would have helped Cyprus, and 
possibly Malta, to have faster economic growth during the interwar period.  
 
Because of the need to balance the budget, colonies had very limited fiscal means to alleviate 
island-specific problems and the effects of the great depression. Yet, Malta urgently needed to 
diversify its economy away from servicing the British military, and Cyprus required a government 
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solution to the intractable agricultural crisis. With budget balance being the priority and government 
wage expenditure rising, the government expenditure that was set aside to solve these problems was 
very limited, leading to poorly financed, ad-hoc policies which failed, disappointing the islands‟ 
inhabitants.  
 
Malta was granted self government in charge of domestic affairs but its power was checked by the 
British armed forces which wished to maintain unlimited power over an island that they considered 
a fortress. Malta‟s dependence on the British military proved to be a double-edged sword: it ensured 
income stability but it severely limited the ability of the Maltese government to implement its own 
policies.  
 
The colonial office was successful in directing the frustration due to the slow development in Malta 
towards a representative government. In contrast, the much more limited powers of the Cypriot 
Legislative assembly meant that all blame was focused on the British administration rather than the 
legislature. The preoccupation with raising taxation cost the government the support of the Turkish-
Cypriot legislative councillors, who formed the basis of the „divide and rule‟ tactics that enabled the 
government to bypass local opposition. 
 
The Cypriot government‟s unwillingness to allow the legislative council to suggest policy in the 
1920s had dangerous repercussions in 1931. The government was caught between the council‟s 
unpalatable demand to reduce the number of British bureaucrats and the colonial office‟s order to 
increase revenue. Governor Storrs was much more willing to provide government solutions for 
Cypriot agriculture, but he was not willing to let the legislative council decide the employment 
policy of the government. His decision to once again circumvent the Cypriot representatives 
through orders-in-council began a chain of events that led to the October riots. It was not the first 
time that the government used orders-in-council; what changed was the grievous and deteriorating 
economic situation in Cyprus during the depression, which added a sense of determined urgency to 
Cypriot actions. Even moderate Greek-Cypriot politicians, angry at the government‟s unwillingness 
to accept their demands and under pressure from their community due to the serious economic 
situation, were pushed to revolutionary actions. Thus, although the spark to the October 1931 riots 
was political, the causes of the political stalemate and of the subsequent riots were economic. The 
reaction of the British government to the 1931 riots in Cyprus was quite the opposite from their 
reaction after the Maltese riots in 1919: they led to a dual government, while the Cypriot riots led to 
authoritarian rule on the island. 
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The economic conditions heightened political tensions, but the colonial government was to blame 
for the riots due to its poor handling of the economic and political problems caused by the great 
depression. By ignoring the Cypriots‟ demands for government action, the colonial government 
missed a chance to defuse the rapid radicalisation of the Greek-Cypriot leadership. The October 
1931 riots were the first step towards a path of conflict between Greek-Cypriots and the government 
that would eventually lead to the EOKA campaign of 1955. This did not only happen in Cyprus: the 
economic policies of the British colonial office strengthened the Indian Congress opposition against 
British rule which would eventually lead to the decolonisation of India
115
.  The failure of British 
administrators to protect colonial inhabitants from the effects of the great depression laid the seed 
for decolonisation in colonies with established political representation.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
“In the interwar period the collapse of growth in the European industrial centre did translate into 
an even poorer performance almost everywhere around the Mediterranean”1  
 
Cyprus and Malta grew as slowly as other Southern European states despite not being negatively 
affected from the First World War: this was surprising as Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey began the 
period with substantial problems. Their growth was lacklustre, even though Malta benefited from 
substantial British military expenditure and Cyprus benefited from an expanding copper industry. 
Thus, Pamuk and Williamson‟s assertion of relatively poor growth in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis 
the advanced European centre was confirmed for Cyprus and Malta.  
 
This thesis presents the first GDP estimates that were constructed in a systematic way. They 
indicate that during the period 1921-1938 annual per capita growth was 1.3% in Malta and 1.9% in 
Cyprus. Due to its faster growth rate, Cyprus managed to create a substantial per capita income gap 
over Malta by 1938, as the Maltese economy could not create sufficient employment for its 
increasing population
2
. Cyprus would have had much slower growth if the seams of copper at 
Skouriotissa and Mavrovouni were not discovered, since the rapid growth of the mining industry in 
the latter half of the 1930s was the main driver of Cypriot GDP growth. The potential for faster 
growth was there in both economies: Cypriot agriculture could have developed rapidly if grain 
acreage was converted into citrus plantations, and Malta could have grown faster if it diversified 
away from servicing the British military. The reasons why the islands failed to develop their 
potential are the key to understanding their performance.  
 
The islands were not similar in structure, and thus they had a dissimilar development experience. 
Malta‟s GDP exhibited a stable and slow growth due to its dependence on British military 
expenditure. This insulated Malta from the effects of the great depression but made its economy 
vulnerable to political events that affected the expenditure of the British Mediterranean fleet. In 
contrast, Cyprus was dependent on agriculture and thus it experienced substantial output 
fluctuations, especially during the great depression, when the island experienced a prolonged and 
severe drought. Furthermore, the average income level of Cypriots and Malta combined was much 
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lower than suggested by Maddisson‟s: the combined per capita GDP was similar to Bulgaria and 
Romania but poorer than Turkey or Greece.  
 
Prior to this thesis it was not considered possible to estimate the islands‟ economic performance 
during this period. The GDP estimates presented have proved that the data environment is 
sufficiently dense for historical national accounts to be constructed. Although there were data 
constraints on some industries, the use of modern estimation methods, tailored to the specific data 
environments of Cyprus and Malta, led to comprehensive and reliable estimates of aggregate 
income. In fact, the methodology might be useful for other British colonies for which the 
information within their statistical (blue) books is deemed reliable.  
 
Labour productivity, defined as GDP per economically active person, paints a fuller picture of the 
islands‟ performance. Productivity increased by an annual average rate of 2.4% in Malta and 2.1% 
in Cyprus during the period 1921-1938. The majority of the productivity increase in Malta was from 
those already in employment: there was no sector shift of employment, and employment was not 
rising despite the increasing population. Cypriot productivity growth was due to some farmers 
becoming productive miners, as well as the increasing productivity of labourers in the secondary 
and tertiary sectors. However the low productivity in Cypriot agriculture remained, becoming a 
restraint to productivity growth. The labour productivity estimates seem to imply two societies of 
“haves” and “haves not”: labour participation rates were falling while those already in employment 
were becoming productive. Thus the islands were not capable to support the increasing population 
in regular employment during the interwar period. As a result the benefits of the islands lacklustre 
growth were only shared by those in employment, while a growing share of the population seemed 
not to be part of the economy‟s productivity advances. 
 
The largest obstacle to faster growth in Cyprus was the prolonged crisis in agriculture. The output 
of agriculture was still important to the welfare of the economy, particularly since a poor 
agricultural year pulled other sectors in a recession. Economic growth could have been faster if the 
island‟s farming crisis was resolved, because a small improvement in agricultural performance 
would have a very positive impact on GDP growth due to the industry‟s size.  
 
However, agricultural output remained stagnant due to the multitude of problems facing the 
industry. The problems were similar to those faced by other South European states such as the lack 
of irrigation investment, extensive land fragmentation and above all the interlinked problems of 
rural debt and a lack of farming credit. Nevertheless other South European states managed to 
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expand their agricultural output. What was different in Cyprus was the severity of the problems, 
combined with the reluctance of the colonial government to step in to solve them. Independent 
South European countries managed to intensify agricultural production by switching to labour-
intensive products: this was aided by large-scale government intervention in terms of credit, 
investment and pricing. The same did not take place in Cyprus, despite the fact that a similar 
conversion to labour-intensive products was possible: the colonial government‟s policies towards 
irrigation, rural debt and farming credit were too limited to be effective.  
 
The real cost of rural debt increased dramatically in Cyprus after 1921, as farmers who borrowed 
money to expand production during the First World War found it impossible to repay with the 
prevailing low prices of the interwar period. The amount of debt defaulted was so large that it 
eliminated a substantial part of the moneylenders‟ capital, which led to a restriction of lending, thus 
creating a vicious cycle of debt and default. This „credit crunch‟ starved the agricultural industry of 
the credit necessary to intensify production during the interwar period.  
 
Although the elected members of the legislative council pressed the government to enforce 
coordinated action to break the cycle of debt and scare credit, the island‟s first governor was 
unwilling to initiate policies that contravened the laissez-faire spirit: the Cypriot government proved 
to be much more reluctant than independent South European countries in providing solutions for the 
agricultural sector. Sir Stevenson‟s replacement was much more willing to help the industry, but the 
policies implemented by Sir Storrs were hampered by the need to avoid a government deficit: these 
ad-hoc and poorly planned policies failed to rejuvenate the farming industry, leading to the sector 
acting as a drag on the economy.  
 
The fall of agricultural product prices due to the great depression occurred as crops failed because 
of the drought, placing the rural smallholders that made up the majority of the population under 
strain. Indebted, landless and under serious financial pressure, the grain farmers of the Mesaoria 
plain descended in Nicosia, catalysing Cypriot politics towards extreme actions. The hardening 
stance of the Cypriot leadership towards the colonial government led to a political stalemate that 
eventually led to riots against British rule. Cypriot legislators demanded that the government rein in 
British wage expenditure and establish additional programs to help rural smallholders, but the 
government‟s reluctance to implement this exacerbated the political tensions to the point of 
violence. It was only during the Second World War, when the stability of food production was 
threatened during wartime, that the colonial government actively intervened in the agricultural 
industry to successfully tackle the issues that held it back. 
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The drag on GDP growth caused by the stagnant agricultural industry was partially alleviated by the 
explosive growth of mining in the 1930s; without it, the per capita GDP growth of Cyprus for the 
period 1921-1938 would have been a dire 1% per annum
3
. The rise of copper mining in Cyprus is 
linked with the rise of the Cyprus Mining Company, an American company which transformed the 
island‟s economic and social structure. The output of copper mining was particularly impressive 
after 1934, as Cypriot copper mines became the chief suppliers of the German rearmament effort. 
The expansion of mining raised the GDP, but it did not provide sufficient employment opportunities 
to the underemployed farmers. In addition growth in terms of National Income was less than the 
growth of GDP, as foreign companies, like the CMC, expatriated substantial profits abroad.  
 
The primary sector was not important for the Maltase economy. Ever since the island‟s occupation 
by Great Britain, its economic development and structure was shaped by its dependence on British 
armed forces expenditure. The primary sector constituted a very small section of the economy; the 
important sectors were the secondary sector, dominated by the Royal Navy Dockyard, and the 
tertiary sector, which catered to the needs of the armed forces. The dockyard was by far the largest 
employer and the largest industrial unit on the island, producing 12.6% of GDP in 1938. As 
dockyard output remained stable for the majority of the period, the economy of Malta was 
negatively affected in terms of output growth.  
 
The reduction of British defence expenditure during the interwar period led to the very slow growth 
of the Maltese economy. The economy remained dependent on the Royal Navy, as exhibited by the 
deep recession that occurred when the British fleet withdrew in 1936. Malta needed to diversify its 
economy away from British defence expenditure in order to ensure its future economic 
development. The colonial office was aware of this, and it placed the problem on the hands of the 
new Maltese self-government. However, the self-government was not given the power to promote 
economic diversity, as it could not enforce its will on the British armed forces, which wanted to 
maintain Malta as a fortress economy.  
 
Despite these island specific-problems, the relatively slow growth of Malta and Cyprus was in part 
due to common problems. In both countries the limitation of emigration opportunities at the start of 
the period had negative effects in terms of per capita GDP growth. The population grew faster than 
previously: if the increase of the population was kept at the pre-1921 level then the annual per 
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capita GDP growth for the period 1921-1938 would have increased by an additional 0.67% in Malta 
and 0.13% in Cyprus. 
 
In addition, the islands‟ small size was a disadvantage in the interwar period. Kuznets argued that 
small states could do well in turbulent economic periods either by relying on their resource 
endowments or by ensuring continued support from a greater economic power
4
. The experience of 
Cyprus and Malta indicates that things were not straightforward, as the islands‟ economic 
performance was poor despite these benefits. Countries dependent on mineral endowments are 
affected by global crises through falls of commodity prices. The Cypriot mining industry suffered a 
severe setback during the great depression as the copper price fell faster than other prices. Thus 
incomes of small states with significant resource endowments are more vulnerable during uncertain 
global trade conditions. Malta might have escaped the worst effects of the depression due to the 
expenditure of the British armed forces, but this expenditure also had significant negative effects: 
Maltese economic growth was a function of British defence policy just as aircraft technology 
undermined the island‟s usefulness to the British military. Therefore, in contrast to Kuznet‟s 
assertion, these economies did have significant negative repercussions to their economic 
performance because they were small in size; having a significant resource endowment or a 
strategic payoff did not compensate for the disadvantage of being small in the interwar period.  
 
In fact, small island economies are “fair weather” performers that need a global expansion of trade 
in order to prosper. It is not surprising that Easterly and Kray seem to think that small states have 
“small problems”; their analysis is from 1960 to 1995, a period of uninterrupted trade liberalisation 
and rapid trade expansion, while the interwar was a period of protectionism and trade bilateralism
5
. 
The ability to trade goods and services enables these economies to overcome the serious 
disadvantages of their small size, particularly in developing manufacturing. In addition, these small 
islands cannot effectively implement protectionism policies, since the internal economy is too small 
to support industries with a large minimum efficiency scale, as the necessary duties would entail too 
high a cost to the islands‟ consumers. Unlike Greece or Turkey in the interwar period, the islands of 
Malta and Cyprus could not have managed to substantially stimulate domestic manufacturing 
through protectionist measures, since their internal market was too small. This sends a clear 
message to small island states: they should be the strongest proponents of free trade as 
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protectionism reduces the ability of small island states to grow faster, particularly in terms of 
manufacturing.  
 
Manufacturing growth was poor in the interwar period. The slow modernisation of industry in 
Cyprus and Malta was unfortunate as the manufacturing sector provided the largest opportunity for 
productivity enhancements in the interwar period. Europe assimilated the advances of the “second 
industrial revolution”, yet without increasing trade liberalisation, Cyprus and Malta could not have 
modernised their industrial sector in order to assimilate this production-enhancing technology. The 
markets of Cyprus and Malta were too small to attract sufficient investment to modernise their 
existing industries; modern factory production could only be profitably established if one could 
trade the surplus. Thus small economic areas need trade liberalisation in order to complement their 
limited domestic market opportunities with export sales; this became increasingly difficult in the 
interwar period as traffic barriers were raised throughout the Mediterranean. At the same time, 
import duties in Cyprus and Malta remained low due to their status as British colonies and as a 
result, even the limited domestic market was eroded by imports: the islands‟ artisans could not 
compete with imported, factory-made, goods.  
 
In chapter 1 it was suggested that some states are more vulnerable due to a greater exposure to 
exogenous shocks and several economic vulnerability indexes have been constructed to rank states 
by their vulnerability to sudden reversals of income
6
. The development of Cyprus and Malta after 
1945 seemed to refute claims that small states are particularly vulnerable, since both managed to 
surpass serious exogenous shocks without long-term repercussions. Yet a capacity to withstand 
such shocks was not present in the interwar period. The Cypriot drought and the withdrawal of the 
British fleet from Malta greatly affected their output. Thus in order for an economic vulnerability 
index to be accurate it must take into account the level of development and the economic diversity 
of a state.  
 
There is an interaction between economic vulnerability and economic development that has not 
been highlighted enough in the literature of economic vulnerability: as an economy develops and 
diversifies its output, the economy‟s ability to withstand exogenous shocks increases. Thus the 
ability of Malta and Cyprus to withstand substantial exogenous shocks in the second half of the 
twentieth century was related to the fact that their economies had developed and their sources of 
income were diversified. Consequently the changes to the economic vulnerability index suggested 
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by Briguglio and Galea are necessary, even if such changes introduce multicollinearity between the 
vulnerability index and GDP, limiting the usefulness of the index for regression analysis
7
.  
 
The service sector became the main economic driver for the islands‟ rapid catch-up after the Second 
World War, but it was not as dynamic in the interwar period. Although the data on the service 
sector are the least robust, it seems that trade was stagnant while the future drivers of the islands‟ 
economies (such as banking) were growing rapidly but from a very low starting base. The service 
sector was in need of modernisation that necessitated human capital investment, but the small size 
of Malta and Cyprus, combined with the low level of human capital, acted as a deterrent to the 
creation of specialised service providers.  
 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, two service industries were transformed during the 
interwar period. Domestic banking services in Cyprus started from a low base in 1921, but by 1938 
the Cypriot industry had already been through a period of expansion, consolidation and regulation, 
thus becoming well suited to fund domestic projects after the Second World War. The 
transportation industry was revolutionised by the dissemination of motorised vehicles. Both islands 
were starved of transport links prior to the introduction of regular bus services and the creation of a 
road network; their establishment created a demand for houses within commuting distance from the 
main urban areas, thus fuelling the construction boom that occurred in both islands.  
 
The construction boom that began in the interwar period continued after the Second World War in 
both islands. It was mainly a housing boom, in part driven by the need for more housing for an 
increasing population, and by the creation of new suburban areas. In Malta the population density 
around the grand harbour was one of the highest in Europe, thus creating a strong demand for 
better, affordable housing that was accessible from the urban area. This rapid growth of the 
construction industry must have been the driver of increasing productivity in the secondary sector, 
as it compensated for the relatively poor performance of the other secondary sector industries.  
 
The analysis of the interwar period makes it clear that the rapid growth of the islands after the 
Second World War was not a continuation of interwar growth, but that some important pre-
requisites were in place by 1938. As Mayer and Vasiliou indicated, Cyprus already had in place 
several of the necessary elements which ensured rapid economic catch-up after the Second World 
War: the transport and finance industries were transformed and the copper mining industry 
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underwent significant investment that enabled it to provide for the voracious copper demand during 
the global, post-1945 economic boom
8
. Malta‟s post-war economic growth had less to do with 
interwar developments since it remained attached to foreign military expenditure as its main source 
of income; however, the establishment of a regulated bus network ensured that the whole island 
could participate in the economic life of the grand harbour area even before the Second World War.  
 
Both islands were disadvantaged by being British colonies during the interwar period. The main 
disadvantage was not due to the lack of trade protectionism, but due to colonial preference towards 
orthodox economic policy at a time of unorthodox economic turbulence. The Governors were under 
strict orders to ensure budget surpluses, but they also wanted to expand the bureaucracy. As a result, 
government revenue and expenditure in Cyprus and Malta grew faster than per capita GDP; 
however, the colonial government remained committed to the principle of non-intervention in the 
economy. To the dismay of Cypriot representatives, the increased government revenue was devoted 
to wage expenditure and not in government efforts to resolve the deepening agricultural crisis.  
 
Unlike independent South European countries, which reluctantly swung towards greater economic 
intervention as global economic conditions deteriorated, the British colonial governments remained 
committed to a policy of balanced budgets, open markets and limited intervention during the great 
depression. In the unusual conditions of the interwar period such policies were a barrier to 
economic development, since the problems of Malta and Cyprus could only be solved through 
active government intervention. As a result the colonial governments did not give the answer to the 
issues affecting the islands‟ economic performances, and Cyprus and Malta missed the chance to 
grow faster than neighbouring states.  
 
The focus on balanced budgets greatly limited the ability of the colonial governments to respond to 
the global economic crisis. This rigidity in economic policy led to violent riots in several parts of 
the British Empire, of which Cyprus was no exception; even Malta, which was largely insulated by 
the economic effects of the great depression, had its constitution suspended due to rising political 
tensions. The ultimate reason for the Cypriot riots may have been economic, but the colonial 
government was to blame: during the great depression the government was unwilling to tackle the 
economic problems of the local population, as demanded by their increasingly agitated 
representatives. Thus the great depression increased political tension to the point where conflict and 
violence became possible. If the colonial government took on board the wishes of the legislative 
council, the radicalisation of the Greek-Cypriot leadership and the subsequent riots might have been 
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avoided. The failure of cooperation between the government and the Greek-Cypriots in 1931 
ensured tragic consequences for the future, with the formation of organised resistance after the 
Second World War.   
 
Alexander Apostolides 
218 
 
Bibliography 
 
Acronyms:  
 
GPO = Government Printing office  
HMSO= Her Majesty‟s Stationary Office 
 
Primary Materials: 
 
Newspapers and Interviews: 
 
Φυνή τηρ Κύππος [Voice of Cyprus]  
 
Ελεςθεπία [Liberty] 
 
Malta Today  
 
Interview with Mr. Antonis Polydorou, a client of the Ionian Bank in Cyprus. He was a client from 
1926 until late 1930s. Interview taken on 27 Dec. 2006  
 
Interview with Mr. Georgios Kyprianou, Former secretary of the Agros Village Co-operative in the 
1930s, and owner of a traditional wine still in the 1980s. Interview taken at 18
th
 of July 2008. 
 
Interview with Mr. Pambos Kanaris, Cyprus Wine Products Commission. Interview taken at 18
th
 of 
December 2006  
 
Archives:  
 
British Library of Political and Economic Science, Holborn, London 
 
IB3: Ionian Bank archives, Court of Directors' minutes.  
IB6: Cyprus branches and Reports of P.N. Caridia, the bank's General Manager.  
 
English National Archives, Kew, London 
 
CO67: Colonial Office: Cyprus, Original Correspondence 
CO69:  Colonial Office: Cyprus, Sessional Papers.  
CO70: Colonial Office: Cyprus, Government Gazettes. 
CO456: Colonial Office: Cyprus, Miscellanea.  
CO158: Colonial Office: Malta, Original Correspondence 
CO161: Colonial Office: Malta, Sessional Papers.  
CO162: Colonial Office: Malta, Government Gazettes.  
CO163: Colonial Office: Malta, Miscellanea.  
FO371: Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966 
ADM116/ 3660, 5390: Admiralty: Record Office: Cases 
ADM1/20578: Dockyards and naval establishments (41): Locally entered workpeople employed on 
dockyard craft Malta: rates of pay. 
  
Alexander Apostolides 
219 
 
Cyprus National Archives, Nicosia 
 
SA1: Colonial Secretarial Archive. 
V5: Unpublished Government Manuscripts 
V53: Ministry of Finance: Statistical office publications   
 
Cyprus Ministry of Agriculture Library, Nicosia 
 
The Cyprus Agricultural Journal 
 
Maltese National Archives, Rabat  
 
PW: Public works Section Public Works: files noted separately in the footnotes. 
GMR: Government of Malta Records 
Hirst Private Papers: Papers of the Director of Agriculture in the 1930s.  
 
University of Malta Library, Msida 
 
Melitensia Collection: Unpublished dissertations of the University of Malta.  
 
British Library, London 
 
British parliamentary papers:  
Command 4045, “Disturbances in Cyprus in October 1931” Reports from Commissioners, 
Inspectors and Others: vol.VI session 03/11/1931 to 17/11/1931 pp.504 – 544 
 
Command 2150, “Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution of Malta” in Reports from 
Commissioners, Inspectors and Others: Vol. VI session 03/11/1931 to 17/11/1931 pp. 803-1043 
 
Command 6090, “Finances, economic position and judicial procedure: Report of the royal 
commission on the finances economic position and judicial procedure of Malta 1912-1913”  
 
Published and Unpublished Manuscripts and Statistical sources: 
 
Advisory Council of Cyprus, The Current Supply, Transport and Marketing Situation in Cyprus, 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
 
Antoniades, A., Mavrogenis, A.P, & Papayiannis, C., Part-time Farming in Cyprus, (Nicosia: 
Agricultural Research Institute, 2001) 
 
Apostolides. A., Why did the Ionian Bank Enter the Cyprus Market in 1926-1927? A Case-Study of 
a British Overseas Bank in the Interwar period (Unpublished MSc dissertation, London School of 
Economics, 2005)  
 
Bevan, W., Notes on Agriculture in Cyprus and its Products, (Nicosia: 1919) 
 
Central Office of Statistics, Malta, Report on the Census of Agriculture, 1956, (Valletta: 
Department of Information and Tourist Services, 1957) 
 
Central Office of Statistics, Malta, Census of Production for 1955, (Valletta: Department of 
Information and Tourist Services, 1956) 
 
Alexander Apostolides 
220 
 
Central Office of Statistics, Malta, National Accounts of the Maltese Islands 1954–1963, (Valletta: 
Department of Information, 1964) 
 
Central Office of Statistics, Malta, National Accounts of the Maltese Islands 1966, (Valletta: 
Department of Information, 1967) 
 
Constantinou, A., Ruminant Livestock: Genetic Resources in Cyprus, (Nicosia: unpublished, 1981) 
 
Cyprus, Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1911 (London: Waterlow, 1912) 
 
Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books. (Nicosia: GPO, 1921-1946) A yearly publication comprising of 
the most important statistical information, published under Colonial Office standards.  
 
Cyprus, Minutes of the Legislative Council of the session of ... (Nicosia: GPO, 1921-1931) A yearly 
publication of the minutes of the Legislative council  
 
Cyprus, Census of Cyprus 1946: Report on Housing in the Six District Towns (Construction, 
Services, etc.), (Nicosia: Census Office, 1948) 
 
Cyprus, National Income: Product, Income, Expenditure 1950, (Nicosia: Secretariat, 1951) 
 
Cyprus, Cyprus Economic Review 1955–1956, (Nicosia: GPO, 1957) 
 
Demetriades, E.I., Census of cottage industry 1982, (Nicosia: Statistical Service, 1983) 
 
Ellul, M., H.M. Naval Dockyard, Malta: Society Work and Industrial Relations in a British Naval 
Base, 1900–1939, (Unpublished M.A, University of Malta, 2004)  
 
Eurostat, GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Standard http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ as consulted 
10 Mar 2006 
 
Federico, G., “Italy”, in Lains P. & Pinilla V. (eds), Agriculture and Economic Development in 
Europe, (Routledge, forthcoming) 
 
Fenoaltea, S., Italian Industrial Production, 1861-1913: A Statistical Reconstruction. Part B. 
Extractive Industries, (Unpublished, 2007) 
 
Hart-Davis, C.H., Cyprus Report of the Census of 1921 Taken on April 24
th
, 1921, (London: 
Dunstable & Watford, 1922)  
 
Hart-Davis, C.H., Cyprus Report of the Census of 1931 Taken on April 27-28
th
, 1931, (Nicosia: 
Passingham, 1932) 
 
Heston, A. & Lipsey, R.E., International and Inter-area Comparisons of Income, Output and 
Prices, (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999) 
 
Heston, A., Summers, R. & Aten, B., “The International Comparison of Prices Program (ICP), 
Version 6.1” Penn World Table (Pennsylvania, PA: CICUP, 2002) 
 http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/icp.html as consulted 20 Jun 2007 
 
Ivanov, M., Bulgarian National Income 1892–1924: 60 years Later or Quarter of a Century 
Earlier, (Unpublished, 2007) 
Alexander Apostolides 
221 
 
 
Kunert, H. & Yiassemides, P., Norm Input-Output Data of Some Crop and Livestock enterprises of 
Cyprus, (Nicosia: Cyprus Agricultural Research institute, 1966)  
 
Maddison, A., Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2006 AD, 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ as consulted 10 Mar 2009. 
 
Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books. A yearly collection of the most important statistical information on 
Malta. Published under Colonial Office standards.  
 
Malta, Eleventh Census of the Maltese Islands 1948 (Valletta, Progress, 1949) 
 
Malta, Census of the Maltese Islands 1931, (Valletta, GPO, 1932) 
 
Malta, Report of the Census of the Maltese Islands 1921 (Valletta: GPO, 1922) 
 
National Statistics Office: Malta, National Accounts (Old System) 
 http://www.nso.gov.mt/site/page.aspx?pageid=57 as consulted 8 May 2006. 
 
National Statistical Office of Malta, Census of Population and Housing 2005, Volume 1 (Valletta: 
National Statistical Office, 2007) 
 
National Statistics Office, National Accounts Finalisation of GDP data: Malta 1995–2003, NSO 
News Release, No.96 (2007) 
 
Potts, H.W., Lecture on the Improvement of Livestock and Agriculture in Malta Delivered at the 
Palace on the 6
th
 February, 1930, (Malta: GPO, 1930) 
 
Raeburn, C., Government of Cyprus, Water supply and irrigation departments: Water Supply in 
Cyprus: a General Report, Revised Edition, (Nicosia: GPO, 1945) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Census of Population and Agriculture 1960, (Nicosia: GPO, 1962) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Economic Review 1961, (Nicosia, GPO, 1963)  
 
Republic of Cyprus, Distribution Survey 1969: Wholesale and Retail Trade (Nicosia: Ministry of 
Finance, 1971) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Agricultural Census 1977 (Nicosia, Ministry of Agriculture, 1978) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Pocket Book No.1: The Cyprus Economy in Numbers (1950–1975) 
and Main socio-economic Indicators (Nicosia: Statistics and Research Department, 1978) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Pocket Book No.2: The Cyprus Economy in Figures (1950–1978) 
and Main socio-economic indicators, (Nicosia: Statistics and Research Department, 1980) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Input-Output table of Cyprus for 1981, (Nicosia: Statistics and Research 
Department, 1988)  
 
Republic of Cyprus, Agricultural Statistics 2000, (Nicosia: Statistical Service, 2001) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Census of Population and Agriculture 1960 (Nicosia: GPO, 1962) 
Alexander Apostolides 
222 
 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Service Press Release 06/10/2008. 
http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/FC5F3AB325D6BEEAC22574D7002DB767?
OpenDocument&sub=1&e=  as consulted 17 Dec 2008  
 
Pamuk, S. “Agriculture and Economic Development in Turkey 1870–2000” in Lains P. & Pinilla V. 
(eds.) Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870 (Routledge: Forthcomming) 
 
Percival, D.A., Cyprus, Census of Population and Agriculture 1946: Report and Tables, (Nicosia, 
GPO, 1947) 
 
Smits, J.P, Woltjer, P.J., and Ma, D., 'A Dataset on Comparative Historical National Accounts, ca. 
1870-1950: A Time-Series Perspective', Groningen Growth and Development Centre Research 
Memorandum (2009), 
 
Stockdale, F.A., Report on the Present Condition of Agriculture in the Maltese Islands (Malta: 
GPO, 1934) 
 
Surridge, B.J., Annual report of the department of co-operation 1937, (Nicosia: GPO, 1938) 
 
The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database,  
http://www.conference-board.org/economics as consulted 20 Oct 2008 
 
PhD Theses 
 
Charlton, W. A., Trends in the Economic Geography of Malta since 1800, (PhD Thesis: University 
of Durham, 1960) 
 
Richardson, M., Aspects of Demography of Modern Malta, (PhD Thesis: University of Durham, 
1960) 
 
Verropoulou, G., The Demography of Cyprus 1881 – 1982, (PhD Thesis, University of London, 
1997) 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Abramowitz, M., “The Catch-up Factor in Post-war Economic Growth. Presidential Address to the 
Western Economic Association, 21 June, 1989”, Economic Inquiry Vol.XXVIII, (1990) pp.1-18 
 
Abela, M., Malta, a Developing Economy, (Malta: Central Office of Statistics, 1963) 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J.A., “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: 
An Empirical Investigation”, The American Economic Review, Vol.91, No.5 (2001) pp.1369 – 1401 
 
Aerts, E., and Valério, N. Growth and Stagnation in the Mediterranean World (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 1990) 
 
Αγθαζηηληώηες Κ.Μ. [Agastinotis, K.M.], Ο Σςνεπγατισμόρ: Γέννηση και Ανάπτςξη τος εν Κύππυ 
[Co-operatism: its Birth and Development in Cyprus], (Nicosia: 1965) 
 
Agathangelou, A., Mortality in Cyprus, (Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, 1985) 
Alexander Apostolides 
223 
 
 
Aldcroft, D.H., Studies in the Interwar European Economy, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997) 
 
Amery, L.S., My Political Life: Vol.2 War and Peace 1914-1929, (London: Hutchinson, 1953)  
 
Amery, L.S., My Political Life: Vol.3 The Unforgiving Years 1929-1940, (London: Hutchinson, 
1955)  
 
Antoniou, A., Athanassiou, E. & Kostelenos, G., “Economic Growth in Greece 1833-1939: A 
Tentative Endogenous Growth Approach”, International Workshop on Modern Economic Growth 
and Distribution in Asia, Latin America and the European Periphery, (2001) 
 
Apostolides, A., and Apostolides C. “Introducing Cyprus in the Economic Debate: The Resilience 
of Cypriot Agriculture in the 20
th
 century 1921–2000” in Hendrickson, K.E., and Pappas, N.C, 
Interpreting the Past: Essays from the 4
th
 international conference on European History (Athens: 
ATINER, 2007), pp.271-286 
 
Apostolides, A., “How similar to south-eastern Europe were the islands of Cyprus and Malta in 
terms of agricultural output and credit? Evidence during the interwar period”, Working Paper, Bank 
of Greece, (2008) no.80  
 
Apostolides. A., “Foreign Banking Entry in Cyprus: History Lessons in Strategy” presented in The 
Critical Function of History in Banking and Finance, European Association of Banking History 
Conference, Nicosia, (2009) 
 
Apostolides, C., The Role of Agriculture in the Economic Development and Trade in Cyprus 1879 – 
1971, (Nicosia: EMS Economic Management, 1980) 
 
Baer, L.M., The Mineral Resources and Mining Industry of Cyprus, (Nicosia: Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, 1963) 
 
Balogh, T., & Seers D., The Economic Problems of Malta: An interim Report (Malta: GPO, 1955) 
 
Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, “110 moments in our History” 
http://www.boccf.org/main/default.aspx?mid=199&TabID=43&ItemID=226 as consulted 12 Dec 
2009 
 
Bassino, J.P & Van der Eng, P. “Economic Divergence in East Asia: New Benchmark Estimates of 
Levels of Wages and GDP, 1913-1970” XIII IEHC, Buenos Aires (2002) 
 
Benians, E.A., Bulter, J., Carrington, C.E. (eds.) The Cambridge History of The British Empire: 
Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 
 
Bond, B. & Williamson, M., “The British Armed forces 1918-1939” in Millet, A.R. & Williamson, 
M. (eds.) Military Effectiveness, Vol.II: The interwar period (London, Allen & Unwin, 1988) 
pp.98-131.  
 
Bonnano, N.S., Capital, Accumulation and Economic Growth: In Theory and as they Relate in the 
Maltese Paradigm, (Fribourg: University of Fribourg, 1989)  
 
Bonnici, J. & Cassar M., The Malta Grand Harbour and its Dockyard, (Malta: Gutenberg Press, 
1994) 
Alexander Apostolides 
224 
 
 
Bonnici, J. & Cassar M., A Chronicle of Twentieth Century Malta, (Malta: Book Distributors ltd, 
2004)  
 
Bowen-Jones, H., Dewdney J.C., & Fisher W. B., Malta: Background for Development, (Durham: 
Department of Geography, 1961) 
 
Briguglio, L., “Island Economies: Plans, Strategies and Performance: Malta” Economics Division 
Working Papers, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 
(Australian National University, 1992) 
 
Briguglio, L., “The Vulnerability Index and Small Island Developing States: A Review of 
Conceptual and Methodological Issues”, (2003)  
http://www.sidsnet.org/docshare/other/20031024170308_vulner_paper_30_sep03.doc as consulted 
10 Oct 2006 
 
Briguglio. L., & Eliawony, K.J., Economic Vulnerability and Resilience of Small States, (Blata l-
Bajda: Formatek ltd, 2004) 
  
Briguglio, L. & Galea V., “Updating and Augmenting the Economic Vulnerability Index” 
Occasional Paper of the Islands and Small States Institute of the University of Malta (2003) 
 http://home.um.edu.mt/islands/eviar_briguglio_galea_ver4.pdf as consulted 20 Dec 2007 
 
Broadberry, S. & Sayanthan G., “From the Counting House to the Modern Office: Explaining 
Anglo-American Productivity Differences in Services, 1870-1990” Journal of Economic History, 
Vol.62, No.4 (2002) 
 
Broadberry, S., Market Services and the Productivity Race, 1850-2000, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 
 
Brown, I., The Economies of Africa and Asia in the inter-war depression (Padstow: T.J. Press, 
1989)  
 
Busuttil, S., “Agriculture in Malta: A historical note” Options Mediterraneennes, Sér. B., no. 7 
(1993) pp.10 - 26  
 
Buyst, E., Smits, J.P.H., & Van Zanden, J.L., “National accounts for the low countries 1800 – 
1990” Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol.XLIII No.1, (1995) pp.53-76   
 
Caircross, A. & Puri, M. (eds.) Employment, Income Distribution and Development Strategy 
(London: Macmillan, 1976) pp.25-42. 
 
Castillo, D., The Maltese Cross: a Strategic History of Malta, (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2006)  
 
Charalambous, J., & Georgallides G.S., (eds.), Focus on Cyprus, (North London University: 
University of North London Press, 1993)  
 
Christensen, J. P., Hjerppe, R. & Krantz, O. “ Nordic National Accounts since the 1880s” 
Scandinavian Economic History Review Vol. XLIII, No.1 (1995) pp.30-52, 
 
Alexander Apostolides 
225 
 
Christodoulaki, I., “Industrial growth revisited: Manufacturing output in Greece in the interwar 
period” Working Paper London School of Economics, Department of Economic History, no. 50 
(1999) 
 
Christodoulou, D., The evolution of the rural land use pattern in Cyprus (Bude, Geographical 
Publication Ltd, 1959) 
 
Christodoulou, D., Contributions towards a Development Plan for Cyprus Agriculture (Nicosia, 
ROC, 1960) 
 
Christodoulou, D., Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini- Economy, 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1992) 
 
Clark, C., The Conditions of Economic Progress, (London: Macmillan, 1940)  
 
Clark G.L., & Feldman, M.P., Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 
 
Coase, A.S., “The Closing of the Malta Railway” The Railway Magazine, (July, 1934) 
www.maltarailway.com/history/rm1934.pdf  as consulted 09 Dec 2008.  
 
Coghlan, F., “Armaments, economic policy and appeasement. Background to British foreign policy, 
1921–7” History, Vol.57, (2007) pp.205-216 
 
Cohen, J. & Federico, G., The Growth of the Italian Economy 1820 – 1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) 
 
Consiglio, J.A., A History of Banking in Malta, (Valletta: Progress Press, 2006) 
 
Crafts, N.F.R., “Recent Research on the National Accounts of the UK 1700–1939”, Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, Vol. XLIII (1995) p.17- 29 
 
Crafts, N.F.R., “The Golden Age of Economic Growth in Europe, 1950-1973” The Economic 
History Review, Vol.48 No.3 (1995) pp. 429–444 
 
Crawshay, I.R., An investigation into the Cypriot sponge fishing industry, (Nicosia: GPO, 1930) 
 
Cyprus, The Mines Regulation 1926: Cyprus (Nicosia: GPO, 1926) 
 
Cyprus, Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the System of Taxation in Cyprus, 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1930) 
 
Cyprus, Report of the Committee appointed to study the Conventions and Recommendations 
adopted by the International Labour Conference at its Tenth and Eleventh Sessions and to report on 
the possibility of applying the Conventions in the Colony of Cyprus, (Nicosia: GPO, 1932) 
 
Cyprus, Report on the Activities of the Debt Settlement Board, (Nicosia: GPO, 1945) 
 
Dean, P., The Measurement of Colonial National Incomes: an Experiment, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1948) 
 
Alexander Apostolides 
226 
 
Dilley, A.R., “The Economics of Empire” in Stockwell, S., (ed.) The British Empire: Themes and 
Perspectives, (Oxford: Blackwell publishing, 2008) 
 
Dockyard and Imperial Workers Union (Malta), Memorandum (Valletta: Empire Press, 1943) 
 
Droulia, L. & Koutsopanagou, G. (eds.), Εγθσθιοπαίδεηα ηοσ Ειιεληθού ηύποσ 1784-1974, 
[Encyclopaedia of the Greek Press 1784-1974] (Athens: Institute of modern Greek research, 2008) 
 
Drummond, I.M, British economic policy and the empire in 1919–1939 (New York, Barnes & 
Noble, 1972)  
 
Easterly, W. & Kraay A., “Small States, Small Problems? Income , Growth and Volatility in Small 
States”, World Development, Vol.28, No.11, (2000) p.2013 - 2027 
 
Eichengreen, B., (ed.), The Gold Standard in Theory and History, (New York: Methuen, 1985)  
 
Electricity Authority of Cyprus, “The History of Electricity in Cyprus and the Electricity Authority 
of Cyprus (EAC)” http://www.eac.com.cy/EN/ourorganization/Pages/History.aspx as consulted 10 
Jun 2009 
 
Ellis, W.M., Report on improving and extending irrigation works in Cyprus (Nicosia: GPO, 1922) 
 
Ellul, M., “Maltese Imperial mentalities: Subjecting the Maltese Mind To Imperial Rule” Storja 
(1998), pp.95-114 
 
Eloranta, J., “Military Spending in History”, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/eloranta.military as 
consulted 10 Sep 2009 
 
Eurostat, European System of Accounts ESA 1995, (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 1996) 
 
Eurostat, NACE Rev.2: Statistical Classification of Economic Activity, (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 
2008) 
 
Eurostat, NACE Rev. 2-CPA 2008 http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nacecpacon/info/data/en/ as 
consulted as consulted 10 November 2007. 
 
Fagerberg J., “Technological Progress, Structural Change and Productivity Growth: A Comparative 
Study”, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics (2000) vol.11 pp.393-411 
 
Farrugia, C. “The Special Working Environment of Senior Administrators in Small States” World 
Development, (1993) Vol.21, No.2, pp.221-226 
 
Faustman, H. & Peristianis, N. Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878–2006  
(Biliopolis: Mannheim & Möhnesee, 2006) 
 
Federico, G., Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture 1800–2000, (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2005) 
 
Federico, G., “Not guilty? Agriculture in the 1920s and the Great Depression”, The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol.65, No.4, (December 2005) pp.949 - 976 
 
Alexander Apostolides 
227 
 
Fieldhouse, D.K., “‟Imperialism‟: An Historiographical Revision”, The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol.14, No.2, (1961), pp.187-209  
 
Feinstein, C.H., National Income Expenditure and Output in the United Kingdom 1855–1965, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 
 
Feinstein, C.H. & Pollard, S., Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750–1920, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) 
 
Feinstein, C.H., Temin, P. & Toniolo, G., The European Economy Between the Wars, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997) 
 
Feinstein, C.H. & Thomas M., “A Plea for Errors”, University of Oxford, Discussion Papers in 
Economic and Social History, (2001), no.41.  
 
Felner, F. “Das Volksvermögen Österreichs and Ungarns” [The national Wealth of Austria and 
Hungary] Bulletin de L’Institut International de Statistique Tome XX–2e Livraison (1915), pp.503–
573 
 
Fenech, D., Responsibility and Power in Inter-war Malta. Book One: Endemic Democracy 1919–
1930 (San Gwann: PEG, 2005)  
 
Fenoaltea, S., “Real Value Added and the Measurement of Industrial Production”, Annals of 
Economic and Social Measurement, Vol.5, No.1, (1976) pp.111-137 
 
Fenoaltea, S., “Notes on the Rate of Industrial Growth in Italy, 1861-1913”, The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol.63, No.3, (2003) pp.695-735 
 
Fenoaltea, S., “The Growth of the Italian Economy, 1861-1913: Preliminary second-generation 
estimates”, European Review of Economic History, Vol.9, (2005), pp.273-312 
 
Fenoaltea, S., “The Reconstruction of Historical National Accounts: The Case of Italy”, 
International Economic History Conference (IEHC) Helsinki, Session 103: New Experiences with 
Historical National Accounts, (2006) 
 
Floud, R., and McCloskey, D., The Economic History of Britain Since 1700 (second Edition): 
Volume 2 1860-1939 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
 
Frendo, H., “Italy and Britain in Maltese Colonial Nationalism”, History of European Ideas, 
Vol.15, No.4/6, (1992) p.733–739 
 
Frendo, H., “Everyday Life in „British Malta‟”, Storja, (1996), p.37-47 
 
Gallagher, J. & Robinson R., “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, The Economic History Review, New 
Series, Vol.6, No.1, (1953), pp.1-15  
 
Geddes, P., “Cyprus and Some of its possibilities” in The Isle of Man, Gibraltar, Malta, St Helene, 
Barbados, Cyprus, The Channel Islands, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & co ltd, 1902)  
  
Georghallides, G.S., A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926, (Nicosia: 
Zavallis Press, 1979) 
 
Alexander Apostolides 
228 
 
Georghallides, G.S., Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 
Crisis, (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985) 
 
Greaves, J.B., Report on Economic Conditions in Cyprus and Malta, with a Note on the Trade of 
Gibraltar, (London: HMSO, 1935) 
 
Goldman, D. “Jewish Settlers in Cyprus during the British rule, 1880-1940s” Journal of Cyprus 
Studies (2006), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-164327863.html as consulted 5 June 2009 
 
Grilli, E. & Maw, C.Y., “Primary Commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods Prices and the Terms of 
Trade of Developing countries: What the Long Run Shows”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol.2, 
(1988) pp.1-47 
 
Grytten, O.H., (ed.), Nordiske Historiske Nasjonalregnskaper. Historical National Accounts. 
Proceedings Workshop IV, Solstrand, November 13-15
th
, 1998, (Noway: Powerprint, 1999)  
 
Grytten, O.H., “Fixed Price Calculations in Nordic National Accounts”, IEHC Helsinki, Session 
103: New Experiences with Historical National Accounts, (2006)   
 
Gudmundur, J., (ed), Nordic Historical National Accounts: Proceedings of Workshop VI Reykjavik 
19-20 September 2003, (Reykjavik, Institute of History, University of Iceland, 2003) 
 
Guido, M.R, (ed.), I Conti Economici Dell’Italia: 1. Una Sintesi Delle Fonti Ufficialli 1890 – 1970 
[The National Accounts of Italy:  A summary of Official Sources 1980-1970], (Roma–Bari, Editori 
Laterza, 1991)  
 
Guido, M.R, (ed.), I Conti Economici Dell’Italia: 2. Una Stima Del Valore Aggiunto Per Il 1911 
[The National Accounts of Italy: An estimate of Value Added for 1911], (Roma–Bari, Editori 
Laterza, 1992)  
 
Guido, M.R., (ed.), I Conti Economici Dell’Italia: 3’ Il Valore Aggiunto Per Gli Anni 1891, 1938, 
1951 [The National Accounts of Italy: An estimate of Value Added for 1891, 1938, 1951], (Roma–
Bari, Editori Laterza, 2000)  
 
Guido, M.R., (ed.), I Conti Economici Dell’Italia: 3’’ Il Conto Risorse E Impieghi (1891, 1911, 
1938, 1951 [The National Accounts of Italy: The uses and resources of 1891, 1911, 1938, 1951], 
(Roma–Bari, Editori Laterza, 2002) 
 
Haas, J.M., A Management Odyssey: The Royal Dockyards 1714-1914 (Maryland: University Press 
of America, 1994) 
 
Hadjilyra, A.M., The Cyprus Government Railway 1905-1951, (Nicosia: Latsia Municipality, 2006) 
 
Hald, M.W., A Study of the Cyprus Economy (Bellapais: 1968) 
 
Harvey, C.E., The Rio Tinto Company: An economic history of a leading international mining 
concern 1873 – 1954 (Penzance: Alison Hodge, 1981) 
 
Hill, G. A history of Cyprus: Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948) 
 
Hill, G., A History of Cyprus: Volume IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952)  
 
Alexander Apostolides 
229 
 
Hjerppe, R., Hjerppe, R., Mannermaa, K., Niitamo, O.E., Siltari, K. Suomen Teollisuus ja Teollinen 
Käsityö 1900-1965 [Industry and Industrial Handicraft in Finland] (Statistics Finland, Helsinki, 
1976) 
 
Hjerppe, R., Finland’s Historical National Accounts 1860-1994: Calculation Methods and 
Statistical Tables, (Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 1996)  
 
Hjerpe, R. “Understanding Economic Development Through Historical National Accounts” in 
Grytten, O.H. (ed.), Nordic Historical National Accounts Proceedings of Workshop, IV (Bergen: 
NHH, 1998) pp.81–pp.97 
 
Hodge, J.M., Triumph of the Expert–Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of 
British Colonialism, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007) 
 
Holland, R. & Markides D., The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern 
Mediterranean 1850-1960, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
 
Hyam, R. Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
 
Ivanov, M. & Tooze A., “Convergence or Decline on Europe's South-eastern Periphery? 
Agriculture, Population, and GNP in Bulgaria, 1892–1945”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 67, 
No.3, (2007) pp.672 - 704 
 
Jalava. J. Essays on Finnish Economic Growth and Productivity 1860-2005 (Helsinki: Statistics 
Finland, 2007) 
 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An analysis of farming costs in Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural 
Journal, Vol.XXXIV, Part.2, (1939) pp.45-67 
 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An analysis of farming costs in Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural 
Journal, Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) pp.87-109 
 
Jenness, D., The Economics of Cyprus: A Survey to 1914, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 
1962) 
 
Karageorghis, V. & Michaelides, D. (eds.) The Development of the Cypriot Economy from the 
Prehistoric Period to the Present Day (Nicosia: University of Cyprus, 1996) 
 
Karouzis G., Land consolidation in Cyprus 1970–1990, (Nicosia: Ministry of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, 1991) 
 
Kauppila, J. The Structure and Short-Term Development of Finnish Industries in the 1920s and 
1930s: An Input-output Approach (Helsinki: Statistics Finland, 2007) 
 
Kesner, R.M., “Britain and the Rehabilitation of the Cyprus Economy” The Journal of European 
Economic History, Vol.7, No.1, (1978) pp.169–190, 
 
Koudounaris, A.L. Βιογπαυικόν Λεξικόν Κςππίυν1800-1920 [Biographical Dictionary of Cypriots] 
(Λεσθωζία: Ίδρσκα Πηερίδε, 1989) 
 
Kostelenos, G., Money and Output in Modern Greece, 1858–1938, (Athens: Kepe, 1995) 
Alexander Apostolides 
230 
 
 
Kostelenos, G., Vasiliou D., Kounaris E., Petmetzas S. & Sfakianakis M.,  Ακαθάπιστο Εγσώπιο 
Πποιόν 1830–1939 [Gross Domestic Output], (Athens: Kepe,  2007) 
 
Kostis, K., Αγποτική Οικονομία και Γευπγική Τπάπεζα: Ότειρ τηρ Ελληνικήρ Οικονομίαρ το 
Μεσοπόλεμο. Τομ. 1 & 2 [Agricultural Economy and Agricultural Bank: Visions of the Greek 
Economy in the Interwar Period. Vol. 1 & 2], (Athens: Cultural Institute of the National Bank of 
Greece, 1990) 
 
Kostis, K., Σςνεπγασία και Ανταγυνισμόρ: Τα 70 Χπόνια τηρ Ένυσηρ Ελληνικών Τπαπεζών 
[Cooperation and Competition: The 70 years of the Union of Greek Banks], (Athens: Alexandra, 
1997) 
 
Kostis, K.,  & Petmezas, S., “Growth and Stagnation in the Greek Economy, 1830–1940” 
http://www.ims.forth.gr/ims/history_studies/agrotiki_oikonomia/GreekEconomy.pdf as consulted 
12 Dec 2007 
 
Kostas, K. & Petmetzas, S. (eds.) Η Ανάπτςξη τηρ Ελληνικήρ Οικονομίαρ κατα το 19ο Αιώνα 1830–
1914 [The growth of the Greek Economy during the 19
th
 Century] (Athens: Alexandria, 2006)  
 
Krantz, O., “Service production in Historical National Accounts” Review of Income and Wealth 
Vol.40, No.1, (1994) pp.19 - 41 
 
Kuznets, S., “Economic Growth and Income Inequality”, The American Economic Review, Vol.45, 
No.1, (1955) pp.1-28 
 
Kuznets, S., Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966) 
 
Lanitis, N. C., Rural Indebtedness and Agricultural Co-operation in Cyprus (Revised edition), 
(Limassol: Proodos Printing and Publishing Ltd, 1944; revised 1992) 
 
Laquiller, F. & Blades, D., Understanding National Accounts, (Paris: OECD, 2007) 
 
Lavender, D., The Story of Cyprus Mines Corporation, (San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library, 
1962) 
 
Le Nay, J.  & Mathis J., “the Impact of Drought on the National Accounts for Livestock in Sahelian 
Countries” Review of Income and Wealth, Vol.35, No.2, (June 1989) pp.209-224 
 
Maddison., A., Two Crises: Latin America and Asia 1929-1938 and 1973-83 (Paris: OECD, 1985) 
 
Maddison, A., Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1995, (OECD, Paris, 1995) 
 
Maddison, A., The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, (Paris: OECD, 2001) 
 
Mallia-Milanes, V., (ed.), The British Colonial Experience the Impact on Maltese Society (Minerva 
Publications, The Free University of Amsterdam, 1988) 
 
Malta, Report on the Working of the Department of Agriculture during October 1938 to September 
1946 and the Agricultural year 1946–1947, (Malta: GPO, 1949) 
 
Alexander Apostolides 
231 
 
Malta Labour Party, The Maltese Economy, (Hamrun: Malta Labour Party, 2001) 
 
Mathias, P., Postan, M.M., Clapham, J.H., Pollard, S., Rich, E.E.. Habakkuk, H.J., Power, E.E., The 
Cambridge Economic History of Europe: The Development of Economic and Social Policies 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
 
Matthews, R.C.O, Feinstein, C.H., Odling-Smee, J.C, British Economic Growth 1856-1973 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982)  
 
Mayer, A.J., Middle Eastern Capitalism: Nine Essays, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1959) 
 
Mayer, A.J. with Vassiliou, S., The Economy of Cyprus, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1962) 
 
Mazower, M., Greece and the Interwar Economic Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 
 
Meinen, G., Verbiest, P. & De Wolf, P. Perpetual Inventory Method: Service Lines, Discard 
Patterns and Depreciation Methods (Voorburg, Statistics Netherlands, 1998) 
 
Meredith, D., “The British Government and Colonial Economic Policy, 1919–1939”, The Economic 
History Review, New Series, Vol.28, No.3, (1975) pp.484-499 
 
Meteorological service of Cyprus, Το κλίμα τηρ Κύππος [The Climate of Cyprus], 
http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/ms/ms.nsf/dmlcyclimate_gr/dmlcyclimate_gr?opendocument&print as 
consulted 23 Jan 2008. 
 
Metwally, M.M., Structure and Performance of the Maltese Economy, (Malta: Aquilina & Co, 
1977) 
 
Munting, R. & Holderness B. A., Crisis, Recovery and War: an Economic History of Continental 
Europe 1918–1945, (Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 1991) 
 
Nicolson, J.L., “National Income at Factor Cost or Market Prices” The Economic Journal, Vol.65, 
No.258 (1955), pp.216-224 
 
North, D.C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) 
 
Oakden, R., Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus, (London: Crown Agents 
for the Colonies, 1935)  
 
OECD, Measuring Productivity: Measurement of Aggregate and Industry Level Productivity 
Growth (Paris: OECD, 2001) 
 
Pamuk, S., “Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East, 1820–1950”, The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol.66, No.3, (2006) pp.809-828 
 
Pamuk, S. & Williamson, J.G., The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950, 
(London: Routledge, 2000)  
 
Alexander Apostolides 
232 
 
Pan-Cyprian Co-operative Confederation, Σςνεπγατισμόρ 1909-2006: Σςνοπτική Θεώπηση [Co-
operativism, 1909-2006: Historical Summary] (Nicosia, Hermes Media Press, 2006) 
 
Pan-Cyprian Labour Federation, Μεταλλυπύσυν Μνήμερ [Miner‟s Memories], DVD, Nicosia, 2007   
 
Phylaktis, K. The Banking System of Cyprus: Past, Present and Future, (London: Macmillan, 1995) 
 
Prados De La Escosura, L.,“Spain‟s Gross Domestic Product, 1850–1990: A new Series”, 
Documentos De Trabajo, Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, (1993)  
 
Prados De La Escosura, L., “International Comparisons of Real Product, 1820–1990: An 
Alternative Data Set”, Explorations in Economic History, No.37, (2000) pp.1-41 
 
Prados De La Escosura, L., El Progreso Económico De España, (1850-2000), (Madrid: BBVA, 
2002) 
 
Pratt, L.R., East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis 1936–1939, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975)  
 
Republic of Cyprus, Report on marketing of Vine products (Nicosia: GPO, 1956)  
 
Republic of Cyprus, Methodology of National Accounts 1958–1963, (Nicosia: Statistics and 
Research Department, 1964) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, Indexes to the Cyprus Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities, 
(Nicosia: Statistics and Research Department, 1969) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, The Economic Consequences of the Turkish Invasion and the Future Prospects 
of the Cyprus Economy (Nicosia: GPO, 1975) 
 
Republic of Cyprus, History and Analysis of the Methodology of National Accounts in Cyprus, 
(Nicosia: Statistics and Research Department, 1977) 
 
Richards, K.L., Report of the Livestock Officer for 1949 (Cyprus: Department of Agriculture, 1950) 
 
Robinson, E.A.G., (ed.), Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations: Proceeding of a 
Conference held by the International Economic Association, (London: Macmillan, 1960)  
 
Rodgers, M. Handbook of Key Economic Indicators (USA: McGraw Hill, 1998) 
 
Rogiros, M. Recent trends of agricultural production and productivity in Cyprus (Nicosia: Ministry 
of agriculture and natural resources, 1970) 
 
Rothermund. D., The Global impact of the great depression 1929-1933 (New York: Routledge, 
1996)  
  
Schulze, M., “Re-estimating Austrian GDP, 1870–1913: Methods and Sources” Working Paper 
London School of Economics, Department of Economic History, No.36, (1997)   
 
Schulze, M. (ed.), Western Europe: Economic and Social Change since 1945, (Harlow: Pearson 
Education Limited, 1999) 
 
Alexander Apostolides 
233 
 
Schulze, M., “Patterns of Growth and stagnation in the late 19th century Habsburg economy”, 
European Review of Economic History, No.4, (2000) pp.311-340 
 
Schulze, M., “An Estimate of Imperial Austria‟s Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Stock 1870-1913: 
Methods, Sources and Results”, Working Paper London School of Economics, Department of 
Economic History, No.92, (2005)   
 
Schulze, M., 'The Growth and Composition of Imperial Austria's Fixed Capital Stock: New Annual 
Time Series for 1870-1913', Économies et Sociétés, Série 'Histoire Economique Quantitative' AF, 
no. 39, (2008), pp. 1597-1614  
 
Schulze, M., “Origins of Catch-up failure: Comparative Productivity Growth in the Hapsburg 
Empire 1870–1910”, European Review of Economic History, (2007) vol.II, pp.189-210 
 
Smits, J.P., Horlings. E., Van Zanden., J.L., Dutch GDP and its components, 1800-1913 
(Groningen: Groningen growth and development centre, 2000)   
 
Smits, J.P., “Measuring the Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Methodological Problems and Possible 
Solutions”, IEHC Helsinki, Session 103: New Experiences with Historical National Accounts, 
(2006) 
 
Statistical Service of Cyprus, Description of the Sources and Methods Used to Compile Non-
Financial National Accounts, (Nicosia: Statistical Service of Cyprus, 2000) 
 
St. John-Jones, L.W., The population of Cyprus: Demographic Trends and Socio-economic 
Influences (London: ICS, 1983) 
 
Storrs, R., Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1945)  
 
Summers, R. & Heston A., “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International 
Comparisons, 1950–1988”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.106, No.2, (1991) pp.32-368 
 
Surridge, B.J., A Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus, (Nicosia: GPO, 1930) 
 
Taeuber, I.B., “Cyprus: The Demography of a Strategic Island”, Population Index, Vol.21, No.1 
(1955), pp.4-20 
 
Thorp, W. L., Cyprus: Suggestions for a Development Programme (New York: United Nations, 
1961)  
 
Tortella, G., Consiglio, J. & Martinez Oliva, J.C. (eds.) Banking in the Mediterranean: A Historical 
Perspective (Ashgate Publishing, 2010) 
 
Troup, R.S., Cyprus: Summary of the Recommendations Contained in a Report on Forestry  
(Nicosia: GPO, 1930) 
 
United Nations, Economic and Social Affairs, Handbook of National Accounting, Series F, No.85: 
National Accounts: A Practical Introduction, (New York: United Nations, 2003) 
 
United Nations, Department of international economic and social affairs, Handbook of National 
Accounting, Series F, No.39: Accounting for Production: Sources and Methods, (New York: United 
Nations, 1986) 
Alexander Apostolides 
234 
 
 
Unwin, A. H., Decennial Report of the Forest Administration in Cyprus for the Years 1921-1930, 
(Nicosia: Kosmos & Th. Kyriakides, 1931) 
 
Valerio, N., “Some Remarks about Growth and Stagnation in the Mediterranean World in the 
XIXth and XXth Centuries”, The Journal of European Economic History, Vol.21, No.1 (1992) 
pp.121–134 
 
Vanoli, A., A History of National Accounting, (Amsterdam: IOS press, 2005) 
 
Van Ark, B., “Towards European National Accounts” Scandinavian Economic History Review, 
Vol.XLIII No.1, (1995) pp.3 – 16  
 
Van Zanden, J.L., “The First Green Revolution: The Growth of Production and Productivity in 
European Agriculture 1870 – 1914”, The Economic History Review, Vol.44, No.2, (1991) pp.215-
239  
 
Varchris, M.A, & Thomas, J., “International price comparisons based on purchasing power parity” 
Monthly Labour Review, Volume 122, (October 1999), pp.3-12 
 
Vassallo, C., The Malta Chamber of Commerce 1848–1979: An Outline History of Maltese Trade 
(Marsa: Malta Chamber of Commerce, 1998) 
 
Vassiliou, S., Input–Output Analysis of the Economy of Cyprus (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard 
University, 1959) 
 
Waterer, R.R., Cyprus: Empire Forests during the War 1939–1945, (Nicosia: GPO, 1946) 
 
Waterer, R.R., Cyprus: Report of the Forest Administration for the Years 1939–1945 (Nicosia: 
GPO, 1948) 
 
Weston, B.J., Annual Rural Development Report for 1938 (Nicosia: GPO, 1939) 
 
Wilmington. M. W., The Middle East Supply Centre (Albany: State University of New York press, 
1971) 
 
Wilson, R. Cyprus and the International Economy, (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1992) 
 
World Bank, “What Makes Small States different?” 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/html/smallstates.nsf as consulted 12 Dec 2007. 
 
World Trade Organisation, “Information-World Merchandise Trade 1921-38” 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91320046.pdf as consulted 21 Dec 2009 
 
Yates, J., “Imputed Rent and Income Distribution”, Review of Income and Wealth Vol.40, No.1, 
(1994) pp.43-66, p.44 
 
Yiassemides, P. & Kunert, H., Aspects of the Agricultural Economy of Cyprus 1950–1965, 
(Nicosia: Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 1967)  
 
A1 
 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Economic Growth or Continuing Stagnation? Estimating 
the GDP of Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938 
Appendix 
PhD in Economic History 
Alexander Apostolides 
23/03/2010 
 
A2 
 
Contents 
Appendix A: Conversions of Maltese and Cypriot Units of Measurement .......................................... A4 
Appendix B: Cypriot GDP at factor cost, 1921-1938 .......................................................................... A7 
Appendix C: Maltese GDP at factor cost, 1921-1938 ........................................................................ A19 
Appendix D: Detailed Methodology of the Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry estimates. ................. A29 
Arble Production ............................................................................................................................ A30 
Animal Production ......................................................................................................................... A39 
Robustness of agricultural estimates .............................................................................................. A46 
Forestry........................................................................................................................................... A48 
Appendix E: Detailed Methodology of Manufacturing and Handicraft estimates ............................. A51 
Manufacturing in Cyprus................................................................................................................ A51 
Manufacturing in Malta .................................................................................................................. A60 
The Royal Navy Dockyard ............................................................................................................. A62 
Handicrafts in Malta ....................................................................................................................... A63 
Appendix F: Detailed Methodology of Construction and Implied Rental Income Estimates ............ A66 
Construction ................................................................................................................................... A66 
Implied Rental Income ................................................................................................................... A69 
Appendix G: Detailed Methodology of Service Sector ...................................................................... A71 
Trade and Transport: .................................................................................................................. A71 
Railways, Passenger Traffic and Communication .......................................................................... A73 
Financial Services .......................................................................................................................... A75 
Personal and Professional services; other services ......................................................................... A76 
Public Administration..................................................................................................................... A78 
Appendix H: Consumer Price Index (CPI) and international comparisons. ....................................... A79 
Appendix I: Maps of Cyprus and Malta ............................................................................................. A86 
 
 
 
Figures, Tables and Maps 
 
Figure A.1: Comparing agriculture estimates with series of minimal assumptions ...................................... A47 
Figure A.2: Comparing animal estimates with series of minimised assumptions ......................................... A48 
 
Table A.1: Currency Conversions ................................................................................................................... A4 
Table A.2: Volume Conversions ..................................................................................................................... A4 
Table A.3: Weight Conversions ...................................................................................................................... A5 
Table A.4: Summary of Cypriot GDP, 1921-1938, in constant 1938, Cyprus Pounds. .................................. A8 
Table A.5: Breakdown of Cypriot GDP, 1921-1938, in constant 1938, Cyprus Pounds. ............................... A9 
Table A.6: Summary of Maltese GDP, 1921-1938, in constant 1938, Pound Sterling. ................................ A20 
Table A.7: Breakdown of Maltese GDP, 1921-1938, in constant 1938, Pound Sterling. ............................. A21 
Table A.8: An interpolating example: Cow Peas in Cyprus.......................................................................... A30 
Table A.9: Wine, Spirit and Table Grape Production in Cyprus. .................................................................. A33 
Table A.10: Production of Grape Products in Cyprus ................................................................................... A34 
Table A.11: Citrus enumerated in the Cypriot department of agriculture ..................................................... A36 
Table A.12: Citrus Production in Cyprus ...................................................................................................... A37 
Table A.13: Estimation of Pome fruits and Nuts in Cyprus .......................................................................... A39 
Table A.14: Animal production model. ......................................................................................................... A41 
Table A.15: Alternative estimates of Animal Production ............................................................................. A45 
Table A.16 Silk Estimation Method in Cyprus ............................................................................................. A54 
Table A.17: Comparisons of total wage to gross output and value added. ................................................... A59 
Table A.18: Service sector occupations estimated using census occupation statistics. ................................. A77 
Table A.19: Weights of the Maltese and Cypriot CPI. .................................................................................. A80 
Table A.20: Items included in the CPI of Malta and Cyprus ........................................................................ A80 
Table A.21: Cyprus and Malta CPI, 1921-1938 (1938=100). ....................................................................... A81 
Table A.22: The Reddway commission COLA, Cyprus, 1939-1944 (1939=100) ........................................ A82 
Table A.23: Government Gazette COLA’s, Cyprus, 1948-1950 .................................................................. A82 
A3 
 
Table A.24: Per capita GDP of Cyprus and Malta, 1921-2008 ..................................................................... A84 
Map A.1 Ordnance survey Map of Cyprus 1912...........................................................................................A86 
Map A.2: Modern Relief Map of Malta.........................................................................................................A87 
 
 
A4 
 
Appendix A: Conversions of Maltese and Cypriot Units of Measurement 
 
Table A.1: Currency Conversions 
  Unit Equals  Unit Source 
1 Cyprus Shilling 9 
Copper 
Piastre 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and 
Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 Cyprus Pound 180 
Copper 
Piastre 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and 
Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 Cyprus Pound 1 
Pound 
Sterling 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and 
Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
 
Table A.2: Volume Conversions 
 
Unit Equals Unit Source 
1 
 Kile 
(Wheat) 1 Bushel 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: 
GPO, 1947) 
1 
 Kile 
(Wheat) 21 Okes 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: 
GPO, 1947) 
1 
 Kile 
(Barley) 16 Okes 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: 
GPO, 1947) 
1  Kile (Oats) 13 Okes 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: 
GPO, 1947) 
1 
 Kile 
(Vetches) 24 Okes 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: 
GPO, 1947) 
1 
Bushel 
Maize / 
Sorghum 56 
Pounds 
(Lbs) 
South African Grain Information Service, Conversion Appendix, 
http://www.sagis.org.za/ . University of Missouri, Extension. Tables 
for Weights and Measurement: Crops 
http://extension.missouri.edu/publications/DisplayPub.aspx?P=G4020 
1 Quart 2 Pints 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming Costs in 
Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) 
pp.87-109 
1 
Cyprus 
Litre 2.8 Quarts 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming Costs in 
Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) 
pp.87-109 
1 Gallon 4 Quarts 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming Costs in 
Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) 
pp.87-109 
1 
 Kile 
(Liquid) 8 Gallon 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming Costs in 
Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) 
pp.87-109 
1 
Kouza 
(Liquid) 9 Quarts 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming Costs in 
Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) 
pp.87-109 
1 
Load 
(Liquid) 16 Kouzas 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming Costs in 
Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) 
pp.87-109 
1 Sacchi 2 Bushel Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Sacchi 4 Tumoli Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Salme 4 Sacchi Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Salme 1 Quarter Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Quarter 8 Bushel Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Litre 0.8799016 
Cartucci 
(Liquid) Own Calculations 
1 Litre 1.7598 Pint Own Calculations 
1 Pinte 1 Gills Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Pint 16.667 Gills Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
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1 Terezi 2 Pinte Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Terezi 0.5 Pint Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Mezzi 1 Pint Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
 
 
1 
Quarte        
(plural 
Quartucci) 1 Quart Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 
Quatre / 
Ottav  4.75 Quartucci Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Quatare 9.5 Quartucci Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 
Barile 
(Plural 
Barrili) 38 Quartucci Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Barile 1 Firkins Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Pipe 11 Barrili Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Botti 22 Barrili Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Botti 209 Gallon Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Barile 9.5 Gallons Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Quart 2 Pint Own Calculations 
1 Litre 1.7636995 Pints Own Calculations 
1 Barile 40.8233 Litre Own Calculations 
1 Botti 948.00728 Litre Own Calculations 
 
Table A.3: Weight Conversions 
 
Unit Equals Unit Source 
1 
Oke (Plural 
Okes) 2.8 Pounds (lbs) 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 Pound (lbs) 0.4535924 Kilograms 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 Oke 1.2700586 Kilograms Own Calculations 
1 Metic Ton 2204.623 Pounds (lbs) Own Calculations 
1 
Hundredweight 
(Cwt) 40 Oke 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 
Hundredweight 
(Cwt) 112 Pounds (lbs) Imperial Standard Measurements 
1 
Hundredweight 
(Cwt) 50.802345 Kilograms Own Calculations 
1 
Long ton 
(U.K) 800 Okes 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 
Long ton 
(U.K) 1016.047 Kilogram Own Calculations 
1 
Long ton 
(U.K) 20 Cwt Imperial Standard Measurements 
1 
Long ton 
(U.K) 2240 Pounds (lbs) Imperial Standard Measurements 
1 Oke 0.785 Kilograms 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 Kantar 180 Okes 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 Kantar 504 Pound (lbs) 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 
Long ton 
(U.K) 4.5 Kantar 
Percival, D.A., Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 
(Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
1 Oke 400 Drams 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming 
Costs in Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, 
Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) pp.87-109 
A6 
 
1 Cyprus Litre 1.8 Okes 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming 
Costs in Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, 
Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) pp.87-109 
1 Kantar 44 Okes 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming 
Costs in Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, 
Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) pp.87-109 
1 Aleppo Kantar 180 Okes 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming 
Costs in Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, 
Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) pp.87-109 
1 
Camel load 
(straw) 100 
Okes 
(approximately) 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming 
Costs in Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, 
Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) pp.87-109 
1 Cart of manure 50 
Okes 
(approximately) 
James, H.H. & Koumides C.C., “An Analysis of Farming 
Costs in Cyprus” The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, 
Vol.XXXV, Part.3, (1939) pp.87-109 
1 Ottavi 1.8666667 Drams Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Quatre 2 Ottavi Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Quatre 3.7333333 Drams Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Once 4 Quattre Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Once 14.933333 Drams Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Rotoli 30 Once Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Rotoli 1.75 Pound (lbs) Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Rotoli 0.7937866 Kilogram Own Calculations 
1 Pese 5 Rotoli Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 
Hundredweight 
(Cwt) 64 Rotoli Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Quantar 100 Rotoli 
English National Archives, Kew, London,  CO161/125, 
"Annual Report of the Office of Agricuture, 1938" 
1 Quantar 175 Pound (lbs) 
English National Archives, Kew, London,  CO161/125, 
"Annual Report of the Office of Agricuture, 1938" 
1 Pese 8.75 Pound (lbs) Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Cantari 20 Pese Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Cantari 175 Pound (lbs) Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Pesate 3 Cantari Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Pesate 525 Pound (lbs) Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, (Valletta: GPO, 1938) 
1 Salma 64 Gallon 
English National Archives, Kew, London,  CO161/125, 
"Annual Report of the Office of Agricuture, 1938" 
1 Salma 16 Tumoli 
English National Archives, Kew, London,  CO161/125, 
"Annual Report of the Office of Agricuture, 1938" 
1 Soma 10 Bundles 
English National Archives, Kew, London,  CO161/125, 
"Annual Report of the Office of Agricuture, 1938" 
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Appendix B: Cypriot GDP at factor cost, 1921-1938 
 
Notes on the Cypriot GDP: 
The value added is categorised on the basis of the NACE rev.2 nomenclature of the European Union
1
. The European Union nomenclature divides output into 
broad economic sectors, labelled A to U. For example, agriculture, forestry and fishing are summed as economic sector A. These sectors are in bold in the 
general table, while a summary table is provided below. The breakdown of GDP beaks up these sectors in industrial divisions identified by digit codes: thus 
agriculture is 1, forestry 2, and so on. The value added of these industrial divisions is shaded and in italics. These are broken down into industrial groups and 
classes, indentified by three or four digits: for example, growing of cereals is 1.11, and of vegetables 1.13. Some industrial sections/divisions/groups and 
classes were added together if the industries were involved in similar production and a greater disaggregation was not possible. Where it was not possible to 
estimate a product, or where the NACE category was not applicable for Cyprus, the category was removed. These non-estimated sectors were just a small 
part of GDP. The handicraft sector was estimated separately from the manufacturing sector, and is given below the formal manufacturing sector in a different 
shaded font, thus allowing for a duplication of some categories. Thus the total production of industry is divided in formal manufacturing and handicraft. If 
one is interested, for example, in evaluating total textile production one can add the digits 13, 14, 15 of both the manufacturing and the handicraft sectors. All 
output estimates are given here in constant 1938 Cyprus pounds; due to the differing purchasing power parity of Malta and Cyprus the results presented here 
in Cyprus pounds do not match the tables in the thesis since, as explained in Chapter 3; an adjustment factor to Maltese prices was necessary. The constant 
1938 Cyprus pounds were converted in Maltese pound sterling of 1938 by the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) as estimated in chapter 3. In order to convert 
the values in Appendix B to constant 1938 Maltese pound sterling, multiply the values presented below by 178% (3 significant figures). 
 
                                                     
1
 For more information see: Eurostat, NACE Rev.2: Statistical Classification of Economic Activity, (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 2008) 
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Table A.4: Summary of Cypriot GDP, 1921-1938,  in constant 1938 Cyprus Pounds. 
NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of 
Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Section A  
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
1207017 1393514 1513823 1397984 1457649 1403025 1536600 1403240 1621980 1609600 1428404 1294505 1192905 1444947 1689899 1434049 1540654 1601156 
Section B Mining and Quarrying 54315 76642 97366 186530 203972 216459 308242 335900 401457 260549 209932 169665 231024 244777 426937 554036 910591 1131233 
Section Ca) + Cb) 
Manufacturing and 
Handicrafts 
912544 932951 923883 763999 908844 734152 883172 832358 1009030 879881 869798 807977 891367 956607 931973 853701 1118536 1059509 
Section D & E 
Electricity, Gas, 
Steam, Water Supply, 
Sewerage, Waste 
Management 
(Utilities) 
36161 36092 35573 36506 37268 36464 37977 37682 39190 36304 34915 33809 33759 35185 35947 35951 38649 38007 
Section F Construction 94494 90323 81860 88097 103312 179587 185203 211603 171234 184520 171645 121392 148356 192265 259626 336648 444425 534294 
Section G 
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles 
395032 392704 372368 410122 441087 409436 470466 459217 520091 405253 350358 307114 306221 364433 396198 397742 507151 483060 
Section H 
Transportation and 
Storage 
299800 297337 282367 308168 330622 309544 353368 346324 392008 313165 274994 245779 246300 288254 313198 316123 397884 385029 
Section I 
Accommodation and 
Food Service 
Activities 
128902 131455 134065 136732 139459 142245 145091 147999 150969 154004 157102 162417 167912 173592 179465 185536 191813 198302 
Section J 
Information and 
Communication 
11856 16541 14409 11128 11906 13431 7137 6936 8462 9315 8186 7656 7383 7763 8542 8409 10169 11316 
Section K  
Financial and 
Insurance Activities 
6311 10002 9300 13306 12049 13036 15593 20381 31944 53660 52103 46439 30184 67084 57918 82247 72880 75662 
Section L Real Estate Activities 102455 102833 103224 103626 104042 104471 105249 106042 106850 107672 108511 115851 123261 130743 138301 145937 154073 162293 
Section M 
Professional, 
Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
55681 59171 61614 62356 63812 64666 66753 55056 57129 59611 61897 62167 62599 62966 63248 63345 63661 64140 
Section O 
Public Administration 
and Defence / Social 
Security 
134565 158964 174075 176970 178757 176699 179237 206937 248757 287500 293165 249486 296249 286110 306789 305785 246872 259692 
Section P Education 102199 107712 113249 118843 124733 131111 137765 144767 152422 253288 269168 269219 170802 170978 171338 172135 173277 174223 
Section Q  
Human Health and 
Social Work 
55967 54336 60676 60577 62594 63637 65953 68619 74604 80647 83199 85243 86261 88605 92395 94152 98668 103398 
Section R 
Arts, Entertainment 
and Recreation 
23436 23819 24232 24678 25158 25674 26230 26826 27466 28153 28890 28963 29071 29357 30679 31441 32680 33371 
Section S  
Other Service 
Activities 
43265 45435 47773 50292 53008 55938 59102 62521 66218 70218 74552 75990 77530 79181 80953 82858 84906 87112 
Section T 
Activities of 
Households as 
Employers; 
Undifferentiated 
goods and Services-
Producing Activities 
of Households For 
Own Use 
68545 72022 75834 80038 84702 89909 95759 102372 109895 118505 128415 129726 131254 133013 135016 137281 139823 142662 
Total Value Added GDP at Factor Prices 3732544 4001854 4125691 4029952 4342975 4169484 4678897 4574781 5189706 4911844 4605234 4213399 4232438 4755859 5318422 5237377 6226713 6544460 
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Table A.5: Breakdown of Cypriot GDP, 1921-1938, in constant 1938 Cyprus Pounds. 
NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of 
Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
1.11 
Growing of cereals (except 
rice), leguminous crops 
and oil seeds  
349601 355650 381761 279054 310728 277718 309123 265343 386887 335369 251225 169624 240281 328920 382041 303851 345376 316719 
1.13 
Growing of vegetables and 
melons, roots and tubers 
70221 54383 49482 55741 43370 73599 66038 63482 108493 87870 87234 73360 63922 73541 86730 89378 109775 88300 
1.15 Growing of tobacco 154 538 372 221 204 1785 4447 5286 9078 3250 1354 2514 5144 17974 6651 3397 842 402 
1.16 Growing of fibre crops 21148 30305 27509 41029 39771 53758 26659 27024 44134 58489 36158 14194 14056 25228 57637 34597 52232 25558 
1.19 
Growing of other non-
perennial crops 
45990 44851 49839 38157 42810 37375 48080 41580 48935 50458 42696 27175 33874 47584 54067 40916 50182 43084 
1.21 Growing of grapes 47568 120760 154626 121819 183036 127065 129611 132158 134704 137250 104335 186313 132580 146815 182587 152143 88499 190412 
1.23 Growing of citrus fruits 38070 39391 40759 42173 43637 45152 46719 48340 50018 51754 53550 55346 57203 59122 61105 63154 65273 67462 
1.24 
Growing of pome fruits and 
stone fruits, nuts (1.25) 
7951 9915 7735 8204 6876 7518 8321 9227 9820 10457 10845 11321 12190 13475 14693 16146 17818 19243 
1.26 
Growing of oleaginous 
fruits 
12151 15217 37942 118389 27624 39463 146013 15785 69169 10015 93407 8232 11441 48650 59237 16500 107723 52294 
1.28 
Growing of spices, 
aromatic, drug and 
pharmaceutical crops 
24645 14642 20341 17309 24528 28569 28475 14149 21576 30672 21933 6899 7992 35737 42580 17154 21353 18958 
1.29 
Growing of other perennial 
crops 
150422 150314 50570 98466 98419 100692 83588 130304 114146 215773 136737 75329 44613 53974 68716 64995 119204 80081 
1.41 
Raising of dairy cattle, 
buffaloes (1.42) 
75416 53679 65393 54000 43626 54408 62169 78240 69833 70346 51741 49980 45440 42653 56297 56433 55674 62944 
1.43 
Raising of horses and 
other equines, camelids 
(1.43), sheep and goats 
(1.45), swine, pigs (1.46) 
221534 247960 316240 239472 242143 268797 277682 359443 309643 305472 335428 329784 309793 303975 328215 324734 341966 334917 
1.5 
Ancillary activities on 
farms, distilling, rectifying 
and blending of spirits, 
manufacture of wine from 
grapes (11.02), 
manufacture of cider and 
other fruit wines (11.03), 
138306 248523 294316 268779 341410 281147 290328 204625 236480 235475 194665 276134 204363 232970 276688 236549 149746 285590 
Sub-Total 1 Agriculture 1203179 1386129 1496886 1382813 1448184 1397046 1527254 1394986 1612916 1602647 1421307 1286206 1182893 1430616 1677244 1419948 1525663 1585965 
2.2 
Logging / gathering of wild 
growing non-wood 
products (2.3), sawmilling 
and planing of wood (16.1) 
2290 2488 4967 3957 6754 3174 2452 3878 4069 3487 3308 4139 5615 6669 6476 8378 9713 10040 
Sub-Total 2 Forestry  2290 2488 4967 3957 6754 3174 2452 3878 4069 3487 3308 4139 5615 6669 6476 8378 9713 10040 
3.11 
Marine fishing, Sponge 
fishing 
1548 4897 11969 11214 2712 2806 6894 4376 4995 3466 3789 4161 4398 7662 6180 5723 5278 5151 
Sub-Total 3 Fishing 1548 4897 11969 11214 2712 2806 6894 4376 4995 3466 3789 4161 4398 7662 6180 5723 5278 5151 
Section A  
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
1207017 1393514 1513823 1397984 1457649 1403025 1536600 1403240 1621980 1609600 1428404 1294505 1192905 1444947 1689899 1434049 1540654 1601156 
7.29 
Mining of other non-ferrous 
metal ores (chrome, 
cuprous pyrite, copper 
precipitate and residues, 
manganese, Gold, yellow 
ore) 
8192 20706 43652 103878 126707 107756 149242 170277 208247 169162 141683 125966 148900 128021 306505 415391 741541 1040323 
Sub-Total 5/6/7 Metal Ore Mining 8192 20706 43652 103878 126707 107756 149242 170277 208247 169162 141683 125966 148900 128021 306505 415391 741541 1040323 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of 
Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
8.11 
Quarrying of ornamental 
and building stone, 
limestone, gypsum, chalk 
and slate, asbestos 
13677 31864 27423 56927 49251 81918 131735 137967 163910 66494 45990 22716 57782 91715 92042 113520 137922 66732 
8.12 
Operation of gravel and 
sand pits; mining of clays 
and kaolin 
0 0 0 113 101 92 97 77 73 71 103 106 57 106 55 48 56 47 
9 Extraction of salt 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 15788 
8.99 
Other mining and 
quarrying n.e.c. 
16658 8284 10503 9824 12125 10905 11381 11790 13439 9033 6368 5089 8498 9148 12548 9290 15284 8344 
Sub-Total 8 
Quarrying and other 
mining 
46122 55936 53714 82652 77265 108703 159000 165623 193210 91386 68249 43699 82125 116756 120433 138645 169050 90911 
Section B Mining and Quarrying 54315 76642 97366 186530 203972 216459 308242 335900 401457 260549 209932 169665 231024 244777 426937 554036 910591 1131233 
10.39 
Other processing and 
preserving of fruit and 
vegetables, Manufacture 
of fruit and vegetable juice 
(10.32) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 103 131 348 298 233 370 353 369 391 389 397 409 
10.41 
Manufacture of oils, fats, 
margarine and similar 
edible fats (10.42) 
3424 3499 3464 2863 3409 2753 3314 3124 3787 3298 3260 3030 3346 3630 3506 1568 2678 3975 
10.52 Manufacture of ice cream 206 120 127 120 117 126 157 197 132 384 519 338 452 561 939 1220 1191 1683 
10.61 
Manufacture of grain mill 
products (including carob 
and sumac crushing) 
143814 150450 154565 110283 126093 88795 113528 95374 134528 114560 106517 81336 100270 134674 149407 129150 173783 158750 
10.71 Manufacture of bread 176310 184688 186047 161293 189293 146410 184305 180986 220947 175603 201147 204760 229065 233662 192706 171172 244736 223392 
10.73 
Manufacture of macaroni, 
noodles, couscous and 
similar farinaceous 
products 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1377 1742 2135 2168 1958 1630 1734 1962 2428 2537 2132 2645 
10.82 
Manufacture of cocoa, 
chocolate and sugar 
confectionery 
775 792 784 648 772 623 750 707 858 747 738 686 758 822 794 720 953 900 
11.04 
 Manufacture of other non-
distilled fermented 
beverages, beer (11.05), 
of malt (11.06), soft drinks, 
mineral waters and other 
bottled waters (11.07) 
542 559 924 880 1474 1600 1272 1241 1257 1153 1449 1410 1499 1611 2062 2264 2533 2926 
Sub-Total 10/11 
Food and Drinks 
Processing 
325072 340108 345911 276088 321157 240307 304805 283504 363992 298211 315821 293558 337477 377291 352233 309020 428404 394679 
12 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products 
46196 50957 40190 44537 44969 39147 42355 40138 37499 35864 33595 30695 30134 30889 32381 34171 35972 40196 
Sub-Total 12 Tobacco Manufacturing 46196 50957 40190 44537 44969 39147 42355 40138 37499 35864 33595 30695 30134 30889 32381 34171 35972 40196 
13.1 
Preparation and spinning 
of textile fibres, Weaving of 
textiles (13.2) 
52578 48431 48052 35036 56430 60478 58860 55067 57602 66356 44069 41953 38348 34696 37152 33292 40907 38284 
13.94 
Manufacture of cordage, 
rope, twine and netting 
444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 648 432 448 145 545 611 978 1083 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of 
Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
15.11 
Tanning and dressing of 
leather, dressing and 
dyeing of fur, Manufacture 
of leather clothes (14.11), 
Manufacture of luggage, 
handbags and, saddlery 
and harness (15.12) 
5632 584 1816 2205 1427 1149 3234 5511 6281 2984 3043 2424 2238 1231 1977 2005 2378 4763 
Sub-Total 13/14/15 
Preparation of Textiles, 
Clothes and Footwear 
58654 49459 50312 37685 58301 62070 62537 61022 64326 69784 47761 44809 41034 36072 39674 35908 44263 44130 
18.11 
Printing of newspapers, 
Other printing (18.12), 
Binding and related 
services (18.14) 
2328 2803 3064 2868 2713 2314 2305 2407 3015 3502 3626 3061 2457 2534 3009 2996 3053 2905 
Sub-Total 17/18 Paper and Printing Works 2328 2803 3064 2868 2713 2314 2305 2407 3015 3502 3626 3061 2457 2534 3009 2996 3053 2905 
20.41 
Manufacture of soap and 
detergents, cleaning and 
polishing preparations 
189 41 101 62 413 516 2593 2284 3235 4258 4927 4214 4129 5582 7911 8447 8230 8079 
20.53 
Manufacture of essential 
oils 
278 95 204 67 144 100 109 70 107 71 102 59 86 78 7 214 171 202 
21.1 
Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products, 
pharmaceutical 
preparations (21.2) 
212 217 214 177 211 170 205 193 234 204 202 187 207 225 217 197 220 246 
Sub-Total 19/20/21 Chemical Industry 679 353 520 306 768 786 2908 2547 3576 4533 5230 4460 4422 5884 8134 8858 8621 8527 
23.32 
Manufacture of bricks, tiles 
and construction products 
in baked clay, tiles and 
flags (23.31), refractory 
products (23.2) 
2241 1005 1348 2841 4726 5194 5376 5878 7442 7371 8016 8299 8764 7874 9451 10247 11418 12692 
23.41 
Manufacture of ceramic 
household and ornamental 
articles, other ceramic 
products (23.49) 
453 877 668 692 942 806 1171 1287 1485 1246 1239 897 809 759 1002 908 844 1192 
23.52 
Manufacture of lime and 
plaster 
1430 1455 827 1364 1892 1205 1544 1742 1783 1353 1840 1491 1654 1325 1349 2708 2838 3223 
23.61 
Manufacture of concrete 
products for construction 
purposes; other articles of 
concrete, plaster and 
cement (23.69) 
2608 2665 2638 2181 2596 2097 2524 2379 2884 2512 2482 2307 2548 2764 2670 2422 1860 3027 
Sub-Total 22/23 
Manufacture of 
Construction Materials 
6731 6002 5481 7077 10155 9302 10614 11285 13594 12483 13578 12994 13775 12723 14472 16286 16959 20134 
24.51 
Casting of iron, steel 
(24.52), light metals 
(24.53) 
3380 3454 3420 2827 3365 2718 3271 3084 3739 3256 3218 2991 3303 3584 3461 3140 4157 3924 
Sub-Total 24/25 
Iron Founding and Metal 
Manufacture 
3380 3454 3420 2827 3365 2718 3271 3084 3739 3256 3218 2991 3303 3584 3461 3140 4157 3924 
30.11 
Building of ships and 
floating structures, 
pleasure and sporting 
boats (30.12) 
0 28 12 7 19 13 11 3 7 8 2 4 8 21 25 63 0 0 
32.5 
Manufacture of medical 
and dental instruments 
and supplies 
13641 13940 13800 11407 13580 10968 13201 12446 15087 13140 12986 12069 13329 4340 11873 19762 16595 15835 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of 
Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
32.91 
Manufacture of brooms 
and brushes 
575 588 582 481 573 463 557 525 636 554 548 509 562 610 589 535 657 668 
32.99 Other manufacturing n.e.c.  5825 5953 5893 4871 5799 4684 5637 5315 6443 5611 5546 5154 5692 6175 5964 5412 7134 6762 
Sub-Total 
26/27/28/29/30/31/32 
General Manufacturing 20042 20509 20287 16766 19971 16127 19407 18289 22173 19313 19082 17737 19591 11146 18452 25771 24386 23265 
Section C a) Manufacturing( Formal) 463081 473646 469185 388154 461398 372772 448202 422276 511915 446945 441911 410303 452194 480123 471815 436151 565814 537760 
10.11 
Processing and preserving 
and creation of products of 
meat (10.13), poultry 
(10.14), fish, crustaceans 
and molluscs (10.2) 
109 111 110 91 109 88 106 100 121 105 104 97 107 116 112 101 134 127 
10.82 
Manufacture of cocoa, 
chocolate and sugar 
confectionery 
6897 7048 6977 5767 6866 5545 6675 6293 7628 6643 6566 6102 6739 7312 7061 6407 8482 8006 
Sub-Total 10/11 
Food and Drinks 
Processing 
7006 7160 7088 5859 6975 5633 6780 6392 7749 6749 6670 6199 6846 7427 7173 6509 8616 8133 
13.91 
Manufacture of knitted and 
crocheted fabrics, made-
up textile articles, except 
apparel (13.91), carpets 
and rugs(13.93) 
50238 51338 50823 42010 50013 40393 48618 45836 55564 48391 47826 44449 49088 53258 51433 46671 61780 58318 
13.94 
Manufacture of cordage, 
rope, twine and netting 
29 29 29 24 29 23 28 26 32 28 27 25 28 30 29 27 35 33 
14 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel 
124485 127211 125935 104095 123926 100089 120471 113578 137683 119907 118509 110141 121635 131969 127447 115646 153084 144505 
14.12 
Manufacture of workwear, 
outerwear(14.13), 
underwear (14.14), knitted 
and crocheted hosiery 
(14.31), other knitted and 
crocheted apparel (14.39) 
2679 2737 2710 2240 2667 2154 2592 2444 2963 2580 2550 2370 2617 2840 2742 2488 3294 3109 
14.19 
Manufacture of other 
wearing apparel and 
accessories 
2149 2196 2174 1797 2140 1728 2080 1961 2377 2070 2046 1902 2100 2278 2200 1997 2643 2495 
15.11 
Tanning and dressing of 
leather; dressing and 
dyeing of fur, manufacture 
of leather clothes (14.11), 
luggage, handbags and 
the like, saddlery and 
harness (15.12) 
7383 7545 7469 6174 7350 5936 7145 6736 8166 7112 7029 6532 7214 7827 7559 6859 9079 8571 
15.2 Manufacture of footwear 87485 89400 88504 73155 87092 70340 84664 79819 96760 84268 83285 77404 85482 92744 89566 81273 107583 101554 
Sub-Total 13/14/15 
Preparation of Textiles, 
Clothes and Footwear 
274447 280457 277644 229495 273215 220663 265598 250401 303544 264355 261273 242824 268164 290947 280977 254961 337498 318586 
16.24 
Manufacture of wooden 
containers 
682 697 690 570 679 548 660 622 754 657 649 603 666 723 698 633 839 792 
16.29 
Manufacture of other 
products of wood, articles 
of cork, straw and plaiting 
materials 
104837 107133 106059 87666 104367 84292 101457 95652 115952 100982 99805 92757 102437 111140 107332 97394 128923 121698 
Sub-Total 16 Wood Processing 105519 107830 106748 88236 105046 84840 102117 96274 116706 101639 100454 93361 103104 111863 108030 98027 129761 122490 
17.29 
Manufacture of other 
articles of paper and 
46 47 46 38 46 37 44 42 51 44 44 41 45 49 47 43 56 53 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of 
Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
paperboard 
Sub-Total 17/18 Paper and Printing Works 46 47 46 38 46 37 44 42 51 44 44 41 45 49 47 43 56 53 
23.52 
Manufacture of lime and 
plaster (gypsum) 
2809 2871 2842 2349 2797 2259 2719 2563 3107 2706 2674 2486 2745 2978 2876 2610 3455 3261 
Sub-Total 22/23 
Manufacture of 
Construction Materials 
2809 2871 2842 2349 2797 2259 2719 2563 3107 2706 2674 2486 2745 2978 2876 2610 3455 3261 
24.51 
Casting of iron, casting of 
steel (24.52), casting of 
light metals (24.53) 
19877 20312 20109 16621 19788 15982 19236 18135 21984 19146 18923 17587 19422 21072 20350 18466 24444 23074 
25.4 
Manufacture of weapons 
and ammunition 
1142 1167 1155 955 1137 918 1105 1042 1263 1100 1087 1010 1116 1210 1169 1061 1404 1325 
25.5 
Forging, pressing, 
stamping and roll-forming 
of metal, powder 
metallurgy, treatment and 
coating of metals (25.61), 
machining (25.62) 
5247 5362 5308 4388 5224 4219 5078 4787 5803 5054 4995 4643 5127 5563 5372 4875 6453 6091 
25.71 Manufacture of cutlery 579 592 586 484 577 466 561 529 641 558 552 513 566 614 593 538 712 673 
25.73 Manufacture of tools 13905 14209 14067 11627 13842 11180 13456 12686 15379 13393 13237 12303 13586 14741 14236 12917 17099 16141 
Sub-Total 24/25 
Iron Founding and Metal 
Manufacture 
40750 41642 41225 34076 40567 32764 39436 37180 45070 39252 38794 36055 39817 43200 41720 37857 50112 47304 
28.3 
Manufacture of agricultural 
and forestry machinery 
83 85 84 69 82 67 80 76 92 80 79 73 81 88 85 77 102 96 
30.99 
Manufacture of other 
transport equipment n.e.c. 
5113 5225 5172 4275 5090 4111 4948 4665 5655 4925 4867 4524 4996 5420 5234 4750 6287 5935 
31.03 Manufacture of mattresses 4223 4315 4272 3531 4204 3395 4086 3853 4670 4067 4020 3736 4126 4476 4323 3923 5193 4902 
31.09 
Manufacture of other 
furniture 
8146 8324 8241 6812 8109 6549 7883 7432 9009 7846 7755 7207 7959 8636 8340 7567 10017 9456 
32.2 
Manufacture of musical 
instruments 
44 45 44 36 43 35 42 40 48 42 41 39 43 46 45 40 54 51 
32.91 
Manufacture of brooms 
and brushes 
233 238 236 195 232 188 226 213 258 225 222 206 228 247 239 217 287 271 
32.99 Other manufacturing n.e.c.  1045 1067 1057 874 1040 840 1011 953 1155 1006 994 924 1021 1107 1069 970 1285 1213 
Sub-Total 
26/27/28/29/30/31/32 
General Manufacturing 18885 19299 19105 15792 18801 15184 18276 17231 20888 18191 17979 16709 18453 20021 19335 17544 23224 21923 
Section C b)  Handicrafts 449463 459305 454699 375845 447445 361380 434970 410082 497115 432936 427887 397673 439173 476485 460157 417550 552722 521749 
Section Ca) + Cb) 
Manufacturing and 
Handicrafts 
912544 932951 923883 763999 908844 734152 883172 832358 1009030 879881 869798 807977 891367 956607 931973 853701 1118536 1059509 
35.11 
Production, transmission 
(35.12), distribution  
(35.13), trade (35.14), of 
electricity, manufacture, 
distribution (35.22), trade 
of gas (35.23), water 
collection (35.21), 
treatment and supply (36), 
and sewerage (37): 
collection and disposal of 
waste (38)  
36161 36092 35573 36506 37268 36464 37977 37682 39190 36304 34915 33809 33759 35185 35947 35951 38649 38007 
Sub-Total 
35/36/37/38/39 
Utilities 36161 36092 35573 36506 37268 36464 37977 37682 39190 36304 34915 33809 33759 35185 35947 35951 38649 38007 
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Classification 
Description of 
Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Section D & E 
Electricity, Gas, Steam, 
Water Supply, Sewerage, 
Waste Management 
(Utilities) 
36161 36092 35573 36506 37268 36464 37977 37682 39190 36304 34915 33809 33759 35185 35947 35951 38649 38007 
41.2 
Construction of residential 
and non-residential 
buildings, roads and 
motorways (42.11), 
railways and underground 
railways (42.12), bridges 
and tunnels (42.13), utility 
projects for fluids (42.21), 
utility projects for electricity 
and telecommunications 
(42.22), water projects 
(42.91), other civil 
engineering projects n.e.c. 
(42.99) 
94494 90323 81860 88097 103312 179587 185203 211603 171234 184520 171645 121392 148356 192265 259626 336648 444425 534294 
Sub-Total 41 Construction 94494 90323 81860 88097 103312 179587 185203 211603 171234 184520 171645 121392 148356 192265 259626 336648 444425 534294 
Section F Construction 94494 90323 81860 88097 103312 179587 185203 211603 171234 184520 171645 121392 148356 192265 259626 336648 444425 534294 
45.11 
Sale of cars and light 
motor vehicles, other 
motor vehicles (45.19), 
maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles (45.2), 
wholesale of motor vehicle 
parts and accessories 
(45.31), retail of motor 
vehicle parts and 
accessories (45.32) 
8114 8522 8950 9400 9872 10368 10889 11436 12011 12614 13248 14270 15372 16558 17836 19212 20695 22292 
Sub-Total 45 
Sale, Maintenance and 
Repair of Motor Vehicles 
8114 8522 8950 9400 9872 10368 10889 11436 12011 12614 13248 14270 15372 16558 17836 19212 20695 22292 
46 
Wholesale and retail trade 
(47) 
386918 384182 363418 400722 431215 399067 459577 447780 508080 392639 337110 292844 290849 347874 378362 378529 486456 460768 
Sub-Total 46 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
386918 384182 363418 400722 431215 399067 459577 447780 508080 392639 337110 292844 290849 347874 378362 378529 486456 460768 
Section G 
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles 
395032 392704 372368 410122 441087 409436 470466 459217 520091 405253 350358 307114 306221 364433 396198 397742 507151 483060 
49.1 
Passenger rail transport, 
interurban, freight rail  
(49.2) 
18238 18091 15572 13318 13608 13806 12647 12088 14028 15915 15392 13889 13510 13481 13322 12888 14437 16002 
49.31 
Urban and suburban 
passenger land transport 
11989 13031 14165 15396 16735 18190 19772 21492 23361 25392 27600 30000 30680 32452 35082 38080 43132 47608 
49.41 
Freight transport by road, 
sea and coast (50.2), 
warehousing and storage 
(52.1) 
268655 265086 251458 278289 299115 276431 319821 311575 353093 270116 230217 200022 198850 239003 261200 261355 336485 317384 
Sub-Total 49/50/51 Transport 298882 296209 281194 307003 329458 308427 352240 345155 390481 311424 273209 243912 243040 284936 309603 312323 394054 380994 
53.1 
Postal activities under 
universal service obligation 
917 1129 1173 1165 1164 1117 1128 1170 1527 1741 1786 1868 3260 3318 3595 3800 3831 4035 
Sub-Total 53 Postal Services 917 1129 1173 1165 1164 1117 1128 1170 1527 1741 1786 1868 3260 3318 3595 3800 3831 4035 
Section H Transportation and 299800 297337 282367 308168 330622 309544 353368 346324 392008 313165 274994 245779 246300 288254 313198 316123 397884 385029 
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Classification 
Description of 
Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Storage 
55.1 
Hotels and similar 
accommodation, holiday 
and other short-stay 
accommodation (55.2), 
restaurants and mobile 
food service activities 
(56.1), other food service 
activities (56.29), beverage 
serving activities (56.3) 
128902 131455 134065 136732 139459 142245 145091 147999 150969 154004 157102 162417 167912 173592 179465 185536 191813 198302 
Sub-Total 55 
Hotel, Café and Bar 
Services 
128902 131455 134065 136732 139459 142245 145091 147999 150969 154004 157102 162417 167912 173592 179465 185536 191813 198302 
Section I 
Accommodation and 
Food Service Activities 
128902 131455 134065 136732 139459 142245 145091 147999 150969 154004 157102 162417 167912 173592 179465 185536 191813 198302 
58.11 
Book publishing, 
directories and mailing lists 
(58.12), newspapers 
(58.13), other publishing 
activities (58.19) 
991 1064 1144 1229 1320 1419 1525 1638 1760 1891 2032 2183 2346 2521 2708 2910 3127 3360 
Sub-Total 58 Publishing Activities  991 1064 1144 1229 1320 1419 1525 1638 1760 1891 2032 2183 2346 2521 2708 2910 3127 3360 
59.14 
Motion picture projection 
activities 
244 268 295 325 358 394 433 477 524 577 635 699 769 846 931 1025 1127 1241 
Sub-Total 60 Broadcasting 244 268 295 325 358 394 433 477 524 577 635 699 769 846 931 1025 1127 1241 
61.1 
Wired telecommunications 
activities 
10622 15209 12970 9574 10228 11618 5180 4821 6178 6847 5519 4774 4268 4396 4902 4475 5915 6716 
Sub-Total 61 Telecommunications 10622 15209 12970 9574 10228 11618 5180 4821 6178 6847 5519 4774 4268 4396 4902 4475 5915 6716 
Section J 
Information and 
Communication 
11856 16541 14409 11128 11906 13431 7137 6936 8462 9315 8186 7656 7383 7763 8542 8409 10169 11316 
64.19 
Banking: monetary 
intermediation   
6311 10002 9300 13306 12049 13036 15593 20381 31944 53660 52103 46439 30184 67084 57918 82247 72880 75662 
Sub-Total 64 Banking Services 6311 10002 9300 13306 12049 13036 15593 20381 31944 53660 52103 46439 30184 67084 57918 82247 72880 75662 
Section K  
Financial and Insurance 
Activities 
6311 10002 9300 13306 12049 13036 15593 20381 31944 53660 52103 46439 30184 67084 57918 82247 72880 75662 
68.2 
Renting and operating of 
own real estate (including 
implied rental income) 
102455 102833 103224 103626 104042 104471 105249 106042 106850 107672 108511 115851 123261 130743 138301 145937 154073 162293 
Sub-Total 68 
Real Estate and Financial 
Agents 
102455 102833 103224 103626 104042 104471 105249 106042 106850 107672 108511 115851 123261 130743 138301 145937 154073 162293 
Section L Real Estate Activities 102455 102833 103224 103626 104042 104471 105249 106042 106850 107672 108511 115851 123261 130743 138301 145937 154073 162293 
69.1 Legal activities 41824 44573 46227 46128 46687 46583 47646 34854 35756 36983 37924 37835 37897 37884 37776 37472 37375 37429 
Sub-Total 69 Legal and Accounting 41824 44573 46227 46128 46687 46583 47646 34854 35756 36983 37924 37835 37897 37884 37776 37472 37375 37429 
71.11 
Architectural activities, 
engineering activities and 
related technical 
consultancy (71.12)  
8781 9118 9467 9831 10208 10599 11006 11428 11867 12322 12795 12990 13188 13389 13593 13801 14011 14225 
Sub-Total 71 
Architectural and 
Engineering Activities 
8781 9118 9467 9831 10208 10599 11006 11428 11867 12322 12795 12990 13188 13389 13593 13801 14011 14225 
74.2 Photographic activities 2484 2619 2761 2910 3068 3235 3410 3595 3790 3995 4212 4384 4562 4748 4942 5143 5353 5571 
74.3 
Translation and 
interpretation activities, 
other professional, 
scientific and technical 
activities n.e.c. (74.9) 
2592 2861 3159 3487 3849 4249 4691 5178 5716 6310 6966 6959 6952 6944 6937 6930 6923 6915 
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Product 
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Sub-Total 74 
Translation and 
Interpretation Activities, 
Certifying Offices 
5076 5480 5919 6397 6917 7484 8101 8773 9506 10306 11178 11342 11514 11692 11879 12073 12275 12486 
Section M 
Professional, Scientific 
and Technical Activities 
55681 59171 61614 62356 63812 64666 66753 55056 57129 59611 61897 62167 62599 62966 63248 63345 63661 64140 
84.11 
General public 
administration activities 
80837 94798 103040 102545 105943 105484 108203 112383 133474 159365 160469 137415 177080 165638 183814 188022 174284 185169 
84.12 
Regulation of the activities 
of providing health care, 
education, cultural 
services and other social 
services, excluding social 
security, regulation of and 
contribution to more 
efficient operation of 
businesses (84.13) 
10039 12033 12545 12917 12293 11548 12545 13941 19080 22648 25687 26557 28328 28023 30460 28910 28305 30234 
84.21 Foreign affairs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 711 842 934 1510 1880 1935 2003 689 599 593 600 
84.23 
Justice and judicial 
activities 
4409 4922 4688 5038 4948 4761 4688 23253 27503 28916 28584 28183 31757 32237 31945 31182 4409 4409 
84.24 
Public order and safety 
activities, fire service 
activities (84.24), 
compulsory social security 
activities (84.3) 
39280 47211 53802 56470 55573 54906 53802 56649 67858 75637 76915 55451 57150 58209 59880 57073 39280 39280 
Sub-Total 84 Public Administration 134565 158964 174075 176970 178757 176699 179237 206937 248757 287500 293165 249486 296249 286110 306789 305785 246872 259692 
Section O 
Public Administration 
and Defence / Social 
Security 
134565 158964 174075 176970 178757 176699 179237 206937 248757 287500 293165 249486 296249 286110 306789 305785 246872 259692 
85.1 
Pre-primary education, 
primary education (85.2),  
general secondary 
education (85.31), 
technical and vocational 
secondary education 
(85.32), tertiary education 
(85.42), sports and 
recreation education 
(85.51), cultural education 
(85.52), other education 
n.e.c. (85.59) 
102199 107712 113249 118843 124733 131111 137765 144767 152422 253288 269168 269219 170802 170978 171338 172135 173277 174223 
Sub-Total 85 Education 102199 107712 113249 118843 124733 131111 137765 144767 152422 253288 269168 269219 170802 170978 171338 172135 173277 174223 
Section P Education 102199 107712 113249 118843 124733 131111 137765 144767 152422 253288 269168 269219 170802 170978 171338 172135 173277 174223 
86.1 
Hospital activities, general 
medical practice activities 
(86.31), residential care 
activities for mental 
retardation, mental health 
(87.2), residential care 
activities for the elderly 
and disabled (87.3) 
40327 37888 43361 42333 43353 43325 44487 45913 50561 55162 56159 57780 58366 60267 63602 64895 68934 73175 
86.23 Dental practice activities 5032 5526 6068 6664 7318 8036 8824 9690 10641 11686 12832 13190 13557 13934 14322 14721 15131 15552 
86.22 
 Specialist medical 
practice activities 
(midwives), other human 
health activities (86.9) 
10608 10923 11246 11580 11923 12277 12641 13016 13401 13799 14208 14273 14338 14404 14470 14536 14603 14670 
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Sub-Total 
86/87/88/89 
Healthcare 55967 54336 60676 60577 62594 63637 65953 68619 74604 80647 83199 85243 86261 88605 92395 94152 98668 103398 
Section Q  
Human Health and Social 
Work 
55967 54336 60676 60577 62594 63637 65953 68619 74604 80647 83199 85243 86261 88605 92395 94152 98668 103398 
90.01 
Performing arts, support 
activities to performing arts 
(90.02), artistic creation 
(90.03), operation of arts 
facilities (90.04) 
15174 15722 16297 16902 17537 18206 18911 19654 20438 21265 22140 22348 22589 22861 23166 23501 23866 24261 
Sub-Total 90 Performing Arts 15174 15722 16297 16902 17537 18206 18911 19654 20438 21265 22140 22348 22589 22861 23166 23501 23866 24261 
91.01 
Library and archives 
activities, museums 
(91.02), operation of 
historical sites and 
buildings and similar visitor 
attractions (91.03), 
botanical and zoological 
gardens and nature 
reserves activities (91.04) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 143 1288 1840 2835 3250 
Sub-Total 91 Cultural Activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 143 1288 1840 2835 3250 
93.29 
Other amusement and 
recreation activities 
(Prostitution) 
8262 8097 7935 7776 7620 7468 7318 7172 7028 6888 6750 6615 6483 6353 6226 6101 5979 5859 
Sub-Total 92/93 
Sports and Other 
Recreation 
8262 8097 7935 7776 7620 7468 7318 7172 7028 6888 6750 6615 6483 6353 6226 6101 5979 5859 
Section R 
Arts, Entertainment and 
Recreation 
23436 23819 24232 24678 25158 25674 26230 26826 27466 28153 28890 28963 29071 29357 30679 31441 32680 33371 
94.91 
Activities of religious 
organisations 
12153 12427 12707 12993 13285 13585 13890 14203 14523 14850 15184 14904 14628 14358 14093 13833 13577 13326 
Sub-Total 94 Relegious Activities 12153 12427 12707 12993 13285 13585 13890 14203 14523 14850 15184 14904 14628 14358 14093 13833 13577 13326 
95.12 
Repair of communication 
equipment, of consumer 
electronics (95.21), 
household appliances and 
home and garden 
equipment (95.22), other 
personal and household 
goods (95.29) 
1557 1742 1949 2181 2440 2729 3054 3416 3822 4276 4784 5352 5988 6699 7495 8385 9381 10495 
95.23 
Repair of footwear and 
leather goods, furniture 
and home furnishings 
(95.24) 
70 87 109 135 169 210 262 326 406 506 630 669 710 753 800 849 901 956 
95.25 
Repair of watches, clocks 
and jewellery 
6020 5977 5934 5891 5848 5806 5764 5723 5682 5641 5600 5850 6111 6384 6669 6966 7277 7602 
Sub-Total 95 Repair Services 7647 7806 7991 8207 8457 8746 9080 9465 9910 10422 11014 11871 12809 13836 14963 16200 17559 19053 
96.02 
Hairdressing and men's 
haircuts 
18598 20112 21749 23520 25435 27506 29745 32167 34786 37618 40681 41473 42281 43105 43945 44801 45674 46564 
96.03 
Funeral and related 
activities 
                                    
96.04 
Physical well-being 
activities (bath houses) 
3550 3737 3935 4143 4362 4593 4836 5092 5361 5645 5944 5995 6048 6100 6153 6207 6261 6315 
96.09 
Other personal service 
activities n.e.c. (shoe 
blacks) 
1316 1353 1390 1429 1468 1509 1551 1594 1638 1683 1730 1747 1764 1782 1799 1817 1835 1853 
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Sub-Total 96 
Personal Services outside 
the Household 
23464 25202 27075 29092 31266 33608 36132 38853 41785 44946 48354 49215 50093 50987 51897 52825 53770 54732 
Section S  Other Service Activities 43265 45435 47773 50292 53008 55938 59102 62521 66218 70218 74552 75990 77530 79181 80953 82858 84906 87112 
97 
Activities of households as 
employers of domestic 
personnel 
68545 72022 75834 80038 84702 89909 95759 102372 109895 118505 128415 129726 131254 133013 135016 137281 139823 142662 
Sub-Total 97 Personal Services 68545 72022 75834 80038 84702 89909 95759 102372 109895 118505 128415 129726 131254 133013 135016 137281 139823 142662 
Section T 
Activities of Households 
as Employers; 
Undifferentiated goods 
and Services-Producing 
Activities of Households 
For Own Use 
68545 72022 75834 80038 84702 89909 95759 102372 109895 118505 128415 129726 131254 133013 135016 137281 139823 142662 
Total Value Added GDP at Factor Prices 3732544 4001854 4125691 4029952 4342975 4169484 4678897 4574781 5189706 4911844 4605234 4213399 4232438 4755859 5318422 5237377 6226713 6544460 
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Appendix C: Maltese GDP at factor cost, 1921-1938 
 
Notes on the Maltese GDP: 
The value added is categorised based on the NACE rev.2 nomenclature of the European Union 
1
. The European Union nomenclature divides output into 
broad economic sectors, labelled A to U. For example agriculture, forestry and fishing are summed as economic sector A. These sectors are in bold in the 
general table, while a summary table is provided below. The breakdown of GDP beaks up these sectors in industrial divisions identified by digit codes: thus 
agriculture is 1, forestry 2, and so on. The value added of these industrial divisions is shaded and in italics. These are broken down into industrial groups and 
classes, indentified by three or four digits: for example, growing of cereals is 1.11, and of vegetables 1.13. Some industrial sections/divisions/groups and 
classes were added together if the industries were involved in similar production and a greater disaggregation was not possible. Where it was not possible to 
estimate a product, or where the NACE category was not applicable for Malta, the category was removed. These non-estimated sectors are just a small share 
of GDP. The handicraft sector was estimated separately from the manufacturing sector, and given below the formal manufacturing sector in a different 
shaded font, thus allowing for a duplication of some categories. Thus the total production of industry is divided in formal manufacturing and handicraft. If 
one is interested, for example, in evaluating total textile production one can add the digits 13, 14, 15 of both the manufacturing and the handicraft sectors. All 
estimates here are given in constant 1938 pounds sterling and match the estimates in the thesis; it was only Cypriot output that was adjusted upwards through 
PPP in Chapter 3.  
 
 
                                                     
1
 For more information see: Eurostat, NACE Rev.2: Statistical Classification of Economic Activity, (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 2008) 
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Table A.6: Summary of Maltese GDP, 1921-1938, in constant 1938 Pound Sterling. 
NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Section A - Total AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
AND FISHING 
372866 424437 441760 487282 508524 531002 530010 515842 577392 526603 523480 507588 499427 607110 543143 449767 542685 554996 
Section B MINING AND QUARRYING 25161 60356 75896 87003 83564 99791 134861 146053 149474 144962 153038 163547 157790 145472 133906 137655 143304 142834 
Section Ca) + 
Cb) 
Manufacturing and Handicraft 
(TOTAL) 
1371109 1494191 1590044 1681692 1679011 1705825 1701916 1596788 1715321 1658225 1721452 1754641 1846702 1727032 2009949 1732666 1872441 1941032 
Section D & E Electricity, Gas, Steam, Water 
Supply, Sewerage, Waste 
Management (Utilities) 
78456 34291 34291 38825 43831 44028 48415 54179 54032 59573 58832 59390 63064 67071 69648 76748 85526 101249 
Section F Construction 92034 120988 148498 184890 210814 239299 247597 279616 301546 394718 474906 543857 580259 685005 650832 677922 673733 355449 
Section G Wholesale and Retail Trade; 
Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
984054 1065326 1146159 1269180 1303495 1328408 1291970 1208049 1317638 1259611 1213857 1260246 1297219 1313549 1415307 1275118 1408612 1423729 
Section H Transportation and Storage 759295 822722 885932 969379 1005025 1062766 1059695 942193 1047994 997187 972175 1001774 1029235 1051784 1140628 1057984 1171817 1220793 
Section I Accommodation and Food 
Service Activities 
70735 72450 74260 76169 78182 80307 82549 84914 87411 90045 92825 100223 108283 117071 126658 137122 148551 161042 
Section J Information and 
Communication 
19128 20146 21218 22348 23537 24790 26110 27499 28963 30505 32129 32472 33446 36181 36112 36547 37016 37802 
Section K Financial and Insurance 
Activities 
14044 14565 15106 15666 16247 16850 17476 18124 18796 19494 20217 20619 21028 21446 21872 22306 22749 23201 
Section L Real Estate Activities 177478 172499 168710 165490 162636 159611 158168 157564 157755 159991 163229 169190 176823 185963 194090 201571 208765 208732 
Section M Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
135111 139645 142097 144780 147779 150579 153517 156875 160598 164280 168449 167978 167432 166965 170059 169860 169321 169106 
Section N Administrative and Support 
Service Activities 
12230 12279 12337 12405 12482 12570 12668 12777 12897 13028 13171 13171 13171 13171 13171 13171 4850 13171 
Section O Public Administration and 
Defence / Social Security 
138061 159796 162823 185966 185385 183996 189490 205417 232419 244633 270588 272795 272736 293281 295256 312926 322563 347144 
Section P Education 107364 125250 127798 135690 145291 147004 150632 159371 171495 178874 192932 199798 201387 216699 219876 227194 230605 235459 
Section Q Human Health and Social 
Work 
49598 52782 53649 55409 57414 57844 59097 60974 63535 65144 67627 68189 69042 70990 70534 72272 73524 75596 
Section R Arts, Entertainment and 
Recreation 
54477 57803 59385 61995 64816 67547 70462 73555 76838 80289 83872 83595 83284 83090 82857 82751 82412 83052 
Section S Other Religious and 
Professional Organisations 
61422 62024 62619 63260 63802 64414 65033 65657 66287 66923 67566 67353 67142 66931 66720 66510 66301 66093 
Section S +  T Other Personal Services 
(From Section S) Activities of 
Households as Employers; 
Undifferentiated goods and 
Services-Producing Activities 
of Households For Own Use 
202929 208326 213866 219553 225391 231385 237539 243855 250340 256998 263832 262748 261668 260592 259521 258455 257392 256335 
Total Value 
Added 
GDP at Factor Prices 4725551 5119876 5436448 5876981 6017227 6208017 6237203 6009303 6490731 6411082 6554176 6749173 6949134 7129401 7520138 7008544 7522168 7416814 
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Table A.7: Breakdown of Maltese GDP, 1921-1938 in constant 1938, Pound Sterling. 
NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
1.11 Growing of cereals (except 
rice), leguminous crops and oil 
seeds 
67926 58643 63301 65703 66800 72804 72331 74677 71954 73716 67032 69795 72299 75083 43948 52804 72236 64343 
1.13 Growing of vegetables and 
melons, roots and tubers 
100939 110943 141533 130326 135193 175252 172955 175122 183000 175252 175859 163950 162712 248802 139411 158710 205244 185942 
1.15 Growing of tobacco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 318 360 
1.16 Growing of fibre crops 1576 3447 1141 702 3394 4630 3002 2029 3206 2243 1735 1195 242 185 117 189 164 154 
1.19 Growing of other non-
perennial crops 
63476 49792 80304 90457 90201 98015 92908 99503 105376 99361 98691 103133 70452 81098 94227 50461 72211 96089 
1.23 Growing of citrus fruits 1111 2584 2380 2554 2459 2641 2604 2141 2269 2542 2660 1032 2192 2883 2578 2116 2297 2342 
1.24 Growing of pome fruits and 
stone fruits / nuts (1.25), 
growing of grapes (1.21) 
24573 18249 25124 50160 41841 50103 70120 44393 87223 50331 38843 39811 54064 36698 37761 27375 32097 43030 
1.28 Growing of spices, aromatic, 
drug and pharmaceutical 
crops 
353 940 4681 13668 22505 10206 6918 7980 10510 11901 10305 5203 4727 9052 5986 5599 3820 3315 
1.41 Raising of dairy cattle, cattle 
and buffaloes (1.42) 
24120 41675 24955 19443 33334 28114 26321 32746 30232 30780 33646 31327 36019 40875 39987 40028 35382 38490 
1.43 Raising of horses and other 
equines, camelids (1.43), 
sheep and goats (1.45), 
swine, pigs (1.46) 
24888 56642 3221 451 26737 31275 24932 26098 23661 24442 43927 31220 37046 29352 31997 33270 36766 31914 
1.5 Ancillary activities on farm, 
distilling, rectifying and 
blending of spirits, 
manufacture of wine from 
grape (11.02), manufacture of 
cider and other fruit wines 
(11.03), 
3874 8955 17289 17854 13621 14679 12555 15869 16231 16069 14732 25589 24107 21798 33817 22947 25883 32748 
Sub-Total 1 Agriculture 312837 351869 363928 391318 436084 487719 484646 480558 533661 486639 487429 472256 463859 545825 429829 393498 486417 498728 
2.1 Silviculture and other forestry 
activities  (pruning firewood) 
2149 2578 2750 3008 3438 3094 3300 3309 7649 7520 3266 2802 2931 2931 2931 2931 2931 2931 
Sub-Total 2 Forestry 2149 2578 2750 3008 3438 3094 3300 3309 7649 7520 3266 2802 2931 2931 2931 2931 2931 2931 
3.11 Marine fishing, sponge fishing 57880 69990 75082 92957 69002 40189 42063 31975 36082 32444 32785 32530 32637 58354 110383 53338 53338 53338 
Sub-Total 3 Fishing 57880 69990 75082 92957 69002 40189 42063 31975 36082 32444 32785 32530 32637 58354 110383 53338 53338 53338 
Section A - Total AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
AND FISHING 
372866 424437 441760 487282 508524 531002 530010 515842 577392 526603 523480 507588 499427 607110 543143 449767 542685 554996 
8.11 Quarrying of ornamental and 
building stone, limestone, 
gypsum, chalk and slate, 
asbestos 
24722 59962 75450 86557 82620 98831 133838 145318 148871 144227 151962 162445 156740 143504 132069 135877 141668 141128 
8.93 Extraction of salt 438 394 446 446 945 960 1023 735 604 735 1076 1102 1050 1968 1837 1778 1636 1706 
Sub-Total 8 Quarrying and other mining 25161 60356 75896 87003 83564 99791 134861 146053 149474 144962 153038 163547 157790 145472 133906 137655 143304 142834 
Section B MINING AND QUARRYING 25161 60356 75896 87003 83564 99791 134861 146053 149474 144962 153038 163547 157790 145472 133906 137655 143304 142834 
10.39 Other processing and 
preserving of fruit and 
vegetables, manufacture of 
fruit and vegetable juice 
(10.32) 
6402 6625 6625 4103 3544 5841 5047 6197 7181 5601 4024 3503 2711 5111 11315 3492 6503 6197 
10.52 Manufacture of ice cream 4282 6124 7232 8277 7525 7515 7505 7270 6186 4802 3672 3249 3249 4096 4520 4379 4379 4379 
10.61 Manufacture of grain mill 
products (including bran and 
forage milling) 
52755 63201 54668 55633 62967 77430 77875 60875 79910 61482 80205 79859 85159 70282 121808 50547 82636 86654 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
10.71 Manufacture of bread 350205 350001 345114 321079 330017 368241 375763 286537 373032 329028 396018 369853 410925 348278 482487 264063 360372 401185 
10.82 Manufacture of cocoa, 
chocolate and sugar 
confectionery 
2069 1945 1807 2248 2180 1147 1096 1426 1843 1624 1639 1809 1752 2295 1906 1522 1742 1937 
11.04 Manufacture of other non-
distilled fermented beverages, 
beer (11.05), malt (11.06), soft 
drinks, mineral waters and 
other bottled waters (11.07) 
16962 21322 23946 26422 24639 24616 24592 29309 26743 23466 24384 29304 30564 36162 32291 37244 25513 30823 
Sub-Total 10/11 Food and Drinks Processing 432675 449218 439392 417762 430872 484790 491878 391614 494895 426003 509943 487576 534360 466224 654327 361248 481145 531175 
12 Manufacture of tobacco 
products 
24848 31452 34698 36769 41582 27367 29438 38112 30921 23729 26080 27647 38952 53335 49473 59659 59659 59659 
Sub-Total 12 Tobacco Manufacturing 24848 31452 34698 36769 41582 27367 29438 38112 30921 23729 26080 27647 38952 53335 49473 59659 59659 59659 
13.91 Manufacture of knitted and 
crocheted fabrics, made-up 
textile articles, except apparel 
(13.92), carpets and 
rugs(13.93) 
783 1713 567 349 1687 2301 1492 1008 1593 1115 862 594 120 92 58 94 81 76 
14.12 Manufacture of workwear, 
other outerwear(14.13), 
underwear (14.14), knitted 
and crocheted hosiery (14.31), 
other knitted and crocheted 
apparel (14.39) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1766 1408 1119 1343 1567 1567 
14.19 Manufacture of other wearing 
apparel and accessories 
2229 1959 4635 5305 4823 4817 4810 4660 3965 3078 2798 3022 3022 3022 3022 2854 2910 2854 
Sub-Total 
13/14/15 
Preparation of Textiles, 
Clothes and Footwear 
3012 3672 5202 5654 6509 7117 6302 5668 5558 4193 3661 3616 4909 4522 4200 4291 4559 4498 
18.11 Printing of newspapers, Other 
printing (18.12), binding and 
related services (18.14) 
14607 20601 23929 27272 25403 25386 25429 25130 22167 18274 20342 19907 19394 21838 24133 21752 21547 22316 
Sub-Total 17/18 Paper and Printing Works 14607 20601 23929 27272 25403 25386 25429 25130 22167 18274 20342 19907 19394 21838 24133 21752 21547 22316 
20.12 Manufacture of dyes and 
pigments, other inorganic 
basic chemicals (20.13), other 
organic basic chemicals 
(20.14), paints, varnishes and 
similar coatings, printing ink 
and mastics (20.3) 
403 576 680 778 708 707 706 684 582 452 397 1874 2317 1847 1847 1847 1623 1623 
20.41 Manufacture of soap and 
detergents, cleaning and 
polishing preparations 
19 27 32 37 33 33 33 32 27 21 19 88 109 87 224 116 135 895 
20.51 Manufacture of explosives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 224 224 224 33 1399 1399 560 616 895 
Sub-Total 
19/20/21 
Chemical Industry 422 603 712 815 741 740 739 716 609 697 639 2186 2458 3333 3470 2523 2373 3414 
23.11 Manufacture of flat glass, 
shaping and processing of flat 
glass (23.12), hollow glass 
(21.13), processing of other 
glass, (23.19) 
482 690 815 933 848 847 846 819 697 541 476 2245 2776 2213 1759 1759 1847 2111 
23.41 Manufacture of ceramic 
household and ornamental 
articles, other ceramic 
products (23.49) 
574 820 969 1109 1008 1007 1005 974 829 643 565 2669 3300 2630 2630 1175 1903 2239 
23.52 Manufacture of lime and 169 241 285 326 297 296 296 287 244 189 166 786 971 774 616 895 1007 1175 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
plaster 
23.61 Manufacture of concrete 
products for construction 
purposes, other articles of 
concrete, plaster and cement 
(23.69) 
5589 7993 9439 10804 9821 9808 9795 9489 8074 6268 6828 7108 7052 9066 8731 6212 8339 8227 
Sub-Total 22/23 Manufacture of Construction 
Materials 
6814 9744 11508 13172 11974 11958 11942 11568 9844 7642 8035 12807 14099 14684 13735 10042 13096 13751 
24.1 Manufacture of basic iron and 
steel and of ferro-alloys, 
tubes, pipes, hollow profiles 
and related fittings, of steel 
(24.2),  Cold drawing or 
forming  of bars or wire, 
narrow strips (24.3) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1935 10729 10729 15127 6596 
24.51 Casting of iron, steel (24.52), 
light metals (24.53) 
1399 2001 2363 2705 2459 2455 2452 2375 2021 1569 1379 6510 8050 6416 5101 2199 2199 6508 
25.5 Forging, pressing, stamping 
and roll-forming of metal; 
powder metallurgy, treatment 
and coating of metals (25.61), 
Machining (25.62) 
482 690 815 933 848 847 846 819 697 541 476 2245 2776 3004 3166 1935 1455 2127 
Sub-Total 24/25 Iron Founding and Metal 
Manufacture 
1882 2691 3178 3637 3307 3302 3298 3195 2718 2110 1855 8755 10825 11355 18996 14863 18780 15230 
29.1 Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, of bodies 
(coachwork) for motor 
vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers (29.2), electrical and 
electronic equipment for motor 
vehicles (29.31), other parts 
and accessories 
4101 5865 6926 7927 7206 7197 7187 6963 5925 4599 4042 19081 23593 18806 14951 3598 3598 3598 
30.11 Building of ships and floating 
structures, pleasure and 
sporting boats (30.12) 
588065 662803 745033 837031 810358 785789 761977 738497 756785 774538 736898 770648 804520 751217 855002 901191 923037 949254 
32.12 Manufacture of jewellery and 
related articles, imitation 
jewellery and related articles 
(32.13) 
6352 9083 10727 12278 11162 11147 11132 10784 9176 7124 7299 7299 8355 8707 11521 4573 4661 7739 
32.99 Other manufacturing n.e.c. 1196 1710 2019 2311 2101 2098 2095 2030 1727 1341 1178 5562 6878 5482 4358 4477 5149 4869 
Sub-Total 
26/27/28/29/30/3
1/32 
General Manufacturing 599713 679461 764705 859548 830827 806231 782392 758273 773613 787602 749418 802591 843346 784212 885832 913839 936445 965459 
Section C a) Manufacturing (Formal) 1083973 1197442 1283325 1364629 1351215 1366892 1351417 1234276 1340326 1270250 1319972 1365084 1468342 1359502 1654166 1388216 1537604 1615502 
13.91 Manufacture of knitted and 
crocheted fabrics,  made-up 
textile articles, except apparel 
(13.92), carpets and 
rugs(13.93) 
2956 3110 3270 3438 3612 3793 3982 4179 4384 4598 4821 4845 4875 4904 4907 4910 4940 4969 
14 Manufacture of wearing 
apparel 
100738 104663 108716 112899 117220 121682 126290 131052 135971 141055 146309 140922 135801 130857 125793 120918 116523 112280 
14.19 Manufacture of other wearing 
apparel and accessories 
2335 2522 2724 2941 3175 3426 3697 3989 4303 4641 5005 5032 5063 5093 5111 5129 5160 5191 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
15.11 Tanning and dressing of 
leather; dressing and dyeing 
of fur, manufacture of leather 
clothes (14.11), luggage, 
handbags and the like, 
saddlery and harness (15.12) 
2951 2870 2821 2799 2800 2819 2855 2904 2966 3038 3119 2771 2468 2202 1958 1745 1568 1413 
15.2 Manufacture of footwear 64250 65492 66741 67999 69267 70544 71831 73130 74441 75764 77101 74481 71986 69570 67075 64665 62499 60401 
Sub-Total 
13/14/15 
Preparation of Textiles, 
Clothes and Footwear 
173230 178658 184273 190076 196072 202263 208655 215254 222065 229096 236354 228052 220193 212626 204845 197367 190689 184254 
16.24 Manufacture of wooden 
containers 
3984 4171 4364 4564 4771 4985 5207 5438 5676 5923 6179 5852 5548 5259 4959 4675 4432 4201 
16.29 Manufacture of other products 
of wood, articles of cork, straw 
and plaiting materials 
62804 66211 69784 73532 77465 81592 85925 90475 95253 100271 105543 102747 100136 97575 94575 91655 89324 87040 
Sub-total 16 Wood Processing 66787 70381 74148 78096 82236 86578 91133 95912 100929 106194 111722 108599 105684 102835 99534 96330 93757 91241 
25.4 Manufacture of weapons and 
ammunition 
353 338 324 310 296 283 270 258 246 235 224 231 239 247 253 260 269 278 
25.5 Forging, pressing, stamping 
and roll-forming of metal; 
powder metallurgy, treatment 
and coating of metals (25.61), 
Machining (25.62) 
1754 1738 1721 1703 1685 1667 1648 1628 1609 1589 1569 1553 1539 1525 1503 1482 1469 1455 
25.71 Manufacture of cutlery 143 161 180 201 225 252 282 316 353 395 442 455 469 484 498 512 528 545 
25.73 Manufacture of tools 42833 43402 43956 44496 45023 45538 46041 46533 47016 47489 47954 47604 47310 47009 46463 45916 45631 45341 
Sub-Total 24/25 Iron Founding and Metal 
Manufacture 
45084 45639 46180 46710 47229 47739 48241 48735 49224 49708 50188 49844 49557 49265 48718 48171 47897 47619 
30.99 Manufacture of other transport 
equipment n.e.c. 
540 583 629 678 732 788 849 915 985 1060 1141 1006 888 784 688 604 533 470 
32.2 Manufacture of musical 
instruments 
205 244 292 348 415 495 590 704 839 1000 1192 1193 1194 1195 1194 1193 1194 1196 
32.99 Other manufacturing n.e.c. 1290 1244 1198 1154 1111 1070 1030 991 954 918 883 863 844 825 805 785 767 750 
Sub-Total 
26,27,28,29, 30, 
31, 32 
General Manufacturing 2035 2071 2119 2181 2258 2354 2470 2610 2778 2978 3215 3061 2926 2804 2686 2581 2494 2416 
Section C b) Handicraft 287136 296749 306719 317063 327795 338934 350499 362511 374995 387976 401480 389557 378360 367530 355783 344449 334837 325530 
Section Ca) + 
Cb) 
Manufacturing and 
Handicraft (TOTAL) 
1371109 1494191 1590044 1681692 1679011 1705825 1701916 1596788 1715321 1658225 1721452 1754641 1846702 1727032 2009949 1732666 1872441 1941032 
35.11 Production, transmission 
(35.12), distribution  (35.13), 
and trade (35.14) of electricity, 
manufacture, distribution 
(35.22), trade (35.23) of gas 
(35.21), water collection, 
treatment and supply (36), 
and sewerage (37): collection 
and disposal of waste (38) 
78456 34291 34291 38825 43831 44028 48415 54179 54032 59573 58832 59390 63064 67071 69648 76748 85526 101249 
Sub-Total 35, 36, 
37, 38, 39 
Utilities 78456 34291 34291 38825 43831 44028 48415 54179 54032 59573 58832 59390 63064 67071 69648 76748 85526 101249 
Section D & E Electricity, Gas, Steam, 
Water Supply, Sewerage, 
Waste Management 
(Utilities) 
78456 34291 34291 38825 43831 44028 48415 54179 54032 59573 58832 59390 63064 67071 69648 76748 85526 101249 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
41.2 Construction of residential and 
non-residential buildings, 
roads and motorways (42.11), 
railways and underground 
railways (42.12), bridges and 
tunnels (42.13), utility projects 
for fluids (42.21), utility 
projects for electricity and 
telecommunications (42.22), 
water projects (42.91), other 
civil engineering projects 
n.e.c. (42.99) 
92034 120988 148498 184890 210814 239299 247597 279616 301546 394718 474906 543857 580259 685005 650832 677922 673733 355449 
Sub-Total 41 Construction 92034 120988 148498 184890 210814 239299 247597 279616 301546 394718 474906 543857 580259 685005 650832 677922 673733 355449 
Section F Construction 92034 120988 148498 184890 210814 239299 247597 279616 301546 394718 474906 543857 580259 685005 650832 677922 673733 355449 
45.11 Sale of cars and light motor 
vehicles, Sale of other motor 
vehicles (45.19), wholesale of 
motor vehicle parts and 
accessories (45.31), retail of 
motor vehicle parts and 
accessories (45.32) 
27915 29855 31931 34150 36523 39062 41777 44681 47786 51108 54660 54660 54660 54660 54660 54660 54660 54660 
Sub-Total 45 Sale, Maintenance and Repair 
of Motor Vehicles 
27915 29855 31931 34150 36523 39062 41777 44681 47786 51108 54660 54660 54660 54660 54660 54660 54660 54660 
46 Wholesale and retail trade 
(47) 
956139 1035471 1114228 1235030 1266971 1289346 1250193 1163369 1269852 1208504 1159197 1205586 1242559 1258889 1360648 1220458 1353952 1369069 
Sub-Total 46, 47 Wholesale and Retail Trade 956139 1035471 1114228 1235030 1266971 1289346 1250193 1163369 1269852 1208504 1159197 1205586 1242559 1258889 1360648 1220458 1353952 1369069 
Section G Wholesale and Retail Trade; 
Repair of Motor Vehicles 
and Motorcycles 
984054 1065326 1146159 1269180 1303495 1328408 1291970 1208049 1317638 1259611 1213857 1260246 1297219 1313549 1415307 1275118 1408612 1423729 
49.1 Passenger rail transport, 
interurban, freight(49.2) 
11371 8242 7698 9280 9506 9846 10603 11301 9569 9189 8624 0 0 0 0 0  0 
49.31 Urban and suburban 
passenger land transport 
51715 56212 61100 66414 72189 78466 85290 92707 100769 109531 119056 129410 132340 139987 151328 164263 186054 205360 
49.41 Freight transport by road, sea 
and coast, (50.2), 
warehousing and storage 
(52.1) 
682956 739622 795877 882164 904980 920961 892995 830978 907037 863217 827998 861133 887542 899206 971891 871756 967109 977906 
Sub-Total 49, 50, 
51 
Transport 746042 804076 864676 957857 986675 1009274 988888 934985 1017375 981938 955678 990542 1019883 1039193 1123219 1036019 1153163 1183267 
53.1 Postal activities under 
universal service obligation 
13253 18646 21256 11522 18350 53492 70807 7208 30619 15250 16496 11232 9352 12591 17409 21966 18654 37526 
Sub-Total 53 Postal Services 13253 18646 21256 11522 18350 53492 70807 7208 30619 15250 16496 11232 9352 12591 17409 21966 18654 37526 
Section H Transportation and Storage 759295 822722 885932 969379 1005025 1062766 1059695 942193 1047994 997187 972175 1001774 1029235 1051784 1140628 1057984 1171817 1220793 
55.1 Hotels and similar 
accommodation, holiday and 
other short-stay (55.2), 
restaurants and mobile food 
service activities (56.1), other 
food service activities (56.29), 
beverage serving activities 
(56.3) 
70735 72450 74260 76169 78182 80307 82549 84914 87411 90045 92825 100223 108283 117071 126658 137122 148551 161042 
Sub-Total 55 Hotel, Café and Bar Services 70735 72450 74260 76169 78182 80307 82549 84914 87411 90045 92825 100223 108283 117071 126658 137122 148551 161042 
Section I Accommodation and Food 
Service Activities 
70735 72450 74260 76169 78182 80307 82549 84914 87411 90045 92825 100223 108283 117071 126658 137122 148551 161042 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
59.14 Motion picture projection 
activities 
19128 20146 21218 22348 23537 24790 26110 27499 28963 30505 32129 31980 31833 31686 31539 31393 31248 31104 
Sub-Total 60 Broadcasting 19128 20146 21218 22348 23537 24790 26110 27499 28963 30505 32129 31980 31833 31686 31539 31393 31248 31104 
62 Other telecommunications 
activities 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 491 1613 4495 4573 5153 5767 6698 
Sub-Total 61 Telecommunications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 491 1613 4495 4573 5153 5767 6698 
Section J Information and 
Communication 
19128 20146 21218 22348 23537 24790 26110 27499 28963 30505 32129 32472 33446 36181 36112 36547 37016 37802 
64.19 Banking: monetary 
intermediation  
14044 14565 15106 15666 16247 16850 17476 18124 18796 19494 20217 20619 21028 21446 21872 22306 22749 23201 
Sub-Total 64 Banking Services 14044 14565 15106 15666 16247 16850 17476 18124 18796 19494 20217 20619 21028 21446 21872 22306 22749 23201 
Section K Financial and Insurance 
Activities 
14044 14565 15106 15666 16247 16850 17476 18124 18796 19494 20217 20619 21028 21446 21872 22306 22749 23201 
68.2 Renting and operating of own 
real estate (including implied 
rental income) 
177478 172499 168710 165490 162636 159611 158168 157564 157755 159991 163229 169190 176823 185963 194090 201571 208765 208732 
Sub-Total 68 Real Estate and Financial 
Agents 
177478 172499 168710 165490 162636 159611 158168 157564 157755 159991 163229 169190 176823 185963 194090 201571 208765 208732 
Section L Real Estate Activities 177478 172499 168710 165490 162636 159611 158168 157564 157755 159991 163229 169190 176823 185963 194090 201571 208765 208732 
69.1 Legal activities 66105 67863 67410 67048 66859 66319 65759 65453 65338 65000 64959 64502 63970 63518 66626 66442 65917 65716 
Sub-Total 69 Legal and Accounting 66105 67863 67410 67048 66859 66319 65759 65453 65338 65000 64959 64502 63970 63518 66626 66442 65917 65716 
71.11 Architectural activities, 
engineering activities and 
related technical consultancy 
(71.12) 
58052 60815 63709 66742 69918 73245 76731 80383 84209 88217 92415 92415 92415 92415 92415 92415 92415 92415 
Sub-Total 71 Architectural and Engineering 
Activities 
58052 60815 63709 66742 69918 73245 76731 80383 84209 88217 92415 92415 92415 92415 92415 92415 92415 92415 
74.2 Photographic activities 10366 10378 10390 10402 10414 10426 10439 10451 10463 10475 10487 10473 10458 10444 10430 10415 10401 10387 
Sub-Total 74 Translation and Interpretation 
Activities, Certifying Offices 
10366 10378 10390 10402 10414 10426 10439 10451 10463 10475 10487 10473 10458 10444 10430 10415 10401 10387 
75 Veterinary activities 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 
Sub-Total 75 Veterinary Activities  588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 
Section M Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
135111 139645 142097 144780 147779 150579 153517 156875 160598 164280 168449 167978 167432 166965 170059 169860 169321 169106 
79.11 Travel agency activities, tour 
operator activities (79.12) 
1218 1159 1103 1050 1000 952 906 863 821 782 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 
80.1 Private security activities, 
Security systems service 
activities (80.2), combined 
facilities support activities 
(81.1) 
2489 2616 2751 2892 3040 3196 3360 3533 3714 3905 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 
Sub-Total 
77/79/80/81 
Civil Administrative and 
Support Service Activities 
3706 3775 3854 3942 4040 4148 4267 4396 4536 4687 4850 4850 4850 4850 4850 4850 4850 4850 
82.99 Other business support 
service activities n.e.c. 
(auctioneres, weighers) 
8524 8503 8483 8463 8442 8422 8402 8381 8361 8341 8321 8321 8321 8321 8321 8321 0 8321 
Sub- Total 82 Other Business Support 
Services 
8524 8503 8483 8463 8442 8422 8402 8381 8361 8341 8321 8321 8321 8321 8321 8321 0 8321 
Section N Administrative and Support 
Service Activities 
12230 12279 12337 12405 12482 12570 12668 12777 12897 13028 13171 13171 13171 13171 13171 13171 4850 13171 
84.11 General public administration 
activities 
56889 67324 67820 83340 75921 75594 78751 84784 97337 102571 113006 114556 117552 126364 128029 136653 142748 164584 
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NACE rev 2 
Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
84.12 Regulation of the activities of 
providing health care, 
education, cultural services 
and other social services, 
excluding social security, 
regulation of and contribution 
to more efficient operation of 
businesses (84.13) 
26666 31906 32121 33760 36898 36688 38071 42194 48044 51745 57688 58712 58034 61380 64689 69139 71546 73359 
84.23 Justice and judicial activities 17635 15256 17258 17697 18791 17940 18372 19290 21597 20727 23768 23362 23308 26000 22678 23777 25609 25149 
84.24 Public order and safety 
activities, fire service activities 
(84.24), compulsory social 
security activities (84.3) 
36871 45310 45623 51169 53774 53773 54296 59149 65441 69591 76126 76165 73842 79537 79860 83357 82660 84053 
Sub-Total 84 Public Administration 138061 159796 162823 185966 185385 183996 189490 205417 232419 244633 270588 272795 272736 293281 295256 312926 322563 347144 
Section O Public Administration and 
Defence / Social Security 
138061 159796 162823 185966 185385 183996 189490 205417 232419 244633 270588 272795 272736 293281 295256 312926 322563 347144 
85.1 Pre-primary education, 
primary education (85.2),  
general secondary education 
(85.31), technical and 
vocational secondary 
education (85.32), tertiary 
education (85.42), sports and 
recreation education (85.51), 
cultural education (85.52), 
other education n.e.c. (85.59) 
107364 125250 127798 135690 145291 147004 150632 159371 171495 178874 192932 199798 201387 216699 219876 227194 230605 235459 
Sub-Total 85 Education 107364 125250 127798 135690 145291 147004 150632 159371 171495 178874 192932 199798 201387 216699 219876 227194 230605 235459 
Section P Education 107364 125250 127798 135690 145291 147004 150632 159371 171495 178874 192932 199798 201387 216699 219876 227194 230605 235459 
86.1 Hospital activities, general 
medical practice activities 
(86.31), residential care 
activities for mental 
retardation, mental health and 
substance abuse (87.2), 
residential care activities for 
the elderly and disabled (87.3) 
31943 34720 35149 36437 37934 37816 38477 39714 41583 42443 44115 44456 45075 46776 46061 47526 48491 50262 
86.23 Dental practice activities 3388 3707 4057 4439 4858 5316 5817 6365 6965 7621 8340 8179 8022 7868 7716 7568 7422 7279 
87.1 Residential nursing care 
activities, other residential 
care activities (87.9) 
14267 14355 14444 14533 14622 14713 14803 14895 14987 15079 15172 15554 15945 16346 16757 17179 17611 18054 
Sub-Total 
86/87/88/89 
Healthcare 49598 52782 53649 55409 57414 57844 59097 60974 63535 65144 67627 68189 69042 70990 70534 72272 73524 75596 
Section Q Human Health and Social 
Work 
49598 52782 53649 55409 57414 57844 59097 60974 63535 65144 67627 68189 69042 70990 70534 72272 73524 75596 
90.01 Performing arts, support 
activities to performing arts 
(90.02), artistic creation 
(90.03), operation of arts 
facilities (90.04) 
50297 52557 54930 57421 60037 62783 65668 68698 71880 75223 78735 78438 78142 77848 77555 77264 76974 76685 
Sub-Total 90 Performing Arts 50297 52557 54930 57421 60037 62783 65668 68698 71880 75223 78735 78438 78142 77848 77555 77264 76974 76685 
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Classification 
Description of  Product 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
91.01 Library and archives activities, 
museums (91.02), pperation 
of historical sites and buildings 
and similar visitor attractions 
(91.03), botanical and 
zoological gardens and nature 
reserves activities (91.04) 
527 1593 802 921 1126 1110 1141 1205 1305 1413 1485 1504 1488 1589 1649 1834 1785 1916 
Sub-Total 91 Cultural Activities 527 1593 802 921 1126 1110 1141 1205 1305 1413 1485 1504 1488 1589 1649 1834 1785 1916 
92 Gambling and betting activities, 
operation of sports facilities 
(93.11), activities of sport clubs 
(93.12), fitness facilities (93.13), 
other sports activities (93.19), 
activities of amusement parks 
(93.21) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 797 
93.29 Other amusement and 
recreation activities 
(Prostitution) 
3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 
Sub-Total 92/93 Sports and Other Recreation 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 4451 
Section R Arts, Entertainment and 
Recreation 
54477 57803 59385 61995 64816 67547 70462 73555 76838 80289 83872 83595 83284 83090 82857 82751 82412 83052 
94.91 Activities of religious 
organisations 
61422 62024 62619 63260 63802 64414 65033 65657 66287 66923 67566 67353 67142 66931 66720 66510 66301 66093 
Sub-Total 94 Relegious Activities 61422 62024 62619 63260 63802 64414 65033 65657 66287 66923 67566 67353 67142 66931 66720 66510 66301 66093 
Section S Other Religious and 
Professional Organisations 
61422 62024 62619 63260 63802 64414 65033 65657 66287 66923 67566 67353 67142 66931 66720 66510 66301 66093 
97 Activities of households as 
employers of domestic 
personnel, washing and (dry-
)cleaning of textile and fur 
products (96.01), hairdressing 
and Men's haircuts (96.02), 
Funeral and related activities 
(96.03), Other personal 
service activities n.e.c. (Shoe 
Blacks) (96.09) 
202929 208326 213866 219553 225391 231385 237539 243855 250340 256998 263832 262748 261668 260592 259521 258455 257392 256335 
Sub-Total 96/97 Personal Services outside the 
Household, Personal Services 
202929 208326 213866 219553 225391 231385 237539 243855 250340 256998 263832 262748 261668 260592 259521 258455 257392 256335 
Section S +  T Other Personal Services 
(From Section S) Activities 
of Households as 
Employers; Undifferentiated 
goods and Services-
Producing Activities of 
Households For Own Use 
202929 208326 213866 219553 225391 231385 237539 243855 250340 256998 263832 262748 261668 260592 259521 258455 257392 256335 
Total Value 
Added 
GDP at Factor Prices 4725551 5119876 5436448 5876981 6017227 6208017 6237203 6009303 6490731 6411082 6554176 6749173 6949134 7129401 7520138 7008544 7522168 7416814 
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Appendix D: Detailed Methodology of the Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 
estimates. 
 
The estimate of agricultural production was the most extensive in terms of industries enumerated. 
The Gross output of 85 products, placed in 19 categories was estimated for Cyprus; Malta’s 
agricultural series comprises of 42 products in 14 categories.  
 
‘Farm gate’ price data were problematic for Cyprus; there were just a few reported in the Cypriot 
agricultural journal
1
. To create the price dataset for the agricultural products for which no farm-gate 
price data existed, the retail, export and import prices were modified by adjusting the prices 
downwards based on a trade and transport margin estimate of 25% in GDP, which was based on 
post-1945 data
2
. Where no price data was found in primary sources, one of two methods was used 
to calculate the item’s price3: 
1)  The price of the item relative to others in the post-war period was assumed to remain 
constant and representative to its price in 1938
4
. 
2) A price of a general export category that included the product was considered to be 
representative to all products within that category. For example modified “other beans” 
export prices were used as the price of haricot and broad beans
5
.  
Prices were not problematic in Malta: prices were given along with the volume of production in the 
annual reports of the department of agriculture
6. It was possible to use different prices for Malta’s 
important potato export in order to capture the higher value of the early potatoes in the European 
market. The volume of spring, winter and summer potatoes was disaggregated and multiplied by the 
relevant price from 1934 onwards; this was not possible for the period 1921-1938 as the volume of 
early potatoes was unknown. 
                                                     
1
 James, & Koumides, “An Analysis of Farming Costs in Cyprus” Part 2, (1939) pp.45-67; “An Analysis of Farming 
Costs in Cyprus” Part.3, (1939) pp.87-109 
2
 National Archives, Nicosia. File V53/26 “Gross Output and Inputs – Indirect Taxes and Value Added in the 
Agricultural Sector During the Period 1959 – 1968” Table 6 
3
 Such products are: favetta, haricot and broad beans, beetroots, cabbages, vetches, maize, Valencia oranges, bitter 
oranges, sweet limes and mandarins.  
4
 Source: National Archives, Nicosia. File V53/26 “Gross Output and Inputs – Indirect Taxes and Value Added in the 
Agricultural Sector During the Period 1959 – 1968” Table 8 “Quantity and Value of Seed and Area Sown by Crop 
1959-1961” 
5
 Source: Percival, D. A. Cyprus Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: GPO, 1947) 
6
 Source: National Archives, London CO161/118, 120, 121, 122,123, 124 “Annual Report of the Department of 
Agriculture” 1921-1938 
A30 
 
Arable Production 
The scope of agricultural products enumerated in Cyprus increased over the estimation period. As a 
result some agricultural products volume series were not complete for every year. The missing 
volume was estimated in several ways depending on the amount of circumstantial evidence 
available.  
1) If the yearly yield of the product was enumerated at the Athallassa government farm, then 
the average acres of that crop sown for the years which the information was complete was 
multiplied by the Athallassa yield for the missing year.  
2)  If the government farm did not report the yield the correlation coefficients of the 
incomplete series were compared with other complete series
7
. For example, the known 
yearly data for Cypriot cowpeas had a correlation of 0.828 in relation to the complete 
sesame production series. The average ratio of sesame to cowpeas for the known period of 
Cypriot cowpeas (1925–1938) was used to extrapolate the production of cowpeas for 1921–
1924 based on the production of sesame in 1921–1924 and the average ratio to sesame seeds 
for 1925–1938, as shown below. 
 
Table A.8: An interpolating example: Cow Peas in Cyprus 
Correlation 
coefficient 
(Sesame/ Cow 
peas)1924–1938 
0.828937  1921 1922 1923… …1937 1938 
 
Average 
production 
differential: cow 
peas to sesame 
1924 - 1928 
 
 
 
 
 
1.465766 
 
 
 
 
Volume of cow 
peas in okes 
   279,480 285,487 
Volume of sesame 
in okes 
270,572 130,522 234,095 301,638 215,348 
Volume of cow 
Peas in okes 
396,595 191,315 343,129   
Price of cow peas 
per oke in 1938 
£0.0116 £0.0116 £0.0116 £0.0116 £0.0116 
Gross output in 
1938 prices 
 
£4,596 
 
£2,217 
 
£3,976 
 
£3,239 
 
£3,308 
Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, years 1921–1938; Bevan, Notes on Agriculture in Cyprus and its Products, 
(1919), National Archives, London CO69/38, 40, 42, 43, 45 “Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture” 1921-
1938 
 
3) If no correlation was discerned the missing yearly volumes were assumed to be constant at 
the 5 year average level; this was rare and led to very minimal output being estimated in this 
                                                     
7
 This method was used in the estimation of volumes of Cypriot cowpeas, haricot beans, cotton seed, kolokasi, 
cabbages, tomatoes, aniseed and for Maltese tomatoes, cotton seed and vetches. 
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way
8
. For example, flax output in Cyprus during 1921–1923, was assumed to equal the 5 
year average for which the information is available from 1924 to 1927. 
4) For foraging products only the exports were enumerated as the relation of the exports to the 
total output was unknown, nut the problem is minimised as output that was not exported was 
used as intermediate consumption in industrial processes
9
. 
5) For products that the volume was missing for just one year, the average of the prevailing and 
following year was used to estimate the missing volume. Similarly, Cypriot grape 
production volume for the period 1927-1931 was incomplete and the gaps were estimated 
using log-linear interpolation.  
6) For some marginal products such as the production of peas and garlic in Cyprus, only a spot 
estimate exists for one year. If the share to total agricultural production was small, the 
production was considered constant throughout the period; but such cases were limited to 
less than 1% of gross agricultural output in either Cyprus or Malta. 
7) For a small range of products, there is evidence of their production, yet it was not possible to 
estimate output. If such products were exclusively used as fodder crops, such as rye, then an 
estimation of gross output of rye was not necessary as it was consumed by livestock. For 
other products such as honey, chickens and eggs, no estimates have been attempted due to 
the lack of evidence.
10
.  
 
For some agricultural products, there were inconsistencies in the reporting method that needed 
correction. The same volume was reported in different units of measurement in Cyprus. The 
agricultural reports were given preference over the Statistical (Blue) Books as the most reliable 
source of information, and all conversions used are available in appendix A. The volumes in the 
agricultural reports of Malta were not always for the calendar year but for the administrative year 
running from April to March. These were corrected by the estimates given in the statistical (blue) 
books which reported data for the calendar year (January to December), and corroborated by using 
the crop harvest calendar of Malta that that suggested which corps were susceptible to 
                                                     
8
 This method was used for flax in Cyprus and melons in Malta, which constituted less than 1% of agricultural calue 
added. 
9
 This was the case for Cypriot sumach and Maltese cumin. 
10
 Some chicken and egg data are included in Christodoulou, D., Contributions Towards a Development Plan for 
Cyprus Agriculture (Nicosia, GPO, 1960); Honey estimates for 1958 are provided by Michaelides, R., Recent Trends of 
Agricultural Production and Productivity in Cyprus (Nicosia: Ministry of agriculture and natural resources, 1970); the 
evidence was not considered sufficient for volume estimates. There was not data for cucumbers, bananas, asparagus, 
artichoke and fresh salad herbs 
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misreporting
11
. Any correction was complicated by the fact that the administrative year changed 
over time: from 1920 to 1923 the Maltese government offices reported in July, from 1924 to 1934 
in September, from 1934 to 1936 in October, and from 1937 to 1938 in November. However, any 
errors due to the timing of the recorded information are minimized in total GDP since agriculture 
was a small sector in the Maltese economy.  
 
For some products it was not possible to estimate production in its raw state as primary data was 
recoding the goods in a semi-processed state, such as tobacco (fumigated or yellow leaf). There was 
a significant price differential between the two types, but as the yearly volume  The volume weights 
the corresponding yellow leaf and fumigated volume weights in 1938 were assumed constant 
throughout the period due to lack of further information. 
 
Estimates of perennial crops of Cyprus, such as grapes, apples and oranges are in need of a greater 
explanation since they were based on much more limited evidence.  
 
Grape production 
The production of grapes was particularly significant in Cyprus as it was the main staple product of 
the mountainous villages of Troodos. Cypriot production remained brisk as it was not affected by a 
devastating attack of phylloxera that virtually eliminated grape output in Malta. Grapes where the 
input for numerous other products such as table grapes, grape juice, raisins, red wine, sweet dessert 
“commandaria” wine, vinegar, local “Zivania” spirit, and brandy. However, there was very limited 
information on the amount of grapes used in each process.  
 
In order to estimate the value of these grape products, the transformation coefficient of each product 
in terms of grapes was collected by historical and contemporary sources. The volume and prices of 
grape products that were exported were available in the Cypriot statistical (blue) books. The 
exported grape products were converted into grape equivalent volumes, thus estimating the total 
volume of grapes that were “exported” in the form of grape products. The domestic consumption of 
grapes was estimated by subtracting the volume of grapes “exported”. Thus the implicit assumption 
is that use of grapes given in the 1938 exports of grape products was indicative of the domestic 
grape product production. The intermediate consumption and value added of the grape products 
                                                     
11
 Sources: Central Office of Statistics, Malta, Report on the Census of Agriculture, 1956, (Valletta: Department of 
Information and Tourist Services, 1957); Malta, Statistical (Blue) Book, years 1921-1938 
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were estimated on the basis of primary sources supplemented by information given by Mr. 
Kyprianou
12
.  
 
The production of wine production from grapes also produces important by-products whose output 
is estimated. Spirits and vinegar in Cyprus are made as derivatives of wine and thus they were not 
assigned a weight in terms of grapes. These products were first transformed into wine and then from 
wine into grapes. The volumes of zivania (the local spirit), brandy and vinegar produced were 
estimated as a fixed percentage to the amount of domestically produced/consumed wine, as well as 
the exported volumes of spirits and vinegar that were known.  The results are summarized below. 
 
Table A.9: Wine, Spirit and Table Grape Production in Cyprus. 
Product 
derived from 
Grapes 
Exports  
1938 
(gallons) 
Exports  
1938 
(okes) 
Export weight 
(not including 
zivania, 
brandy and 
vinegar) 
Transformation 
coefficient 
Conversion 
to wine 
(gallons) 
Conversion to 
grapes (okes) 
Wine 1,234,865  46.3% 
1 gallon :4.46 
oke grapes  
 5,509,200 
Commandaria 
wine (sweet 
dessert wine) 
34,678  1.3% 
1 gallon :4.46 
oke grapes 
 154,712 
Zivania (other 
spirits) 
3,778   
1 gallon: 4 
gallons of wine 
15,112 67,420 
Brandy 5,439   
1 gallon: 4.5 
gallons of wine 
24,476 109,194 
Vinegar 137,819   
1 gallon: 1 
gallon of 
Vinegar 
137,819 614,863 
Grape juice 125,998  3.1% 
1 gallon: 2.97  
okes of grapes 
 374,750 
Table grapes  912,640 7.7% 
1 oke: 1 oke of 
grapes 
 912,640 
Currants and 
sultanas 
 1,799,600 41.6% 
1 oke: 2.75 okes 
of grapes 
 4,948,900 
Total 1,542,577 2,712,240 100%  177,407 12,691,679 
Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book for the Year 1946 (Nicosia: GPO, 1947); Interview with Mr. P. Kanaris, Cyprus 
Wine Products Commission 18 Dec 2006; Interview with Mr. G. Kyprianou; see footnote 12; Republic of Cyprus, 
Report on Marketing of Vine products (Nicosia: GPO, 1956) p.6 
 
In 1938 the grape products exported consumed 12,691,679 okes out of 51,000,000 okes. Thus 
38,308,321 okes of grapes were available for transformation in several grape products. The export 
weights were assumed to be representative of domestic production in order to estimate the volume 
of locally consumed grape products. The domestic consumption of Zivania, brandy and vinegar was 
                                                     
12
 Interview with Mr. Kyprianou, G., former secretary of the Agros Village Co-operative in the 1930s, and owner of a 
traditional wine still. 
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estimated as a proportion of the domestic vine process. It was assumed that 0.5% of wine for 
domestic consumption was transformed to spirits, as well as a further 10% of domestic wine was 
converted to vinegar
13
. Thus in 1938 3,727 gallons of Zivania, 1,104 gallons of brandy, 397,519 
gallons of vinegar and 3,557,798 gallons of wine were produced and consumed domestically. Their 
value added in Cyprus pounds was estimated at: Zivania £322, Brandy £144, Vinegar £8,019, Wine 
£153,969. 
 
The above was cheeked for plausibility. Firstly the estimates also correspond very closely to the 
independent estimates of raisins, grapes, and wine given in the annual reports of the department of 
agriculture for the period 1921-1925. The second test was to see if the grape products had a higher 
value added of unprocessed grapes. The estimation of grape products is by 18% higher than if one 
took the value added of grapes only. The estimates were also checked using the Cypriot input-
output tables for 1954 and 1957. The percentage of the exports of grapes to total grape output was 
compared to the estimates for 1938
14
. Grape products in 1954 and 1957 represented 7.1% and 7.2% 
of gross agricultural output; the grape products in 1938 represented 17.7% of the gross output, 
which is very plausible considering the rapid increase of agriculture since 1945 due to the 
expansion of the citrus producing areas. Thus the result is plausible when compared to interwar 
juxtapositions and more accurate post-Second World War statistics.  
 
Table A.10: Production of Grape Products in Cyprus 
Product derived 
from Grapes 
Assigned 
local use of 
grapes (okes) 
Exported use of 
grapes (okes) 
Total grape use 
Imputed factor 
price: oke of 
grapes  
Value of 
grape 
products  
Other wines 17,734,842 5,509,200 23,244,042 £0.00970023 £225,473 
Commandaria 498,037 154,712 652,749 £0.01798601 £11,740 
Currants and 
sultanas 
15,931,163 4,948,900 20,880,063 £0.00439310 £91,728 
Table grapes 2,937,909 912,640 3,850,549 £0.00629961 £24,257 
Grape juice 1,206,369 374,750 1,581,119 £0.01308073 £20,682 
Brandy  109,194 109,194   
Zivania (other 
spirits) 
 67,420 67,420   
Vinegar  614,863 614,863   
Total  38,308,321 12,691,679 51,000,000 £0.00629419 £321,004 
Total Value (inclusive of vinegar, brandy and zivania exports) £380,284 
Ratio of Total Uses Value to total Grape Value 1.18 
Source: Table A.9; Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book 1938 (Nicosia: GPO, 1939); Percival, Census of Population 
and Agriculture 1946 (1947) Cyprus. Statistical (Blue) Book 1946 (Nicosia: GPO, 1947).  
 
                                                     
13
 It is assumed that spirits are produced to the ratio of 75% zivania and 25% brandy 
14
 Vassiliou, Input–Output Analysis of the Economy of Cyprus (1959) 
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The estimates of grape products were also compared with estimates of other Mediterranean 
countries. Prados de la Escosura estimated that the proportion of grape output to total agricultural 
final output in Spain for the period 1929-1933 was 6.3%, which is much less than in the case of 
Cyprus
15
. However Spain has a diverse geography that led to the output of grapes being less 
important to the total economy than in Cyprus. Greece is more similar to Cyprus in terms of 
geography, and grape products were a vital to its economy in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century
16
. 
Kostellenos calculated the share or wine, grapes and currants is 15.2% of the agricultural value 
added in 1938, a share that is close to the share Cypriot economy in 1938
17
.  
 
A fourth of plausibility was based on the consumption of wine in Cyprus. The daily consumption 
estimate for alcohol in rural villages was estimated based on the rural survey
18
. Surridge provides 
information on the proportion of persons who drink per community (which is 82% of all Christians 
and 40% of all Muslims) in the villages surveyed. The population of Cyprus in 1931 over the age of 
14 was divided in their respective religious affiliation. Then an estimate of the consumption of wine 
was estimated on the survey, which records a daily expenditure of wine of ½ to ¾ piastres. The 
yearly expenditure in 1929 was estimated and deflated to 1938 constant prices based on the price of 
wine. The value of the alcohol consumption in 1929, in constant, 1938 prices, had a lower bound of 
£128,922 and an upper bound of £193,384. The total alcohol production of for domestic use in 1929 
was estimated as £174,439. It is encouraging that the estimates for alcohol production in within the 
bands despite being estimated by different sources.  
 
Citrus estimates 
Cypriot citrus production data is much more limited than for grapes. The estimates of citrus 
production in 1927 and 1928 were provided in the annual reports of the agricultural department and 
presented in Table A.11, but no clue was given on the estimation method. Thus citrus production 
was based on other sources particularly on irrigation, using the estimates below as a check.  
                                                     
15
 Prados de la Escosoura, Leandro, El Progresso Económico de España (1850–2000) (Bilbao: Foundation BBVA, 
2003)  p.52 Table 2.2 
16
 Kostas, K. & Petmetzas, S. (eds.) Η Ανάπτυξη της Ελληνικής Οικονομίας κατα το 19ο Αιώνα 1830 – 1914 [The growth 
of the Greek Economy During the 19
th
 Century] (Athens: Alexandria, 2006)  pp.154-157 
17
 Kostelenos, Money and Output in modern Greece (1995) p.75, Table A. 
18
 Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life... (1930) p.22  
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Table A.11: Citrus enumerated in the Cypriot department of agriculture 
 Type of Citrus 1926 1927 
Number of  Citrus  produced Oranges 29,637,440 28,000,000 
Lemons 16,417,870 N/A 
Mandarins 4,511,870 N/A 
Number of Citrus Exported Oranges 14,275,459 20,774,568 
Lemons 1,391,760  
Percentage of citrus production 
exported 
Oranges 48.2% 74.1% 
Lemons 8.5%  
Mandarins   
Estimated citrus value in 1938 factor 
prices 
Oranges £33,227 £31,391 
Lemons £12,275  
Mandarins £2,915  
Total citrus value in 1938 prices All citrus £48,417 £31,391 
Source: National Archives, London. File: CO69/38 “Cyprus Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture 
1927/1928” 
In 1946 there were two estimates of citrus volumes based on different methodologies: a survey of 
production was undertaken and reported in the statistical (blue) book of 1946 and a census of 
agriculture based on returns provided to farm holders. Despite the differing data sources the 
difference of volume estimated in the two methods was very small
19
. The statistical (blue) book and 
the agricultural census provide enough information to estimate yields per acre and per tree for 
oranges, Valencia oranges, bitter oranges, lemons, sweet lemons and grapefruit. By estimating the 
yield of citrus trees per acre it was clear that all citrus plantations in 1946 were situated at 
perennially irrigated areas: the estimated acres of citrus cultivation in the statistical (blue) book of 
1946 is just 0.08% smaller than the stated perennially irrigated area under citrus cultivation in the 
1946 census.  
 
An assumption was made that during the period 1921–1946 the perennially irrigated area increased, 
but the product mix planted on irrigated areas remained unchanged. This is not so unreasonable 
since the perennially irrigated area was mostly trees; citrus trees need time from when they are 
planted to become productive. As a result a change in the tree composition under irrigation would 
change only slowly. Therefore it was assumed the same proportion of the irrigated area was 
producing citrus products in 1931 as in 1946. Citrus cultivation is assumed to be 17% of the 
perennially irrigated area of 1931 based in the 1946 data. If one assumes that the fruit yields of 
1946 are representative for 1931 then an estimate of the citrus in 1931 was possible
20
. The 
perennially irrigated area in 1931 was 68,749 donums; the assumed area under citrus cultivation 
                                                     
19
 The estimation of output and number of trees are slightly different between the Blue Book and the 1946 Census 
(0.7%).  The Blue Book results are based on a survey of an area under cultivation while the Census results are based on 
questionnaires given to agricultural producers.  Source: Percival, Census... 1946 (1947) and Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) 
Book... 1946 (1947) 
20
 Hart-Davis, Report... Census of 1931 (1932) and Percival, Census... 1946 (1947) 
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(17%) was estimated at 11,687 donums, equivalent to 3,863 acres. Assuming that there were 194 
trees per acre (as was the case in the 1946 census), the total number of citrus trees in 1931 was 
estimated at 749,422
21
. The estimated trees for 1931 can be separated into their type of citrus by 
using the 1946 composition of trees as weights, leading to the volume and value of citrus 
production in 1931 as shown below. The growth of trees from 1931 to 1946 was annualised at 
3.35% and used to extrapolate yearly output estimates.  
 
Table A.12: Citrus Production in Cyprus 
Type of 
Citrus 
Tree 
1931 1946 
Citrus 
Production 
1946 
Yield of 
Citrus 
products in 
1946 (no. 
per tree) 
Estimated 
Production 
in 1931 
Price of 
Citrus 
1938 (£ 
per fruit) 
Value of Citrus 
Production 
(constant 1938 
prices) 
Oranges 544,209 892,677 87,945,000 99 53,614,533 £0.00112 £60,107 
Valencia 
Oranges 
20,155 33,061 2,258,000 68 1,376,546 £0.00112 £1,543 
Grapefruit 36,327 59,588 6,116,000 103 3,728,535 £0.00278 £10,352 
Bitter 
Oranges 
20,634 33,847 2,045,000 60 1,246,684 £0.00112 £1,398 
Mandarins 23,675 38,835 2,045,000 53 1,246,694 £0.000646 £805 
Sour 
Lemons 
100,149 164,277 34,400,000 209 20,971,442 £0.000748 £15,679 
Sweet 
Limes 
4,273 7,008 637,000 91 388,399 £0.000748 £290 
Total  749,422 1,229,293 135,446,000  82,572,834 £0.00828 £90,175 
Source: Hart-Davis, Report... Census of 1931 (1932) and Percival, Census... 1946 (1947) 
 
Such a method creates almost as many problems as it solves. The current estimates shown in Table 
A.12 are much higher than those of Table A.11: even by removing the products not enumerated in 
1927 the output of oranges is higher than in Table A.11. However, the department of agriculture did 
argue that the spot estimates in Table A.11 were speculative rather than definitive. The number of 
trees indicates that output for 1931 could be an underestimate; there was a 39% increase in citrus 
trees from 1932 to 1946
22
.  
 
The estimate is unsatisfactory but the best possible with current data availability
23
. Yet its problems 
have to be noted: the growth of irrigation might not have grown at a smooth annual rate, the share 
of citrus trees in the irrigated area could have been less in 1931, the number of trees per acre and the 
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 The current density of orange trees per acre is anything from 80–1000 trees per acre.  
22
 Source: Percival, Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 (1947) 
23
 Published sources on irrigation are not helpful in providing additional estimates on irrigation and the product mix of 
irrigated lands: Ellis, W.M., Report on Improving irrigation works in Cyprus (Nicosia: GPO, 1922); Raeburn, C. water 
Supply in Cyprus: A general report (2
nd
 ed.) (Nicosia: GPO, 1945) 
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yield per tree might have been lower in 1931 than in 1946, the product mix of citrus might have 
been different in 1921 and the majority of citrus expansion could have occurred in the period 1939-
1946; all these could change the output of the 1931 benchmark. In addition the estimates follow a 
constant annual growth rate; this is unrepresentative of the yearly variability in agricultural 
production. Further research is necessary to understand the interaction of available and rain and 
their impact to the yield of citrus trees. Pitcairn estimated the irrigated area under citrus in 1935 as 
11700, just 13 donums higher than the 1931 census estimate, possibly indicating a much slower 
growth of acreage under irrigation before 1935
24
. However it is probable that Pitcairn was just 
quoting the 1931 irrigation area census as the most up to date figure in 1935.  
 
Pome Fruit (fruits with a stone inside) and Nuts 
The estimate for citrus trees in 1931 allowed an estimate of other pome fruit and nuts to be based on 
the number of fruit and nut trees not devoted to citrus production. The 1931 census provides the 
number of trees, without including olives, carob, mulberry or pomegranate trees
25
. By subtracting 
the estimated number of citrus trees in 1931 and using the 1946 weights of trees as reported in the 
census, the remaining “other fruit trees” of 1931 can be allocated other fruit and nut trees. The 
numbers of trees in 1931 are weighted based on their 1946 enumeration, their yield assumed 
identical to their 1946 yield. This estimation procedure is unsatisfactory as it compounds to the 
problems of citrus fruit production mentioned above
26
. There is not sufficient information for 
pomegranate or mulberry production for period 1921 – 1938, other than exported pomegranates and 
pomegranate rinds, used in the eastern Mediterranean for the production of black dye
27
. 
                                                     
24
 Pitcairn, A., “Irrigation of Cyprus” Cyprus Agricultural Journal, p.43 
25
 Percival states that “No definition is given in the 1931 census of the ‘other trees,’ but from an examination by villages 
they appear to comprise citrus, deciduous fruit and nuts, but not mulberries and pomegranates”. Percival, D. A. Census 
of Population and Agriculture 1946 (1947) p.73.  
26
 Such concerns are more pronounced than the citrus estimate: the other fruit estimate has a very high annual growth 
rate of 9.65% and is based on the created estimate of citrus trees. Fresh fig prices were created based on the price 
differential of exported fresh and dried apricots and applying it to dried fig prices.  
27
  Cyprus, Annual Report of the Agricultural Department for the Year 1929 (Nicosia: GPO, 1930) 
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Table A.13: Estimation of Pome fruits and Nuts in Cyprus 
 
Yield per 
tree in 1946 
(okes per 
tree) 
Tree weight to 
total Fruit and 
Nut trees in 
1946 
Estimate
d Trees 
in 1931 
(no.) 
Estimated 
Production 
(okes) 
Price 1938 (£ 
per oke) 
Value of Fruit 
and Nuts in 
1931 (£, 1938 
prices) 
Apples 5.93 0.0654 22,364 132,713 £0.0174 2,308 
Pears 3.63 0.0188 6,428 23,367 £0.00938 219 
Peaches 6.19 0.0130 4,440 27,487 £0.0124 341 
Apricots 8.17 0.0514 17,574 143,517 £0.0119 1,708 
Cherries 4.74 0.0202 6,887 32,613 £0.0335 1,094 
Plums 8.24 0.0197 6,745 55,578 £0.00731 406 
Figs 18.26 0.0940 32,111 586,355 £0.00598 3,509 
Almonds 0.95 0.668 228,564 217,386 £0.0276 5,994 
Walnuts 0.90 0.0139 4,760 4,284
*
 £0.0382
*
 163 
Hazelnuts 2.07 0.0345 11,777 24,422 £0.0382 932 
Other nuts 0.95 0.000165 57 54
*
 £0.0340 2 
Total -  341,709 1,247,777  16,676 
*Walnut estimates were given in number rather than weight: it is assumed that 433 hazelnuts equal 0.9 okes; the price 
of walnuts is assumed to equal the price of hazelnuts. The yield of other nuts was considered similar to almonds. 
Source: Hart-Davis, Report... Census of 1931 (932) and Percival, Census of... 1946 (1947) 
 
Carobs 
Carobs were the most important agricultural export of Cyprus; the major merchant families of the 
time were all involved in its trade
28
. The majority of the crop was exported; what was not exported 
was mainly consumed by livestock as fodder and thus not included in the value added estimates. 
Estimates of carob production were based on an export duty data. As the export prices for Cyprus 
are “f.o.b” prices (fee on board), the value of the export duty was removed prior to the calculation 
of the imputed price for carobs
29
.  
 
Animal Production 
Estimating the volume and output of animal products was fraught with difficulty. This is because 
animals are both the unit of production but it can also be transformed into product. The main source 
of information was the statistical (blue) books; they provide information on the annual (sometimes 
bi-annual) stock of animals is Cyprus and Malta
30
. Data was quite reliable since there was a tax on 
sheep, goats and pigs thus providing an incentive for the government to measure their number 
accurately. However such data by itself was insufficient for estimating the output of meat, skin and 
wool since the most of the animals slaughtered for their meat were under a year’s old31. Thus the 
method needed to take into account the meat and skin produced the young animals who were born 
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 Κουδουνάρης, Α.Λ. Βιογραφικόν Λεξικόν  Κυπρίων1800-1920 [Biographical Dictionary of Cypriots] (Λευκωσία: 
Ίδρυμα Πιερίδη, 1989) p.32 
29
 The export tax was as high as £0.22 Cyprus pounds per Aleppo cantar in 1938.  
30
 The Cyprus blue books enumerated camels horses, donkeys, mules, oxen, sheep, goats and pigs. Malta did not 
enumerate camels.  
31
 Percival, D. A. Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 (Nicosia: GPO, 1947?) p.82 
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and slaughtered before being enumerated in the livestock census. Eggs, poultry, rabbit and honey 
were not estimated. The nature of the sources sometimes allowed for a direct enumerated of output, 
but more often than not it was necessary to build models to produced plausible estimates of 
production on circumstantial sources by adapting the methodology used by Kostellenos et al., for 
estimating animal products in Greece
32
.  
 
Estimating Meat, Milk and Wool 
The data sources used for the estimation of animal products in Cyprus and Malta were not 
compatible. Primary sources on annual animal slaughtering were available in Malta
33
. Due to the 
small surface area of Malta and Gozo and the urbanized nature of the Maltese archipelago, the 
slaughter of animals took place in the government slaughter houses in Malta and Gozo. These 
slaughterhouses published an annual report, providing data of the number of animals killed and the 
total volume and value of meat produced. The model constructed for Cyprus, as shown below, was 
used for Malta only to estimate milk and wool production by using of the information provided in 
the Cyprus agricultural journal on product yield of Maltese sheep and goats.  
 
Cypriot data on meat production was limited to some of the urban areas of Cyprus for a short span 
of years. Due to the incomplete nature of the data and possible differences between the propensity 
of meat consumption between the minority urban and the majority rural population, it was decided 
to build an alternate model of meat production based on alternative sources, and relegate the limited 
evidence of slaughtering as a plausibility test.  
 
The Cyprus meat estimates were based on agricultural studies published during the period, 
published in the quarterly journal of the department of Agriculture
34
. Where more information was 
needed, post-Second World War sources were consulted and combined information on the Greek 
case in Kostellenos et al.
35
. A numerical representation of the method is available below.  
                                                     
32
 Γεώργιος Κωστελένος, et al, Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν (2007), pp.47 - 58 
33
 National Archives, London. File: CO161/118, 120, 121, 122, 123. 1924, 125 “Annual Report of the Public Health and 
Veterinary Department” 
34
 The Cyprus Agricultural Journal (which was also known before 1918 as the Cyprus Journal) was published quarterly 
by the department of agriculture. 
35
 Γεώργιος Κωστελένος, et al, Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν (2007), pp.47 - 58 
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Table A.14: Animal production model. 
No. of 
Equation 
Explanation Notation Source: 
(1) Number of animals year t   Blue Books (1921-1938) 
(2) Number of animals year t -1   Blue Books (1921-1938) 
(3) Gross increase / decrease    (3) = (1) – (2) 
(4) Ratio of males to total flock   
Republic of Cyprus, Agricultural Census 
(1978), Bevan (1918), Kostellenos et al 
(2007) 
(5) Number of males year t-1    (5) = (2) * (4) 
(6) Number of females year t-1       (6) = (2) * (1 – (4)) 
(7) Reproduction coefficient  
Maule & Shevki (1935), Maule (1938), 
Constantinou (1981) 
(8) Lambs / kids  born      (8) = (7) * (6) 
(9) 
Natural Deaths / Disease / 
Culling  
Θ Maule & Shevki (1935), Gambles (1936) 
(10) 
Number of lost animals 
during Yt  
(10) = (2) * (9) 
(11) Net exports Yt  Blue Books (1921 – 1938) 
(12) 
Number of lambs / kids 
needed for Yt and net 
exports Xt 
 (12) = (3) + (10) + (11) 
(13) 
Number of lambs / kids 
consumed  
(13) = (8) – (12) 
(14) 
Number of adult animals 
consumed    
Maule & Shevki (1935) 
(15) No. animals consumed  (15) = (13) + (14) 
(16) Adult, meat per carcass (kg)  Kostelenos et al., (2007) 
(17) 
Lamb / kid, meat per carcass 
(kg)   
Kostelenos et al., (2007) 
(18) Total meat produced   (18) = [(13) * (17)] + [(14) * (16)] 
(19) 
Wool per surviving adult  
male (kg.)  
Maule & Shevki (1935)  
(20) 
Wool per surviving adult  
female (kg.)  
Maule & Shevki (1935) 
(21) Total  wool produced 
 
 
  
(21) = [[(1) – (12)] * [[1 – (4)] *(20)]] + 
[[(1) – (12)] *(4)] * (19)] 
(22) 
Adult hide weight per 
slaughtered animal (kg.)   
Kostelenos et al., (2007) 
(23) 
Lamb / kid hide per 
slaughtered animal (kg.)    
Kostelenos et al., (2007) 
(24) Total hides produced     (24) = [(14)* (22)] + [(13)*(23)] 
(25) 
Milk per surviving female 
adult (ltr.)  
Government Farm Reports. Cyprus 
Agricultural Journal (1932 - 1938), 
Kostelenos et al., (2007)  
(26) Total milk produced 
 
(26) = [[(1) –[ (12) * (1 – 4)]] *(25)] 
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Sheep and goat products were based on the yearly enumeration of livestock, which enumerated 
every animal over one year old. The annual rate of change of animals was combined with the net 
exports of sheep and goats to estimate the yearly increase/decrease of the stock. Using evidence 
from historical and contemporary sources the ratio of males to females in the flock was estimated. 
The reproduction coefficient was based on sources of animal births, animal infant mortality and 
miscarriages; Cypriot sources suggested the need for a more conservative estimate of total births 
than in Kostellenos et al.
36
. This coefficient was multiplied with the females of the previous year 
(yt-1), thus estimating the total number of young lambs/kids born in year t.  The aggregate flock of 
animals was assigned a constant coefficient of death by disease, old age and culling. By adding the 
number of animals that died to the difference between the animals in year t in relation to year t-1 
and the net exports of animals of the species, the number of lambs/kids maintained to make up the 
flock in year t was estimated. It was assumed that the remaining births were fed only until they 
reached a certain weight and where then killed for their meat and skin before the next enumeration 
of livestock. Constant volume transformation coefficients were assigned to slaughtered adults and 
young to estimate the production of meat and skin. Milk production was estimated based by a 
constant transformation coefficient based on the female animals older than a year. The model is 
quite successful, as in no year did the new animals born proved to be insufficient to cover the 
shortfall in population and provide surpluses for exports and meat. 
 
The estimation of beef was separated from the estimation of cow’s milk. The herd of milk cows and 
the production of milk extrapolated backwards using post-Second World War data. Beef and cattle 
skin were estimated in a similar way to sheep and goats. Pig production was not estimated in the 
same way due to the stock enumeration not differentiating between adult and young pigs; this is 
important as pigs bred over an 18 month cycle, leading to the model reaching implausible results. 
Instead it was assumed that since pork was reared for fat a constant breeding stock was kept and 
this piglet births were assumed constant. It was further assumed, based on Cypriot evidence that a 
quarter of the adult population of pigs would die or be killed each year and piglets were assumed to 
fill the gap of the enumerated population in year t. Any piglets remaining are assumed to be 
processed into meat. It is regrettable that the production of lard could not be estimated separately 
due to lack of data over the proportion of lard in the slaughtered meat of Cypriot pigs. 
 
                                                     
36
 Sources: Maule, J P, “The Breeding and Management of Sheep in Cyprus”, The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, 
December, Part 4, Vol. XXX (1935) p.88; “The Milk Yield of the Maltese and Native Goats”, The Cyprus Agricultural 
Journal, December, Part 4, Vol. XXXIII (1938); Constantinou, A, Ruminant Livestock Genetic Resources in Cyprus, 
(unpublished, 1981)  
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Although the model is a good method in estimating output, it is not as responsive to a sudden 
reduction of available fodder, and thus it may overestimate output in years of fodder scarcity. This 
is because the model assumes that births, deaths, the ratio of females of the flock and the amount of 
meat extracted are constant over the time period. Yet during period of drought most of these 
variables which are assumed constant are significantly away from the norm value. During drought 
there is a high prevalence of disease, while the wastage of the animals reduces meat and milk 
production
37
. During the Cypriot drought of 1931-1933 the production of meat declined: even 
though more animals are sent for slaughter by the farmers the emaciated animals gave a much lower 
meat yield
38
. The model does not take into account variables such as fodder availability, demand, 
weather, husbandry, nutrition, animal hygiene or the change of tastes of the consumer. If the animal 
hygiene is improved the constant transformation coefficients will underestimate production as may 
be fatter prior to slaughter. 
 
However, contemporary evidence seems to suggest that, the model is providing accurate results. 
The estimation of goat flesh might be overestimated in Malta, since contemporaries mention goats 
being kept for their milk and not for their flesh, which the British observer considered as not 
palatable
39
. However, the source was written from the standpoint of a British colonial officer and 
thus it may not reflect the eating habits of the Maltese. The statistical (blue) books of Cyprus or 
Malta did not record the price of goat meat but personal interviews suggest otherwise
40
.  
 
Cypriot meat production in 1938 is similar to output in 1946, despite the two estimates using 
different sources. The census states that the average annual slaughter was of 80,000 adult sheep and 
goats and 250,000 lambs and kids in the early 1940s
41
. The war did not allow for the increase of 
flocks, due to the decrease of available fodder as land was used for the more remunerative grains 
and imported fodder was prevented from arriving to the island
42
. The model’s results for 1938 were 
similar: 76,507 adult beasts and 232,825 lambs and kids were slaughtered for meat. In addition the 
1938 estimate and the 1946 census also produce similar results in terms of flock composition. Flock 
                                                     
37
 “Introduction”, The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, volume XXVIII, Part.1 (1933); for a discussion of the effects of 
drought on the cattle trade please see: Le Nay, Jean & Mathis, Jean , “The Impact of Drought on the National Accounts 
for Livestock in Sahelian Countries”, Income and Wealth, Series 35, No.2 pp. 209 - 224 
38
 “Introduction”, The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, volume XXVII, Part.1 (1932); “Introduction”, The Cyprus 
Agricultural Journal, volume XXVII, Part.2 (1932); 
39
 Grieve, N.S., Preliminary Report on an Agricultural Survey of Malta and Gozo with Specific Reference to Increased 
Food Production During War-time, (Malta: GPO, 1942) p.4 
40
 Interview with Mr. A., Polydorou, 27 Dec. 2006; Interview with Mr. G. Kyprianou, 18
th
 of July 2008. 
41
 Percival, Census... 1946 (1947), p.82 
42
 Source: National Archive, Cyprus. File: Statistical (Blue) Book, 1994, (Unpublished).  
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composition is important since in the model it determines the fertility the total flock, but these 
shares were estimated independently from the census. The ratio of males to the total adult 
population were estimated in 1938 as 0.04 for sheep and 0.065 for goats
43
. The 1946 census ratios 
were 0.032 and 0.071 respectively. The proportions of young animals as a proportion of the flock, 
which provide the replacement ratio of the flock, are also very similar, despite being constructed 
from different sources. In 1946 young animals represented 20% of sheep and goats while the 1938 
estimate has the ratio as 21.6%. Using the model to estimate the output of Cypriot meat production 
in 1946 led to very similar results to the 1946 census, with output being smaller by less than 3%. 
The fact that the 1938 estimate is similar while using different sources of information than the 1946 
census adds validity to the estimates. 
 
The estimates of Cypriot animal production were also checked with the limited data on municipal 
slaughter houses. In 1933 the colonial government initiated mandatory inspections, under guidance 
from the veterinary service, of the municipal slaughterhouses of the four largest cities: Nicosia, 
Larnaca, Limassol and Famagusta
44
. These four cities contained approximately 17.4% of the total 
population
45
. Data on the yearly slaughter of cattle, sheep and lambs, goat and kids and the total 
volume and value of meat is available from 1933 to 1938.  
 
The upper bound of domestic meat consumption was estimated by expanding the volume 
production of meat to the population as a whole, as cities were wealthier and could afford more 
meat. The slaughterhouse extrapolation for the whole population can be considered as an estimate 
maximum, since the slaughter houses served wealthy urban areas the consumption of meat was less 
in the rural areas. The average per capita production of meat for the period was assumed to be 
constant, and then was combined with the yearly estimates of population.  
                                                     
43
 The constant ratio for cattle is not included as it was calculated based on the 1946 census. 
44
 National Archives, London. Files: CO69/45 “Annual report of the director of agriculture for the year 1938” p.24 
45
 The same inspectors estimated that the population served in the cities totalled 69000 and the instercensal population 
estimate for 1938 was 307302.  
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Table A.15: Alternative estimates of Animal Production 
Title 
Estimated 
Animals 
Slaughtered 
1938  
(1) 
Enumerated Animals 
Slaughtered in urban area 
(17.37% of total 
Population) 
(2) 
Estimated Animals 
based on expanding 
results of urban area 
(100% of population) 
(3) 
Difference of 
estimated and urban 
area extrapolation 
(1) – (3) 
Sheep and Lambs 
Slaughtered 
166,738 67,676 389,614 -222,876 
Goat and Kids 
Slaughtered 
142,595 19,222 110,662 31,933 
Oxen Slaughtered 33,062 2,091 12,038 21,024 
Pigs 29,134 3,420 19,689  9,445 
Total Number of 
Animals 
Slaughtered 
371,529 92,409 532,003   -160,474 
Total Volume of 
meat (kg.) 
4,629,548 1,552,977 8,940,571  -4,311,023 
Volume of meat 
per capita 
11.65 22.5 22.5 -10.65 
Value of Meat (£) 293,181  102,096 587,772 -294,591 
Source: Table A.14; Cyprus, Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year 1938 (Nicosia: GPO, 1939) p.24. 
 
The returns indicate that the model estimates are within the upper bound of meat consumption: the 
number of both animals being killed and the meat that is extracted out of each animal was far higher 
in the slaughterhouses. In addition the implied weights of the slaughterhouses are substantially 
more than the weights recoded in the Cypriot agricultural journal and the Greek animals in 
Kostellenos et al.
46
. The meat estimated using the slaughter house method is far too high with a per 
capita consumption of 22kg. In addition, the model estimate is based on producer and not market 
prices. As a result, the animal slaughter value is double the model estimate for 1938. The large 
discrepancy is due to that fact that municipal slaughter houses dealt with a much wider section of 
the demand for meat than just the urban population. In Malta almost all slaughtering took place in 
two government slaughterhouses; thus it is likely that in Cyprus the villages would also bring the 
animals for butchery in the municipal slaughter houses. Thus the share of the population of the 
cities with municipal slaughterhouses is not representative to the amount of livestock slaughtered 
there
47
. The model is preferred to the use of the slaughterhouse data.  
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 Kostelenos et al., Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προιόν (2007)  pp.47 - 58 
47
 A serious weakness of the slaughterhouse method of estimations is that meat production is linked to the intercencal 
yearly growth of population and not with the stock of animals available for meat consumption. Thus even if livestock is 
completely decimated in a certain year the estimate will continue to show a rising trend of meat production; thus meat 
production has no relation with its input (of animals to be slaughtered). 
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Net Increase in Livestock 
The estimate of net increase in livestock, was estimated for both islands based on yearly 
enumerations of livestock, and the annual statistics of import and exports in the statistical (blue) 
book. For the period 1930–1938 there was only a bi-annual survey of horses, donkeys, oxen, mules 
and camels for Cyprus. Goats and sheep under a year at the time of enumeration and pigs younger 
than 3 months were not included in the enumeration
48
. The bi-annual change was evenly divided 
into the respective years in order to estimate the annual change of livestock production.  
 
Ancillary Production to Agriculture 
Ancillary Production on farm was calculated using direct volumes recorded by the blue books; thus 
Cyprus has estimates of butter and Halloumi (a Cypriot cheese), while Malta has estimates of 
sausage production in the veterinary department’s annual report49. Derivative grape products 
described above were also included in ancillary production to agriculture. 
 
Robustness of agricultural estimates 
It is a widely held view that one of the most significant problems in comparing historical national 
accounts is between differing methods used in estimating gross output. In order to evaluate the 
effect of the methodology described above, a second series of gross output was constructed where 
assumptions were kept to a minimum. This was estimated using the agricultural product of Cyprus 
since it was the series that was constructed using the most assumptions. The new series was based 
on only crop series for which data for the period 1921 – 1938 was complete and the animal 
production, which was estimated indirectly. Animal production was checked for plausibility 
separately and is described below. These new series represented 73% of the originally estimated 
value in 1938. Missing values were completed by assuming that the rate of growth the 73% was 
representative of the remaining 27% that was not estimated. Thus, this procedure eliminates the 
assumptions made in estimating citrus and grape products.  
 
The results are positive as the additional assumptions do not significantly alter the growth of GDP. 
The differences in the gross output are relatively small. The largest difference in gross output 
between the series is in 1922 Yet, with the exception of 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1927 the differential 
between the two series is less than ±2%.   
                                                     
48
 National Archives, London. File: CO69/40 “Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year 1929”  
49
 National Archives, London. File: CO161/118, 120, 121, 122, 1923. 1924, 125 “Annual report of the Public Health 
and Veterinary Department” 
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Figure A.1: Comparing agriculture estimates with series of minimal assumptions 
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Source: Statistical (Blue) Book; Own calculations, Chapter 4, Figure 4.1  
 
The animal production model is preferred to other estimation methods since it better captures the 
cycles of animal production mentioned in the literature. However alternative methods to estimate 
animal production have been used in HNA construction; these methods require less research but can 
operate under few assumptions. A new series was constructed by estimating the value of meat, skin, 
wool and milk in 1938 and divided by the number of animals in 1938 to calculate evaluate the 
transformation coefficient of meat per animal for the benchmark year. Then the numbers of animals 
in year were multiplied by the transformation coefficients for meat, milk, wool and skin. The net 
change in livestock and the production of cocoons was retained in this new series as they were 
directly estimated from primary evidence. The only assumptions used were those to estimate animal 
product output for 1938. 
 
An additional series was created by assuming that the value of livestock produced a constant rate of 
animal products to the rate of 30% per annum. This enables the elimination of the assumptions 
which were necessary to estimate animal products in 1938. The results are presented below: the two 
new series have low correlations to the estimate of gross animal production output or to the estimate 
of crop production. The new series does not fit with the known distress of the animal sector in the 
1930s. The series based on the gross output per enumerated animal exhibits violent yearly 
variations in output that seem implausible, while the series based directly on the value of livestock 
seems to miss time significant milestones in animal production. The series has its peaks and troughs 
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a year ahead of the animal model estimate. This is because of the unique nature of animals being 
both the stock and the final product; thus when many animals are slaughtered in a year the volume 
of animal products increases, while the total stock of animals decreases; the new estimate based on 
the stock of animals fails to take this into account. Thus the model used better encapsulates the 
yearly fluctuations of animal production, with important ramifications in the GDP growth rate. 
 
Figure A.2: Comparing animal estimates with series of minimised assumptions 
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Source: Table 1.14; Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books 1921-1938. 
 
Forestry 
Malta did not have forests; the pruning of trees created some leftovers that were used as firewood 
and their value and volume was recorded in the annual reports of the department of agriculture. 
These were included as forestry output for Malta. The forestry department was one of the first 
departments set up by the British administration in Cyprus; it was considered critical for the 
administration to introduce some level of forest management not practised under the Ottomans as 
the Cypriot forest area was a state asset. Thus a substantial amount of primary information was 
available. Forests were still important in Cyprus during the period due to the island’s dependence 
on wood fuel and the lack of alternative building materials. The forests of Cyprus were substantial 
relative to the island’s size: by 1939 the areas designated as forests still represented 18% of the land 
area of Cyprus
50
. The main areas of forest activities where on the central Troodos mountain range, 
although substantial firewood and charcoal was produced throughout the island. Less is known of 
                                                     
50
 Waterer, R.R., Cyprus: Empire Forests During the War 1939–1945, (Nicosia: GPO, 1946), Ch.1. 
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the production on the Pentadaktylos range as it was not directly placed within a forest management 
scheme at that time. The estimates were constructed by information provided in the annual reports 
of the forestry department as well as additional reports published by contemporary conservators of 
forests
51
.   
 
More than half of the total timber produced domestically was absorbed by the mining industry. The 
building trade also absorbed large amounts of timber, with less being used for carpentry. Firewood 
was the staple household energy source for the villages and as a fuel for industry. The largest 
company of Cyprus, the Cyprus Mines Corporation (CMC), was considered to be more technically 
advanced than other production facilities; yet in the mid-1920s all its energy needs where still 
satisfied by wood fuel
52
. Cypriot wood products were not considered to be good quality as CMC 
found imported timber superior
53
. Other industries, such as the lime burning industry, depended 
almost exclusively on domestic production of wood fuel
54
. As a result the total yield of Cypriot 
timber was not enough to satisfy the needs of the colony resulting to the colonial administration 
prohibiting the export of timber
55
. 
 
The forested area was also important for animal grazing with important animal grazing rights and 
permits provided for neighbouring villages. The collection of timber, charcoal and wood fuel also 
required licences. However such rights were usually provided for free, while a substantial number 
of herders illegally used the forest for fodder and for fuel collection.  
 
The main forestry products were timber and fuel. Classification of the products produced in Cypriot 
forests, changed over the period. Timber products were sometimes given in the amount of round, 
plank and sawn wood produced, while fuel could be divided into firewood and charcoal. In 
estimating timber production, all categories were merged into the ‘timber’ category as they were all 
measured in cubic feet without bark. In most years, there was an estimate of both private and 
government production in volume terms (usually in terms of cubic feet), as well as the revenue per 
product for the government production. Price data are scarce, with only the average price for timber 
is provided for the years 1933 to 1927. Minor products such as nursery seeds, forest fruit, tanning 
                                                     
51
 National Archives, London: File: CO69/38, 40, 42, 43, 45 “Annual Report of the Forest Administration in Cyprus”, 
for the years 1921–1938; Unwin, A.H,. Decennial Report of the Forest Administration in Cyprus for 1921–1931 
(Nicosia: Kosmos, 1932)  
52
 Lavender, D., The History… (1962) p.178 
53
 Ibid. p.192 
54
 National Archives, London: File: CO69/45 “Annual Report of the Forest Administration in Cyprus, 1938” p.14 
55
 Ibid. p.13 
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supplies, vegetable oils, canes and spices are provided in aggregate value terms without additional 
information in terms of prices or volumes
56
. Thus the minor forest products were deflated to 
constant prices based on a Paasche Price index of the major timber products.  
 
The lack of price information on the input and output of forestry does not allow for double 
deflation; the series is deflated by deriving value added in volume and multiplied by imputed 1938 
prices. The prices were calculated by comparing the volume produced by forestry product and the 
revenue received by government for that product in order to have an average price per cubic foot.  
 
Estimates for 1921 were also included some of the estimates for 1922 since the department moved 
from the administrative reporting year to the calendar year. The estimates for the 15 month period 
1921 -1922 were modified by removing 3/15 of the production to 1922 (which only has estimates 
for 9 months of the year), thus annualising production figures. The data reported increased over 
time so by 1929 there were recorded volumes of timber equivalent in trees, round wood. No attempt 
has been made to extrapolate such estimates backwards due to lack of additional information; thus 
the increase in production is partly due to more extensive recording of timber production.   
 
In classifying timber production, it was considered necessary to modify the ESA 1995 directives. 
The ESA NACE Rev.2 nomenclature requires the separation of support activities to agriculture and 
forestry
57
. However such support services were impossible to be separated: thus fire fighting was 
included in the service sector and not in the forestry sector. 
                                                     
56
 Ibid. Table II; Table IV 
57
 Eurostat, NACE Rev.2:Structure and Explanatory Notes as seen 26/11/2007  
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nacecpacon/info/data/en/index.htm  
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Appendix E: Detailed Methodology of Manufacturing and Handicraft estimates 
 
Sources  
The manufacturing sector output of Cyprus and Malta was estimated primarily by using information 
from the statistical (blue) books and censuses. The statistical blue books provided information over 
the number of establishments, the number of persons employed, the cost of materials used, the 
quantity produced and the values of the products. The information on manufacturing industries 
within the blue books is somewhat patchy and by no means exhaustive as the statistical (blue) 
books only enumerated factories and small manufacturing establishments. As a result, there are 
some industries which were not covered due to the manufacturing process taking place within the 
household.  
 
This data was not sufficient to estimate all of manufacturing and handicraft production using the 
output approach. All handicrafts and some formal manufacturing industries had to be estimated 
using the income approach. Even when the output approach was used, some assumptions were still 
necessary due to the lack of sufficient information over the nature of the manufacturing processes. 
Although sales of goods are recorded in the statistical (blue) books, there is no information on the 
yearly change of stock or on goods sold which were actually bought for re-sale. Thus it was 
necessary to assume that companies began and ended the accounting period with a constant level of 
inventories, and that all goods sold were produced on-site.  
 
Manufacturing in Cyprus 
For Cyprus, there was sufficient information in the statistical blue books to estimate the value added 
of for the benchmark year 1938 and the yearly volumes for sixteen industries, two of which were 
included in the agricultural, rather than the manufacturing sector
1
. The value added per unit created 
in 1938, was assumed to be constant and applied to the yearly volume produced to estimate a yearly 
value added in 1938 constant prices. As a result, it is assumed that there was no technological 
change affecting the ratio of value added to total output during the 1921–1938 for those industries.  
 
For an additional six industries it was possible to combine information available in the statistical 
(blue) books with other qualitative and quantitative material and thus create estimates based on the 
                                                     
1 The sixteen industries were: gypsum factories, potteries, brick & tile factories, oregano oil factories, tanneries, cotton 
ginning, tobacco, mineral water factories, soap factories, macaroni factories, ice factories, carob crushing factories, 
jam factories, citrus oil & juice factory, wine production and cheese. Wine and cheese making were estimated in the 
agricultural sector as it was not possible to separate farmer production form modern distillery production.  
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inputs used by these industries
2
. The industries were central to the rural-urban trade, and were 
important in complementing rural incomes. Not including flour milling and bread making would 
exclude a large part of within-household manufacture, where the majority of food processing took 
place. Similarly the silk industry was an auxiliary activity for rural female labour and acted as an 
important supplement to rural incomes; this was not captured by occupation statistics of the period, 
as census officials only recorded the primary occupation of the interviewee.  
 
Milling and Baking 
Milling and baking were significantly large sections of the manufacturing sector. The output 
estimate of milling was constructed by estimating the wheat available to be milled. The total 
quantity of wheat produced in a year was added to the imports of wheat in order to estimate the total 
amount of wheat in a year. The retained seed and exports were subtracted and the remaining wheat 
was converted into flour, semolina flour and bran, based on qualitative sources on milling in 
Cyprus, cross-checked by the conversion ratio used in research on Ottoman Macedonia in the early 
20
th
 century
3
. The value of the wheat to be milled in 1938 prices was estimated as intermediate 
consumption of milling; the value of the milled products (bran, semolina, flour) in 1938 producer 
prices was estimated as the gross output. The subtraction of the intermediate consumption from the 
gross output created a yearly value added of the milling industry.  
 
The output of bread baking was estimated using the volume of flour as an input. The total quantity 
of flour milled in a year (after removing exports) was added to the flour imported to estimate the 
total amount of flour to be baked into bread; it was arbitrarily assumed that 10% of the total flour 
was used to make other products. Although the proportion of flour removed is arbitrary, the amount 
is plausible as bread was an essential part of urban and rural diet in Cyprus, dominating the use of 
flour
4
. It was difficult to convert bread into a measure of weight or volume; it was assumed that 100 
okes of flour provided 150 okes of bread based on the addition of water and other baking material. 
The value of the flour converted into bread in 1938 prices was estimated as intermediate 
consumption; the value of the bread baked in 1938 retail prices was estimated as the gross output. 
                                                     
2 The six industries are: flour milling, bread making, rope factories, ship building, silk making (spinning, weaving and 
goods manufacture), and cotton spinning.  
3 The conversion ratio given for Cypriot hard wheat for every 100 okes of wheat milled the miller produced 75 okes of 
flour, 22 okes of bran and 3 okes of semolina. Source: “Cereal Crops”, The Cyprus Agricultural Journal, Vol.XXXII 
Part.1 (March 1937). In Ottoman Macedonia in the early 20
th
 century, every 1 kilogram of hard wheat produced 750 
grams of flour and 250 grams of bran. Source: Akarli, A.O., in Pamuk and Williamson The Mediterranean Response... 
(2000) p.127  
4  Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life... (1930) p.20  
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Due to the lack of data over the consumption of wood, fuel consumed during baking was arbitrarily 
assumed to cost 20% of the gross output in order for the total cost of fuel to rise in step with the 
volume of bread produced. The cost of fuel is added to the cost of flour and subtracted from the 
gross output to estimate baking value added.  
 
Silk Production 
The production of silk in Cyprus was estimated separately for government silk filatures, non-
government filatures and domestically produced silk goods. Data from the statistical (blue) books 
was combined with data for cocoons from the annual reports of the agricultural department to create 
a flow diagram of inputs and uses
5
. The sources provided data that was sometimes conflicting; in 
order to resolve these conflicts it was necessary to introduce some assumptions. It was assumed that 
the cocoons not kept as seed were divided into three markets which were mutually exclusive: most 
cocoons were made into silk cloth in households, some were bought by merchants and some bought 
by the government silk filature. Those cocoons bought by merchants were either exported or made 
into silk goods by households on a piece-rate system.  
 
The silk produced within households was estimated as a residual to the total number of cocoons 
produced in a year. After subtracting the cocoons kept as seed, and the cocoons converted into silk 
by merchants and the government silk filature, the residual was converted into silk cloth by 
assuming that 1 oke of cocoons led to 0.255 oke of cloth. The conversion ratio assumed that 
homemade production was 15% less productive than merchant made silk, as the best cocoons were 
controlled by the merchants through agreements with the cocoon producers. The value of cocoons 
spun at home in 1938 prices was considered as intermediate consumption, while the value of silk 
cloth in 1938 prices was considered as the gross output. The value added was estimated as the 
subtraction of intermediate consumption for gross output.  
                                                     
5 The cocoons as reported in the agricultural production per annum were divided in the cocoon’s uses. The number of 
cocoons kept for next year’s agricultural production were given in the agricultural department’s annual report for 
1928-1938; cocoons bred for centipedes for 1921–1927 were based on the average number of eggs kept for production 
1928-1938. Sources: National Archives, London CO69/38,40,42,43,45 “Annual Report of the Department of 
Agriculture” years 1921-1938. 
A54 
 
 
Table A.16 Silk Estimation Method in Cyprus 
Inputs Uses Products To be Estimated in 
Manufacturing Output 
 Kept for next year Seed  
 Home Silk Production Non - 
Merchant Silk 
Production 
Non - Merchant Silk 
Production 
Cocoons  
Bought by Merchants 
Export of 
Cocoons 
 
Reeled into 
Thread by 
Merchants 
Merchant Silk Filatures 
Made into Silk 
Goods 
Merchant Raw Silk 
 Government Filature Reeled into 
Thread in the 
Government 
Filature 
Government Sponsored 
Silk Filature 
 
Primary data indicates that some cocoons were bought by merchants and then divided into three 
uses. There is data on the number of cocoons reeled into thread and it was necessary to assume that 
all exports of raw cocoons were given by the merchant purchased cocoons. The cocoons that were 
made into silk goods by merchants were calculated as a residual of exported or reeled into thread
6
. 
The residual was converted into cloth by assuming that 1 oke of cocoons made 0.3 oke of cloth. The 
silk filatures operated by the merchants were assumed to convert 1 oke of cocoons to 0.7 oke of 
thread. The value added of the silk thread and cloth in 1938 constant prices was estimated by 
subtracting the value the cocoons used from the gross output of silk goods produced.  
 
The government provided substantial incentives for the establishment of a private filature in Paphos 
in 1923. Cyprus was the second most important silk-producing country in the British Empire, and 
the rearing of silk-worms was an important source of income for rural households in Nicosia, 
Paphos and Karpasia. The filature was intended to act as a showcase for young women in order to 
improve the quality and quantity of silk thread produced
7
. The filature was not successful as it could 
not procure enough cocoons because merchants bonded production by providing credit prior to the 
                                                     
6 Data on the cocoons reeled into thread are available from 1929–1938. It is assumed that for the missing data the 
average cocoons used for thread in the period 1929 to 1938 is broadly representative of the period.  
7 National Archives, London CO69/38, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year 1923, 
“Sericulture”  
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consignment of silk goods; as a result the government filature run on imported cocoons
8
. The 
filature closed in 1931 and partially re-opened until its permanent closure in 1934. Enough data is 
available to estimate intermediate consumption, and gross output in current prices, and thus create a 
yearly series of value added in current prices. In order to deflate the value added in 1938 prices the 
price of raw silk was used as a deflator.  
 
The assumption of mutual exclusivity does lead to problems. The residual nature home production 
means that sometimes there were not enough cocoons for home production after subtracting all 
other uses. More research on the nature of the silk industry is needed in order to construct a more 
reliable estimate.  
 
Rope and Thread 
Rope and cotton thread output were estimated using the respective inputs of hemp and cotton. Rope 
was estimated on the input of hemp used to produce rope. The quantity of domestically produced 
hemp and imported hemp were added. The need to keep some hemp for seed was removed by the 
sum and the remaining hemp was converted into rope. The conversion ratio used was one oke of 
hemp to one of rope. The value of the hemp to be converted into rope in 1938 prices was estimated 
as intermediate consumption; the value of the rope created in 1938 retail prices was estimated as the 
gross output. The subtraction of the intermediate consumption from the gross output created a 
yearly series to the value added of rope. Cotton spinning was calculated by subtracting cotton 
exports and cotton to be used as seed from the domestic cotton produced and assuming a conversion 
ratio of cotton to thread of 1 oke of ginned cotton to 0.8 okes of cotton thread. The value of cotton 
thread is estimated as gross output and the cost of raw cotton was estimated as the intermediate 
consumption, and an identical process was repeated for spinning in Malta.  
 
Boatbuilding 
There was enough data for the production of small boats in current prices and was deflated using a 
Paasche price index of forest products to 1938 factor prices. However the output was minimal, 
being less than 1% of GDP. 
                                                     
8 National Archives, London CO69/40, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year 1929, “The Silk 
Industry”  
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Other Products  
The statistical (blue) books also provided sufficient information in order to estimate value added for 
the 1938 benchmark for thirteen other industries, but not enough to estimate yearly output due to 
gaps in the data series
9
. A thorough analysis of yearly exports and qualitative sources was 
undertaken to evaluate the starting year of such production in Cyprus; as a result, yearly output of 
such industries was only calculated if sufficient evidence was available that such industries were in 
production during the calculated year. Value added was extrapolated backwards from the 
benchmark year by assuming the growth rate of these industries was similar to the average for 
which annual value added output was known. Such industries did not constitute a large section of 
the total manufacturing output, as the proportion to the total manufacturing and handicraft sector 
was only 3.4%.  
 
Handicraft Industry in Cyprus 
The output estimation described above comprised of the most important manufacturing activities of 
Cyprus during the interwar period that took place within factories or small enterprise 
establishments. It confirms that industrialisation in Cyprus was low: there were no significant heavy 
industries, nor were they any dynamic industries created during the period, despite the overall 
increase in manufacturing production. However with the exception of bread baking, rope making 
and oil making, the traditional handicraft and small scale manufacturing activities were not taken 
into account. Information for smaller industries such as basket makers, lace workers and furniture 
workers was not recorded in the statistical (blue) books. In order to estimate the output of the 
handicraft industry, a compromise was necessary as output needed to be estimated by the less 
reliable occupation statistics.  
 
In estimating historical GDP, a researcher is highly conscious of the trade-off between accurate 
results and extensive coverage of sectors. This is particularly the case for estimating output using 
the production approach for the handicraft and the service sectors, where any information will be 
sporadic and incomplete. There is no uniform approach in how to estimate the output of the 
handicraft sector: some researchers do not make specific attempts to include it due to the 
inconsistency of using occupational statistics with estimating output from the production approach, 
                                                     
9 For these thirteen industries some or all quantity estimates except 1938 were missing: boot cream factories, button 
manufacture, broom manufacture, artificial teeth manufacture, foundries, cement tile factories, toothpaste & cleaning 
powder factories, hosiery factories, sumac processing factories, flax schutching mills, oil works, breweries, and gum 
manufacture.  
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or are confident that the manufacturing indicators encompass their handicrafts sector
10
. Hjerppe 
painstakingly estimates the handicraft sector using the production approach, supported by extensive 
research on the manufacturing and handicraft history
11
. Schulze follows Komlos in assuming that 
the handicraft sector is the one fifth of the manufacturing, mining and construction industries, and 
extrapolates yearly value added by using a weighted index of the manufacturing and the 
construction sector
12
. Ivanov estimates crafts from census occupations multiplied by annual 
earnings based on wages for masons, journeymen and apprentices; this is supplemented by 
multiplying the number of females of working age with the average number of days spent for work 
from home based on peasant account books and contemporary surveys; Johnson also estimates 
crafts from census occupations multiplied by annual earnings
13
. It was considered that an attempt to 
estimate the handicraft industry was necessary in order to fully capture the output of Cyprus, while 
being sensitive to the limitations of the data sources available. A similar method to Johnson was 
used: the gross wages were estimated using census and wage data, and then converted to value 
added by using industry specific wages to value added ratios. The end result is certainty an 
underestimate as great care was taken to eliminate any double counting.  
 
There is information on thirty seven occupations that were not enumerated in the industries 
estimated above; however goldsmiths, printers and book makers were excluded in order to maintain 
the estimate as one of the handicraft industry
14
. The 1931 census provides information on 
occupations divided by sex and the number of assistants per occupation. It is unfortunate that the 
census does not provide vital information on whether the person interviewed was actually in 
employment at the time when the interview was taken; since the censuses took place during the 
great depression, it was deemed important to somehow account for the unemployment within the 
stated occupations. Due to the lack of data of unemployment within stated occupations in Cyprus, it 
was assumed that the unemployment within each occupation as stated in Malta was representative 
                                                     
10 Prados De la Escosura, “Spain’s Gross Domestic Product” … (1993), p.23, pp. 28 – 30; Κωστελένος, et al, (2007); 
p.93 Kostelenos, Money and Output…(1995) p.175 - 176  
11 Hjerppe,  Finland’s Historical National Accounts, (1996) pp.33 -34  
12 Schulze, “Re-estimating Austrian GDP, 1870–1913…” (1997) p.12; Schulze, “Patterns of Growth and Stagnation… 
(2000) p.335  
13 Ivanov, “Bulgarian National Income 1892 – 1924…” (unpublished), Appendix A; Ivanov, & Tooze, “Convergence 
or Decline...” (2007) p.679, p.694; Jonsson., G., “The GDP of Iceland 1870 – 1945”in Grytten (ed.), Nordiske 
Historiske Nasjonalregnskaper (1999), p.10  
14 The thirty four industries are: candle making, wreath making, musical instrument making, mattress makers, 
carpenters, cabinet makers, chair makers, cart builders, agricultural implement makers, coopers, blacksmiths, 
toolmakers, cutlers, farriers, gun makers, confectionery makers, dry meats preservers, lime processors, gypsum 
manufacturers, comb makers, embroiderers, hand knitters, lace makers, book binders, cardboard box makers, basket 
makers, reed plaiters, milliners, sock makers, tailors, dress makers, fishing net makers, carpet makers.  
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to Cyprus. Thus the stated occupation statistics of 1931 were assumed to suffer a rate of 
unemployment of 5% based on the unemployment within industrial occupations in 1931 in Malta
15
. 
As the census classified occupations rather than establishments, great care was taken not to have 
any occupations that were already enumerated in manufacturing activities. Thus in order to 
minimise the possibility of double counting, all foundry work as well as work relating to cotton 
preparation was excluded. Therefore, the important handicraft industry of cotton weavers and 
spinners was excluded as the census did not establish how many worked in cotton spinning factories 
(enumerated using the output approach) and how many worked in the handicrafts sector.  
 
People in handicraft occupations in 1931 were assigned daily manufacturing wages of 1938 as 
provided by the 1938 statistical (blue) book. The book provides different wage rates for sectors of 
the economy (including manufacturing) for skilled labour, unskilled, labour, and wages for women 
and young apprentices. Such daily wages were converted into yearly incomes (after adding non-
monetary returns) based on Surridge’s account of public holidays and conditions of work in 1929
16
. 
The manufacturing wage was reduced by 10% to create a wage differential between formal 
manufacturing and the handicraft sector. The number of males was multiplied by a male wage, and 
the women with a much lower female wage.  
 
The estimate of wages in the handicraft sector in 1938 prices is not an estimate of value added. 
Although the majority of value added is assigned to wages in small industries, the existence of 
capital expenditure and profits are also important. Results were compared to Felner’s wage / gross 
output estimates for early 20
th
 century Hungary as well as wage to value added estimates of Cypriot 
manufacturing industries calculated with the output approach in an attempt to extract value added 
estimates. The relation of real wages to gross output in the national income estimate in 1950 was 
also consulted to provide an accurate picture of the relation between total wages and value added.  
 
Thus the wage estimated would be supplemented by the capital and profit of the handicraft industry 
to estimate value added
17
. Based on the observations in Table A.17, it was decided that the total 
                                                     
15 Malta, Census... 1931 (1932) p.xxxiv “Unemployment”. For manufacturing which also involved a large retail 
element, such as tailoring, dressmaking, millinery, boot making, confectionery making and mattress making, the 
lower commercial sector unemployment rate of 3% was assigned, as these sectors are more related to the commercial 
sectors of the economy.  
16 Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life... (1930) p.24; Daily wages were commuted to yearly wages by excluding 23 
religious holidays and Sundays.  
17 Source: Friedrich Felner, “Das Volksvermögen Österreichs and Ungarns” (1915); Cyprus, National Income... 
(1951)p.5; See table A.13. 
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wages in 1931 represented an aggregate 70% of the total value added. Such an estimate is very 
conservative as it represents the lower estimates based on Table A.17.  
 
Table A.17: Comparisons of total wage to gross output and value added. 
Author and 
Country (Date) 
 
Felner – 
Hungary 
(1911) 
Felner – 
Hungary 
(1911) 
Statistical 
Office - 
Cyprus (1950) 
Own Estimates on 
similar industries - 
Cyprus (1931) 
Industry 
Weight in 
Handicrafts 
Wage / 
Value 
Added
* 
Wage / Gross 
Output 
Wage / Value 
Added 
Wage/ Value 
Added 
Carpenters  0.206 20.7 32.5 26.9 N / A 
Dress Makers 0.195 50.4 20 9.9 N / A 
Boot Makers 0.195 88.5 19 22.7 N / A 
Lace Makers 0.103 48.6 30  N / A 
Tailors 0.082 50.4 20 9.9 N / A 
Blacksmithing 0.044 49.9 24.7 40.2 N / A 
Tool Makers of 
Machines and 
Tools 
0.031 39.5 25 40.2 N / A 
Basket Makers 0.021 20.7 22.5  76.8 
Saddlers 0.016 88.5 N / A 27.4 66.9 
Confectionery 
Makers 
0.015 40.5 N / A 15.1 N / A 
* Felner’s Wages/value added ratios are only provided for large groups of industries (i.e. metal production, clothing, 
textiles, wood) and are not as representative as the wage to gross output ratios. 
Sources: Felner, “Das Volksvermögen Österreichs and Ungarns” (1915); Cyprus, National Income: Product, Income, 
Expenditure 1950 (Statistics Section, Secretariat, 1951), p.5; Estimates based on Appendix B.  
 
The benchmark estimates of the censuses were extrapolated into annual figures using the growth 
rate of the formal manufacturing industry. As Schulze has pointed out, when there is no evidence of 
a decline of the handicraft sector in absolute or relative terms it is best to assume that formal 
manufacturing output and handicraft output grew at the same rate
18
. This is confirmed by the census 
occupation statistics: it is clear that at least in absolute terms occupation in the handicraft sector was 
increasing
19
. Thus the growth rate of the formal manufacturing sector is used to extrapolate the 
yearly output of the handicrafts sector.  
 
Robustness of the Cypriot manufacturing estimate 
In order to check for the plausibility of the results, counterfactual scenarios were established 
regarding the growth of the industries whose output was not directly estimated. The group of 
                                                     
18 Schulze, “Patterns of Growth and Stagnation… (2000), p.335  
19 Handicraft occupation s in Cyprus increased by an annual rate of growth of 1.79% in 1921-1931, and 1.26% in 
1931-1946. The respective population growth rates where 1.13% and 1.91% respectively. Sources: Hart-Davis, 
Cyprus... Census of 1921, (1922); Hart-Davis, Cyprus... Census of 1931 (1932); Percival, Cyprus...1946 (1947) 
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companies for which only a benchmark for 1938 could be established, as well as the industries 
whose output was extrapolated using census results were assumed to develop under four scenarios:  
a) they were assumed to grow as the average growth rate of the known industries (the 
procedure used above)  
b)  they were assumed to remain constant (i.e. no growth),  
c)  they were assumed to grow at half the overall growth rate for 1921 – 1938 of the known 
industries 
d) they were assumed to grow twice as fast the overall growth rate of the known industries.  
 
If one compares the values of estimate a) with the counterfactual scenarios b), c) and d), one can 
evaluate how large is the possible error if the indirectly estimated output did not follow the average 
rate of growth. The results are very encouraging: the differences between the estimation and the 
alternative scenarios are very small. With doubling and halving the growth rate, the difference 
between the estimated value and the counterfactual estimates is under 5%. When assuming that the 
output was constant, the maximum difference is 11.5%. If one averages the annual differences 
between the estimated and the counterfactual values the difference is less than 1.4% of the 
originally estimated value for all series. Thus the estimation is considered relatively accurate; 
changing the growth parameters for the indirectly estimated industries does not significantly alter 
the estimated results. 
 
The proportion of manufacturing to total output can be compared with the proportion of 
manufacturing employment in total employment in order further ensure the plausibility of the 
estimates. The results are encouraging: the share of total employment was falling as the relative 
contribution of manufacturing and handicrafts sector to GDP was declining. The labour productivity 
of manufacturing is also not implausible.   
 
Manufacturing in Malta 
The estimate of the manufacturing sector output in Malta for 1921-1938 was more difficult due to 
much more limited primary data in the statistical (blue) books. The books inform the researcher on 
what manufacturing activities were present, but not with enough information to allow an estimate 
based on the output approach. As a result, the estimate for Malta was much more reliant on indirect 
estimation, mainly through known inputs and through extrapolating value added by the total wage 
bill. Milling and bread making was estimated in the same way as in Cyprus. It was necessary to 
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assume that the wheat milled in Malta had an identical conversion ratio to wheat milled in Cyprus. 
This is plausible as both countries cultivated similar types of hard wheat. Cotton thread production 
was also estimated using the method explained for Cyprus above.  
 
Canning, Chocolate and Beer 
It was possible to estimate seven industries by using domestic production and import data of raw 
materials
20
. Pasting and canning of tomatoes was estimated by removing all exported tomatoes from 
the domestic production, as there were no imports of raw tomatoes for pasting / canning. It was 
estimated that 2/3 of the tomato crop was processed, and the tomatoes were assigned to either 
pasting or canning based on the basis of an estimated ratio
21
. The conversion ratio for tomato 
pasting used was 5 cwt of tomatoes for 1 cwt of tomato paste and 3 cwt for 1 cwt of canned 
tomatoes. The value of the tomatoes pasted / canned in 1938 prices was estimated as intermediate 
consumption of the process; the value of the outputs in 1938 retail prices was estimated as the gross 
output. The subtraction of the intermediate consumption from the gross output created a yearly 
value added of the industries. Chocolate production was estimated based on imports of cocoa, and 
beer was estimated using the number of import of hops as neither hops nor cocoa were produced in 
Malta. The industries estimated using output approaches constituted 25.6% of the total 
manufacturing sector. Thus a much smaller percentage of manufacturing in Malta could be 
estimated directly than Cyprus, leading to a greater margin of error in the Maltese manufacturing 
output. 
 
Due to the lack of direct output data, the remaining manufacturing sector production was on 
different principles.  An extensive use of statistics within the statistical (blue) books and in the 
censuses formed the basis for indirectly estimating the remaining manufacturing industry. Thirty 
one industries were estimated using the statistical (blue) books occupation statistics multiplied by 
the wages in 1938 in order to produce total wage estimates
22
.  For the years where the occupational 
statistics were missing, the total wage estimate (in 1938 wages) were annualized based on the 
                                                     
20 The seven industries estimated are: canned tomatoes, tomato paste, milling, bread making, chocolate production, 
beer production and cotton spinning  
21 The respective assigned weights are 57% for pasting and 43% for canning: it was estimated by assuming that the 
number of tomatoes processes was proportional to the number of persons employed.  
22
 The thirty one industries are: fruit preserving factories, ice manufacturing, ice cream manufacturing, bran and forage 
milling, turkish delight, mineral water manufacturing, cigarettes, cigars, shirt factories, cap sewing, gilders, printing , 
caustic soda making, carbonic acid gas creation, soap manufacture, fireworks making, orange flower distilling, glass 
mirror manufacture, earthenware manufacture, lime factories, cement title manufacture, metal pipe factory, foundries, 
tinsmiths, metal polish factories, chromium plating, upholstery, boat building, gold and silver smiths, buttons 
manufacture and the Royal Naval l Dockyard, the most important manufacturing establishment on Malta.   
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growth rate of the intermediate goods imports in Malta; the reason for choosing intermediate 
consumption was that most of Malta’s manufacturing was dependent in inputs from abroad as the 
basic inputs for the manufacturing industry (metal, chemical, lubrication and power) were imported 
due to the lack of a heavy industry base. The total wage bill, estimated in constant 1938 wages, was 
assumed to represent 70% of the total value added. The formal manufacturing industries estimated 
using blue book occupation statistics (and excluding the Royal Navy Dockyard) was 13% of the 
total manufacturing and handicraft value added in 1938.  
 
The Royal Navy Dockyard 
The Royal Navy Dockyard was the most important industrial establishment in Malta
23
. Ever since 
the occupation of Malta by the British, the dockyard at the Grand Harbour was enlarged and its 
facilities were upgraded: by the interwar period the Malta HM dockyard was the only station 
between Gibraltar and Singapore capable of repairing the capital ships of Her Majesty’s Navy24. 
The dockyard and the naval station dominated the economy directly through employment for the 
naval services and the dockyard, and indirectly by providing washing, entertainment and retail 
services to the sailors visiting Malta
25
. It is argued by some that the existence of the dockyard 
increasingly acted as a double edged blade; the importance of the Royal Navy and its dockyard both 
reduced possibilities for diversification and increased Malta’s reliance on outside sources of finance 
for its wellbeing
26
. 
 
Despite the consensus among contemporaries and historians over the pivotal role of the dockyard to 
Maltese welfare, there has not been an attempt to estimate its benefits to Malta in a quantitative 
way. This is partly due to the lack of definite accounts of the dockyard: despite being the larger 
employer in Malta, the dockyard was not subject to the Maltese self-government’s jurisdiction, and 
financial records in the British Admiralty Office papers (ADM) for the Maltese dockyard were not 
found. Archival work did provide some information over rates of pay, workers employed and 
capital infrastructure work on the dockyard during the interwar period, but it did not provide output 
of repaired ships or the total expenditure of the British Government on the dockyard
27
. Such 
                                                     
23
 Abela, Malta (1963), p.2 
24
 Pratt, East of Malta West of Suez...(1975) p.121 
25
 Ellul, “Maltese Imperial Mentalities” (1998) pp. 95- 114, p.101 - 109 
26
  Fenech, Responsibility and Power… (2005) p.8; Frendo, H.,, “Everyday Life in ‘British Malta’”, Storjia 1996, p.37 – 
47, p.39; Cassar, C.,, “Everyday Life in Malta in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” in Mallia-Milanes, V., The 
British Colonial... (1988), pp.91 – 126, p.116 
27
 For rates of pay see: Dockyard and Imperial Workers Union (Malta), Memorandum (Valletta: Empire Press, 1943); 
National Archives, London. File: ADM 116/5290, “Pay and Bonus Rates Locally Entered Workmen at Malta”, 1936-
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information was supplemented by other sources: the annual reports for the labour department, 
published and unpublished studies of the dockyard, and archive material enabled accurate data on 
the structure of employment and the wages given to dockyard workers
28
.  
 
As a result of such efforts, an average annual employment to the dockyard was re-constructed. The 
average employment was multiplied by a dockyard wage that was constructed taking into account 
all the available evidence: it is 10% more than the metal working occupations to take into account 
the documented wage gap differential towards other metal workers and government clerks
29
. The 
total wages as estimated in 1938  were then assumed to represent a conservative estimate of 70% of 
the value added of the dockyard throughout the period: as a result the dockyard value added was 
estimated as 45.2% of the total manufacturing sector of Malta, dominating the manufacturing sector 
of the island.  
 
A more accurate value added measurement for the dockyard would be desirable: although the 
estimate above does take into account changes in worker participation, it does not consider the 
reduction of working hours that the dockyard enforced at times of distress
30
. At the same time, the 
estimate fails to take into account the considerable additional capital expenditure invested in the 
dockyard: a new floating dock was introduced, oil storage tanks were constructed and new 
hydraulic machines were installed
31
.  
 
Handicrafts in Malta 
The handicraft sector of Malta was estimated by extrapolating inter-censal employment rates using 
the census data for 1921, 1931 and 1948. Extreme care was taken not to introduce double counting 
in the estimates
32
. The 1931 census provides information of within-occupation unemployment for 
1921 and 1931. Unemployment figures were annualized using the inter-censal growth rates for the 
period 1921–1931. For the period 1931 to 1938 it was assumed that unemployment per sector was 
                                                                                                                                                                                
1937, 1940-1944, 1945; ADM 116/3660 “Malta: Pay of locally-entered Dockyard Industrial Workpeople”, 1932-
1933; ADM 116/5269 “Malta Dockyard: Employees' Improved Scale of Wages, Conditions of Service, etc”, 1928-
1930, 1934-1938, 1945; ADM 1/20578  “Locally Entered Workpeople Employed on Dockyard Craft Malta: Rates of 
Pay”. 
28
 Sources: National Archive, London. File: CO 161/120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125 Annual report of the Labour Office, 
Malta; Fenech, Responsibility and Power… (2005) p.251; Ellul, M., H.M. Naval Dockyard, (2004) p.42; Cassar, 
“Every day life in Malta..” (1988), p.95 
29
 Frendo, “Everyday Life in ‘British Malta’” (1996) p.39 
30
 Bonnici, & Cassar, The Malta Grand Harbour... (1994) p.115; Ellul, H.M. Naval Dockyard, Malta (2004) p.41 
31
 Bonnici & Cassar, The Malta Grand Harbour… (1994), pp.215 -216 
32
 The existence of shirts and caps factories resulted to a necessary reduction of tailors and milliners by 40% to avoid 
possible double counting. Other handicraft industries that were partially enumerated in the formal manufacturing 
sector were removed. 
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declining until an increase in 1936, whereupon it continued its previous declining trend. The 
number of employed per occupation were multiplied by the respective handicraft yearly wage in 
1938: it was assumed that handicraft wages were 10% less than formal manufacturing in order to 
take into account lower levels of productivity. This procedure was not possible to reproduce for 
Cyprus, since the occupational classifications were changed in each census. The handicrafts sector 
value added was 17.2% of the manufacturing and handicraft value added in 1938
33
.  
 
Robustness of the Maltese Estimates 
In order to check for the possible accuracy of the Maltese results, counterfactual scenarios identical 
to scenarios for Cyprus have been used to evaluate the plausibility of the indirectly estimated 
manufacturing output. The group of companies for which only a benchmark for 1938 could be 
established, as well as the industries whose output was extrapolated using census results were 
assumed to develop under four scenarios:  
a) they were estimated as described above 
b) they were assumed to remain constant (i.e. no yearly growth and the value added equal to 
their estimate for the benchmark year for the period 1921-1938 
c) they were assumed to grow at half the overall growth rate for 1921–1938 of the known 
industries 
d) they were assumed to grow twice as fast as the overall growth rate of the known industries. 
If one compares the values of estimate a) with the counterfactual scenarios of estimates b), c) and 
d), one can evaluate how large is the possible error if the indirectly estimated output behave 
differently from the average growth of the directly estimated output. The results are less 
encouraging than robustness tests for Cyprus, due to the limited number of directly estimated output 
and the extensive use of occupational data in Malta. In all three scenarios (no growth, double 
growth of half the growth of the estimated total) the final differences are large, with up to 37% 
difference from the estimated value. If one averages the annual differences between the estimated 
and the counterfactual values the differences are: b) 14% c) 5.9% d) 12.5%. This is because Malta’s 
estimated manufacturing output was too heavily reliant on indirect sources of output estimation. 
Although the estimate of the manufacturing value added is not as robust as for Cyprus, it is the best 
estimate one can calculate for Malta at the present time; more research is needed into the input-
output structure of the interwar Maltese economy in order to provide a more accurate estimate of 
the manufacturing sector. The occupation statistics indicate that the value added in manufacturing 
                                                     
33
 The percentages of the four different estimating procedures result in 101% of the total value added; this is due to the 
rounding up of the percentages to three significant figures. 
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has been a conservative estimate as labour productivity per worker is higher in manufacturing 
industries, but seem to correspond to sector remaining stable in terms of output and employment
34
.  
                                                     
34
 Cassar, “Everyday Life in Malta…” (1988), pp.91 – 126, p.116 
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Appendix F: Detailed Methodology of Construction and Implied Rental Income 
Estimates 
Construction 
 
Malta, Sources and Estimates 
The problematic living conditions in Malta were apparent in the overcrowded conditions of the 
conurbations around the grand harbour. Such conditions led to a very high infant mortality rate and 
the outbreak of cholera epidemics, such as the cholera epidemic of 1936
1
. The Maltese government 
appreciated the seriousness of the problem and attempted to partially alleviate the poor living 
conditions by the workmen dwelling act of 1927, which set up a fund for the construction of sub-
urban housing for families with limited means
2
. The annual report of the Maltese commissioner of 
labour included the volume of construction for the period 1921–1938 in detail, including the houses 
and apartments built, any alterations to existing buildings, and the construction of stables and store 
rooms
3
. The commissioner of labour also provided for the price of such construction in 1938 prices. 
The intermediate consumption was estimated for 1938 and the share of value added to total output 
was assumed constant for the period 1921–1938. The construction of commercial properties was 
assumed to follow the expansion of the housing industry as new commercial properties were 
constructed when new houses were built in Malta; they were assumed to equal 10% of the yearly 
value of housing construction. Public construction was added by estimating the value added in 
current prices and deflating it by a construction materials index. The share of value added to total 
output was assumed constant for the period 1921–1938.  
 
Cyprus, Sources and Estimates 
The poor living condition of the people of Cyprus was one of the main issues of the Cypriot press. 
In Cyprus, the living condition of most villagers was considered substandard and unhealthy. The 
colonial government, spurred on by the colonial office’s new-found (but vague) commitment for 
improvement of native living standards, introduced a host of piecemeal measures to improve life in 
the country side
4
. Cypriot administrators thought that living conditions of the country could 
improve gradually if efforts to improve the construction of new housing units were undertaken. 
Despite the interest by the government, such efforts did not materialise until 1938, when a small 
                                                     
1
 Ellul, “Maltese Imperial Mentalities...:” (1998) p.98 
2
  Fenech, Responsibility and Power... (2005), p.175 
3
  National Archives, London. Files: CO161/120, 121, 122, 123,  124 “Report of the Commissioner of Labour “ 1921-
1938 
4
 Hodge, Triumph of the Expert... (2007). p.7. A Summary of Measures Undertaken in Cyprus: National Archives, 
London. File: CO69/45 “Annual Rural Development Report for 1938” 
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pilot study of rural housing improvement began
5
.  The study on rural housing provided crucial data 
on the construction of houses
6
. This was combined with dwelling information from the Cypriot 
censuses. Price and intermediate consumption estimates were based on the information in the rural 
and urban contraction of government housing, and were supplemented by construction costs of 
agricultural buildings provided in the Cyprus agricultural journal
7
.  
 
No annual construction data exist for Cyprus, despite having an active land registry and survey 
department during the interwar period. There were several sources of information which one could 
use to estimate construction, each having its own advantages and limitations. A possible option was 
to use the land registration estimates of the yearly value of immovable property. This method had 
significant disadvantages since an increase in value was indeterminate: it could be any combination 
of a rise in value of property, an increase in construction, a rise in the value of land or of non-
movable property other than buildings was included. The tax receipt by the immovable property tax 
(Verghi Kimat) was also considered and rejected as it was taxed at differential rates for town and 
country, included all immovable property, including trees and water rights. It was also considered 
that the tax base of the Verghi Kimat was not complete as it was based on land registration surveys, 
which were not updated frequently
 8
. 
 
The average cost of construction of the median house was based on information of government 
housing and government reports as cited above. The urban houses were constructed based on 
different standards. The urban house was based on the construction of a government house with 
local materials, but scaled down to take into account the fact that the government houses were for 
the British government officials and thus they were far larger than the average city dwelling
9
. The 
cost of the government house was given in 5 variants according to the methods used in construction. 
Using what was labelled by the colonial official as the “traditional” method of construction, the 
author estimated the cost per cubic feet in building dwelling. The house was scaled down using the 
average number of rooms per dwelling in the urban areas of Cyprus. Archival evidence also 
provided the value of a house, since the rent of a completed house was given and was mentioned to 
                                                     
5
 National Archives, London. File: CO69/45 “Annual Rural Development Report for 1938” 
6
 Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life... (1930) pp.12-13, p.73 
7
 National Archives, Nicosia. Secretarial Archive, File: SA1 605/1921, SA1 673/1920, SA1 1277/1919, SA1 
1415/1920/1-5.  
8
 Oakden, , Report on the Finances....(1935) p.51 
9
 National Archives, Nicosia. File: SA1/1415/1920/2, “Construction of Dwelling Houses for Government  officials”. 
Note “Plan of Residence, 1938”.  
A68 
 
be 3% of the total house’s value10. The value of the median urban house was estimated as £253.80 
Cypriot Pounds in 1938 prices. The house still stands today and as the offices of the Cyprus 
Diabetes Society.  
 
The median rural house was more difficult to construct as most families built their own houses, not 
providing valuations; the materials used were of a much lower standard than for urban housing. 
Using the average number of rooms of a dwelling given in the censuses, and combined by the first 
report on rural development which provided a lengthy description of a typical rural house, one 
estimated the total size of the house
11
. The cost per square feet for the urban house was revised 
downwards using the costs of construction of agricultural stables and outhouses, and crosschecked 
by Surridge’s description of rural housing conditions in 192912. As a result, the median rural house 
was estimated as having a value of £145.44 Cypriot Pounds in 1938 prices.  The intermediate 
construction of both median houses was estimated to be 40%, using the cost of materials and labour 
it would need to construct it from the Cyprus Agricultural Journal
13
.   
 
The censuses provided the sum of construction in 1921–1931 and 1931–1946, divided in urban and 
rural dwellings, but not the yearly construction of houses. Thus one needed to break down the sum 
value added of 1921-131 and 1931-1946 into yearly construction of housing. Prados De la Escosura 
estimated the construction estimate of Spain using similar census data. In order to annualise the 
census data, Prados De la Escosura created an index of construction materials
14
. The index is a 3-
year moving average of imported and domestically construction material and represents the 
availability of construction material available for annual construction
15
. This methodology was used 
to estimate the yearly output of construction in Cyprus. An index of construction materials, in 1938 
constant prices, was created; the materials used for construction within the index were weighted 
based on the volume needed to build in Cyprus, taken from the Cypriot agricultural journal
16
. Then 
the share of each year to the total construction material for the period 1921 – 1931 and 1931 – 1946 
                                                     
10
 Ibid.  
11
 Sources: National Archives, London. File: CO69/45 “Annual Rural Development Report for 1938” p.3; Hart-Davis, 
Census… (1922); Hart-Davis, Report and General Abstracts… (1932); Percival, Census... 1946 (1947)  
12
 James, & Koumides “An analysis of farming costs in Cyprus: Part 2” (1939), pp.87-109, Surridge,  A Survey of the 
Rural Life…(1930) p.12 
13
 James, & Koumides “An Analysis of Farming Costs in Cyprus: Part 2” (1939), 
14
 Prados de la Escosura, “Spain’s Gross Domestic Product” (1993) p.30-32 
15
 The index was constructed by adding the major input materials of construction and their relative weight in new 
buildings. A consideration was made for the increasing use of building material is mining. For more details see the 
Appendix. Source: James, & Koumides, “An Analysis of Farming Costs in Cyprus: part 1” (1939) pp.61-65  
16
 James, & Koumides “An analysis of farming costs in Cyprus: Part 1” (1939) pp.45-67; James, & Koumides “An 
analysis of Farming Costs in Cyprus: Part 2” (1939), pp.87-109 
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was used to allocate the share of houses built in that year from the total stock of constructed houses 
for 1921-1931, 1931-1946. The annual share was divided into rural and urban housing based on a 
log linear growth of the number of dwellings in urban areas provided by the censuses. Thus two 
series of value added were created: annual value added of urban house construction and annual 
value added of rural house construction. These were multiplied by the relevant value added for the 
median rural and urban house to estimate the value added of dwelling construction in Cyprus.  
 
Commercial and agricultural buildings were estimated as proportion of urban and rural housing 
construction respectively. Farming buildings were assumed to be constructed in line with rural 
dwellings at 30% of the value added of rural house construction, based on the evidence provided on 
the typical outhouses of a rural household
17
. The value of commercial buildings was produced 
based on the value of constructed urban housing. The value added of public construction was 
estimated using the annual report of the expenditure from the blue books and the reports of the 
public works department
18
. The series of public construction was in current prices; it was deflated 
to 1938 constant prices using a price index of construction materials as weighted for the volume of 
materials needed to build a house.  
Implied Rental Income 
The housing construction estimate enabled, with some additional information, the estimation of the 
rental income of those dwellings. Houses were assumed to provide a service in national accounts by 
providing a roof; their value added was the opportunity cost of renting rather than living in one’s 
house. The inclusion into GDP was considered necessary in order to allow comparisons between 
countries where the majority of the houses were owner-occupied with countries where a substantial 
rented accommodation. In order to estimate the implied rental income of housing, one requires the 
total stock of housing, the value of stock and the level of rent in the open market relative to the 
value of the house. To calculate the total stock of housing we first had to depreciate the value of the 
housing units, since house buildings depreciate with age.  The best method of depreciation is the 
perpetual inventory method where the total stock of housing is depreciating at a constant rate 
according to its age
19
. The statistical service of Cyprus currently assumes that houses loose 1/75 of 
their value each year: thus by the 75
th
 year of its existence, a house has no value without significant 
renovation and investment. Most houses in Cyprus were built by mixing clay and straw, thus their 
                                                     
17
 National Archives, London. File: CO69/45 “Annual Rural Development Report for 1938”  
18
 Sources: National Archives, London. File: CO161/118, 120, 121, 122,123, 124 “Annual Report of the Public Works 
Department”; Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book. Years 1921-1938 
19
 Meinen, G., Verbiest, P. & De Wolf, P. Perpetual Inventory Method: Service Lines, Discard Patterns and 
Depreciation Methods (Voorburg, Statistics Netherlands, 1998) pp.6-7 
A70 
 
life was limited to 50 years without significant renovation and investment. The annual number of 
houses in urban and rural areas for the period 1921-1938 was known through the construction 
estimate, and that was multiplied by the value of the respective median urban and rural house. The 
censuses of Malta and Cyprus for the year 1921 provided the number of dwellings in every ten 
years from 1851 to 1921 allowing for the extrapolation of all housing stock back to 1851
20
. This 
allows for the re-evaluation of the stock of housing using the perpetual inventory method
21
. The 
houses from 1851 were depreciated at a rate of 1/50
th
 of their constant 1938 value each year.  
 
Using information of the Maltese government archives led to the realization that there was a 
significant difference in rental values between the rural and urban areas. In Malta, rent controls 
were being gradually introduced in this period: as a result, the public works department took a large 
survey of what was the state of rental housing in Malta
22
.  By taking 93 reported cases of urban and 
rural dwellings, and by combining it with information already known from the housing construction 
estimates, it was possible to estimate that the yearly rental value of a house was 5% in the city and 
3% in the country. The imputed rental income was less than 4% of the GDP of Malta and Cyprus 
throughout the whole period. 
 
                                                     
20
 Hart-Davis, Census… 1921 (1922); Malta, Report of the Census… 1931(1932) 
21
  Depreciation of the stock of dwellings was undertaken to calculate the declining value of rent from depreciated 
houses. 
22
 National Archives, Rabat. Public Works, File: PW534, PWD548 
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Appendix G: Detailed Methodology of Service Sector 
 
The service sector was the most difficult sector to estimate, requiring the largest amounts of 
interpolation and inference. The service sector in Malta was the impact of the British navy presence: 
however, its impact cannot be measured directly as the expenditure of the British military is 
unknown. In addition the methodology of national income accounting, argues that “military 
personnel and civil servants, including diplomats employed abroad by another economic territory, 
are residents of the territory that employs them”1. Thus the wages of the British seamen and soldiers 
are to be included in the British and not the Maltese national accounts. In addition, the inclusion of 
British armed personnel wages in the national accounts of Malta would create double counting, as 
their expenditure in the Maltese economy is already accounted for in these estimates.  
 
Trade and Transport: 
It was difficult to estimate trade directly due to the lack of substantial private archives of merchants 
in Cyprus and Malta. Such archives could have provided information that would allow the 
estimation of shipping cost, domestic transport costs, as well as the trade mark-up on retail sales. 
Thus a different approach was implemented whereby products with known producer and retail 
prices had their prices compared in order to estimate a trade and transport mark-up
2
. This approach 
entails estimating the mark-up of the combined trade and transport of domestic tradable products 
and adding the value added of export, re-export and import trade. The mark-up multiplied by the 
volume of trade gives the gross output of trade and transport of goods. The intermediate 
consumption of both industries was estimated in order to arrive to value added. The value added of 
passenger transport was added to this by combining information on the value added of public 
transport companies
3
.  
 
The price mark up was based on price information in the statistical (blue) book. The average yearly 
retail prices of products deemed essential to British officials (which mainly constituted foodstuffs, 
fuel and alcohol) were recorded in Valletta and Nicosia, and reproduced in the blue books. Products 
were then matched with the producer prices of local manufacturers as well as the import price of 
such commodities. Information was much more extensive on agricultural products where it was 
                                                     
1
 For details see: United Nations, National Accounts: A Practical Introduction (New York, United Nations, 2003)  
2
 Lequiller, Understanding National Accounts (2006) p.107 
3
 United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Handbook of National Accounting, Series 
F, No.39: Accounting for Production: Sources and Methods, (New York: United Nations, 1986) 
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possible to estimate a relatively inclusive series of gross output in producer and retail prices of 1938 
for Cyprus in order to estimate the mark up. The mark up ranged as an additional 22% to 27% on 
top of the output in factor prices, with an average for the period 1921-1938 of 25%. Thus the 
combined gross output of trade and transport was a 25% of gross output multiplied by the 
percentage of traded agricultural products. A similar, but more limited, process took place in Malta, 
leading to a trade and transport margin of agricultural retail sales at 20%. 
 
The problem that arose from this method was that the amount of agricultural production grown for 
household consumption was not known. As Chapter 1 indicated, Cyprus and Malta were open 
economies, with a proportion of their farming community being committed to cash crop agriculture 
since the middle ages. The very high rate of urbanisation in Malta, with 80% of the population 
living in urban or sub-urban areas, combined with the lack of remote locations on the islands, 
indicates that farmers of Malta were in their majority integrated in the market through the 
agricultural middle men or Pitkali
4
. Thus, it was assumed that 70% of the gross output in 
agriculture was traded in Malta. In the case of Cyprus, the existence of very distinct agricultural 
zones (orange plantation around Morfou and Famagusta, grain production in Mesaoria, grape 
production on the Limassol side of the Trooodos mountains) would not have been possible if 
farmers did not trade with each other in order to explain the comparative advantage of their area. 
However, because of the existence of remote villages in Cyprus, particularly in the Troodos 
mountain range, a very conservative estimate of 50% of agricultural production was considered to 
be traded domestically.  
 
There was not enough information to estimate the totality of the manufacturing output of Cyprus 
and Malta in bith producer and retail prices. Thus the post-war margin of trade and transport on the 
retail trade of manufacturing products was used as a reference, which was 25% for Cyprus
5
. This 
was revised downwards for Malta, based on the fact that the agricultural trade margin was lower 
than in Cyprus and on the descriptions of a much more competitive retail market
6
. It was considered 
that all the manufacturing products of Cyprus and Malta were traded.   
 
                                                     
4
 Frendo, “Everyday Life in ‘British Malta’”, (1996), p.44; Bowen-Jones, Dewdney,  & Fisher, Malta: Background for 
Development (1961), p.333; Urbanization: Malta, Census... 1931 (1932). 
5
 Source: National Archives, Nicosia. File: V53/26 “Gross Output and Inputs – Indirect Taxes and Value Added in the 
Agricultural Sector during the Period 1959–1968” Vassiliou, Input – Output Analysis…(1959) p.69 
6
 Greaves, Report on Economic Conditions…(1935), p.62. 
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The total amount of imports and exports were deflated to 1938 current prices. Two deflation 
method alternatives were considered:  
a) used specific import and export deflators based on the largest items in terms of value for 
which yearly prices could be obtained.  
b)  used the consumer price index.  
Unfortunately method a) was less desirable, exhibiting high volatility despite being the closest to 
best practice in methodology. This was due to the fact that the export value represented in the index 
was very limited as most products did not have yearly prices; thus just one or two main product 
prices, such as the price of imported kerosene, were enough to destabilise the index. In addition, the 
export and import prices included other costs which were unrelated to the price of the product such 
as duties and insurance quotes
7
. Smits, Horlings and Van Zanden argue that official import and 
export prices have no relation with actual market prices, leading to spurious outcomes
8
. Thus, 
deflation method b) was used, despite being methodologically less sound. As there was no 
indication of trade margins in foreign trade, the margin of 25% was assumed to be the trade and 
transport mark-up for both Malta and Cyprus. 
 
The intermediate consumption as a share of total output was estimated separately for transport and 
trade on the basis of Cypriot post-war data; this intermediate consumption was considered to be 
similar for Malta. The shares of intermediate consumption to value added were estimated as 50% 
and 30% respectively
9
. The value added estimated is a combined estimate for trade and transport of 
traded goods. The share services was assumed that trade and transport had an equal share of the 
gross output; by removing the respective intermediate consumption, the estimate of goods trade and 
transport was completed.  
 
Railways, Passenger Traffic and Communication 
As tram and railways in Cyprus and Malta were government enterprises, there was substantial 
information available in the annual reports of the departments
10
. Such data included running costs, 
freight and passengers carried, total receipts, cost of wages and intermediate consumption and net 
                                                     
7
 As C.I.F. imports also include maritime insurance, it is fortunate that there were not enough data to estimate marine 
insurance as the estimation of trade would have led to some double counting of marine policies. 
8
 Smits, J.P., Horlings. E., Van Zanden., J.L., Dutch GDP and its Components, 1800-1913 (Groningen: Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre, 2000)   
9
 Source: National Archives, Nicosia. File: V53/26 “Gross Output and Inputs – Indirect Taxes and Value Added in the 
Agricultural Sector During the Period 1959 – 1968” Vassiliou, Input – Output Analysis…(1959) p.69  
10
 National archives, London. Files: CO161/120,121,122,123, 124 “Report of the railway department “, Malta, 1921 to 
1938. Files: CO69/38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, “Annual report of the railway department”, Cyprus 1921 to 1938. 
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profit or loss. Both railways were narrow gauge and small, and by 1931 they were outdated and 
completely inappropriate for significant goods and passenger haulage
11
. The railways, particularly 
the Maltese railway, operated as a public good since the bankruptcy of the private company that 
constructed it in 1892; thus it was essential to estimate the value added through the sum of the 
railway’s production costs as the prices charged were not considered to be representative of the 
value added created
12
. 
 
The Maltese railway operated solely on passenger traffic. As a result, the introduction of an 
extensive and efficient bus network during the interwar period to the redundancy of tram and rail 
operations, leading to their permanent closure in 1931. The Cypriot government railroad was 
operated with a small profit which was insufficient for the depreciation of capital. As a result, the 
railroad closed in 1951 as it could not cover the expense to overhaul its equipment
13
.   
 
The passenger traffic was more difficult to estimate. A benchmark for 1938 was estimated as a 
proportion of total goods transport and it was estimated as 15% of the value added of trade. The 
benchmark was extrapolated backwards on an index of road vehicles, in order to account for the 
increasing value added provided by the proliferation of motorised transport.  
 
Postal and telephone services on the islands were government controlled; thus ample information 
sufficient to estimate for the value added was given in the annual reports of their respective 
departments. The postal department of Malta had sufficient information of yearly prices of inputs 
and outputs to create a annual series of value added. The output of the Maltese post was the only 
series where yearly intermediate consumption was also estimated, allowing for double deflation. 
There was no telephone department in Cyprus as all telephones were government controlled, and 
thus the value added of the service is included in government expenditure. Likewise, the Maltese 
radio which was diffused through cables was not estimated as it was not possible to find the 
accounts of the radio diffusion company
14
.  Telegraph output was estimated based on the statistical 
(blue) book information, since the volume of telegraphs and their costs were provided. The share of 
value added to output was assumed similar to the one of the post office. There was no information 
on wireless services in order to be able to provide an estimate.  
                                                     
11
 Lavender, The Story of…(1962) p.60, Coase, A.S., “The Closing of the Malta Railway” The Railway Magazine, (July, 
1934) www.maltarailway.com/history/rm1934.pdf  as accessed 09/12/2008. 
12
 Lequiller, & Blades, Understanding National Accounts (2006),  p.105.  
13
 Hadjilyra, A.M., The Cyprus Government Railway, (2006), p.12 
14
 Bonnici, & Cassar, A Chronicle of Twentieth Century Malta, (2004),  p.134 
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Financial Services  
 
It was only possible to have a direct estimate of output for the Cypriot banking sector. The direct 
estimate was based on the output approach of the United Nations and the OECD
15
. Output is 
estimated differently for banks since their output is achieved by borrowing money at low interest 
and lending it at higher interest rates. Thus the output of banking is estimated as the difference 
between the interest received and the interest paid. The sector was divided in three sub-sectors in 
Cyprus: the formal banking sector, saving banks and the co-operative credit societies. The formal 
banking sector was estimated using information in the blue books and in the archives of the Ionian 
Bank. The Cyprus Blue books provided the total deposits in foreign and domestic banks in each 
year. The interwar period displayed a great increase in the total deposits of the island: from 1921 to 
1938, deposits increased by a factor of 5.28. However it was not known how these deposits were 
distributed, how many of the accounts were accruing interest, and what was the average interest 
rate. Thus a collection of interest rates was collected from the statistical (blue) books, the Ionian 
Bank archives of the Cyprus branch and the interest rates given to the government by the Ottoman 
Bank
16
. This allowed for an estimate of the average interest demanded for the period 1930-1938. 
The average interest given for deposits was 3%, which was based on the saving rate of the 
government registered saving banks. Thus the yearly interest differential was estimated for the 
period 1930-1938: this ranged from as low to 2% to as high as 5%. It was not possible to estimate 
the yearly interest differential for the period 1921-1929; thus it was assumed that the interest 
differential was 3%, which was the average of the interest differential of the period for which we 
have sufficient data. The interest rate differential was multiplied by the total deposits in order to 
estimate the gross output of the formal banking sector.  
 
The intermediate output was estimated based on a report of the working expenses of the Cypriot 
branches of the Ionian bank in 1929
17
. Working expenses (without the inclusion of wage cost, as 
wages are part of value added) were subtracted by the gross output of the Ionian Bank in 1929 in 
order to a share of value added to gross output; this was assumed constant for all years and 
                                                     
15
 Laquiller, F. & Blades, D., Understanding National Accounts, (Paris: OECD, 2007), pp.105-106; United Nations, 
Economic and Social Affairs, Handbook of National Accounting, Series F, No.85: National Accounts: A Practical 
Introduction, (New York: United Nations, 2003) p.32 
16
 British Library of Political and Economic Science Archive, Ionian Bank Papers, File: 6/79 
17
 Lending rates were a constant 3% above the base rate. Source: British Library of Political and Economic Science 
Archive, Ionian Bank Papers, File: 6/64 Luard to Court of Governors, 12
th
 Jan, 1927; File 6/100 General Manager to 
Chairman, 18
th
 December 1929. 
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representative for all formal banking institutions, allowing the conversion of the gross output to 
value added.  
 
The saving banks were a small section of the banking sector, providing less than 1% of the sector’s 
value added. Their deposits were known and their value added was estimated in a similar way as 
above, but using a smaller interest differential as they were more conservative institutions.   
 
The deposits of the co-operative saving banks were estimated for certain benchmark years (1938, 
1928, 1923, 1922 and 1921) when such information was provided in the statistical (blue) books. 
The number of co-operative credit societies expanded rapidly during this period and so did their 
deposits. The output for the benchmark years is estimated as described for the formal banking 
sector. This enabled a comparison of the value added of the co-operative sector with the value 
added to the formal banking sector value added for the benchmark years. This proportion was then 
log-linearly interpolated for the years when no information was available, and the interpolated 
proportion was multiplied by the value added of formal banking sector to estimate the value added 
of the co-operative banking sector in the years between the benchmarks.  
 
In Malta the only information available was occupational data. The output of the financial sector 
was estimated on the basis of the wage bill as described in the estimation of personal services 
below. No estimates of insurance output were possible for either island.  
 
Personal and Professional services; other services 
The estimation of this section of the service industry took place under severe data limitations. The 
only information available was the number of persons who stated a professional service (such as 
lawyers and doctors), or a service work (such as cycle fitters, entertainers and painters) and 
domestic services (such as domestic servants or cooks). Such information is only given in the 
censuses of Malta and Cyprus. In such difficult data conditions, HNA specialists resort to the only 
possible way forward, by using linear interpolation of occupations to estimate output
18
. Thus the 
number of persons in service occupation was linearly interpolated for the in-between census years. 
These were separated in their respective codes, provided by the Nace.Rev.2 nomenclature
19
. The 
table below gives the range of service occupations included for Cyprus and Malta. 
                                                     
18
 Hjerppe, R., Finland’s Historical National Accounts 1860 - 1994: Calculation Methods and Statistical Tables  
(Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 1996) p.14 
19
 Eurostat, NACE Rev.2: Statistical Classification of Economic Activity (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 2008) 
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Table A.18: Service sector occupations estimated using census occupation statistics. 
 Cyprus  Malta 
Miscellaneous Service Work  cycle fitters, electricians, watch 
repairers, upholsterers, photographers, 
water carriers, editors, authors, 
journalists, artists, sculptors, poets, 
owners / managers of theatres and 
picture theatres, actors, actresses, 
dancers, musicians, restaurant keepers,  
hotel / inn keepers, café proprietors, 
barbers, bath keepers, shoe blacks, 
prostitutes 
electricians, hotel / inn keepers, 
lodging / boardinghouse keepers, 
coffee / eatinghouse keepers, 
photographers, guides, watchmen, 
auctioneers / weighers, sculptors, 
painters, draughtsman, image 
makers, musicians, cinema 
proprietors, librarians, prostitutes, 
bankers, waiters, 
Professional service clergymen, church attendants, nuns, 
lawyers, petition writers, certifying 
officers, physicians, surgeons, bone 
setters, vets, animal castrators, dentists, 
oculists, midwives, nurses, mental 
asylum attendants, chemists, 
apothecaries, professors, teachers, 
engineers, architects,  music teachers 
chemists, lawyers, engineers, 
architects, vets, physicians, 
dentists, occultists, midwifes, 
nurses, other medical attendants, 
teachers, clergymen, church 
attendants, nuns,  
Domestic and personal services chauffeurs, domestic servants, cooks, servants, chauffeurs, cooks, 
launderers, housemen 
Source: Hart-Davis, Cyprus... Census of 1921 (1922); Hart-Davis, Cyprus... Census of 1931 (1932); Percival, Cyprus, 
Census... 1946 (1947); Malta, Eleventh Census... 1949 (1949); Malta, Census... 1931 (1932); Malta, Report... Census of 
the Maltese Islands 1921 (1922) 
The occupations were multiplied with the yearly wages of 1938 to get the value added for their 
services. The wages of 1938 were based on the wages provided in the 1938 statistical (blue) books, 
and annualised based on information on the days of rest and of festivities in Cyprus and Malta
20
. 
The books provided wage information for a limited range of occupations and provided separate 
wage rates for women and children. The census occupation statistics were thus separated to women 
and men and multiplied by their respective wage. For domestic services, the cost of food and 
lodging was included to the wage since the wage provided by the statistical (blue) books did not 
include such costs. For the wages of other occupations not provided by the statistical (blue) books, 
their wage was estimated by benchmarking their profession on the basis of a profession with a 
known wage (such as assuming that a motor mechanic was earning 200% more than railroad 
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 Bowen-Jones, Dewdney & Fisher, Malta: Background for Development, (1961); Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life... 
(1930) 
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workers), or by finding the government wage for that profession (such as assuming that a certifying 
officer earns as much as a 4
th
 class government clerk).  
 
In order to remove double counting, the government employees were removed from their 
occupation in order not to count their value added in both government and service industries. For 
example, the number of government engineers working in the public works department was 
removed from the persons occupied as engineers in the service sector. 
 
Public Administration 
The government sector’s value added was based on the detailed government expenditure per 
department in the statistical (blue) books. The information enabled one to break down government 
expenditure in personal emoluments from other expenditure. Yet the personal emoluments did not 
equal the value added of the total government sector; thus the expenditure on the public debt charge 
and the cost of pensions were included to estimate the value added of the sector in current prices. 
Due to the lack of sufficient price data, the government value added was deflated using the 
consumer price index as there are no other prices available. Government doctors and teachers were 
not included in the government sector but in the relevant sectors of health and education
21
. 
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 United Nations, National Accounts… (2003) pp.43-48 
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Appendix H: Detailed Methodology of Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 
international comparisons. 
 
The objective of a consumer price index is to track the changes in the prices affecting the purchases 
of households. In order to construct it, one needs to find a representative cross section of the target 
society, and record their spending patterns through a budget enquiry for a base year. The enquiry 
enables one to get the average expenditure pattern on items spent by a group in a way that is 
representative of the whole society. Then prices of the items are measured each year; the quantities 
purchased are those that were purchased in the base year and the weigh they carry in the total index 
is determined through the budget survey. 
 
There were three possible studies which could have been used as the basis of a CPI: the Cypriot 
statistical (blue) book of 1946, a study reconstructing the Cypriot CPI in modern basis in 1949, a 
study on the living conditions of Maltese labourers in 1938 and a study on the calories consumed by 
Maltese families, also in 1938
1
.  
 
The consumer price index was mainly based on the report on constructing a cost of living index in 
Cyprus in 1949, but with information from Malta used to alter some product weights on the Maltese 
CPI. The Cypriot report was preferred over the others as it provided detailed information on the 
weight of each individual product in the Cypriot basket, while the other sources were less precise 
and focused almost exclusively on foodstuffs. In addition, the 1949 index provides the advantage of 
creating a CPI that will be compatible in methodology with the estimates of CPI of Malta and 
Cyprus after the Second World War, enabling the CPI to be extended forwards.  
 
The CPI has five general price categories: rent, food, tobacco / alcohol, fuel / light, clothing and 
other. The weight of each category in the final index is shown below. There was no price 
information for articles of clothing in Malta. As a result of the lack of information, it was decided to 
share the weight of clothing to fuel / light and other items. 
 
 
                                                     
1
Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Book 1946, (Nicosia: GPO, 1947); Reddway. W., Recommendations about the Cost of Living 
Index for Cyprus (Nicosia: GPO, 1950); National Archives, London. File: CO161/124 “Report of the Commissioner for 
Labour for 1937-1938”, p. 131; National Archives, Rabat. File: GMR 1368, “Report of the Commission Approved to 
Inquire and Report on the Question of Nutrition in Malta & Gozo” Appendix A & B. 
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Table A.19: Weights of the Maltese and Cypriot CPI. 
 Cyprus Malta 
Rent 16 16 
Food 49 49 
Tobacco and Alcohol  11.8 11.8 
Fuel and Light 4.4 9.4 
Clothing 10 N/A 
Other Items 8.8 13.8 
 Source: Reddway, Recommendations about the Cost of Living... (1950) p.4 
Within these categories the prices of items were collected: the items and their categories are shown 
below
2
. Care was taken for items that were in consumption by the population and not for the British 
expatriate market. 
 
Table A.20: Items included in the CPI of Malta and Cyprus 
 Cyprus Malta 
 Items Items 
Food cheese, salt, mutton, flour 
(wheat), sugar, rice, bread, 
potatoes, eggs, milk, olive oil, 
french beans, cow peas, broad-
beans, 
wheaten bread, English cheese 
(English), Maltese cheese, eggs, 
milk, beef, mutton, pork, rice, 
sugar, salt, potatoes, beans 
Tobacco and Alcohol  brandy, wine wine (common), brandy (local), 
beer, tobacco (local) 
Fuel and Light kerozene, tobacco, wood (for 
fuel), charcoal 
kerozene, firewood kindling, 
firewood, 
Clothing shoes, cloth (for one shirt), 
hosiery 
N/A 
Other Items soap, coffee, boot cream coffee, tea, soap 
Sources: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, 1921-1938; Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books 1921-1938. 
 
The yearly prices of these products were divided by the base year of 1938 in order to arrive at an 
index for each product. The products were then bundled in the six categories and the change of 
prices averaged within the subcategory. The subcategories were then multiplied by the weights 
given in Table A.20 and summed in order to create the unified CPI with a base year of 1938.  The 
CPI of Malta and Cyprus is presented below. It is encouraging that the downward trend is very 
similar to both Malta and Cyprus, since they were estimated independently. There was a sharp 
deflation throughout the period: the British attempt to join the gold standard at its pre-war level led 
to rapid deflation in the 1920, while the decline in prices during the depression meant that inflation 
was only present in the period of recovery of 1934-1938. 
                                                     
2
 The rent values for Cyprus and Malta were based on the research for the estimation of construction and the implied 
rental income, explained in detail in Appendix F. It was not possible to estimate the rent values for all years, but only 
for some years. It was seen that the Cypriot rent increased at approximately 2.5% per annum. In Malta it was more 
difficult to estimate after rent control was imposed in 1924; thus it was assumed that rent remained constant after rent 
control, but increased at a rate of 2% per annum prior to its imposition.    
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Table A.21: Cyprus and Malta CPI, 1921-1938 (1938=100). 
 
Cyprus Malta 
1921 163.2 143.2 
1922 141.7 128.9 
1923 133.7 128.1 
1924 136.1 123.8 
1925 136.5 116.5 
1926 141.5 120.4 
1927 144.0 119.2 
1928 140.6 114.6 
1929 118.8 104.5 
1930 107.0 104.3 
1931 105.7 98.8 
1932 104.3 100.9 
1933 101.8 103.8 
1934 98.9 97.0 
1935 97.1 99.0 
1936 100.2 97.6 
1937 101.2 99.2 
1938 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, 1921-1938 
Malta, Statistical (Blue) Books, 1921-1938 
 
 
International Comparisons 
 
In chapter 3 the GDP of Cyprus and Malta have been compared to each other using constant 1938, 
PPP sterling. However as Maltese prices are not representative of British prices, a different 
approach was needed to convert the estimates into international comparable currency units. The 
approach presented below represents the best possible at present, but this is far from ideal as it 
suffers from significant index number problems. More research is needed to establish a unified price index 
for the period 1921-2005 before a definitive estimate in international comparative currencies can be 
achieved.  
 
Using a diverse mix of price indexes it was possible to convert the Cypriot GDP for the period 
1921-1938, which was originally estimated in 1938 constant Cyprus pounds, to 1950 constant 
Cyprus pounds, which is the benchmark of the first GDP estimates of Cyprus. In order for this to be 
achieved a unified price series was constructed using diverse evidence of period 1938-1950.  
 
There were several price indices constructed in this period. A commission was established in 1950 
in order to create a cost of living index that was more representative of the needs of government 
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officials. The commission constructed a cost of living index for the period 1939-1944, shown in 
table A.22. 
 
Table A.22: The Reddway commission COLA, Cyprus, 1939-1944 (1939=100) 
Date Index Date Index 
August 1939 100 August 1942 219 
May 1941 133 October 1942 235 
October 1941 181 January 1944 240 
Source: Reddway. W., Recommendations about the Cost of Living Index for Cyprus (Nicosia: GPO, 1950) 
 
The next price index was reported in the government gazette, as shown in Table A.23. Unlike the 
Reddway commission, nothing is known about the basket of goods that was used to construct this 
cost of living index. In addition the benchmark year is given as 1938/1939, making it difficult to 
evaluate if the starting date is the same as the starting date of the cost of living index presented in 
Table A.21. The government gazette of 1950 began a new price index with a benchmark year of 
1950, which was based on the national accounts that were about to be constructed for the island. 
 
Table A.23: Government Gazette COLAs, Cyprus, 1948-1950 
Government Gazette 1948 and 1949 (1938-1939=100) 
Year 12
 
month Average index 
1948 337.08 
1949 324.08 
Government Gazette 1950 (Jan 1950=100) 
December 
1950 107 
Source: Government Gazette 1949, MP298/1949 issue no.43, “Cost of living index”; PIO newspaper archive, Cyprus: 
Government Gazette Collection, Government gazette volume.1950, p.654 “retail price index”. 
 
The main issue of all the price indexes is that the inflation of 1938-1939 and of 1949-1950 was 
unknown. No other price data is available, and any further research needs to focus on these two 
main data gap in price data. Thus three assumptions were suggested:  
a) It was assumed that there was no inflation in 1939, and 1949-1950. 
b) It was assumed that there was no inflation in 1939, and that inflation in 1949-1950 equalled 
the inflation of 1950-1951 which was 7%. 
c) It was assumed that there was a deflation of 7% in 1949-1950. 
The price indexes were used to reflate the GDP in constant 1938 Cyprus pounds prices to GDP in constant 
1950 pounds. The Cypriot GDP of 1950 in constant 1950 prices has been calculated in international 
comparison currencies by the total economy database (1990 Gheary-Khamis $) and the Penn world tables 
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(2005 international $)
3
. Thus GDP of Cyprus for the period 1921-1938 has been estimated in both these 
international units, and using the PPP of Cypriot estimates to Maltese sterling the Maltese GDP was derived. 
The estimates under assumption B (no inflation in 1939 and 7% inflation in 1951) was chosen as the growth 
rate for the period 1938-1950 was much more in line with the qualitative description of the islands 
development at that period. They are presented in the table A.24. Although this procedure has many 
problems, and it would be unsuitable if more price information is unearthed, it is the best possible under the 
present data conditions. 
                                                     
3
 Heston, A., Summers, R. & Aten, B., “The International Comparison of Prices Program (ICP), Version 6.3” Penn 
World Tables (Pennsylvania, PA: CICUP, 2009); The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre, Total Economy Database,  http://www.conference-board.org/economics as consulted 30 Feb 2010 
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Table A.24: Per capita GDP of Cyprus and Malta, 1921-2008 
 
GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita 
Unit I$ 2005 I$ 2005 G-K $  1990 G-K $  1990 
Year Cyprus Malta Cyprus Malta 
1921 1,219 1,269 891 928 
1922 1,293 1,357 945 992 
1923 1,318 1,423 963 1,040 
1924 1,273 1,518 930 1,110 
1925 1,356 1,534 991 1,121 
1926 1,287 1,563 941 1,142 
1927 1,428 1,550 1,044 1,133 
1928 1,381 1,474 1,009 1,077 
1929 1,549 1,571 1,132 1,149 
1930 1,449 1,532 1,059 1,120 
1931 1,343 1,546 982 1,130 
1932 1,208 1,570 883 1,148 
1933 1,193 1,595 872 1,165 
1934 1,318 1,613 963 1,179 
1935 1,449 1,678 1,059 1,227 
1936 1,402 1,542 1,025 1,127 
1937 1,639 1,633 1,198 1,193 
1938 1,693 1,588 1,238 1,160 
1939 . . . . 
1940 . . . . 
1941 . . . . 
1942 . . . . 
1943 . . . . 
1944 . . . . 
1945 . . . . 
1946 . . . . 
1947 . . . . 
1948 . . . . 
1949 . . . . 
1950 2,576 . 1,883 891 
1951 2,644 . 1,814 929 
1952 2,875 . 1,969 964 
1953 3,190 . 2,136 1,007 
1954 3,478 . 2,144 1,045 
1955 3,628 . 2,192 1,094 
1956 3,963 . 2,406 1,218 
1957 4,060 . 2,510 1,215 
1958 3,382 . 2,387 1,278 
1959 3,564 . 2,489 1,291 
1960 3,313 . 2,280 1,350 
1961 3,641 . 2,508 1,338 
1962 4,219 . 2,746 1,281 
1963 4,317 . 2,885 1,283 
1964 3,694 . 2,590 1,328 
1965 4,596 . 3,146 1,439 
1966 4,849 . 3,315 1,603 
1967 5,385 . 3,738 1,709 
1968 5,630 . 3,878 1,876 
1969 6,279 . 4,204 1,975 
1970 6,303 4,157 4,297 2,206 
1971 6,884 4,015 4,806 2,261 
1972 7,142 4,124 5,070 2,438 
1973 7,193 4,607 5,059 2,657 
1974 5,613 5,015 4,230 2,938 
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1975 4,707 5,303 3,656 3,503 
1976 5,797 6,306 4,482 4,123 
1977 7,323 7,032 5,278 4,635 
1978 8,157 7,846 5,752 5,088 
1979 8,967 8,672 6,382 5,564 
1980 9,492 8,902 6,807 5,735 
1981 9,450 9,268 7,332 5,897 
1982 9,836 9,651 7,715 5,960 
1983 10,204 9,620 8,029 6,194 
1984 11,116 9,749 8,618 6,318 
1985 11,309 9,982 8,856 6,553 
1986 11,402 10,421 8,477 6,810 
1987 12,154 10,808 8,387 7,149 
1988 13,485 11,676 9,167 7,574 
1989 14,646 12,380 9,877 8,034 
1990 15,196 13,124 9,762 8,318 
1991 14,991 13,827 9,656 8,722 
1992 16,159 14,231 10,391 9,344 
1993 15,530 14,856 10,296 9,606 
1994 16,468 15,743 10,784 9,947 
1995 17,677 16,315 11,750 10,541 
1996 17,814 16,586 11,879 10,868 
1997 17,885 17,268 12,075 11,312 
1998 18,673 17,914 12,597 11,612 
1999 19,238 18,616 13,123 11,985 
2000 20,275 19,442 13,699 11,816 
2001 20,756 18,496 14,161 11,567 
2002 21,267 18,587 14,375 11,821 
2003 21,427 18,700 14,567 11,735 
2004 22,550 18,716 15,095 11,820 
2005 23,219 19,553 15,607 12,187 
2006 24,075 20,094 16,167 12,527 
2007 25,141 20,983 16,797 12,937 
2008 . . 17,320 13,190 
Note: in Gheary-Khamis 1990$ and international 2005$. Source: Heston, A., Summers, R. & Aten, B., “The 
International Comparison of Prices Program (ICP), Version 6.3” Penn World Tables (Pennsylvania, PA: CICUP, 2009); 
The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database,  
http://www.conference-board.org/economics as consulted 30 Feb 2010. 
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Appendix I: Maps of Cyprus and Malta 
 Ordnance Survey Map of Cyprus, 1915 
This content has been removed for reasons of copyright 
Source:  Hadjilyra, The Cyprus Government Railway (2006) 
Modern Relief Map of Malta 
This content has been removed for reasons of copyright 
Source: http://www.reisenett.no/map_collection/europe/Malta.GIF as consulted 17 Dec 2009 
